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PREFACE 
Writing a Ph.D. thesis was for me an intrinsically social enterprise. During my doctoral 
studies I have met countless extraordinary individuals who have helped me, in various 
ways, put together certain ideas and concepts and, without whom, this body of work 
would not have existed, at least not in its current form.  
The seven chapters collected in this dissertation, titled Historical Epistemology of the 
Concept of Virulence: Molecular, Ecological, and Evolutionary Aspects of Emerging 
Infectious Diseases in the nineteenth and twentieth Century, were drafted and completed 
at different times and places over the past four years. They reflect both the author’s own 
hesitations and certitudes about the topic but also the conviction that a wholly integrated 
approach in the history and philosophy of the life sciences is a desirable goal to be 
pursued.    
Upon arriving in Exeter, after completing a bachelor’s and a master’s degree in 
philosophy at the Université de Montréal, the latter on the topic of biological 
individuality, I decided to concentrate on problems in the philosophy of medicine, 
informed by contemporary philosophy of biology. A natural direction was to explore the 
field of evolutionary medicine and the consequences of different conceptions of the 
evolution of pathogens’ virulence for current medical understanding of health and 
disease. Endeavouring to approach these problems from an integrated history and 
philosophy of science perspective, the work of Georges Canguilhem as well as that of Ian 
Hacking and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger was particularly attractive and useful for developing a 
conceptually rich framework.  
One of the main challenges, however, was to strike the right balance between 
critically examining aspects of the methodological approach developed by Canguilhem, 
while at the same time addressing some of the philosophical issues raised by recent 
advances in biomedicine. In other words, the task I set myself was to combine in-depth 
analyses of an author’s methodology with historic-philosophical work on a concept, that 
is, on a problem.  
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the trajectory of the biomedical concept of virulence from 
1880 until the present. Following the concept across disciplinary boundaries, from a 
longue durée history perspective, it explores how virulence was shaped through two 
distinct, although sometimes overlapping, “styles of reasoning”. Located at the 
intersection of several distinct research domains in biology and medicine, the concept of 
virulence provides, in addition, a window into the complex and changing relations 
between evolutionary biology and the health sciences (broadly construed) over the past 
two centuries. Moving back and forth between field experiments and the laboratory, this 
work examines, through the lens of historical epistemology, the emergence of what I call 
the molecular and the ecological styles, and their respective conceptual practices. It 
focuses on the ways in which these styles operationalize the distinction between virulent 
or avirulent organisms in sometimes opposite sense: Whereas in the molecular (or 
endogenous) style the expression of virulence is explained by properties of internal 
structures of the infectious agent (e.g. polysaccharide capsule, virulence gene, or 
pathogenicity island), the concept of virulence in the ecological (or exogenous) style 
reflects, in contrast, either a lack of adaptation between two species (avirulence 
hypothesis) or the existence of one or more ecological compromises between, say, the 
mode of transmission of a pathogen and its host’s recovery rate (trade-off model). Both 
styles can be said to originate in the medical bacteriology of the late-nineteenth century, 
but while the former grew mostly out of the work of Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch in 
Europe, the latter was primarily shaped by Theobald Smith in the United States. Nearly a 
century later, the introduction of the category of emerging infectious disease within 
public health discourses in the mid-1990s facilitated a rapprochement between the two 
styles that had, so far, remained apart. Employing the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic as 
an example in which to illustrate the trajectory of the molecular and the ecological 
approaches, the diversity of explanatory schemes developed to account for the 
pandemic’s exceptional virulence points toward an unresolved, and yet productive, 
epistemic tension between the two styles, on the one hand, and the intrinsic polarity of 
the concept of virulence itself, on the other. 
Keywords: Disease, evolution, parasitism, bacteriology, ecology, operationalism, styles of 
reasoning.    
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For a biologist, there are two different ways of examining the history of his science. 
Firstly, it may be considered as a succession of ideas, thus involving a search for the 
thread which guided thought along the path to current theories. This is reverse history, so 
to speak, which moves back from the present towards the past. Step by step, the 
forerunner of the current hypothesis is chosen, then the forerunner of the forerunner, 
and so on [...] 
 
The alternative approach to the history of biology involves the attempt to discover 
how objects become accessible to investigation thus permitting new fields of science to 
be developed. It requires analysis of the nature of these objects, and of the attitude of 
the investigators, their methods of observation, and the obstacles raised by their cultural 
background. The importance of a concept is defined operationally in terms of its role in 
directing observation and experience. There is no longer a more or less linear sequence of 
ideas, each produced from its predecessor, but instead a domain which thought strives to 
explore, where it seeks to establish order and attempts to construct a world of abstract 
relationships in harmony not only with observations and techniques, but also with current 
practices, values and interpretations. 
 
 
François Jacob, 1970 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 When the H5N1 influenza strain emerged in Asia in 1997 it triggered massive 
economic loss in poultry industry and caused, overall, less than 600 laboratory-confirmed 
cases in humans (although these were very deadly). A number of factors could explain 
why between-human transmission was relatively ineffective in this case and why the 
avian virus did not go pandemic in human populations. Some scientists think, for 
example, that only H1, H2, and H3 strains can cause influenza pandemic. Others, in turn, 
argue that in order to adapt to humans, the virus’ genes would first have to reasort, that 
is, to reshuffle with those of a human variety, a process known as antigenic shift that 
usually takes place in pigs infected with both humans and avian strains (Enserink 2011). 
Yet, a recent study questions these and similar arguments and assumptions about the 
biology and evolution of influenza viruses. In effect, in late September 2011 the New 
Scientist magazine reported that Ron Fouchier, a Dutch virologist working at the Erasmus 
Medical Center, succesfully altered a strain of influenza (H5N1) rendering it airborne 
transmissible between mammals (ferrets, in this case). Using reverse genetics techniques, 
Fouchier first induced three mutations in two genes that allowed the avian virus to adapt 
(and thus infect) mammals. Using the mutated strain, he then artificially infected more 
ferrets by serial passages. After ten generations, the virus had mutated and had become 
airborne. With this newly acquired set of five genes healthy ferrets could contract the 
disease just by sitting in a cage next to a sick animal. As Fourrier said, these mutations are 
all found in nature but not in the same strain. In other words, the Dutch scientist had 
“given deadly flu virus wings” (Enserink 2011)  
 Historically, influenza viruses adapted to ferrets are also adapted to man, however. 
Because of this rather alarming possibility Fouchier’s experiment, submitted for 
publication to Science, is now undergoing a safety review by the U.S. National Science 
Advisor Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), a National Institute of Health (NIH) advirsory 
panel.1 Fouchier’s work has spurred considerable debates within scientific communities 
and across social networks, both in Europe and in the U.S., regarding the dangers of dual-
                                                                
1
 A similar research article produced by a U.S. team led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, and submitted to Nature, is also under review by the NSABB.  
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use technologies amidst concerns that if relased (intentionally or not) the newly-created 
pathogen could trigger a deadly pandemic in human populations because it could spread 
much more effectively.2 Head of the NSABB, microbiologist Paul Keim, was quoted in a 
short piece in Science saying “he can’t think of another pathogenic organism as scary as 
this one” (Keim, quoted in Enserink 2011, 1193). Others like Fouchier, however, argue 
that this research should yield unexpected benefits from a public health standpoint 
because scientists will then be in a position to investigate the precise mutations that 
make this influenza strain particularly virulent, to develop appropriate counter-measures 
like vaccines, and to monitor future outbreaks more effectively.  
 At the time the present work went off to print, we still ignore what the NSABB’s final 
decision will be.3 In any case, the safety review board lacks the authority to prevent the 
publication of Fouchier’s article. Beyond the problem of dual-use technology and the 
obstacles in developing a “culture of responsability” (NSABB 2011) in the life sciences, 
Fouchier’s experiment reflects a strong reductionist tendency in present-day biomedicine. 
Indeed, his case is not isolated. A similar situation was brought to light in 2005 when a 
team of American scientists re-created the strain of the 1918-19 influenza pandemic, 
which claimed over forty millions of lives worldwide, as to whether their results and 
methods should be published. After a last-minute safety review from the NSABB the 
article was nonetheless published in Science (Tumpey et al. 2005) alongside the technique 
of how to re-create the 1918 strain. A note (added in proofs, as recommended by the 
NSABB) indicates the potential public health benefits this research is likely to create.  
 While researchers (and funding agencies) tend to strongly emphasize the need to 
investigate the smallest genetic or molecular components of viruses and bacteria, other 
                                                                
2
 The concept of dual-use technology refers to the potential for a new technology or object to be employed 
to achieve either well-intended or nefarious goals. Influenza research is the paradigm case of dual-use 
technology. See Rappert (2007); Selgelid (2005); and chapter 7.  
3
 The decision came out on December twentieth 2011 – one day after this work was submitted for 
evaluation. The NSABB recommended censoring part of the methodology to decrease potential risks linked 
to biosecurity. In late January 2012, the scientific community agreed on a 60 days moratorium to study the 
potential impacts, both social and ethical, and from a public health perspective, of the work of Fouchier in 
the Netherlands and Kawaoka in the U.S. Amidst growing global controvery, the scientists who signed the 
declaration agreed not to pursue any work on highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 during this time 
period.  
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factors, including ecological and evolutionary processes, also impact on whether an 
infectious disease will turn pandemic or not, however. In other words, a mosaic of 
interconnected elements often partakes to the overall explanation of why a disease is 
deadly, or what can increase its virulence. The articulation of these elements in explaining 
changes in virulence, in addition to the complex and changing relations between 
evolutionary biology and medicine broadly construed, are central to the present project. 
Questions like “why do some diseases persist while others decline?” Or, “why was the 
1918-19 influenza pandemic exceptionally virulent?” can benefit from evolutionary 
insights. From a longue durée history perspective, this thesis investigates the ways in 
which scientists have articulated evolutionary theory with various explanations of 
pathology from the late nineteenth century until the present, especially in the field of 
(emerging) infectious diseases.  
 
EVOLUTION, HEALTH, AND DISEASE IN A “WORLD ON ALERT” 
 The collaboration of psychiatrist Randolph Nesse and evolutionary biologist George 
Williams during the 1980s culminated, twenty years ago, in the creation of “Darwinian 
medicine” (Williams and Nesse 1991), an offshoot of the adaptationist approach in 
evolutionary biology (Gammelgaard 2000). Two aspects of Darwinian medicine are 
especially noteworthy: firstly, when looked at from an evolutionary standpoint some 
diseases and symptoms (e.g. anxiety, depression, fever, iron depletion) are seen as 
providing a selective advantage to their bearers and are hence not to be treated as 
pathologies at all; secondly, because the environment in which we now live has 
dramatically changed, the nature of this selective advantage is much less obvious. Thus, 
there is often a mismatch between human physiology that evolved during the Pleistocene 
epoch and today’s modern environments. This maladapted state, it is argued, increases 
the risks of diseases such as chronic illnesses, cancers, and so on.   
 While Darwinian medicine was useful in bringing to the attention of physicians some 
of the potential benefits of applying evolutionary thinking to the field, some underlying 
ideas of Darwinian medicine remain controversial (chapter 2). More importantly maybe, 
older connections between evolutionary biology and the health sciences were largely left 
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aside in favour of the development of adaptationist hypotheses about human’s biological 
past. These trends in “evolutionary medicine”, emphasize not so much how humans face 
new diseases because of the way our (normal) physiology has evolved during the Stone 
Age or Pleistocene era, but insist rather on the persistent, dynamic co-evolution of human 
populations and microorganisms, and explore how these relations between man and the 
microbial world shape states of health and disease. Recently, “virulence management” 
theorists have picked up the idea of using evolutionary theory to model the ways in which 
various human activities and social practices impinge on the delicate biological relations 
between microbes, and how this influences human health (Dieckmann et al. 2002).  
This mathematical and ecological approach to virulence was developed almost at the 
same time governments and health authorities like the World Health Organization (WHO) 
recognized the burden of infectious diseases worldwide. Despite the recent steep rise in 
chronic and degenerative illnesses, infectious diseases still represent a global challenge 
for 21st century biomedicine, as they continue to claim 15 million lives annually (Morens, 
Folkers, and Fauci 2004). Scientists have now catalogued the emergence of 335 diseases 
in human populations between 1940 and 2004, the bulk of them emerging in the 1980s 
after rapid increase in drug resistance was detected (Jones et al. 2008). Microbial threats 
to human health are numerous and to make things worse virulent factors, drug resistance 
and receptor specificities vary widely among strains of the same species (Woolhouse and 
Antia 2008).4 The evolutionary potential of microorganisms to undergo pathogenic 
change is, indeed, almost unlimited (Antolin 2009).  
Changes in the environment and human behaviour can also dangerously tip the 
delicate balance established between man and microorganisms. As some have argued, 
humans may well be the “world’s greatest evolutionary force” (Palumbi 2001) behind the 
increased virulence of pathogens as, through new practices, we are creating new routes 
for “viral traffic” (e.g. blood transfusion, organs transplantations); fostering behavioural 
changes facilitating pathogens’ transmission (e.g. air travel, migrations, sexual practices, 
use of drugs, etc.); and introducing “new” pathogens from different parts of the world 
                                                                
4
 As Woolhouse and Antia (2008) pointed out human infections can be acquired from other humans; from 
animal reservoirs (zoonotic diseases); or from the wider environment (sapronose diseases). 
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into immunologically naive populations (Morse 1995). The emerging and re-emerging 
infectious diseases might be indicative of a third “epidemiologic transition” (Barrett et al. 
1998; see Omran 1971). The latent potentiality of microorganisms to cause ill-health, as 
opposed to the view that the microbial world was largely static and fixed, was recently 
interpreted as nothing short of an “epistemological break” in the field of public health 
(Weir and Mykhalovskiy 2010, 62).   
 In the 1990s, the saying that “diseases know no borders” has become a cliché, and 
many recognized that a genuinely new approach to global public health was much needed 
(Roemer 1994, 421, quoted in Kings 2002, 62). In 1996, a WHO committee argued along 
the same lines that “no one is safe from infectious diseases” given that new ones are 
emerging, and previously conquered ones are returning: 
  
Far from being over, the struggle to control infectious diseases has 
become increasingly difficult. Diseases that seemed to be subdued, such 
as tuberculosis and malaria, are fighting back with increased ferocity. 
Some, such as cholera and yellow fever, are striking in regions once 
thought safe from them. Other infections are now so resistant to drugs 
that they are virtually intreatable. In addition, deadly new diseases such 
as Ebola hemorrhagic fever, for which there is no cure or vaccine, are 
emerging in many parts of the world. At the same time, the sinister role 
of hepatistis viruses and other infectious agents in the development of 
many types of cancer is becoming increasingly evident. The result 
amounts to a global crisis: no country is safe from infectious diseases. The 
socio-economic development of many countries is being crippled by the 
burden of these diseases. Much of the progress achieved in recent 
decades towards improving human health is now at risk (1996, 1, quoted 
in Van Loon 2002, 124). 
 
This state of affairs, in the post-9/11 climate of the increased risks of bioterrorist 
attacks, culminated with newly elaborated International Health Regulations in 2005, 
approved by all 194 states members of the WHO. The new regulations emphasise the 
need for national and international collaboration in detecting, monitoring, and 
responding to disease outbreaks and emergence events in “hot spots” anywhere on the 
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planet.5 Seen in this light, the (biomedical) world is truly “on alert” to use Weir and 
Mykhalovskiy’s (2010) expression, and the saying attributed to the U.S. General Surgeon 
that it is time to close the book on infectious diseases (Stewart 1967) resonates today as 
being plainly wrong, and regrettable.6 Yet, Stewart was not the only one to have this 
opinion. A few years before his alleged declaration, British anthropologist and 
epidemiologist Aidan Cockburn7 wrote an influential book on Evolution and Eradication of 
Infectious Diseases (1963) where he made the famous statement that within one hundred 
years most human and animal diseases could be eradicated (Cockburn 1963). To those in 
the 1970s who voiced concerns regarding the possible resurgence of infections, the 
Australian immunologist and Nobel Prize winner Frank Macfarlane Burnet responded that 
although “there may be some wholly unexpected emergence of a new and dangerous 
infectious disease” we should expect “nothing of the sort that has marked the last fifty 
years” (Burnet and White 1972, 263). The eradication of smallpox in 1977 and the control 
of a number of other infectious and vector-borne diseases (e.g. malaria) supported these 
enthusiastic perspectives a step further (Snowden 2008).8  
As analyzed in chapter 4, this view was supported by an influential and widespread 
evolutionary understanding of host, pathogens, and environmental interactions: the 
avirulence hypothesis. Promoted by the American bacteriologist Theobald Smith (1859-
1934) this hypothesis considers that the “tendency of infectious diseases is toward a 
balanced parasitism” (Smith 1906, 1247). As a corollary, “mortality from infectious 
diseases would be greatly reduced through the operation of natural causes” (Smith 1904, 
838). Smith recognized, however, that “how rapidly this evolution [towards avirulence] 
                                                                
5
 Surveillance is defined here as “the systematic ongoing collection, collation and analysis of data for public 
health purposes and the timely dissemination of public health information for assessment and public health 
response as necessary” (in Castillo-Salgado 2010, 95).  
6
 The reference to Stewart’s alleged statement, however, is almost never linked to a primary source, and 
the year of the quote varies from 1967 to 1969. While this quote may be a medical “urban myth” (Spellberg 
2008), confirmation of the prevalence of such perspective during the 1960s and 1970s is given in Fauci 
(2005); Ewald (1994); see chapter 4. 
7
 Cockburn was at the time was Assistant Commissioner of Health in Cincinnati (Ohio). 
8
 In contrast, Thomas McKeown (1912-1988) defended the view that the decline in mortality from infectious 
diseases was well underway before the development of the medical model in the 1930s and 1940s. Socio-
economic conditions (including public health measures and better living standards) therefore, and not 
medical progress alone, should be regarded as the genuine determinants of health.  
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may progress we have no means of knowing” (Smith 1921, 6). The possibility of 
eradicating diseases like smallpox, combined with the belief that evolution was going to 
naturally wipe out infections worked together in entertaining the possibility that 
infectious diseases would soon vanish, as population ecologist Richard Levins once 
pointed out (Levins 1994). But during the early 1980s the avirulence hypothesis and its 
corollary were empirically challenged following the augmentation of drug resistance 
worldwide, the beginnings of the AIDS pandemic, and the increase in emerging infections. 
Both were also theoretically challenged after the development of the trade-off model by 
evolutionary ecologists. Other work in medical bacteriology, bacterial genetics, and more 
recently, pathogenomics, has also contributed to downplay the latent optimism of the 
avirulence model.  
 
THE CONCEPT OF VIRULENCE AND EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
The concept of virulence is central to a number of medical disciplines but is also often 
used by ecologists working on host-pathogens’ relations and by evolutionary biologists. In 
medicine the concept is often invoked to characterize the severity of a disease in a 
patient, or to describe the scale of the damage caused by an epidemic in a population. 
Comparing levels of virulence between epidemics (population), or patients (individual) is 
only possible, however, once clear operational criteria have been established by 
practitioners. In the modern history of infectious disease, starting with the bacteriological 
revolution at the end of the nineteenth century, host death remains one of the most 
widely-used measures to quantify and assess virulence, although other methods have 
since been developed, drawing on new tools (LD50 test)
9 and concepts such as 
pathogenicity islands, virulence genes, or the trade-off model in epidemiology.  
Coming from the latin virulentus (meaning “full of poison”) this old medical term 
conjures-up images of disease and contagion, bringing to the fore cognate concepts such 
as epidemic, infection, pestilence and the like. Public health practitioners frequently 
classify one disease being more virulent than another or as gaining (or losing) virulence 
                                                                
9
 This test refers to the dose of, for instance, a virus that can kill at least 50% of the individuals to which it 
was inoculate. This test was developed in the early 1920s.  
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power over time. The decline in virulence observed in myxoma virus among rabbit 
population in Australia during the 1950s and 1960s is often cited as a case in point 
(Fenner and Radcliffe 1965). In contrast, the level of virulence of the influenza virus 
increased dramatically during the 1918-19 influena, claiming more victims than the Great 
War itself (McNeil 1976). Likewise, biomedical scientists frequently debate existing 
definitions of virulence and related terms like pathogenicity but no general definition has 
yet surfaced across (even within) disciplines concerned with the problem of infectious 
diseases. The concept of virulence is wholly disunified although it was and continues to 
be, of central epistemic importance for the medical sciences broadly construed. Yet, in 
contrast with other key biomedical categories capable of several (sometimes conflicting) 
interpretations like gene, species or organism, the concept of virulence has not received 
much attention from either philosophers or historians of science until recently (but see 
Mendelsohn 1998; 2002).  
 
TWO WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING VIRULENCE 
What is virulence? Virulence does not refer directly to a material or physical 
structure, although it relates to them in multiple ways. Virulence is in fact a process 
which, for many, refers to the capacity of a pathogen to successfully invade a host, 
reproduce, multiply and be transmitted to another host. According to this view, virulence 
is primarily the side-effect of complex, and perhaps incompletely or imperfectly evolved, 
life-cycles. For others, virulence correlates with toxins produced by pathogens or with 
their capacity to neutralize, manipulate, or evade the host’s immunity, thanks to specific 
physiological traits like a polysaccharide capsule or a plasmid. Virulence, as Pastorian 
Émile Roux once said, is “the ability [of a pathogen] to live within an organism and exude 
poisons” (quoted in Nicolle 1939, 65). But if virulence is irreducible to a particular 
material substrate like a DNA sequence or a protein (e.g. HA and NA in influenza A 
viruses), the level of virulence has, in the wake of molecular biology, genomics, and 
synthetic biology, become increasingly associated with gene functions and other intra-
cellular pieces. One of the functions of virulence genes is to facilitate the pathogen’s 
entrance into a host or its transmission to new hosts. It is now common in molecular 
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pathology to link the level of virulence of a pathogen with its mobile elements (e.g. 
transposon, plasmids, and pathogenicity islands).  
Yet immunologists and evolutionary ecologists might want to disagree with the view 
that virulence can be defined one-sidedly, i.e. without taking into account the overall 
reactions of the organism being infected by a pathogen, and the ecological context in 
which infection takes place. For these scientists, virulence refers to the process of 
infection as much as to the infective properties of either the host or the pathogen. 
Moreover, this propensity to cause severe disease is subject to selective forces and can 
therefore evolve in many, and sometimes unpredictable, ways (Ebert 1999). Here lies one 
of the difficulties and the (irreducible) tension in studying the phenomenon of virulence 
across the biomedical sciences: one can either look for determinants of pathogenic power 
analytically, that is from within microorganisms, or synthetically at the level of host-
pathogen interactions in a given ecological environment. Each level of analysis has its own 
ways of characterizing the nature and causes of virulence, leading to the development of 
different measures to prevent or to treat infectious diseases. In effect, while ecological 
approaches contributed to the establishment of national and international programmes 
intended to increase detection and surveillance in emerging infections on a global scale, 
monitoring changes in virulence to prevent pandemics worldwide, molecular approaches 
facilitated the development of biomedical tools, such as vaccines or antibiotics, to fight 
infectious diseases either by reducing their pathogenic power, and/or by enhancing 
individual and group immunity.   
These two ways of investigating the nature of virulence and pathogenicity have both 
a long history which is reflected in the divergent methods and objects of bacteriology, 
immunology, ecology and public health. In order to gain insight into these sometimes 
overlapping methodological and epistemological differences, the bulk of this dissertation 
concentrates on these two broad ways of understanding and explaining the evolution of 
virulence in the biomedical sciences. Building on a variation of this approach, and 
influenced by Ludwig Fleck, historian of science Ton van Helvoort traced the history of the 
modern concept of virus and the establishment of virology as a full-fledged autonomous 
discipline during the first half of the twentieth century (1994; 1993; 1992). According to 
him, the explanation of the nature of bacteriophagy swung back and forth between the 
24 
 
thought that bacteriophages are autonomous viruses, that is, “exogenous agents”, and 
the possibility that bacteriophages are, from an endogenous perspective, “the result of a 
derangement of the physiology of the bacterium” (1994, 98). For van Helvoort, there was 
a “clash” between research styles that took place in the 1950s and 1960s (1992, 572). In 
this thesis, I expand on the work of van Helvoort and I show that his initial distinction 
between exogenous and endogenous can usefully be applied to a number of fields 
outside virology. Adopting the Fleckian terminology of van Helvoort (1993), I label these 
perspectives the exogenous and the endogenous “thought-styles” – or “styles of 
reasoning” – as one focuses on the internal properties of disease-causing organisms 
(endogenous) while the other concentrates on the larger ecological context (exogenous). 
Viewing this distinction between the endogenous and the exogenous from a still broader 
perspective, one can see that it captures, and reformulates, an older distinction in the 
history of medicine between the ontological and the physiological views of disease. 
Whereas the former models diseases as invading agents coming from outside, the latter 
frames illnesses in terms of internal metabolic perturbations (see Temkin 1977). 
In contrast with van Helvoort’s argument, however, my analyses reveal not a direct 
clash between research styles but rather, most of the time at least, a polite ignorance of 
one another, akin to the development of evolutionary biology and physiology in the late 
nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century. I argue that the exogenous and 
endogenous styles have developed along broad parallel lines through several (sometimes 
unrelated) disciplines, and that this divide has crossed the past century. Both styles can 
be said to originate in the medical bacteriology of the late-nineteenth century, but while 
the former grew mostly out of the work of Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch in Europe, the 
latter was primarily shaped by Theobald Smith in the United States. Nearly a century 
later, the introduction of the category of emerging disease within public health discourses 
in the mid-1990s facilitated a rapprochement and a dialogue between the two styles that 
had, so far, remained apart. Employing the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic as an example 
in which to illustrate the evolution of the molecular and the ecological approaches, the 
diversity of explanatory schemes developed to account for the pandemic’s exceptional 
virulence points toward an unresolved, and yet productive, epistemic tension between 
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the two styles, on the one hand, and the intrinsic polarity of the concept of virulence 
itself, on the other. 
The evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr has long suggested that functional and 
evolutionary approaches in biology lack unification (Mayr 1961). Another significant 
divide is between ecological and functional approaches. In this dissertation, I will show 
that recent work on the nature and mechanism of infection is starting to bridge these 
gaps between functional biology, ecology, and evolutionary biology. For example, in the 
case of the 1918 pandemic, both molecular and ecological approaches are thoroughly 
engaged in an evolutionary understanding of the pandemic, although each of them picks 
out a different aspect of what a Darwinian (or evolutionary) explanation consists of. 
Whereas ecological approaches focus on selective pressures (e.g. population density) 
acting on the hosts and the pathogen, molecular pathologists trace the evolutionary 
pathway of the influenza virus from animal(s) to man. In other words, the former analyses 
one of the main mechanisms of evolution – natural selection – while the latter describes 
the path of evolution – phylogeny –, to use Ruse’s vocabulary (1992). Both aspects – that 
all livings things (including viruses and bacteria), through common descent, can be 
represented on a larger Tree of life diagram (increasingly becoming network-like), and 
that natural selection provides an explanation for those changes – are two of the most 
fundamental claims of the theory of evolution by natural selection, as developed by 
Charles Darwin in On the Origin of Species (1859). 
 
ON THE CATEGORY OF STYLE IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 
Science is not understood (anymore) as a single, unified enterprise seeking to unveil 
the secrets of Nature through the steady progressive discovery of universal laws. Since 
twenty years, historians and philosophers have described how the different branches of 
the sciences are plural and genuinely disunified in both their epistemology and 
methodology (Galison and Stump 1996; Dupré 1993). In an attempt to capture significant 
aspects of how scientists investigate and carve out objects in the natural world, the 
historian of science Alistair Crombie has described the emergence of six styles of 
“scientific reasoning” in the history of Western science (1994). These styles are 
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“postulation”; “experimental”; “modeling”; “taxonomy”; “probabilistic and statistical 
analysis”; and “historical derivation” (Crombie, 1994). It is, however, the philosopher of 
science Ian Hacking (1992) who most clearly articulated the notion of “styles of 
reasoning” as being self-vindicating, autonomous scientific methods. Combining the 
experimental and probabilistic styles as defined by Crombie, Hacking introduced and 
investigated the “laboratory style” (Hacking 1992b).10  
A rapid survey of the history and philosophy of science of the past fifty years 
indicates that there are many kindred notions available to characterize particular ways of 
doing and thinking about science. I do not aim to be exhaustive here but these include 
the concepts of “paradigm” (Kuhn 1962); “thought-style” (Fleck 1939); “research 
traditions” (Laudan 1988); “epistemic styles” (Maienschein 1991); “styles of scientific 
reasoning” (Hacking 1992); “styles of scientific thinking” (Crombie 1994); “scenes of 
inquiry” (Jardine 2000); “ways of knowing” (Pickstone 2004); as well as a number of other 
accounts (Elwick 2007; Harwood 1987). In his studies on the history of virology, Van 
Helvoort uses Ludwick Fleck’s concepts of “thought-style” and “thought collective” to 
characterize these two perspectives, and in this project I will use the term “styles of 
reasoning” as defined by Hacking, and Fleck’s “thought-styles” interchangeably because 
there are conceptually very close (and Hacking himself connects them explicitly in his 
1992). The last issue of the journal History of Science is dedicated to the concept of Ways 
of Knowing and Ways of Working introduced by John Pickstone a decade ago. The 
contributors to this issue, however critical at times, make clear that the concept of styles 
or its cognates continue to have currency among historians and philosophers of science 
and medicine. But why continuing to talk about styles?  
Firstly, styles are important analytic tools for historians and philosophers of science 
because they permit to study how concepts develop and grow within them, to use a 
biologic metaphor. Within styles, concepts can take on different and sometimes opposite, 
forms and meanings. As I want to argue, there was and continues to be, a (productive) 
tension between two broad styles of thinking about virulence, and this tension results 
from the intrinsic polarity of concepts expressed within styles. As historian of biology Jane 
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 For a critical review of Hacking’s use of style see Kusch (2010). 
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Maienschein (1991) noted, there may be different schools or approaches within one style, 
which is, itself, embedded into distinct scientific traditions. Styles, also, are not 
necessarily delineated by national or disciplinary boundaries although they sometimes 
are. But in order to exist ontologically, styles do not have to be adopted by all scientists 
working on a similar problem, or at the same time.  
In addition, styles are epistemic as they possess explanatory power to the extent that 
they frame what counts as evidence, relevant questions to ask, truth-value, and sound 
explanation in distinct research and/or cultural contexts (Maienschein 1991; for a 
contrasting view see Harwood 1989). In effect, alongside the development of distinct, 
individual styles of reasoning one finds the emergence of new standards for 
measurements, objectivity, proof, and so on (Hacking 1992). Although styles are flexible 
they are not loose or relativist categories; they admit rules, systems of norms, 
stabilization techniques, and methods of justification. As they become stabilised over 
time, entrenched within scientific activities, the very existence of styles of reasoning and 
their historical development become taken for granted. Styles, with time, become 
invisible.  
Another important aspect of styles for historians and philosophers is that they 
illustrate how distinct scientific methods can be combined and survive signigicant changes 
in science. In other words, several styles can coexist in space at a given time. As historian 
and philosopher of biology Jean Gayon pointed out, the styles of reasoning outlined by 
Hacking and Crombie “did not succeed each other; they did not replace one another […]; 
some of them are extremely ancient, others are more recent, but they all have the 
remarkable property of having survived through time” (1999, 241). The persistence and 
dynamics of scientific styles over long periods of time characterizes the endogenous and 
exogenous styles introduced above. In effect, these methods of inquiry into the nature 
and causes of virulence have not superseded one another but alternated and developed 
in parallel in a relative isolation, although they sometimes overlapped, for instance with 
the construction of the category of emerging disease in the mid 1990s (chapter 6). 
Moreover, styles are appropriate to study science on long periods of time. As Hacking 
stressed, “styles of scientific thinking are not static. They persist in the longue durée, not 
because they remain immobile through centuries, like the Alps, but because they evolve, 
28 
 
because they react to new problems and criticisms, both internal and from outside” 
(Hacking 2005/2006, quoted in Kusch 2010, 164). Focussing on longer historical 
developments, in turn, allows for a broader view of concepts and their evolutions within 
distinct epistemic styles.  
The French historian Fernand Braudel (1902-1985), one of the directors of the leading 
journal Les Annales d’histoire économique et sociale in the 1940s, introduced the concept 
of long durée history in The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of 
Philip II (1949). In his book, Braudel argued that there are distinct temporalilties at work 
in history. In addition to the short-term history (or as we would say today, “micro-
history”), one also finds intermediate and long-term historical trends. The merit of 
looking at history (of science) over periods of time longer than that of individuals or 
institutions is to make visible trends – or styles – that would otherwise remain unseen. 
One of the aims of the present project is to assess the wider significance of some 
scientific episodes (e.g. 1918 influenza pandemic) when placed in longue durée history 
perspective. The historian and biologist Michel Morange was the first to apply the 
concept of longue durée to the history of science (1994). Modulating the historical 
duration allowed him to question the philosophical significance of the so-called 
“molecular revolution” in biology in the 1960s. Some forty years before, Mirko Grmek, 
who supported Morange during his enterance into the field of the history and philosophy 
of biology and who was his “master” (Morange 2001), had applied the concept of longue 
durée to pathology and disease in his famous article on “pathocenosis” (1969), and later 
to the problem of the emergence of AIDS (1989) and other emerging diseases (1993; 
1995). As Grmek was himself a pupil of Braudel there is a straightforward genealogy 
running from Braudel (history) through Grmek (history of medicine) and to Morange 
(history of biology).  
Following this opened-path, a retour to longue durée history – without the grand 
narrative of the past – was recently advocated by a number of historians of biology 
(Rheinberger 2010b; Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 2007, 7) and medicine (Jackson 2011). 
Philosophers of science, however, are sometimes sketpcical to go down this road (Kusch 
2010; 2011). One of the worries is that the concept of style becomes empty or thin once it 
is stretched over decades, or centuries. Another concern is to run the risk of losing sight 
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of the science as it happened in local contexts, by glossing over significant differences. My 
aim, however, is not to pitch “microstudies” against “big pictures” (de Chadarevian 2009) 
against each other. We will see that dividing up the history of science according to 
different temporalities, that is, moving between focussed cases-studies and longer views, 
can be done without falling back into the grand narrative of “total history” or leaving out 
important details. 
Science is a highly diversified set of activities and consequently, there is a variety of 
scientific practices (Rouse 2002) including modelling, abstracting, representing, and so on. 
In this project I am mostly interested in scientific practices to the extent that they bear on 
the formation of concepts in the biomedical sciences. The formation and rectification of 
concepts is not (just) an intellectual task independent of scientific practices on the one 
hand; and conversely, concepts can be used as epistemic tools in various experimental 
and practical contexts, on the other. As Georges Canguilhem pointed out “it is at the level 
of questions, of methods” but especially, “of concepts”, that “scientific activity appears as 
such” (2005, 204 [1968]; emphasis mine). Analysing the coming into being of different 
styles allows for a deeper understanding of science as a practice (Rabinow 1994). 
Likewise, Maienschein also stressed, “science is not just thinking or just theorizing. It also 
involves doing” (1991, 410). Historians and sociologists of biomedicine Peter Keating and 
Alberto Cambrosio’s concept of a “sytle of practice” (2007) is precisely intended to 
capture the practical dimension of the sciences. Indeed, the development of styles does 
not only involve mental but also material and practical operations. In this sense, talking 
about styles should help to capture a crucial part of what scientific activity is about: the 
aspect of “doing”.  
It may seem, however, that the terms “reasoning” and “thinking” are closely bound 
with writing and with the mind and they do not “sufficiently invoke the manipulative 
hand and the attentive eye”, as Hacking put it (1992, 4). Hacking himself recognized that 
the expression “styles of reasoning” fails to fully capture the practical aspects of science, 
or science as a practice. But perphaps we should not separate too sharply the theoretical 
and the practical aspects of science, as both usually intimately coevolve. As Joseph Rouse 
emphasized, such would be misunderstanding the very concept of scientific practice itself 
(2002, 162). I suggest it is more accurate to describe theorizing and representing as being 
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different forms of scientific practices. Bruno Latour has long urged historians, 
philosophers and sociologists to look at “science in action” in order to grasp the different 
(social, economic, political) dynamics involved in the making of science and the 
construction of scientific facts (Latour 1987). Reworking Latour’s suggestion, I want to 
argue that by looking at “concepts in action” one can achieve a clearer view on the 
relations between concepts and the set of scientific practices – or styles – within which 
they are embedded. In this sense, and despite Hacking’s warning, I will talk about styles of 
reasoning (and thought-styles) in practice.  
The coexistence of several scientific styles should call into question the idea of a 
unified picture of the sciences. While the goal of unifying different sciences through 
theory reduction has now largely been abandoned, philosophers have nevertheless found 
new ways of talking about unification, although by other means. In contrast with today’s 
strong emphasis by philosophers on integration in science, however, my claim is that this 
divide between two distinct styles of practice is productive, leading to the development 
of new avenues, methods, questions, and objects of scientific research. Or, as Hacking put 
it, “styles […] open up new territory as they go” (Hacking 1992, 8). Inquiring into the 
formation of biomedical concepts provides a window into how disciplines, fields of 
research, and more generally scientific practices (such as concept formation) are shaped, 
and how the objects of study within these styles – the ontology –change and evolve over 
time. Moreover, identifying styles of reasoning and the concepts they harbour permits to 
establish links between separate fields that would otherwise remain largely invisible to 
historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science. Note, however, that I am not 
suggesting an evolutionary scenario in which one of these two approaches will eventually 
turn out to be the correct one, after competing with rivals. The claim is that it is in virtue 
of the concept of virulence itself, embedded within different styles of practices that we 
have a polarized understanding of the nature of virulence across the sciences nowadays. 
As the concept of virulence lends itself to different, sometimes incompatible meaning(s) 
this, in turn, facilitates and maintains this productive tension.  
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TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIFE SCIENCES 
 Currently there is a strong disciplinary distinction between the philosophy of biology 
and the philosophy of medicine, on the one hand, and between these two and the history 
of science and medicine, on the other. One of the claims I wish to illustrate with the 
problem of virulence is that specialization in philosophy of science has gone far enough, 
perhaps even too far. It is becoming obvious that the analysis of a number of fields 
requires one to combine resources and skills from philosophy of medicine and biology. 
For instance, to understand and assess the claims of Darwinian medicine one needs to 
draw on both the concepts of health and disease in the philosophy of medicine and on 
the theory of evolution. Similarly, the concept of virulence is located at the crossroad of 
numerous scientific fields, and to study it one has to take many very different 
perspectives into account. In the end, to analyse the relations between evolutionary 
thinking and the health sciences in a way that is satisfying both from a philosophical and 
an historical point of view, one has to challenge the disciplinary boundaries set up by 
philosophers of biology and philosophers of medicine themselves in the past forty years.  
Making connections between these groups requires us to be mutually aware of what 
their varying perspectives on medicine are, however. The approaches of philosophers of 
biology and of philosophers of medicine to the medical sciences remain somewhat 
independent and distinct. While philosophers of biology attend to the research side and 
attempt to study it in terms of their specific paradigm concepts of causation, mechanism 
and function, for instance, applying these as the framework for research on the human 
organism, philosophers of medicine are acutely aware that medicine is not strictly a 
biological science, but is situated in clinical practices. Interactions between the clinical 
side of medicine and research impact on the relevance, operation, and meaning of the 
concepts mentioned above. Disease is conceptualized in various distinct practices in the 
clinic, in labs, statistics and public health – and this multiplicity seems to resist unified 
causal models. The human organism, in turn, is perceived through a complicated prism of 
normal and pathological states, illness and therapy, fact and value, which determines how 
medical research selects what is of interest, what counts as explanatory for its goals, what 
is relevant for its practice and so on (Méthot et al. 2010, 294).  
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 The present work draws on both Anglo-American and continental resources in the 
history and philosophy of science, and in particular on the work of Canguilhem, 
Rheinberger, and Hacking in historical epistemology. It attempts to make sense, both 
philosophically and historically, of the nature of the relationship between medicine and 
the health sciences, with a particular focus on the concept of virulence. Moving back and 
forth between field experiments, the laboratory, and the clinic, this project explores how 
the concept was shaped through two distinct, although sometimes overlapping, styles of 
practices, namely the exogenous and the endogenous styles. 
 
THE EXOGENOUS AND THE ENDOGENOUS STYLES IN PRACTICE  
The persistence of scientific styles is a feature that can be observed regarding the 
two styles of reasoning about virulence I outlined above. Like Hacking’s styles of 
reasoning these two “methods” of inquiry into the nature and causes of virulence have 
alternated and even, sometimes, overlapped. In a chapter on his book Les virus published 
in 1891 “The evolution of ideas on nature and mechanism of virulence”, French virologist 
Saturnin Arloing pointed out that virulence was for centuries characterized in terms of 
“fermentation” that is, as chemical reactions (Pasteur), but it was also, and at the same 
time, conceptualized as being the result of parasitism of one species by another (Raspail). 
According to the first model, virulence is a physicochemical reaction involving the action 
of enzymes in the organism, whilst on the other virulence is the outcome of a parasitic 
relation between a host and a pathogen. In the former, virulence originates from within, 
so to speak, whereas in the latter it results from an invading agent coming from the 
outside. These two approaches are surely very old, as Arloing observed, tracing their 
genealogies back into the Middle Ages.  
Discussing the details of Arloing’s argument further would require digressing for too 
long. My claim, here, is that the two ways of “reasoning” about virulence (i.e. “chemical” 
and “parasitic”) as outlined by Arloing are still doing some important work today, 
although framed slightly differently. In effect, the two approaches Arloing outlined are 
roughly equivalent to functional and ecological explanations of virulence today, to the 
difference that both styles now draw on evolutionary biology. The distinctiveness of each 
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styles comes out particularly clearly when comparing how virulence is defined in medical 
bacteriology and molecular biology (e.g. virulence factors, pathogenicity islands, virulence 
genes, etc.) and how it is conceptualized by evolutionary ecologists (trade-offs between 
transmission, host immunity, and so on). We can trace the legacy of the divide between 
the exogenous and endogenous styles from the late nineteenth century and across most 
of the twentieth century, following two broad, parallel, and sometimes intersecting lines 
of research.  
The exogenous style (chapter 4) was shaped at the turn of the twentieth century by 
the work of bacteriologist Theobald Smith in the United States. It grew into a full-blown 
“ecological vision” of infectious diseases (Anderson 2004) a few decades later with the 
work of Frank Macfarlane Burnet, Frank Fenner, René Dubos, and to some extent Joshua 
Leberberg. To explain why parasites harm their host, scientists within this style draw on 
the concept of “evolving parasitism” and on the “law of declining virulence”, as defined 
by Smith. This law predicts that given enough time, any host and parasite relationship will 
evolve into a state of commensalism, where no harm is felt on either side. Disease thus 
indicates an incomplete or unsuccessful biological adaptation. Although it did not trigger 
a major discontinuity, the most important theoretical change in this tradition was the 
passage from the avirulence model to the mathematical and epidemiological model of 
the trade-off in the late 1970s. According to this other model there is a positive coupling 
between virulence and transmission such that virulence can either increase, decrease or 
become stabilized at an intermediate level over time. Evolution towards harmlessness, 
therefore, is not a necessary outcome of host and pathogens relations. Despite this 
change in understanding the evolution of virulence there is some continuity between the 
avirulence and the trade-off model as they both appeal to the concept of “balance” or 
“stable equilibrium” in a biological system that is established by natural selection. While 
the concepts of virulence genes and pathogenicity islands were quickly adopted by 
molecular geneticists they were, and continue to be, regarded with suspicion by 
evolutionary ecologists. 
The second route through which virulence was studied runs parallel to the first in 
many respects (chapter 5). The endogenous approach, seeking determinants of virulence, 
grew mostly out of medical bacteriology, and particularly the work of Pasteur and Koch in 
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Europe. The French microbiologist Charles Nicolle was one of the first to suggest the 
possibility of a “material support” for virulence (1939, 66). It was, however, the English 
bacteriologist Frederick Griffith who pursued the virulence-based programme of Pasteur 
during the 1920s-1930s. Griffith’s puzzling results in 1928 led, a decade later, Oswald 
Avery and his team to establish that the “transforming principle”, as named by Griffith 
(who was able to return avirulent pneumoccocci to a virulent form, and vice-versa), was 
not a protein but DNA. From then on, the history of virulence became firmly intertwined 
with the history of heredity. A few years later, the discovery of plasmids (i.e. mobile 
genetic elements) by Joshua Lederberg (1952) opened up the door to the development of 
bacterial genetics, which facilitated a molecular understanding of virulence and 
pathogenicity. For instance, in the 1970s, microbiologist Stanley Falkow studied how 
plasmids and resistance factors can be hereditarily transmitted and can contribute to the 
pathogenicity of enteric organisms. His book Infectious Multiple Drug Resistance (1975) 
was one of the first contributions to the problem of antibiotic resistance from a molecular 
point of view. It is also Falkow who articulated “Koch’s molecular postulates” and applied 
them to “microbial pathogenicity” (Falkow 1988). Working through the lens of the 
endogenous style, scientists progressively developed a number of powerful techniques to 
study virulence at the molecular, genetic, and more recently genomics, levels. One of the 
latest concepts within the functional approach of virulence is the concept of 
“pathogenicity islands”, a region of virulence-associated genes in an organism’s genome 
(Hacker et al. 1990; Hacker and Kaper 1999). It was hope that this concept would 
unambiguously demarcate virulent from avirulent organisms.  
To summarize, this project aims at shedding new light on the relations between 
evolutionary thinking and medicine by looking at the natural histories of infectious 
diseases in the nineteenth and twentieth century especially. It also focuses on the ways in 
which evolutionary theory provides new insights into changes in the level of virulence and 
antibiotic resistance, in as much as they both contribute to the larger phenomenon of 
emerging diseases. Evolutionary processes can select for high virulence leading 
potentially to devastating pandemics, and for resistance genes among bacterial 
populations in hospital contexts, making common diseases more difficult to treat and 
facilitating the spread of nosocomial (hospital-acquired) diseases. These selective 
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processes are conducive of the upbringing of emerging infectious diseases on a global 
scale. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
Chapter 1 provides an analysis of a philosophical approach that is usually called 
“historical epistemology”. Building on a new interpretation of Georges Canguilhem’s 
history of concepts, I argue that taking concepts as units of analysis is compatible with a 
focus on scientific practices and experimental systems. In addition, this chapter explores 
the legacy of historical epistemology in the late twentieth century and sets the stage for 
the analysis of the concept of virulence in chapter 3, 4, and 5.  
In Chapter 2, I analyse meaningful aspects of the historical and contemporary 
relations between evolutionary biology and medicine. After surveying some significant 
connections between Darwin’s theory of evolution, eugenics, and medicine in the late 
nineenth and early twentieth century, I distinguish between Darwinian medicine and 
evolutionary medicine as follows: while the former attempts to understand health and 
disease in relation to human’s distant biological past, the latter uses evolutionary theory 
as a complementary explanatory tool, enabling scientists to shed light on medical 
problems such as the spread of antibiotic resistance and the evolution of virulence in 
emerging infectious diseases.  
Chapter 3 is more epistemological. It connects the idea that epistemically productive 
concepts are often those whose meaning remains “in flux” with a pragmatic approach of 
operationalism.  It then examines the concept of virulence itself from the point of view of 
an operational analysis of concepts. Reviewing the definitions of virulence it is argued 
that an operational approach is well suited to explain the disunification and the state of 
“flux” of the concept across the life sciences. According to the perspective defended here, 
our understanding of virulence throughout most of the twentieth century was not the 
result of more fine-grained definitions but is rather the consequence of the concept being 
operationalized in distinct epistemic contexts.  
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Chapter 4 follows the elaboration of the “law of declining virulence and advancing 
parasitism” by Theobald Smith in the U.S. whose work on disease transmission provided 
the foundation for a new style of reasoning to account for the evolution and decline of 
infectious diseases: the exogenous or ecological style. After a close examination of the 
work of Smith, this chapter traces the legacy of this model across the field-lab border 
until its downfall during the late 1970s, concluding with its mathematical refutation by 
the epidemiological model of the trade-off. This chapter also links the avirulence 
hypothesis to the widely spread optimism that was then characteristic of modern 
medicine.  
Chapter 5 analyses the conceptual developments of medical understanding of 
virulence in molecular biology, genetics and genomics from the perspective of an 
endogenous style of reasoning. Focussing on the material determinants of virulence, it 
shows how, within this tradition, virulence was intimately associated with problems of 
heredity and the structural basis of disease transmission. This other style of reasoning 
operationalized the concept of virulence in terms of the internal constituents of 
microorganisms, not in terms of their degree of adaptation to a particular environment.  
Chapter 6 investigates how the two styles previously described started to come 
together following the introduction of the concept of emerging disease within public 
health discourses in the mid-1990s. However, an examination of the current molecular, 
ecological, and evolutionary explanations of the exceptional virulence that characterises 
the emerging 1918-19 influenza pandemic reveals the enduring polarization between the 
two epistemic styles. Whereas, ecologists and epidemiologists offer an account of the 
steep increase of virulence based on environmental factors, molecular pathologists 
investigate the whole genome of the influenza virus in order to locate the genes 
potentially responsible for its exceptional virulence. Both, however, draw on the theory of 
evolution.  
Chapter 7, finally, explores some of the ethical issues related to the reconstruction of 
the 1918-19 influenza virus and other pathogenic organisms and how these call for a new 
and broader definition of the concept of emerging disease. 
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CHAPTER 1: FROM CONCEPTS TO EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEMS: TRENDS IN 
HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding programmatic statements there seems to be no emerging 
consensus among scholars as to whether the relation between philosophy and history of 
science is like a marriage of convenience (Giere 1973) or a more intimate kind of 
relationship (Burian 1977; see Schickore 2011).11  As a consequence, the relations 
between both partners continue to be heated, debated, and even at times altogether 
contested (Hacking 1992, 1). The H and the P in “HPS” – standing for “history and 
philosophy of science” – remain in a state of “essential tension”, to use Thomas Kuhn’s 
expression (1977a), and convey the sense of a hybrid discipline (Chang 1999).12 That 
philosophical analysis – especially when concerned with science but not only – has 
traditionally sought to attain general knowledge (or principles) whereas history’s focus is 
on particular, and usually unique spatio-temporally located events, exacerbates the 
perceived rift between the aims and methods of history and philosophy of science further 
(Pinnick and Gale 2000). Based on citation analyses, a recent article even argued that 
there is no such thing as a field of history and philosophy of science per se and that HPS is 
at best a “sub-field of philosophy” itself (Wray 2010).  
This diagnostic regarding the non-existence of a genuine field of HPS contains a 
kernel of truth but it applies only in very specific contexts either wholly dominated by a-
historical analytic philosophy, or by wilfully inimical history scholars, allergic to 
philosophical reflection on the sciences – both entirely ignoring that any philosophical 
problem has a history and conversely, that the history of every branch of science has once 
relied, at one point or another, on philosophical conceptions and ideas. Wray’s diagnostic 
is plainly estranged to a number of other intellectual traditions, in particular in France but 
also in Germany and elsewhere. In fact, there is a wide range of options available for who 
                                                                
11
 For instance, Lakatos’ saying that the “history of science without philosophy is blind; philosophy of 
science without history of science is empty” (Lakatos 1970, 135). 
 
12
 For Kuhn, however, the history and philosophy of science should remain separate domains (1977, 20). 
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wants to do HPS (and how) and such plurality in methods, styles, and approaches should 
be preserved and praised, not lamented on and rejected (Fagot-Largeault 2009).  
The tension between generality and particularity just mentioned bears witness to the 
fact that philosophy and history have sometimes distinct (but not necessarily 
irreconcilable) epistemic goals. Even though, both the “historical” and the “practical” 
turns followed by many students of science in the late 1970s and early 1980s dramatically 
shifted the focus from finding general (even timeless) rules for knowledge production and 
discovery to the role of laboratory notes, material objects, scientific instruments and 
other apparatuses, themselves embedded at several levels of organization (national, 
international) within scientific research and practices (Brenner and Gayon 2009; 
Rheinberger 2000).13 Those shifts brought out the tension between the locality of 
scientific knowledge (both historically and spatially), on the one hand, and the problem of 
the scope of its validity (i.e. knowledge is said to be universal), on the other. Scientific 
knowledge, supposedly valid everywhere, thus became seen as the result of situated (or 
local) practices and research programmes, generated in particular sites (e.g. laboratories), 
and not established as knowledge because in conformity with the natural world (Strasser 
2006). As a result of those turns, the function(s) of experiments, for example, ceased to 
be regarded as mere hypotheses-testers for general, near-universal truth-claims. 
Experiments were reconceptualized as performative devices shaping scientific knowledge 
in various and rather unpredictable ways in local contexts (Hacking 1988, Rheinberger 
1997). We could say that progressively, doing became seen as a legitimate way of 
knowing, as Hacking (1983) demonstrated.14 The history of experimental practices 
opened-up new avenues to inquire into how experiments begin and end (Galison 1987), 
                                                                
13
 While the “historical turn” usually refers to the fact that philosophers of science began to use the history 
of science to thicken their analysis, the “practical turn” refers to a renewed emphasis on scientific practices, 
as opposed to theories or concepts. In both cases Hacking’s Representing and Intervening (1983) and Shapin 
and Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air Pump (1985) are some of the earliest and most salient works that 
testify to these shifts. A visible sign of the shift from theory to practice in the history and philosophy of 
science is the new society for a Philosophy of Science in Practice. 
 
14
 Knowking by doing is perhaps best exemplified by model organisms. Model organisms are both models 
(i.e. representations) of nature and modelled (i.e. shaped) according to specific research questions 
formulated by a scientific community (Ankeny and Leonelli 2011). 
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and more generally to examine what the specific status of different kinds of scientific 
practices within the whole of science, is (Rouse 2002).  
The focus on a practice-oriented view of science prompted another – and perhaps 
until recently less perceptible– change in the historiography of science as well. Following 
the practical turn indicated above, the relevant time frame for historical analysis shifted 
accordingly, fostering rapid developments of micro (or local) histories of science intended 
to replace larger historical narratives that then prevailed (Rheinberger 2010b). Micro-
histories focus on experiments, model organisms, instrumentations, and so on, and are 
usually contained within a short space and time framework. Along the lines of 
ethnography as initiated by Latour and Woolgar (1979), historians and social scientists 
began to closely examine a number of localized scientific practices (e.g. so-called 
“laboratory studies”), inquiring into the nature of “experimental systems” and 
“biomedical plateforms”, rather than into scientific concepts as such, and their histories. 
Micro-history is the typical model of most history of science and medicine nowadays. As 
will be examined below, this shift in timescale underpins a larger one in terms of what the 
relevant unit of analysis in the history of science is.  
A little more than a decade after this change of direction, philosophers and historians 
of science (re)discovered a new terrain to discuss the nature of the relations between the 
history and philosophy of science further with the help of a rather old label: “historical 
epistemology”. From the mid-1990s onwards historical epistemology began to be 
frequently employed as a guiding concept by a small but growing number of historians 
and philosophers of science working at the then newly-opened Max Planck Institute for 
the History of Science in Berlin – headed by Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Lorraine Daston and 
Jurgen Renn – as well as by philosophers of science whose names are usually more 
associated with Anglo-American philosophical traditions (e.g. Hacking 2002; 1992; 
Davidson 2001).15 International conferences focussing on this topic brought together 
                                                                
15
 Hacking organized a week-long conference on historical epistemology in 1993. Nowadays, he prefers to 
use the label “historical meta-epistemology”, a branch of a wider “historical ontology” (a concept he 
borrowed from Foucault) to characterize his own project (Hacking 2002). Although it would be going too far 
to claim that analytic philosophers in general are engaging with historical epistemology, see the special 
issue by Sturm and Feest in Erkentnnis (2011) where analytically-trained philosophers of science delve into 
the concept of historical epistemology.  
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scholars in the history and philosophy of science to debate the use (and misuse) of the 
concept of historical epistemology and its future applications.16 During the last fifteen 
years the concept of historical epistemology not only (re)gained currency in philosophical 
and historical circles but suggested the possibility of bringing together the disconnected 
aims of history and philosophy into a more unified framework.17 In this process of 
rethinking the relation between the history and the philosophy of science the emphasis 
placed on the experimental and practical side of science, as opposed to its conceptual 
dimension alone, also seems to indicate a marked difference between newer and older 
programmes in historical epistemology. The historian and philosopher of science Georges 
Canguilhem (1904-1995), whose views will be introduced and discussed below, is usually 
associated with an early tradition in historical epistemology, or “conceptual history” 
(Gayon 2009)  where concepts unfold according to their own internal dynamic of change 
and rectification.  
While it might appear that there is a natural convergence between Canguilhem’s 
“concepts” and what Hans-Jörg Rheinberger – one of the latest heirs of historical 
epistemology – has called “epistemic things”, the latter puts more emphasis on 
experimental system than on concepts, however. The most fundamental notion in 
Rheinberger’s epistemology, indeed, is not concepts but “experimental systems” within 
which “epistemic things” and “technical objects” interact in an unpredictable way, 
generating novelties and “allowing cognitive spatiotemporal singularities to emerge” 
(Rheinberger 2000, 285; 1997). Experimental systems are precisely, in Rheinberger’s 
words, “the smallest integral working units of research” (1997, 28). In fact, Rheinberger’s 
interest lies in the development of an epistemology of experimentation within a larger 
                                                                
16
 In addition to Hacking’s conference in Toronto in 1993, one of the largest conferences on historical 
epistemology was organized at the MPI in July 2008 by Thomas Sturm and Uljana Feest. Later the same 
year, a second conference was organized at Columbia University. In December 2009, the University of 
Leuven in Belgium also held a conference on historical epistemology. Another conference on the theme of 
historical epistemology, and more precisely titled From Bachelard and Canguilhem to Today’s History of 
Science, was organized in December 2010 and was also hosted by the MPI.  
 
17
 Importantly, the way the term “epistemology” is employed by most of these thinkers (and here) does not 
correspond to the philosophical discipline understood as a branch of philosophy concerned with the study 
of knowledge and justified beliefs. In contrast, the term “epistemology” here refers to the ways in which 
knowledge production is historically possible and changes over time and on the relations between abstract 
scientific concepts and concrete material equipment in which these concepts emerge (see Rheinberger 
2010a, 2).  
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practice-oriented history and philosophy of science. Looking at “the power of material 
objects” driving scientific research, not only in relation to concepts (or what Canguilhem 
called “scientific objects”) or ideas, but in relation to the entire and larger experimental 
systems in which those objects or concepts are embedded and shaped (Rheinberger 
2005; 1997), this new approach stands uneasily with the previous perspective of historical 
epistemology. The tension I am trying to capture and render here stems, on the one 
hand, from the choice of a different unit of analysis for the history of science (i.e. 
concepts versus systems), and from the way in which this choice itself leads to adopting a 
wholly different epistemological approach to science and scientific change (concept-
based versus practice-based), on the other.  
Drawing on scholars from various philosophic horizons, including Bruno Latour, 
Michel Serres, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, Rheinberger’s work has been (and 
continues to be) strongly influential beyond the borders of the history and philosophy of 
science, having set a firm foot-hold in several other disciplines, including anthropology, 
the social studies of science, and literary studies (Lenoir 2010). Whereas Rheinberger 
quickly rallied a great number of academics to his practice-oriented view of science, 
Canguilhem’s views on the history of science, however, were increasingly charged with 
inadequacies from historians, sociologists and philosophers of science.18 This situation is 
puzzling for at least two reasons: firstly, on many occasions, Rheinberger draws 
extensively on the work of Canguilhem, in particular his work on concepts. 19 This suggests 
that by going below the surface resemblances one can identify some underlying common 
ground, or a shared motivation, between the two, as well as between older and newer 
programmes in historical epistemology; and secondly, while his epistemological approach 
to the history of the life sciences was strongly criticized and eventually rejected (e.g. 
Hodge 2000), Canguilhem’s earlier analyses of the concept of the normal and the 
                                                                
18
 Hodge (2000); Zibakalam (1996); Bowker and Latour (1987). 
19
 Rheinberger has often analysed Canguilhem’s tripartite distinction between natural, scientific and 
historical objects (2010b; 2005c). His observations on Canguilhem’s concepts somewhat echoes his own 
notion of “epistemic things” which he defines as things that “present themselves in an “irreducible 
vagueness”, embodying what “one does not yet know” (1997, 28). For instance, Canguilhem once suggested 
that the object of the historian of science and the object of the sciences are not the same as the former are 
doubly individuated, being situated at another level of abstraction. The history of science then “practices on 
these second, nonntatural, cultural objects” to which “incompleteness is essential” (Canguilhem 2005, 203 
[1968]; emphasis added). 
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pathological (1943) are now gaining momentum,20 winning him some years ago the 
(paradoxical) title of a “vital rationalist” (Rabinow 1994).21 This second point is all the 
more surprising as The Normal and the Pathological not only supports Canguilhem’s later 
analyses on the intricate relations between scientific practice, techniques, and concepts 
but also sharply examines a category central for the present chapter and for recent work 
in the history of science, that of “experimental”. How do these trends in historical 
epistemology relate to one another? Can they be reconciled? I hope to show that the 
answer to the last question is definitely affirmative. 
This puzzle and those interrogations spearhead the development of this chapter 
where I want to argue more precisely that (a) Canguilhem’s philosophy of the concept 
needs to be re-evaluated and that it is in fact much richer and more relevant to current 
philosophical debates than is commonly assumed, and (b) that in particular Canguilhem 
and Rheinberger’s approaches are quite compatible, even though they choose different 
units of analysis. Based on text analyses, I show that the nature of concepts in 
Canguilhem’s work has been misunderstood, and in particular that the role of practice, 
techniques and experimentation in concept formation was largely overlooked. My 
defense of Canguilhem’s (historical) epistemology will illustrate how both the criticisms 
voiced against his conceptual approach and the perceptible distance separating his work 
from recent studies in historical epistemology dissolve, once we move beyond 
Canguilhem’s image – an image he somehow himself contributed to promote – as 
concerned with disembodied, abstract genealogies of concepts. Drawing especially on The 
Normal and the Pathological (1943) and on The Formation of the Concept of Reflex 
(1955), I will show that the formation and transformation of a concept, in Canguilhem’s 
sense, is intrinsically connected with the experimental, material, technical, and cultural 
contexts in which a concept is operationalized. The new reading of Canguilhem’s 
philosophical legacy shows there is no sharp discontinuity between “old” and “new” 
historical epistemology perspectives, and further suggests that Canguilhem anticipated a 
                                                                
20
 For a commentary and a reassessment of The Normal and the Pathological see Keating (2001). For a 
discussion of Canguilhem’s medical thesis in contemporary philosophy of medicine see Méthot (2009a, 42-
46). 
21
 This expression is indeed paradoxical because vitalistic biologists are often considered to be anti-
rationalists (Canguilhem 2008 [1952]).  
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number of claims (e.g. links between concepts and scientific practices) that are now in the 
process of becoming the norm among historians and philosophers of science.  
Beginning with a short history of French historical epistemology, the next section 
introduces some of Canguilhem’s most important critics in the past fifteen years. In order 
to show why those arguments fail to convince, I then examine three different units of 
analysis in the history of science and those analyses are further supported by an 
examination of Canguilhem’s early views on technique (even phenomeno-technique), 
science and life, and the idea that concepts take on new meaning following not only 
theoretical contexts in which they are embedded, but distinct operationalizations. Finally, 
the last section of the chapter covers the normative aspect of Canguilhem’s concepts and 
discusses how, despite a deep respect for science and scientific practices, the authority of 
which he did not seek to undermine, Canguilhem’s conception of the object of the history 
of science can help philosophers and historians to free themselves from the tutelage of 
science. 
 
A SHORT HISTORY OF (FRENCH) HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
Even if the renewed interest in historical epistemology is closely linked to the work of 
a number of scholars at the Max Planck Institute its beginnings are located elsewhere. 
The original (French) context of emergence of the concept and tradition of historical 
epistemology are often left partially – sometimes even completely – untold by those who 
appropriated the label for their own project, however (Gingras 2010). 22 Throughout the 
twentieth century historical epistemology (or conceptual history) became especially 
associated with the work of Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, and Michel Foucault 
(Brenner and Gayon 2009, 8; Braunstein 2008). While Bachelard (so far as I know) never 
used himself the expression “historical epistemology”, Dominique Lecourt, a former 
student of Canguilhem, was certainly the first to write a book on Gaston Bachelard’s 
épistémologie historique (historical epistemology) in 1969. This book, shortly followed by 
                                                                
22
 Although historical epistemology is often characterized as “French epistemology”, it was also developed 
by philosophers working outside France (Schmidgen, 2008; Bontens, 2005). Other scholars like Arnold 
Davidson have used the concept of historical epistemology in the French context (particularly following 
Foucault). See also Rheinberger (2005; 2010a; 2010b). 
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Marxism and philosophy: Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault (Lecourt 1975), propelled the 
concept of historical epistemology on the philosophical scene, next to Kuhn’s “paradigm” 
and Lakatos’ “research programme” in the mid-1970s.23 Since then, the expression 
historical epistemology has come to designate Bachelard’s way of practicing epistemology 
as well as the work of many of his students and followers, including Canguilhem and 
Foucault, but also Camille Limoges, Francois Dagognet, Dominique Lecourt, Susanne 
Bachelard, Claire Salomon-Bayet, Francois Delaporte, Michel Serres, Christiane Sinding, 
and many others.  
Amidst the recent debates and controversy regarding the origin and history of 
historical epistemology, Dominique Lecourt admitted he borrowed the concept from 
Georges Canguilhem himself (Lecourt 2008). Curiously, though, Canguilhem did not use 
the category “historical epistemology” programmatically, methodologically or otherwise. 
In fact, he may have used it only once or twice, in a slightly critical way, and not to 
characterize the philosophy of Bachelard or his own (as we often do today), but to 
indicate what he considered to be an overtly descriptive and linear way of engaging with 
the history of a science (2002, 178). In contrast, he credited Bachelard for doing 
“historical history” by which he meant the ways in which Bachelard was attentive to the 
role of errors and “rectification” in science. For some readers, these comments may 
chime in with Canguilhem’s idea that the history of a science should not to be written as 
an “unfolding” – i.e. as a linear and preformed development – but instead as an 
“adventure” – i.e. as an open-ended process (1977, 157). Yet, by claiming that “in some 
sense, epistemology has always been historical” (1988, 10), and in the light of numerous 
historical essays, Canguilhem aligned himself fully with the tradition and the significance 
of a genuine historical epistemology.24 Indeed, except on rare (and mostly 
commemorative) occasions Canguilhem’s philosophy of science (or epistemology) is 
developed alongside meticulous analyses of well-chosen episodes in the history of 
science, not apart as meta-discourses on science. For Canguilhem, such disconnected 
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 For an analysis of the Marxist roots of historical epistemology see Gingras (2010, 442-443). 
 
24
 See the collection of Canguilhem’s essays recently translated as Knowledge of Life (2008 [1952]). 
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discourses, in fact, would themselves be tantamount to the (positivist) idea of a “scientific 
method” (Balibar 1993, 61).  
Given Canguilhem’s critical stance towards the concept, if not the content, of 
historical epistemology, we can understand better his frank response when Lecourt asked 
for his approval to use the expression for his book on Bachelard. In an often-told 
anecdote Canguilhem is said to have replied to Lecourt “No! Not historical epistemology 
but epistemological history” (Lecourt 2008; Gayon 2003). Lecourt, however, did not 
follow Canguilhem’s recommendation although he remained careful to speak of 
Canguilhem’s “epistemological history” (Lecourt 1975). Some have detected in Lecourt’s 
philosophical choice a corroboration of their intuition that Bachelard and Canguilhem’s 
methods differ significantly (Rheinberger 2005; Gayon 2003; Gutting 2001).25 Recently, 
historian and sociologist of science Yves Gingras radicalised the difference between the 
two approaches arguing that “if we use the language correctly, ʻhistorical epistemology’ is 
kind of epistemology and not a kind of history and ʻepistemological history’ is a kind of 
history and not a kind of epistemology” (2010, 444). Gingras argues that historical 
epistemology places more emphasis on the philosophical than on the historical aspects of 
this project (and so better characterizes thinkers like Bachelard and Hacking who used 
history for philosophical purposes); whereas epistemological history is more adequate for 
historically-oriented authors. Both Gingras and Lecourt agree that “epistemological 
history” is overall a better label for Canguilhem’s project which is (they gather), of a more 
historical nature.26 But Canguilhem himself, at times, felt the history of science had to be 
“underpinned” by a philosophy of science which, in turn, must be supported by a “theory 
of knowledge” (1949).  Here, I will not attempt to deepen what the differences between 
historical epistemology and epistemological history may be, although I will characterize 
the work of Canguilhem as one of the best examples of historical epistemology in a wholly 
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 In retrospect, Rheinberger sides with this interpretation as indicated by the change to the title of his 
article on Canguilhem (2005) from “Reassessing the historical epistemology of Georges Canguilhem” to 
“Epistemological history” when it was recently republished (2010b). 
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 Gary Gutting also distinguished Bachelard and Canguilhem as the former being more a philosopher and 
the latter a historian, although he recognized at the same time that Canguilhem’s historical work “cannot 
be sharply separated from his generally Bachelardian philosophical viewpoint” (2005, 10; 1990, 137).  
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philosophical sense.27 While Gingras’ definition is accurate (i.e. that historical 
epistemology does encompass philosophically-oriented histories of science) it is, 
however, missing the point than to try to pigeon-hole thinkers as being either on the 
philosophical or on the historical side of the fence. Moreover, the the real interest of the 
concept of historical epistemology is precisely that it indistinctly links the history and 
philosophy of science together in a single, coherent project. 
A short time ago, philosophers of science Uljana Feest and Thomas Sturm attempted 
a typology of historical epistemology which, according to them, is often understood as 1) 
a study of higher epistemic concept (e.g. objectivity, observation, probability); 2) the 
study of historical trajectories of particular scientific objects of research (e.g. electron, 
phlogiston, DNA); and 3) as the long term study of scientific developments (2011). 
According to them this typology remains open and does not intend to be exhaustive. 
Indeed, those categories can apply by degrees as we can easily envisage a project that 
encompasses all of them or that, conversely, neglects most of them. However, these 
categories apply only partially to historical epistemology as practiced by Canguilhem.  
Indeed, we can underline three aspects of historical epistemology as usually 
understood in France. Firstly, the history of science in France has always been a 
philosophical project; there is no sharp distinction made between the history and 
philosophy of science. The idea of a historical epistemology has itself a long history and 
goes back (at least) to Auguste Comte’s saying that “we do not know completely a science 
if we do not know its history” (Comte 1869, 65, quoted in Gingras 2010, 447).28 
Dominique Lecourt summarized the situation well enough when he said that “the 
discipline which takes scientific knowledge as its object must take into account the 
historicity of that object” (1973, 25). In this sense, the concept of historical epistemology 
is interesting because it can help us to move past the debate between the history and 
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 This is also one of the most common denominations for Canguilhem’s approach. See Chimisso (2003); 
Rose (1998). 
28
 In a recent communication in Berlin Jean-Francois Braunstein (2010) pointed out that the expression can 
be found in the work of Abel Rey, founder of the Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences in 1938 
where Bachelard and Canguilhem have succeeded one another as its directors.  
 
47 
 
philosophy of science in the anglo-american world that is still going on (see Schickore 
2011).  
Secondly, epistemology (or philosophy of science) is necessarily interwoven with 
historical analyses because without this historical dimension, “epistemology would be a 
completely superfluous duplication of the science about which it pretends to have 
something to say” (Canguilhem 1968, quoted in Rheinberger 2010a, 66). History, here, 
provides the critical distance necessary to philosophically evaluate scientific claims in the 
light of new and recent findings. Rejecting the old-fashioned idea of a timeless scientific 
method, Canguilhem endeavoured to analyze the developments of the life sciences from 
an historical standpoint in order to avoid redundancy with science itself. It is notworthy 
that “epistemology”, understood as a theory of knowledge, is usually absent from the 
French discourses on the history and philosophy of science. Epistemology, in contrasts, is 
understood as the operation of restituting, a posteriori, conceptual and practical forms of 
knowledge in a given domain.29  
Thirdly, there is a normative element in the historic-philosophical method developed 
by Bachelard and by Canguilhem. Historians and philosophers must not only observe and 
select the “facts” but they must also “judge” them as being part (or not) of the science of 
today. With the metaphor of the “tribunal” Canguilhem tried to convey this normative 
stance which stood in sharp contrast with predominant views according to which the 
history of science is not just the “memory of science” but is also its “epistemological 
laboratory”.30 Canguilhem gave the example of 18th century botanists which, for “pure 
historians”, would be “nothing but what botanists of the period would take to be within 
their scope of inquiry [...] But does this science of the past constitute a past for the 
science of today?” (1988, 3) For Canguilhem, the past of a science is not given but must 
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 “For the epistemologist, practicing a science amounts to mimicking the practice of the scientist by 
attempting to reconstitute the means by which knowledge is produced through studious attention to the 
papers in which the producer explains his behavior” (Canguilhem 1988, 8). As a footnote in Canguilhem’s 
text indicates, with a reference to the work of Grmek on Claude Bernard, this definition of the practice of 
epistemology is broad enough to include not only published articles but also laboratory notes and 
notebooks “in which a scientist attempts a posteriori to rationalize his experimental methods” (1988, 20).  
30
 This metaphor that the history of science is the laboratory of epistemology is usually attributed to Edward 
J. Dijksterhuis. 
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be reconstructed and therefore cannot be equated with the science in the past. Cast in 
the light of epistemological analysis, the history of science becomes a genuine 
philosophical endeavour, not designed only to validate (or reject) philosophical claims but 
primarily to allow for a better understanding of the diversity of scientific practices, as 
seen through the emergence of methods, objects, styles, and concepts.31 This is how the 
expression historical epistemology will be used and understood in the following pages. 
The next section will analyse two important criticisms voiced against Canguilhem’s 
historical epistemology.  
 
CRITICS AND CRITICISMS OF G. CANGUILHEM’S CONCEPTUAL HISTORY 
Recent translations have given Canguilhem’s ideas on biological individuality, 
normality, and the concepts of health and disease new vigor and relevance to evaluate 
and criticize, from a fresh perspective, various claims in contemporary biomedical 
sciences.32 Yet, in the last two or three decades a number of criticisms were voiced 
against his conceptual history (Bowker and Latour 1987; Hodge 2000), and epistemology 
especially as developed in Canguilhem’s Ideology and Rationality in the Life Sciences 
(Zibakalam 1996). I will mostly concentrate on the first two here, reserving a fuller 
analysis for the third one on another occasion.  
One of the strongest disagreements with French historical epistemology was made, 
ironically, from another Frenchmen: Bruno Latour. Together with Geof Bowker, he 
compared the diverse trends of social studies of science and history of science in French 
and in Anglo-American contexts (1987), remarking that Canguilhem and Bachelard are 
“the two giants of French social studies of science”. Bowker and Latour, however, went 
on to suggest that “French workers in the field could see much further without those two 
giants standing on their shoulders” (1987, 741; emphasis added). What was particularly at 
stake in the sociological reception of Bachelard and Canguilhem in France in the 1970s 
and 1980s was the marked distinction they advanced between pre-scientific and scientific 
                                                                
31
 “To do the history of sciences [...] is one of the functions, and by no means the easiest, of philosophical 
epistemology” (Canguilhem 2005, 206 [1968]).  
32
 See Canguilhem’s Knowledge of Life (2008 [1952]).  
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spirit (Bachelard) or, between science and ideologies (Canguilhem) which many saw as 
going against the “principle of symmetry” introduced by the advocates of the “Strong 
Programme” (i.e. Barnes and Bloor) in the sociology of scientific knowledge (Tiles 2009).  
This line of criticism was driven by a sense that in France, science was often depicted “as 
something somehow apart from society and history”, a situation with deep political and 
social consequences, according to Bowker and Latour (1987, 717).33 However, for others, 
Canguilhem’s “scrupulous respect for the reality of real science”, as Althusser put it, is 
what permitted the emergence of a new kind of epistemologists who, “similar to 
ethnologists”, “go into the field”, to overturn the problems of classical epistemology 
(1998, 163 [1964]). Strikingly, Althusser compared Canguilhem to ethnologists studying 
scientists in their own milieu, an idea frequently associated with Latour’s own laboratory 
studies and the several ones he fostered.  
For the purpose of this article, another (and more recent) line of criticism, one that 
comes directly from the history of science itself, is particularly relevant as it directly calls 
into question the adequacy of “concepts” as units of analysis and narration for the history 
of science. In an article published as part of a collective journal issue dedicated to the 
work of Georges Canguilhem, historian of biology Jonathan Hodge attempted to unravel 
the roots of Canguilhem’s own historical approach to the life sciences. According to 
Hodge’s analyses, Canguilhem is more “English” than we usually suspect and his thinking 
perhaps needs “liberating” with the help of German philosophers. The seemingly 
paradoxical situation Hodge describes amusingly is that despite sharp criticism, 
Canguilhem has always admired the work of the positivist Auguste Comte.34 In turn, 
Comte was profoundly influenced by Condorcet who himself owed a great deal to the 
philosophy of Bacon and Newton. This genealogical method as applied to Canguilhem’s 
personal trajectory makes him look more English than French! Hodge complains, 
however, that more importantly Canguilhem’s “preoccupation with concepts” has 
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 Latour, however, did not wholly dismiss Bachelard’s philosophical examinations of science. He thought, 
however, that those comments would “make better sense when set within a sociological framework” 
(Latour and Woolgar 1979, 258). An example of a sociological analysis of Bachelard can be found in Gingras 
(2003). For a defence of Canguilhem’s work from a science studies point of view, see Nicholson (1991); Rose 
(1998); Tiles (2011). 
 
34
 For an analysis of the influence of Comte on Canguilhem see (Braunstein 1998).  
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seriously confined his agenda as an historian of science by neglecting both the role by 
played interests and institutions and the influences of predecessors and scientists’ 
intentions on scientific progress (2000, 72). 
Hodge is convinced that Canguilhem’s method is wholly inadequate to its object of 
study, and he goes on to claim that, for example, “any historical analysis of the Principles 
of Geology cannot succeed if it restricts itself to an analysis of concepts” (2000, 72). 
According to Hodge:  
 
A historiography for science that concentrates our attention on concepts 
cannot do justice to the challenges we face as historians. Nor, in any 
case, is the concept a very suitable unit of analysis and narration. For a 
concept is a product, an achievement not a process or a goal. The 
concept, then, as a unit of analysis and narration is not adapted to the 
historian’s quest of insight into the process of enquiry that Lyell or 
Darwin, or Bernard or Monod, have undertaken, or for insights into the 
aims that inspired and directed those activities (2000, 72-73; emphasis 
added). 
 
To rephrase Hodge’s argument, conceptual history should be rejected because it 
neglects the role of influences and institutions, on the one hand, and concepts are the 
wrong units of analysis to understand science historically and dynamically, on the other, 
because firstly, they are static entities, whereas science is presumably characterized by 
dynamic and change; and secondly, because the aims of scientists are irreducible to the 
formation of concepts. Thus, when Charles Lyell wrote the Principles or when Charles 
Darwin opened up his Notebooks they both had a number of goals in mind such as 
reforming the science of geology, or introducing new methods of classification, none of 
which are reducible “to an intention to construct one or more concepts” (Hodge 2000, 
72). In brief, Hodge accuses Canguilhem of providing a wholly internal history of science, 
one that leaves out the role of social institutions, intentions and beliefs. Echoing Latour’s 
concerns, Hodge also points out that Canguilhem’s focus on concepts has constrained the 
scope of his historical analysis by neglecting the social and political influences on the 
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development of the sciences.35 As a consequence of these shortcomings, Hodge argues, 
Canguilhem’s methodology fails to provide historians with “insight” into the process of 
scientific enquiry. While this line of critique raises important issues it is, however, based 
on an oversimplified view of what Canguilhem’s concepts are. As the next sections will 
illustrate, a “preoccupation with concepts” can lead not only to a “broad intellectual view 
of science”, as Hodge points out (2000, 71), but also to a more embodied view of 
concepts and scientific practices.  
 
UNITS OF ANALYSIS IN HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY : A (TENTATIVE) TAXONOMY 
 
Historians and philosophers of science can historicize a wide range of “objects” and 
“processes”, including concepts, theories, ideas, models, experimental systems, 
institutions, and so on. Within the tradition of historical epistemology discussed here, 
however, concepts and experimental systems occupy a privilegied place and this section 
will focus on these units of analysis in particular. Before turning to them, I first discuss the 
notion of “ideas” as units of analysis in the history of science to mark the transition to 
“concepts” and later “experimental systems”.  
 
IDEAS 
Historians of science have long been interested in the nature and roles of concepts, 
although these were not always the main analytic notion to understand and interpret 
science. Prior to concepts and experimental systems, Alexandre Koyré (1892-1964), one 
of the most important historians of science during the first half of the twentieth century, 
strongly emphasized “scientific ideas” as the relevant unit from which to reconstruct and 
understand the history of a science, for instance astronomy. From the Closed World to the 
Infinite Universe (Koyré 1957) championed the view that theories and ideas reflect the 
true essence of science, and even govern its process. Because of his intellectualist 
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 This critique persists in new forms of historical epistemology. In a recent paper, philosopher Martin Kuch 
raises three objections to new work in historical epistemology such as Hacking’s, and Loraine and Galison’s 
work on objectivity. For a reason similar to Hodge’s critique of Canguilhem, Kusch argues that those recent 
works fail to meet what he calls the “microhistory point”, namely to analyse intentions, institutions, and 
interests in the development of scientific knowledge (Kusch 2011).   
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approach Koyré was often accused of providing a strictly “internalist” account of the 
history of science. Recent scholarship has shown Koyré’s work to be, however, more 
nuanced (Stump 2001; Elkana 1987). Nevertheless, his Galilean Studies published in 1939 
strongly challenged those who, like the Soviet physicist Borris Hessen (1893-1938), 
attempted to explain the emergence of modern science by appealing to social factors 
alone.36 In the historiography of science Koyrés is primarily remembered as the one who 
asserted the primacy of theoria over praxis in driving science forward. Indeed, Koyré’s 
approach oriented to metaphysical world views mostly emphasized the development of 
theories and downplayed the role of experiments. It could be said that Koyré’s idealistic 
(or Platonic) approach was “to a certain degree even antiexperimental” (Rheinberger 
2010, 52). Many other historians of science shared a number of Koyré’s epistemological 
positions such as the rejection of the concept of “precursors” in the history of science; the 
role of errors and truth in the transformation and rectification of scientific knowledge; the 
discontinuous aspect of scientific revolutions, and the importance to situate scientific 
problems against their own cultural, metaphysical, philosophical, and historical 
backgrounds. 
Canguilhem and Koyré knew each other. They met for the first time at the “Congrès 
Descartes” in 1937 – an international conference in philosophy held in Paris. On this 
occasion Canguilhem gave his first philosophical paper on “Descartes et la techniques”, to 
which I will come back later. This encounter with Koyré left a lasting mark on the young 
philosopher, not yet physician or historian of science (Canguilhem 1987).37 In his work 
prior to his becoming known as an historian of science, Canguilhem’s most important 
reference in the history of science was Koyré, not Bachelard. For example, in an essay on 
“Le rôle de l’histoire des sciences dans la philosophie des sciences : l’établissement des 
faits fondamentaux de la dynamique” (1949) written six years before he became head of 
the Insitut d’histoire des sciences, Canguilhem draws heavily on Koyré’s analyses while 
the name of Gaston Bachelard is mentioned only once. With time, however, Koyré’s name 
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 Hessen gave a famous paper at the Second International Congress of the History of Science, held in 
London in 1931, titled “The socio-economic roots of Newton’s Principia”. This paper motivated the 
development of an externalist approach in the history of science that was later challenged by Koyré.  
37
 A detailed and systematic comparative analysis of Canguilhem’s and Koyré’s oeuvres has not yet been 
attempted and is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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faded out slowly from Canguilhem’s writings while Bachelard’s gained prominence, a shift 
that runs parallel with the moment Canguilhem succeeded Bachelard as the head of the 
Institut d’histoire des sciences in 1955. 
Although the name of Koyré continued to appear in Canguilhem’s writings after this 
date,38 and even in relation to Bachelard’s epistemology to whom his work relates, 
Canguilhem was moving towards a new kind of history of science, one where the “typical 
units of knowledge” are not theories, ideas, or phenomena anymore but “concepts” 
(Balibar 1993, 68; see Gutting, 1990, 137). Yet what is the difference between concepts 
and ideas, and what difference does it make in terms of historiography? Regarding the 
first question, one of the differences between concepts and ideas, as it will become clear 
later, is that a conceptual history, in Canguilhem’s sense and in contrast with Koyré’s 
approach, advocates a much closer focus on scientific practice, instruments, and 
techniques than the latter. As to the second question, it follows from the emphasis on 
concepts, once correctly understood, that a history of conceptual changes will place equal 
emphasis on the development of scientific practices in which those concepts are 
operationalized and embedded. 
   
CONCEPTS 
In a tribute article to Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault credited his mentor for 
promoting a “philosophy of the concept”, as opposed to a “philosophy of the subject”, 
placing at the same time épistémologues (Bachelard, Cavaillès) and phénoménologues 
(Sartre, Merleau-Ponty) in two distinct and rarely overlapping philosophical traditions, at 
least in France (1991 [1985]). There is little doubt, in fact, that whichever name we give to 
Canguilhem’s philosophy, the central notion in it is that of a concept, not theories or 
ideas. As Lecourt pointed out, “Canguilhem concerns himself more with the descent of 
concepts than with the concatenation of theories” (1973, 171). Following Foucault, 
commentators noted that Canguilhem’s approach consists in applying the “principle of 
the genealogy of concepts” (Macherey 2009, 113-114; Badiou 2009, 7). In fact, this aspect 
was first noticed by philosopher Pierre Macherey in an article published more than 
                                                                
38
 For instance, in the essay on “The Object of the History of Science” (2005 [1968]). 
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twenty years before Foucault’s tribute mentioned above, in a Marxist journal. In this first 
systematic study of Canguilhem’s philosophy of science Macherey wrote that 
“Canguilhem substitutes the filiation of concepts to the chain of theories” (1998, 171 
[1964]; italics in original). A historic-philosophical approach à la Canguilhem consists thus 
primarily in following concepts over time and across scientific disciplines (and ideologies) 
in order to locate significant shifts (i.e. “rectification”) regarding meaning and domains of 
application. According to Gilles Renard (1996), unravelling the trajectory of concepts was 
Canguilhem’s objective. Likewise, Fichant and Pêcheux’s Sur l’histoire des sciences 
stressed that in contrast with the “intellectual history” inherited from Koyré, Canguilhem 
sought to develop an approach to the history of science based on the filiations of 
concepts (Fichant and Pêcheux 1969).  
Of course, Canguilhem was not alone in promoting similar conceptual approach to 
science in France at the time but as Yves Schwartz pointed out, if compared with other 
“philosophers of the concept” he appeared to them “as a singular character in the 
conceptomania – which was largely indebted to him – during the 1950s-1960s” (1993, 
307). It is unsurprising that commentators attentive to the work of Canguilhem, in 
addition to his students, have been listening to “the discipline of the concept” (Schwartz 
1993, 305). This received-view of Canguilhem’s epistemological method, formed between 
the 1960s and the 1990s, remains the dominant interpretation today, although 
philosophers rarely explain what a concept, for Canguilhem, is. Concepts occupy a central 
place in science and because of this, Canguilhem claims, they deserve much philosophical 
and historical attention.39 A few years after he became head of the Institut d’histoire des 
sciences in Paris, Canguilhem suggested that “the history of science” cannot be satisfied 
with collecting biographies of scientists but […] “has also to be a history of the formation, 
deformation, and rectification of scientific concepts” (2002, 235 [1963]). As his detailed 
historical analyses reveal, Canguilhem had a broad vision of what the history of science 
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 Canguilhem wrote that “to be ironical with regard to the importance given to concepts is easier than to 
try understanding why without them there is no science” (2005, 204). 
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should be like, one that reaches beyond the determination of epistemological breaks or 
conceptual filiations, however.40 
Both the centrality and the lack of clarity of the notion of a “concept” in Canguilhem’s 
writings need to be (re)evaluated and examined more closely. Even Canguilhem’s 
perception of his method can be misguiding, and if we rely on his own account alone, 
paraphrasing Yehuda Elkana’s assessment of Alexandre Koyré, we will not be able to 
break out of the confines of the usual images of Canguilhem as a philosophical historian 
of disembodied concepts (1987, 136). The experimental or practical dimension of 
Canguilhem’s epistemology is original even though it is often left out by commentators 
who focus largely (if not exclusively) on the notions of “filiation” and “genealogy” of 
concepts. And yet, Canguilhem’s conceptual history was from the very beginning, 
practice-oriented, as his first articles on the relations between science and techniques 
illustrate. In a word, what Canguilhem promoted is an epistemology of conceptual 
practices. The interpretation of Canguilhem I propose in this chapter could, moreover, 
provide a way out to reconcile what often appears as a rupture in French philosophy, 
history, and sociology of science in the 1960s and 1970s, disconnecting the (applied) 
rationalism of Bachelard and Canguilhem from the work of Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, 
Bourdieu and many others. By focusing on Canguilhem’s notion “practice” and 
Bachelard’s “phenomeno-technique” we can understand better the emergence of 
contributions such as The Logic of Practice of Bourdieu in the 1980s, for instance. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEMS 
The historian and philosopher of science Hans-Jörg Rheinberger is one of the latest 
descendents of this tradition in (French) historical epistemology. Trained in continental 
philosophy, Rheinberger translated and introduced the work of Derrida and Lacan to 
German-speaking audiences in the 1970s. For more than ten years he also worked at the 
Max Planck Institute for Molecular Genetics in Berlin while at the same time pursuing his 
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 Indeed he gladly admitted that the history of science “distinguishes and admits many levels of objects of 
analysis in the theoretical domains that it constructs: documents to catalogue; instruments and technique 
to describe; methods and questions to interpret in addition to concepts to analyse and criticize” 
(Canguilhem 2005). 
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investigations of the roots of historical epistemology which he locates in the work of 
Ludwig Fleck, Edmund Husserl, Gaston Bachelard, and Georges Canguilhem (Rheinberger 
2010a). While a director of the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, 
Rheinberger emerged in the late 1990s as a prominent figure in the history and 
philosophy of science, armed with a promising set of “categories of discourses” – 
including epistemic thing, experimental system, and experimental cultures – most of 
which are foreign to Anglo-American philosophers of science, as Richard Burian (1995) 
observed. Although Rheinberger does not often directly engage Anglo-American 
philosophers in his written work he neverhtless is closely related to the rise of philosophy 
of biology as an academic discipline, and in particular with Marjorie Grene. In a review of 
Rheinberger (1997), Grene wrote that the latter is guiding philosophers of science in “the 
direction they need to go to escape the sterility of philosophy of science in its once 
‘received’ forms, or of the ‘social constructivist’ mode that has sometimes replaced it” 
(2002, 574). Two years before that, Grene had written a lengthy paper on Canguilhem’s 
philosophy of science in which she noted a convergence between his and Rheinberger’s 
attempt of staying close to scientific practices (Grene 2000).41  
Canguilhem and Rheinberger have met only once (Rheinberger, personal 
communication), but Rheinberger entertained a long lasting interest in the spirit of 
French historical epistemology. His work, indeed, is especially informed by, and 
characteristic of, the style of Bachelard and Canguilhem where the links between 
philosophical reflection and historical analysis are tightly interwoven, even indivisible. 
Inheriting the richness of a long tradition in the history and philosophy of science, 
Rheinberger reinterprets and reactivates a number of key concepts and ideas elaborated 
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 Marjorie Grene (1910-2009) and Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995) both lived throughout the twentieth 
century and both demonstrated astute skills in analyzing the history and epistemology of the life sciences. 
Grene had long been interested in the philosophical approach of Canguilhem (Méthot 2009a) and the two 
of them met at least once in 1973 in Finland at the “Colloque de Jyvaskyla”, an international conference in 
philosophy where Canguilhem gave his paper on « La question de la normalité dans l’histoire de la pensée 
biologique ». His talk was followed by a commentary from philosopher of biology Ken Schaffner who 
rejected Canguilhem’s analysis of the concept of normal. Interestingly, while Schaffner, today, does not 
remember whether Canguilhem answered his commentary, he vividly remembers, however, that Marjorie 
Grene gave a ten minutes defense of Canguilhem, making him feel that he had been inappropriately critical 
of the French philosopher and historian (Schaffner, personal communication). This episode illustrates 
shared concerns between two emblematic, and at the same time atypical, philosophers of the life sciences 
working on both sides of the Atlantic.  
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by these earlier thinkers (e.g. phenomeno-technique, recurrence, epistemeological 
obstacle, and so on), and demonstrates their currency for today’s philosophers and 
historians of science. Moreover, he introduced a new unit of analysis: the experimental 
system (1997; 1994). 
Both attempting to bridge the gap between the history and philosophy of science, 
Rheinberger and Canguilhem are, however, doing so using different units of analysis 
which do not seem to map neatly onto each other (at least at first glance). And yet, with 
Rheinberger the standpoint from which to view scientific activity has begun to shift once 
again, completing the practical and regionalist turn in the history and philosophy of 
science with the notion of experimental system. To mark the difference in a sharper way 
Rheinberger himself contrasts his system-centred approach to a concept-oriented one.42 
Illustrating the shift from “concept” to “system” further he insists that his goal is to track 
the emergence of epistemic things as “material research objects” across a variety of 
experimental practices, techniques and programmes, “rather than pursuing the 
developments of concepts, disciplines, institutions, or individual researchers” 
(Rheinberger 2000, 273; emphasis added).  
Not only do Canguilhem and Rheinberger promote a different unit of analysis but the 
latter is primarily concerned with understanding scientific practices, “scientific cultures”, 
and overall, to develop an “epistemology of experimentation” (1997, 138; 2005; 2000). In 
a word, Rheinberger’s work is “practice-oriented” and concentrates on the material 
culture of scientific experimentation – something seemingly remote from Canguilhem’s 
methodology if we think of his approach as being primarily concerned with the 
elaboration of “genealogies of concepts”. Yet as we will see, a deep convergence between 
these two thinkers emerges once the notion of “concept” in Canguilhem is investigated 
further. 
The difference between Rheinberger and Canguilhem’s unit of analysis can be 
explained by the fact that these authors explored the development of different scientific 
                                                                
42
 For example, Rheinberger claims that in Synthesising Proteins in the Test Tube he has “followed the 
history of an experimental system” (1997, 222), in an attempt to demonstrate “the power of material 
objects – in contrast to ideas or concepts – as driving forces in the process of knowledge acquisition” 
(Rheinberger 2005, 406; emphasis added).  
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disciplines over different timescales, thus requiring different approaches in terms of 
narration and analysis. Whereas Canguilhem’s interests were mostly located on the side 
of the history of the life sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, dealing with 
organisms in their milieu and their interactions, Rheinberger focussed on molecular 
biology, genetics and more recently, heredity (Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 2007). As a 
result they both studied different kinds of “objects” that populate those fields: 
Canguilhem examined how the meaning of concepts such as regulation, health and 
disease, information or reflex has shifted following their migration through different 
theoretical contexts; whereas the history of the entities Rheinberger investigated (e.g. 
microsomes, ribosomes, RNAs) are such that they “cannot easily be reconstructed in 
terms of conceptual shifts that could be considered as being paradigmatic” (2000, 272; 
emphasis added).43 On the contrary, the history of such objects results from the 
establishment of several experimental systems.   
Without offering a full argument here, the choice of a unit of analysis for the history 
of science, I suggest, is contingent upon the temporality of the science at stake, on the 
one hand, while it also reflects the scope of the narration chosen by the historian and 
philosopher of science, on the other. Whereas to analyse broad shifts in our 
understanding of disease ranging from, say, the nineteenth century to the twentieth 
century “concepts”, understood as mediators between practices and other aspects of 
scientific inquiry, are a relevant units of analysis, detailed case-studies of short-time 
periods such as the discovery of the genetic code, as Rheinberger showed, require a 
different approach, one where the emphasis is placed instead on the development of a 
series of experimental systems. Just as Canguilhem promoted a shift in the unit of analysis 
in the history of science from Koyré’s “ideas” to concepts, particularly when it comes to 
the life sciences, Rheinberger understood the need for a new unit of narration to make 
sense of recent and fast growing fields of research such as molecular biology, genomics, 
and synthetic biology. While neither would claim there is only one correct unit of analysis 
                                                                
43
 As Morange observed, molecular biology occupies only a limited place in Canguilhem’s writings, and 
Canguilhem’s analyses of the “molecular revolution” indicate some misunderstanding (2000). 
 
59 
 
available,44 both would agree that scientific concepts emerge and shift their meaning 
within the context of well-defined and localized material and epistemological 
configurations. 
 
ON THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTER OF CONCEPTS 
Following Bachelard, Canguilhem often repeated that “a same word is not a same 
concept” (2002, 177). Scientific texts sometimes contain terms that are linguistically 
identical but are nevertheless epistemically different. To distinguish words from genuine 
(scientific) concepts, Canguilhem tells us, one needs to reconstitute the “synthesis” of a 
concept, that is, to reconstruct the specific “conceptual context” in which the concept is 
inserted “and the goal [intentions directrices] of the experiments or observations” (2002, 
177). For example, in “Théorie et technique chez Claude Bernard”, Canguilhem argued 
that it is by the means of experimentation in the course of his research on diabetes and 
with the help of related concepts (such as “internal secretions”) and theories (cell theory), 
that the concept of milieu intérieur was formed, not through the application of a 
“general” scientific method (2002). Going back to the “initial moment” of the creation of 
a concept like milieu intérieur allows to witness the construction of a “properly biological 
concept, one whose elaboration is at once an effect and a cause of experimentation” 
(Canguilhem 2008, 7). In other words, concepts are the result of experimentation and 
foster, at the same time, the developments of new practices. This give-and-take 
relationship between the construction of a concept and the experimental set-up in which 
it is embedded opens up new ways of experimentation and vice-versa.45  
                                                                
44
 In fact, many other units of analysis could be identified such as, for instance, Keating and Cambrosio’s 
notion of a “biomedical plateform” (2003). While this notion bears similarities with that of experimental 
system (although it remains distinct from it), fleshing out their precise articulation and specificities requires 
further study. In fact, the convergence in several trends in historical epistemology is not immensely 
surprising for Keating and Cambrosio took their PhD in Sociopolitiques des Sciences at the Université de 
Montréal in the mid-1980s under the supervision of Camille Limoges, himself a former student of Georges 
Canguilhem at the IHPST between 1964 and 1968 (see Méthot 2009a).  
It must also be noted Rheinberger has himself analysed the history of a number of concepts in the spirit of 
Canguilhem, for instance the concept of gene (2000; Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 2009) and information 
(Rheinberger 2010).  
45
 That is what Canguilhem means when he says that the “concept of the internal environment provides [...] 
the theoretical foundation for the technique of physiological experimentation” (2002, 148). 
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Canguilhem rarely expressed himself on the nature of concepts, and we can regret he 
was not more precise on this issue. We can, however, try to reconstruct his thinking from 
an article on the concept of reflex in the late nineteenth century where he explains that 
“when talking about “concepts” he has in mind “a denomination and a definition, that is 
to say, a noun endowed with meaning that is able to fulfil a function of discriminating 
between a number of observations or experiments” (Canguilhem 2002, 295; emphasis 
added). Thus for him concepts perform an operational function (see chapter 3) as they 
allow diverse kinds of judgment (e.g. discrimination) to be made. As concepts come into 
being within certain scientific practices, if one wants to understand the formation, 
deformation and rectification of biological concepts (as Canguilhem claims), one also has 
to consider the experimental and material contexts in which they were successively 
elaborated. This process of conceptual change is indeed not a purely intellectual or 
theoretical one, well to the contrary. Indeed, the “process of rectification of the concept 
is not a matter of logic, but of experimentation” (Canguilhem 2002, 296). Concepts are 
thus both formed and rectified in the context of scientific practices.  
We could say that the philosophy of Canguilhem is part of a tradition where concepts 
are “tools”46 or operational devices used alongside instruments and other kind of 
scientific apparatuses. For Canguilhem a concept always “contains an operational or 
judgmental norm” (2005, 198). Paraphrasing a well-known formula, understood in a 
certain way, Canguilhem’s historical epistemology is, somehow, a philosophy of scientific 
practice and experimentation.47 Canguilhem’s position on the operational character of 
concepts as depository of norms contrasts with most work on concepts nowadays but 
many philosophers before him, Kant included, have claimed that concepts are what make 
judgments possible (see Schmid 2003). It is not surprising that for Canguilhem, reader of 
Kant, what guarantees the “theoretical efficacy” or the “cognitive value” of a concept is 
precisely “its operational function” [fonction d’opérateur] (2002, 360).  
The point concerning the operational character of concepts was well taken by the 
French historian of biology and Nobel Prize laureate François Jacob for whom, indeed, 
                                                                
46
 See Feest (2010): Chang (2009). 
 
47
 The experimental aspect of the constitution of concepts in Canguilhem was noted by Barbara (2008).  
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“the importance of a concept is given operationally in terms of its role in directing 
observation and experience” (1973, 11; emphasis added). The value of a concept thus 
refers to the possibility of further theoretical, technical, or experimental developments it 
creates. For example, we could say that Claude Bernard’s concept of milieu intérieur 
opened up an epistemic space for the development of physiology as a “deterministic” 
science, and to do so without drawing on physics as a model (Canguilhem 2002, 149). To 
recast this point, concepts are not about representation alone but also about 
intervention; concepts are at the same time created by the means of experimental 
practices and later on translated into practice so as to order the messiness of biomedical 
realities. There is a co-production of concepts and phenomena that takes place inside an 
experimental set-up. Using Hacking’s words, Canguilhem was not interested (only) in how 
concepts represent, but how they intervene in the world. Concepts are active, so to speak. 
The emphasis on the operational character of concepts was recently emphasised by 
Rheinberger (2010b) as well (chapter 3).  
That the (life) sciences can only make significant progress with the right kind of 
concepts, that is, one that is adequate to their object of study, is roughly the conclusion 
of Canguilhem’s essay on the experimental method in biology: “the use of concepts and 
intellectual tools forged by that living scientist, the biologist, in order to understand the 
experience of life proper to the organism is [...] at once both inevitable and artificial” 
(2008, 22). Not only do concepts operate as tools in observing, measuring, individuating, 
and studying phenomena, but they can similarly be used to tracing experimentally new 
“roads”, which are by definition artificial, into the living organisms themselves, just like 
humans’ roads cut through their natural milieu. In this resepect, the distinction between 
an “internal” and an “external” environment provided a means to delineate the 
phenotypic contours of living beings. On the other hand, experimentation is at once 
“inevitable” because it partakes to the process of knowledge acquisition which 
Canguilhem defines as being primarily about resolving the tension between man, life and 
his milieu, a tension that springs from the requirement to intervene with organisms 
experimentally to gain access to their modes of functioning, while at the same time 
recognizing that living organisms are individual (in the sense of indivisible) entities (2008, 
xix). Forming concepts is no easy task, though, and in biology “the issue is not using 
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experimental concepts” as such “but experimentally constituting authentic biological 
concepts” (Canguilhem 2008, 6).  
The tightly-interwoven relation between concepts and experimental practices in 
Canguilhem’s epistemology suggests a strong link between the logic of practice as 
deployed in concept formation and experimentation. But what is the relation between 
concepts and theories for Canguilhem? Following the “principle of the genealogy of 
concept”, commentators often argued that concepts and theories are, for him, to a large 
extent decoupled, in the sense that concepts can migrate from one theoretical context to 
the other (Gutting 2001; Chimisso 2010). Gary Gutting, for instance, commented that 
“Canguilhem’s most important methodological contribution” is precisely the “distinction 
between concepts and theories” (2001, 229). Drawing on Canguilhem’s history of the 
concept of reflex (1955), Gutting argues that Canguilhem demonstrated how a particular 
concept can operate within very different theoretical contexts (e.g. mechanism, vitalism), 
taking on different meanings and significations. For Gutting, Canguilhem’s approach 
posits a neat separation between concepts and theories that allows for the development 
of a “distinct” kind of history of science, one that is not based on a succession of 
theoretical frameworks, but on the genealogy of concepts (2006, 8).  
The possibility for concepts to move from one theoretical context to another 
indicates that they are to some extent, independent of theories within which they are 
invoked.48 And yet, concepts are not free-floating entities for Canguilhem. The next 
section will drive this point home drawing on the Concept of Reflex and The Normal and 
the Pathological. While Canguilhem’s analysis gave precedence of concepts over theories, 
his more valuable methodological contribution is perhaps not so much the distinction 
between theories and concepts, but the dynamical logic of concepts formation and 
scientific practices. 
 
 
 
                                                                
48
 To take a more recent example, the concept of “gene” travelled from Mendelian genetics to molecular 
genetics and to evolutionary biology shifting meanings accordingly (Beurton, Falk and Rheinberger 2000; 
Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 2009). 
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TECHNIQUES AND SCIENCE  
Before his “mature” work, the young Canguilhem had already developed a distinctive 
and original view on the relationship between technique and science that was 
significantly different from the dramatic discourse on technology pervading the first half 
of the twentieth century. In effect, at the exact same time Heidegger wrote “The question 
concerning technology” (1938) in which he worried about the future of a technological 
society, Canguilhem addressed the problem of technology (or technique) in explicit, but 
different metaphysical terms in two related articles. His main conclusion is that 
technological developments do not (necessarily) lead to an instrumental society but 
rather illustrate a deeper and normative impulse proper to living systems. 49 
In “Descartes et la technique” (1937) and “Activité technique et création” (1938), 
Canguilhem argued that scientific progress is not a direct result of the application of 
theoretical knowledge (as positivists like Comte would say)50 but on the contrary, that the 
growth of science emerges from technical failures. Practice, in a sense, discredits theory. 
In all cases, technique (or technology) is prior to scientific development, both historically 
and epistemically.51 For Canguilhem, the development of instruments and techniques as 
well as their inevitable shortcomings not only facilitates the discovery of new phenomena 
or the formulation of theories (e.g. Pasteur’s germ theory comes from his work on silk 
worms; thermodynamics comes from the construction of the steam engine, etc.), but 
opens up future research avenues for scientists to engage into a more theoretically-
oriented investigations, precisely because of those unavoidable breaks provoked by 
technical obstacles (1937, 83-4). Technological development is itself driven by “the 
exigencies of life” [les exigences du vivant], manifesting and extending those deep vital 
impulses further (1994; 225; 1937, 84; 1978, 72). In a broad Nietzschean sense, 
                                                                
49
 “Human technique extends vital impulses” (Canguilhem 1978, 72). Those vital impulses are attributed by 
Canguilhem to the whole of life forms: “therapeutic need is a vital need, which, even in lower living 
organisms (with respect to vertebrate structure) arouses reactions of hedonic value or self-healing or self-
restoring behaviors” (1978, 70).  
50
 Auguste Comte’s slogan was “savoir pour prévoir et prévoir pour pouvoir”.  
51
 In an essay on “Thérapeutique, expérimentation, responsabilité” published twenty years later (1959), 
Canguilhem expressed the same idea again, writing that it is “spontaneous technique that creates for 
knowledge the conditions of its emergence, and thus precedes it” (2002, 387 [1959]).    
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Canguilhem sees techniques (including medicine and agriculture) as reflecting the 
“creative” and “original power” of man in his quest to “master” and to become 
“possessor” of the natural world (1937, 77). Situated somewhere “between life and art”, 
technologies have an irreducible art-like dimension as they are at once both “creative” 
and liberating” (Canguilhem 1938, 85). Whereas for Heidegger, however, machine-based 
technology is the hallmark of modernity, technological developments broadly construed 
express, for Canguilhem, what in The Normal and the Pathological he has called the 
“normativity of life” (1991).  
 
THE CATEGORY OF “EXPERIMENTAL” IN THE NORMAL AND THE PATHOLOGICAL 
“Medicine is like a technique or art at the crossroads of several sciences” 
(Canguilhem 1978, 7). This aphorism opens Canguilhem’s medical dissertation on the 
concepts of the normal and the pathological, and is one of the most well-known phrases 
of the book published in 1943, during the Second World War. The Normal and the 
Pathological (N&P hereafter) can be read from different perspectives, including as a 
meditation on the concept of biological individuality (Gayon 1998). The category of 
“experimental” is at the core of the book and supports Canguilhem’s argument that the 
determination of the concept of “normal”, especially in physiology and medicine, is linked 
to specific laboratory equipments and sets of practices; in other words, that there is no 
absolute concept of the “normal” state in medicine or physiology. Already before 
Canguilhem developed a more sustained methodlogical reflection to scientific concepts 
he grasped that their elaboration requires setting up a realm of intelligibility. I first 
introduce and summarize some of Canguilhem ideas about health, disease, and 
normativity.  
 
THE POLARITY OF LIFE ITSELF 
Medicine, for Canguilhem, is a technique that “extends a spontaneous effort, peculiar 
to life”, the effort of living beings adapting to their milieu, and adapting their milieu to 
them. Located at the intersection of several sciences, medicine exists “as the art of life” 
not because therapeutics designates certain states as being normal and others as 
abnormal, but rather because man, as an individual, has come to call certain dreaded 
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states as being in need of correction “in relation to the dynamic polarity of life” 
(Canguilhem 1978, 70). The human enterprise that medicine is reflects thus this 
“fundamental fact” that life is not indifferent to environmental circumstances, and that it 
is “polarity” or “position of value”, even unconscious (Ibid.) Organisms are normative 
beings in the sense that, contrary to inorganic matter, they are always affected by their 
environment and will spontaneously react to external perturbations by making 
physiological adjustments. Given a change in the environment, healthy organisms will be 
those that are able to adapt smoothly to the external modifications. For Canguilhem, 
health is thus defined as “the possibility of tolerating infractions of the habitual norm and 
instituting new norms in new situations” (1991, 197). Similarly, disease is a “new 
dimension of life”; it is “an innovative experience in the living being and not just a fact of 
decrease or increase” (1991, 184). This last point is a critique directed at Claude Bernard’s 
epistemology (which Canguilhem called “Broussais’ principle”) on which normal and 
pathological states are identical in nature and only differ quantitatively (i.e. for Bernard, 
pathological phenomenon amounts to an increase or a decrease of an otherwise normal 
function). 52     
For Canguilhem, an impoverishment in the plastic or normative capacity is a sign of 
disease as it indicates a reduction in the “margin or tolerance” at the level of the whole 
organism. What distinguishes the normal from the pathological then is that an organism 
will be in a pathological situation if the new norms he has established are inferior in terms 
of “stability, fecundity and variability of life” than the previous ones (1991, 144). The sick 
organism is the one which “has lost its normative capacity, the capacity to establish other 
norms in other situations” (Canguilhem 1991, 183). However, a new norm is never a priori 
normal or pathological; its normality will come from its normativity (1991, 144), that is, 
from the organism’s capacity to organize the milieu according to its own needs. In other 
words, norms of life cannot be said normal or pathological a priori, because judgments 
about normal and pathological states must take into account the environment or the 
milieu into which an organism lives. Grounded in a Darwinian conceptual approach, 
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 Bernard’s classical example is diabetes.  
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Canguilhem argued that “Taken separately, the living being and his environment are not 
normal: it is their relationship that makes them such” (1991, 143).  
The approach just outlined could lead one to think that the frontier between the 
normal and the pathological may be “imprecise for many individuals considered 
simultaneously” although, Canguilhem argued, it is “perfectly precise for one individual 
considered successively” (1991, 182). In this, Canguilhem followed the neurologist Kurt 
Goldstein and argued that health and disease require the notion of individual being. In 
N&P Canguilhem also argued that physiology cannot secure an objective foundation for 
pathology because physiological norms are initially noticed through a pathological 
situation in a clinical encounter (1991, 209). In that, however, he agreed with the French 
surgeon René Leriche (1879-1955), who maintained that “at every moment there lie 
within us more physiological possibilities that physiology would tell us about. But it takes 
disease to reveal it to us” (1991, 100). Although this argument is not a weak one, 
Canguilhem complements it with a stronger one that brings together scientific practices 
and concept formation.  
 
THE NORMS OF THE LABORATORY 
Canguilhem’s strongest argument against the possibility to derive an objective 
concept of the normal is found in his critique of the science of physiology, and how the 
laboratory constructs new norms of life that cannot be called “normal” in an absolute 
sense. Although not frequently mentioned by commentators, “the relationship of the 
normal and the experimental”, Canguilhem says, “is at the heart of our concerns” (1978, 
82; emphasis added). At the outset, N&P critically analyses how the experimental method 
expounded by Bernard impacted on the ways in which physiology and pathology were 
being realigned with the clinic at the end of the nineteenth century. For Canguilhem, two 
important consequences that flew out of these disciplinary rearrangements were that, to 
begin with, in discovering the laws of normal and pathological phenomenon, physiology 
became epistemically first, and could pretend to guide and illuminate the clinic. 
Additionally, in elucidating the statistical constants representing the normal curve of vital 
functions of living beings, physiology went down a reductionist slope and ended up 
ascribing health and disease not to the whole organism anymore, but to its most inner 
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constituents (organs, tissues, cells, etc.) which departed from the statistical mean. Using 
scientific measurement, health and disease could then be quantified and assessed 
“objectively”. What Canguilhem endeavoured to do in the second part of the book was to 
turn this view upside down and replace the whole individual, and the clinic, at the centre 
of medical epistemology.  
Canguilhem’s concerns in the second part of the book are with the adequation 
between the norms constructed by the physiologist with the help of laboratory 
instruments and standardization procedures, and “the living being’s functional activity 
outside the laboratory” (1978, 83). Looking at the distinction between the normal and the 
pathological from from an evolutionary point of view, Canguilhem frames it as the 
“problem of the variability of organisms”, on the one hand, and the “significance and 
scope of this variability”, on the other (1978, 80). In the context of the physiological 
experiments, the significance and scope of variability among organisms (and 
environments) is reduced to a minimum by standardization and control procedures, so 
that any deviation beyond a particular threshold could be marked as pathological, at least 
in principle. However, Canguilhem argues, the results from experiments are always 
context-dependent, as others experimental conditions would have produced other 
norms.53 Thus, while the physiologist can claim to have established a norm, he does not 
“objectively defines which conditions are normal” (1978, 83). And yet, it is the relation 
between organism and environment that makes them either normal or pathological 
(Canguilhem 1991, 143). It follows that if one defines the pathological as a deviation from 
the average, as a statistical difference, the “laboratory’s conditions” places the organisms 
in a pathological situation from which scientists attempt to derive norms understood as 
the normal state.  
 
A NOTE ON G. CANGUILHEM’S NORMATIVISM 
Although Canguilhem denies the possibility for science to objectively identify what 
the normal is, he does not fall prey to a wholly cultural or social normativism either. 
                                                                
53
 “The living being’s functional norms as examined in the laboratory are meaningful only within the 
framework of the scientist’s operative norms” (1978, 83).  
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Canguilhem’s normativism is intended to be universal and biologically grounded: “even 
for an amoeba, living means preference and exclusion”; [...] this point of view is that of 
vital normativity” (Canguilhem 1991, 136). This normativity is an intrinsic property of 
living beings and does not merely reflect social preferences at a given space and time. 
“The existence, coextensive in space and time with humanity, of medicine as a more or 
less scientific technique for healing diseases” (Canguilhem 2008, 132) appears to 
Canguilhem to be the result of a universal tendency in living organisms to avoid diseases 
and prefer health instead. 
 
It is life itself and not medical judgment which makes the biological 
normal a concept of value and not a concept of statistical reality. For the 
physician, life is not an object but rather a polarized activity, whose 
spontaneous effort of defense and struggle against all that is of negative 
value is extended by medicine by bringing to bear the relative but 
indispensable light of human science (1978, 73). 
 
However, in addition to those biological norms, Canguilhem is perfectly aware that 
the definition of the normal is partly established by the social context. Technological 
innovations having considerably enlarged the possibilities of human beings in terms of 
activities, he argued, the line between the normal and the pathological ought to take into 
account “certain activities which have become a need and an ideal” for mankind (1991, 
200-1). This is why, for Canguilhem, to discern the normal from the pathological one must 
also “look beyond the body” (Ibid.). 
 
THE FORMATION OF THE REFLEX CONCEPT: APPLIED PHENOMENO-TECHNIQUE 
Canguilhem’s interpretation of the relation between technique and science feeds 
back into the formation of concepts by emphasizing the active, even creative role 
technological apparatuses play. In addition to N&P, the mutually engaging, two-ways 
relation between scientific concepts, phenomena and technical laboratory apparatuses 
appears most clearly in Canguilhem’s book on the reflex concept where he contrasts the 
“reflex 1850” with the “reflex 1800”. The main difference between these concepts is at 
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the level of the experimental possibilities generated by the latter, in contrast with the 
former. As Foucault usefully put it, “The concept of ‘reflex’ was not formed as a biological 
concept when Willis applied the image of a reflected light ray to an automatic movement; 
but it did happen the day Prochaska could write it down in the analysis of sensorimotor 
functions and their centralization in relation to the brain” (1991, 21). 
The shift between a word and a concept in the case of the reflex was contiguous to 
the moment where the tools necessary to measure it and make it happen, so to say, 
became available. As Canguilhem points out (with an intended play on words), while the 
concept of reflex 1800 was a “good” concept, it was, however, “not good for anything 
yet” (1977, 161). The reflex concept was discussed and, indeed, was included in 
physiology textbooks but no one did anything practical with it yet. Circa 1850, however, 
things began to change and the reflex concept was not only written in books but “also in 
the laboratory, in terms of exploratory and demonstrative apparatuses, designed for it, 
and which would not have existed without it” (1977, 161). In that sense the concept of 
reflex facilitated the creation of new technical support which, in turn, allowed for a 
deeper and more thorough analysis of the larger phenomenon of reflex action itself. At 
this point in time, the reality of the 1850 reflex concept is finally demonstrated “as it 
brings new objects into existence that it can, in turn, explain” (1977, 161). Concepts and 
experimental arrangements are reciprocally co-produced. 
Drawing on the work of his mentor and friend Gaston Bachelard, Canguilhem points 
out that the reflex concept in 1850 is no longer “phenomeno-logical” but had become 
“phenomeno-technical” (Ibid). As early as in La formation de l’esprit scientifique 
Bachelard (1938) had explained that “a concept has become scientific according to the 
proportion to which it has become technical, to which it is accompanied by a technique of 
realization” (1969, 61, quoted in Rheinberger 2005, 320-1). Concepts become scientific 
through their intricate relation with the technical realm. But if the 1850 reflex concept 
has become more scientific on the grounds that it has become more phenomeno-
technique, its validity and usage as a scientific concept is not limited to the frontiers of 
physiological laboratories. In effect, one find “traces” of the reflex 1850 concept in 
hospitals, the clinic, but also in the contemporary culture broadly construed (1977, 162-
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3). To take a simple but clear example of this, nowadays everyone wants to know 
“whether they have good reflexes” (Canguilhem 1977, 163).  
In an explicit attempt to apply Bachelard's epistemology to biology, Canguilhem relies 
on the distinction between phenomeno-logic and phenomeno-technique, but he assesses 
the epistemic value of a concept or a scientific object somewhat differently by examining 
its “semiotic” insertion in a broader scientific context or culture, and at the changes it 
brings about at the practical level. For instance, when medical students use a pocket light 
to detect pathognomonic “signs” most of them ignore who Argyll Robertson is; 
nevertheless, they construct their diagnosis on the basis of the presence (or the absence) 
of a reflex action of the eye’s accommodation to light. Similarly, the kneecap reflex tested 
with a small hammer, or the Babinski sign gave the reflex concept at the end of the 
nineteenth century “the status of a biological fact” to the extent that it becomes unclear 
whether “its existence realizes a concept” or if it is “its concept that reflects its existence” 
(1977, 162). The coming into being of the concept of reflex as a “biological fact” is 
assessed by Canguilhem, finally, not only by the techniques it generated or the 
instruments it helped developing but also by its “cultural extension”, its “public 
notoriety”, that is, by its being rooted in “contemporary culture” (1977, 163).  
We begin to understand why describing Canguilhem’s approach of concepts as one 
entirely focussing on the genealogy of concepts is at best incomplete, provided that such 
interpretation presupposes that the history of those genealogies and their theoretical and 
experimental backgrounds can be neatly divorced or treated as separate. Because 
concepts emerge and change, not in the abstract but in the context of concrete scientific 
practices, this interpretation would be unfaithful to Canguilhem’s approach. Thus, one 
should not talk about genealogies of concepts alone but also of genealogies of scientific 
practices which run an intertwined course. Scientific concepts do not emerge out of 
nothing and their formation, rectification, and re-organisation are always closely linked to 
particular experimental cultures, while they also relate in multiple ways to the cultural 
context in the broader social and political sense of the word.   
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NO NATURAL HISTORY: DISENTANGLING THE OBJECT OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND THE 
OBJECT OF SCIENCE 
Hodge’s characterization of Canguilhem as being almost obsessed with concepts, 
truth and rationality is, to be sure, a slightly caricatured portrait, but it does contain a 
kernel of truth. We have seen in the discussion on phenomeno-tecnhique that 
Canguilhem does not isolate concepts from theoretical and material contexts, although it 
is clear he does grant a certain authority to science, which others – like Latour – would 
certainly like to undermine. In effect, Canguilhem exhibited “a scrupulous respect for the 
reality of real science”, as Louis Althusser put it in the preface to Macherey’s 1964 article 
(1998, 163). Contrary to a number of sociologists of scientific knowledge Canguilhem 
neither set himself the task to challenge what science tells us about the world or to 
mount an attack on it based on social, economic or political “influences”, nor to explain 
science by appealing to these very same factors. This respect for science is rooted in the 
belief that while science is product and part of human culture, scientific discourses and 
practices cannot, however, be reduced to aspects of a given cultural context. But if one 
follows Hodge’s programme of taking as object of inquiry “nothing other than sources, 
inventions, influences, priorities, simultaneities, and successions”, one fails “to distinguish 
between science and other aspects of culture” (Canguilhem 1988, 3).   
While present and past advocates of historical epistemology are accused of providing 
a purely internalist history of science, Canguilhem had no illusion that his account was 
entirely different, for he rejected both internalism and externalism as being deeply 
flawed. For him “both positions come to assimilate the object of the history of sciences to 
the object of science” (2005, 202). Science, according to Canguilhem is one of the many 
cultural systems that flourish within society; but there is something specific, or special 
about it. Science creates certain norms of rationality that are not found in say, esthetics, 
politics or culture broadly understsood. To say that science and society are wholly 
coproduced is to miss this particularity about science that it operates according to a set of 
norms that are not found outside it.  Canguilhem was no naive realist either and 
recognized that the truth of today in science is often tomorrow’s error. For him, the 
construction of scientific facts does not spring out of unmediated observation of the 
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world but, as we have seen, is always the result of a configuration of specific 
technological, conceptual and experimental practices.  
 A long time elapsed since Canguilhem occupied the directorship of the Institut 
d’histoire des sciences. His respect for science is nowadays questioned by sociologists like 
Latour. And yet, Canguilhem’s approach can, perhaps surprisingly, help to free the history 
and the philosopher of science from the tutelage of the scientists, as Alberto Cambrosio, 
Peter Keating and Alfred Tauber have long emphasized (1994). The subordinate situation 
occurs when scientists want to impose on historians and philosophers their views as to 
what really happened in the past of their own discipline. This is a problem that persists 
today and while calls for “independence, not transcendence” with regard to scientific 
authority have been voiced (Forman 1991), they were rarely answered or listened to (see 
Gingras 2007).  
 Very often, partly because of the (fruitful and important) close collaboration between 
scientists, philosophers, and historians of science today, the last two are torn between 
different allegiances (Gingras 2007). The conceptual approach of Canguilhem can help to 
untangle the situation. Canguilhem’s epistemology displays great respect for the sciences 
and for the scientists who, according to him, tells “the truth” about the world but it offers 
at the same time a powerful antidote to free both historians and philosophers of science 
from this subordinate situation, while continuing to acknowledge the specific nature of 
scientific knowledge and discourses. The reason for this lies in the fact that scientists and 
historians (and philosophers) of science do not exactly study the same object. Thinking 
otherwise is to fail to acknowledge that that the history (and philosophy) of science and 
science are not the same enterprise. As Canguilhem put it, the object of the history of 
science is secondary, but non-derivative, from the work of scientists, just like the objects 
of science are secondary, carved out from “nature”, without being reducible to it (2005 
[1968]). This means that the history of science is no natural history or catalogue of facts, 
on the one hand, and cannot be reduced to biography, scientists, or scientific results as 
presented in the many contemporary or older textbooks, on the other (Cambrosio, 
Keating, and Tauber 1994, 376). As Canguilhem pointed out, scientific objects are “doubly 
historical” because they are delineated from the work of scientists whose work is itself an 
attempt to divide-up the natural world into objects, processes, and so on. Scientific 
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objects, like genes or species are objectified through scientific methods, but are not “out 
there” ready to be picked out. Just as scientific objects are free from scientific objects, the 
object of the history of science stands on its own, is defined by the historical method, and 
does not directly derive from the scientific object itself. Acknowledging that the object of 
science and the object of the history (and philosophy) of science are distinct provides not 
only a way to separate both the history and the science, but also for historians and 
philosophers to re-claim their own disciplinary identity. Both internalism and externalism 
are flawed because they assimilate the object of the history and philosophy of science to 
the object of scientific disourses and practices.  
The larger implications of Canguilhem’s approach become clearer when one looks at 
the concepts of the life sciences he chose to focus on – health, disease, the reflex, 
regulation– concepts whose impact reaches beyond science deep into the social and 
political realms. As a “vital rationalist” (Rabinow 1994), Canguilhem believed that 
“philosophy must learn from science because only science can tell us what exists” 
(Canguilhem 1967, 51). This was not a sign of defeat from the part of philosophy; on the 
contrary, this attitude comes alongside a deep conviction that “philosophy is a normative 
activity” (Ibid). Canguilhem’s position as to the role of science and its relation to 
philosophy was in sheer contrast with a long philosophical tradition beginning with the 
Greeks that was still dominant in France in the 1960s and according to which philosophy 
is primarily a kind of contemplative activity of what is “real”. For him, however, the 
fundamental reason why philosophers should gain a minimal understanding of what 
scientists take to be real about the world is that it opens up new possibilities as to how 
this “reality” could eventually be changed. Canguilhem’s philosophy, epitomized in his 
concept of “normativity”, is above all a philosophy that leads one to make decision and to 
undertake action.  
François Delaporte once suggested that for Canguilhem, knowledge of life 
participates of a larger strategy of human beings that leads to a philosophy of action 
(1993, 228). This is what Canguilhem hinted at in a difficult passage from the essay on 
Claude Bernard’s method already mentioned, weaving together the problem of 
experimentation, technique and life within a broader action-oriented philosophy: 
“Experimentation, at the level of its technique, contains a philosophical theory of the life 
74 
 
sciences that relates itself to a philosophy of action of the science on life” (2002, 154). It is 
no coincidence that the concepts studied by Canguilhem are core concepts of the life 
sciences. In fact, Canguilhem’s project could be summarized as one constantly attempting 
to come to terms with advances in biomedicine by demonstrating how the formation of 
concepts is one of the multiple forms of living. Or, As Foucault poignantly noted in a 
tribute article to his mentor: “forming concepts is one way of living, not killing life” (1991, 
21). 
Not only do the evolutions of concepts partake of an experimental culture but they 
also constitute a platform onto which broader relations of power are articulated. The link 
between power and knowledge embedded in scientific concepts was developed further 
by Foucault but can already be identified in Canguilhem’s work. Although concepts are 
linguistic entities to which we attach different meanings, they are not just “words”, that 
is, they are not neutral descriptions of scientific objects – they also convey value 
judgments about people, society, and so on. As Staffan Müller-Wille recently emphasised, 
“the meaning of a concept [for Canguilhem] does thus not exhaust itself in its discursive 
relationship to other words and texts only”; on the contrary, concepts “articulate dynamic 
power relationships of authority and resistance by advancing certain evaluations in order 
to contest or overcome others” (2011, 479). For example, the 1850 concept of reflex, 
spreading across many disconnected fields, served the purpose of those promoting a 
mechanistic philosophy of labour where the actions of the workers are decomposed into 
smaller reflex actions in order to fit larger economical needs in the production of goods. 
Following the analysis of G. Friedman, Canguilhem remarked that the reduction of the 
worker’s actions to a “sum of reflex” was only possible once man in general was 
assimilated to a (no doubt complex) machine, as for example in Taylorism, and his actions 
subordinated to it. As Canguilhem concluded, however, “in so far as the worker refuses 
practically to be mechanised, he brings to the fore the theoretical error consisting in 
decomposing his own actions into mechanical reflexes” (1977, 166). 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter was concerned with a neglected aspect of Canguilhem’s historical 
epistemology, namely the links between the formation of concepts, scientific practice, 
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and technologies. The motivation behind it was that on the one hand there seems to be a 
widespread misunderstanding of what a “concept” is, and that, in turn, led to some 
confusion and some  criticisms of Canguilhem’s conceptual approach. I hope the previous 
analyses provided a new perspective on Canguilhem’s epistemology that breaks with the 
image of him as being a philosopher of disembodied concepts. Despite the fundamental 
role of concepts in both science and its history, Canguilhem rarely explained what a 
concept is, and what the nature of a philosophy of science based on the analysis of 
concepts could possibly mean. Philosophers and historians have tended to assume that 
the notion of a “concept” in Canguilhem’s writings was straightforward and transparent, 
and some crucial aspects of the formation of concepts have been overlooked, caricatured, 
or simply ignored over time such as the relation between concept formation and various 
epistemic practices. As a consequence, concepts in Canguilhem’s philosophy have 
somehow become understood as free-floating entities, with no connection whatsoever to 
either experiment or theory. This idealized history of science was further accused of 
neglecting the role of institutions and influences in the growth of science. The previous 
sections illustrated that, on the contrary, the formation of biological and biomedical 
concepts is always grounded in a set of experimental practices. It was shown that the kind 
of epistemology Canguilhem provided is one deeply embedded and embodied in concrete 
scientific practices, where experimentation has a privileged place. As a consequence, if 
one wants to talk about a genealogy of concepts as a sound methodological approach for 
the history of the life sciences, one should do so by linking it to a genealogy of 
experimental practices that accompany them and operationalize them in various ways.  
To come back to the criticisms of conceptual history described at the beginning of the 
chapter, Hodge’s point of contention was that the “concept” is not a relevant unit of 
analysis for the history of science because it is a “product, an achievement, not a process 
or a goal” (2000, 72). We have seen, however, that concepts cannot easily be grasped as 
“product” because they are changing and morphing entities. To use a more recent label, 
scientific concepts are often “in flux” and this is precisely what makes them interesting 
entities to study scientifically, historically and philosophically (chapter 3). Concepts can 
become “achievements” in Hodge’s sense – for instance, the “reflex 1850” – but only 
temporarily before they go through another round of rectification process.  
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As to Latour’s critical remarks, suffice it to say here that firstly, as Mary Tiles recently 
observed, there is no doubt that historical epistemology is closer to social and political 
concerns than most of what is done in “epistemology” in the Anglo-American world in 
particular and in the philosophy of science more generally (2011). Secondly, although 
Canguilhem never exposed scientific knowledge as being “socially constructed”, his work 
showed that a number of key concepts such as regulation, disease or reflex, which are 
apparently neutral, are in fact value-laden and have significant impacts on social norms. 
Nowadays the label historical epistemology is commonly used to characterize very 
different thinkers including Husserl, Cavaillès, Fleck, Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault, 
and a plurality of research projects such as Daston’s, Renn’s, and Rheinberger’s. What 
seems to unite most of these projects is the emphasis placed on the need to historicize 
epistemological categories which were once taken for granted, while at the same time 
avoiding the trap of relativism or social constructivism.  
Finally, how can we reconcile Canguilhem’s disavowal for the label of historical 
epistemology with the strong intuition that it is the most compelling way to describe 
Canguilhem’s approach? As indicated above, if we accept Gingras’ account of historical 
epistemology as being primarily a philosophical project, there is no reason not to include 
the work of Canguilhem under this categorization. But there is another way to look at it. 
According to the interpretation of Rheinberger in On Historicizing Epistemology (2010b) 
historical epistemology is not a concerted “research programme” and is not reducible to 
the work of a few isolated individuals. Historical epistemology captures a deep trend in 
the history of philosophy of science itself, one that includes the work of Canguilhem. 
Under the heading of historical epistemology, Rheinberger brings together a deeper, 
double movement of the “historicization of the philosophy of science” and the 
“epistemologization of the history of science” starting in the late nineteenth century 
science and continuing throughout the twentieth century (2010b, 3-4). In replacing 
Canguilhem’s contributions within this larger historical perspective and in reassessing his 
philosophical legacy it is hoped that his work will continue to stir the development of 
historical epistemology on both sides of the Rhine and beyond to create a genuinely 
integrated approach to the history and philosophy of science.    
77 
 
CHAPTER 2: DARWIN, EVOLUTION, AND MEDICINE: HISTORICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Centenary commemorations provide long-awaited opportunities to explore the 
influence of scientific ideas, concepts, and methods developed previously, but also allow 
deconstructing myths and revisiting historical claims, or omissions. Monographs 
commemorating the work of Charles Darwin (1809-1882) typically embrace a wide range 
of topics on which the theory of evolution has thrown some light, but the influence of 
Darwinism in medicine and the health sciences was until recently often left out in the 
dark.54 The essays gathered in Darwinism and Modern Science (1909), published on the 
occasion of Darwin’s hundredth birthday and the fiftieth anniversary of On the Origin of 
Species (1859), for instance, explored how the theory of evolution impacted on other 
branches of the natural and social sciences, including philosophy and history, but did not 
touch upon the topic of health and disease. At least one physician addressed the question 
directly this year, however. In his Bradshaw lecture on “Darwinism and Medicine”, J.A. 
Lindsay, working at Queen’s University in Belfast, considered the “significance of Darwin’s 
great discovery for medical thought and practice” (1909, 1325). Musing on the nature of 
disease, Lindsay concluded that it [disease] “becomes something more than a 
disagreeable and embarrassing fact when we realize how closely it is related to 
evolutionary processes”. Disease, he continues, “even takes its place – a temporary place 
we may hope – in the eternal order” (1909, 1331). Evolution in the Light of Modern 
Knowledge published a few years later (Bateson and Seward 1925) contained no 
contribution on medicine and evolution either, however. This neglect was noticed by a 
professor of pathology in London who, one year later, wrote an essay in The Lancet 
entitled “Disease in the light of evolution” in the hope “to supply the missing chapter” 
(1926, 1075).  
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 See Bateson and Seward (1909).  
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The second important commemoration of Darwin’s work marked the centenary of 
the publication of On the Origin in 1959 appeared to have had equally little to say about 
the relations between evolutionary biology and medicine.55 Yet evolutionary biology has 
crossed path with medicine more than once during the last 150 years, although the 
changing nature of these interactions has only begun to be addressed historically and 
philosophically (Zampieri 2009a; Zampieri 2009b; Bynum 2002; Bynum 1983). In 2009, 
however, the question as to how do Darwin’s theories relate to medicine historically, and 
what the relations between the medical sciences and evolutionary biology are today, was 
at the center of numerous workshops held worldwide and was, at the same time, the 
focus of several scientific publications in medical journals.56 In fact, since more than 
twenty years the nature and causes of health and disease are increasingly being 
addressed in the light of evolution, a shift that indicates a global change in both the public 
and scientific perception of the role of evolutionary biology in medicine and the health 
sciences broadly construed.  
While the progressive growth of mechanistic explanations of disease can be regarded 
as “one of the most salient features of the development of medicine over the past three 
centuries” (Tracy 1992, 53; Campaner 2011), we have recently witnessed rapid 
developments in evolutionary explanations of disease (Williams and Nesse 1991, Nesse 
and Williams 1996; Stearns 1999; Trevathan et al. 2008; Stearns and Koella 2008; 
Gluckman et al. 2009). This current trend is reﬂected in a number of international 
conferences that aim to assess the medical consequences of the evolutionary past of 
human beings and to negotiate a space for the teaching of evolution in medical schools 
(see Nesse et al. 2010). Sometimes these evolutionary perspectives go under the heading 
of “Darwinian medicine”, but occasionally, the term “evolutionary medicine” is used 
instead. This is done on the grounds that the term Darwinian medicine narrows the 
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 In a lengthy essay Smocovitis (1999) relates the organization of the 1959 centenary in the United States 
by the Darwin Centennial Committee. To the exception of Ilza Veith who was from the department of 
medicine and was interested in the history of medicine, the other committee members were from the 
departments of zoology, geography, and paleontology. Veith’s own contribution to the centenary, however, 
was not on medicine but on “Creation and Evolution in the Far East” (Smocovitis 1999, 318).   
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 See The Evolution and Medicine Review (online), and the contributions in the special issue in The Lancet, 
December 2008.   
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concept of evolution to the processes of natural selection and adaptation while 
evolutionary medicine is more general and acknowledges other important aspects of the 
theory of evolution such as symbiosis, the role of epigenetic processes, and so on 
(Swynghedauw 2004; Lewis 2008). However, the nomenclature is not ﬁrmly established, 
and often, the expressions are used interchangeably (Zampieri 2009b, 347).  
As one of my goals for this chapter, I defend a methodological distinction between 
two evolutionary approaches that I have sketched elsewhere (Méthot 2009; 2011). I think 
that the terms Darwinian medicine and evolutionary medicine are useful for expressing 
the contrast between the two orientations. I follow Stephen Lewis (2008) in drawing this 
distinction, but in contrast with Lewis, what I propose is informed by David Buller’s 
distinction between Evolutionary Psychology as speciﬁc to the work of John Tooby and 
Leda Cosmides and evolutionary psychology broadly construed (Buller 2007, 256). Buller’s 
distinction is important because it permits the distinctiveness of the former to be 
characterized and contrasted with other kinds of biological explanations of human 
behaviour, which involve evolutionary biology, such as evolutionary anthropology or 
human behavioural ecology. Similarly, I want to argue that distinguishing evolutionary 
from Darwinian medicine will help us assess the variety of roles that evolutionary 
explanations can play in a number of medical contexts. Because the boundaries of 
evolutionary and Darwinian medicine overlap to some extent, however, they are best 
described as distinct “research traditions” rather than as competing paradigms.57  
In this chapter, I focus especially on two styles of evolutionary explanations of 
disease in order to render more precisely the distinction between these two research 
traditions. I begin by drawing a contrast between evolutionary and Darwinian medicine. 
Then I give a more ﬁne-grained critical description of the ﬁeld of Darwinian medicine. 
Finally, I show that evolutionary and Darwinian medicine can also be distinguished with 
respect to the styles of evolutionary explanations they employ. Whereas the former 
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 Recently, Nesse suggested that “in order to provide a designation as general and inclusive as possible” he 
prefers to call the field neither Darwinian medicine nor evolutionary medicine but “evolution and medicine” 
(2007, 419). Terminology aside, my distinction is intended not to promote a division of labour among 
practitioners but rather to draw attention to the different methodological principles and underlying 
assumptions that guide research in this area, in addition to some possible historical connections with older 
research traditions.   
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primarily involves “forward looking” explanations, the latter depends mostly on 
“backward looking” explanations. A forward looking explanation tries to predict the 
effects of ongoing evolutionary processes on human health and disease in contemporary 
environments (e.g., hospitals). In contrast, a backward looking explanation typically 
applies evolutionary principles from the vantage point of the evolutionary past of humans 
(here, the Pleistocene epoch) in order to assess present states of health and disease 
among populations. The contrast between these two explanatory styles can also be 
captured by the distinction between a theoretically and a practically oriented approach; 
whereas evolutionary medicine seeks to devise practical solutions to medical problems 
based on speciﬁc applications of evolutionary biology’s toolbox, Darwinian medicine, in 
contrast, stresses the need to compare past and present populations from an 
evolutionary point of view in order to gain insights into why we in the present get sick. 
Both approaches, however, are ultimately concerned with the prevention and control of 
human diseases. To illustrate how forward looking explanations can work I develop the 
example of the evolution of antibiotic resistance. First, however, I provide an overview of 
the relations between the history of Darwinism and medicine in order to contextualize 
the recent development of Darwinian and evolutionary medicine. 
 
CHARLES DARWIN AND THE DOCTORS 
Despite not being a doctor himself Charles Darwin had “medicine in his blood”, so 
historian of medicine William Bynum said (1983, 43). Indeed, the young Charles may have 
dropped out of his medical studies in Edinburgh (1825-1827) to study theology in 
Cambridge and later natural history, but he grew up in close contact with medical 
doctors, including his own father and grand-father, the colourful Erasmus Darwin. During 
most of his professional life Darwin’s friends and scientific correspondents included many 
doctors like Henry Holland, John Scott Burdon-Sanderson, William B. Carpenter, Lawson 
Tait, and James Paget (Towers 1968). Darwin’s own experience with chronic, but 
intermittent, illness resulted in his frequently undergoing various medical treatments.58 
Toward the end of his life Darwin was pleased to bear witness to the development of one 
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 The nature and cause(s) of Darwin’s illness have been the focus of much speculation and are still debated 
nowadays. For a recent view see Hayman (2009). 
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of medicine’s most powerful theory: the germ theory of disease, as developed by Pasteur 
and Koch. In a letter to botanist and bacteriologist Ferdinand Cohn in 1877, Darwin wrote:  
 
I remember saying to myself, between twenty and thirty years ago, that if 
ever the origin of any infectious disease could be proved, it would be the 
greatest triumph to science; and now I rejoice to have seen the triumph 
(quoted in Bynum 1983, 52).   
 
Whilst the development of the medical sciences during the nineteenth century had 
relatively little impact on Darwin’s own scientific work, the converse is not true – indeed 
quite to the contrary. As the London physician K.W. Millican indicated in his monograph 
on The Evolution of Morbid Germs, “the general application of the great doctrine of 
evolution to disease appears to have been more or less distinctly ʻin the airʼ for some 
considerable time” (1883, 44). More precisely, and as Bynum rightly noted (1983, 46), 
medical practitioners rapidly turned to Darwin’s evolutionary theory and to his work on 
heredity (Darwin 1868) to understand both the “diseases of evolution” (hereditary 
diseases) and “the evolution of diseases” (infectious diseases). Drawing on the Origin of 
Species epidemiologists and public health officers relied, on the one hand, on the 
concepts of natural selection and adaptation to explain the remarkable virulence seen 
during epidemics in terms of ongoing evolution (or lack thereof) between hosts and 
microorganisms (Thorne Thorne 1882; Airy 1878), and those concepts also provided early 
bacteriologists a way to reconcile the observable and sometimes puzzling variation in 
infectious diseases with the claim that diseases have a specific cause (e.g. a bacterium). 
On the other hand, physicians and surgeons who studied the transmission patterns of 
specific pathologies from one generation to the next, and how these traits sometimes 
disappear, revert, and suddenly reappear in a discontinuous but heritable fashion in 
offspring, emphasized yet another aspect of Darwin’s work, namely his theory of 
heredity, or pangenesis (Paget 1883; Hutchinson 1884; Bland-Sutton 1890; Haycraft 
1894). For, building on the breeders’ knowledge of inheritance and on Prosper Lucas’s 
(1805-1885) Traité philosophique et physiologique de l’hérédité naturelle (1847), Darwin’s 
Variation of Plants and Animals under Domestication (1868) supported the view that 
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inheritance can be adaptive as well as maladaptive, as hereditary diseases indicate. This is 
but one aspect of the “dark side” of evolution which remains an underappreciated aspect 
of Darwin’s work even today (Müller-Wille 2009).59 In addition, old medical concepts of 
constitution, predisposition to disease, and diathesis were, at the time, reinterpreted 
from an evolutionary point of view as well (Zampieri 2009a). Diseases of evolution also 
included “disease of modern life” which would later be called “diseases of civilization”. 60 
On the whole, unraveling the genealogical trajectory of diseases through Darwinian 
concepts provided a new understanding of a number of pathologies, social or otherwise, 
in the late nineteenth century.  
Although one should not draw the line between the “evolution of diseases” and the 
“diseases of evolution” too sharply – indeed, germ theorists also believed that pathogenic 
germs can undergo “reversion” and “atavism” – late nineenth century medical scientists 
appear to have applied Darwin’s theories to medicine to two broad lines of thinking 
(Bynum 1983). Moreover, one can trace significant continuities between these two ways 
of understanding the role of evolution in medicine and today’s Darwinian and 
evolutionary medicine: the former inquiring into the origins and nature of humans’ 
adaptations (and maladaptation) and their hereditary transmission, and the latter 
focusing on the factors influencing the evolution of infectious diseases. Like their 
analogues in the late nineteenth century, these new evolutionary trends to disease and 
health sometimes overlap while they also bear the marks of older research traditions 
from which they derive. 
 
DARWINISM AND EUGENICS 
The period spanning 1880 to 1940 – recently labeled the era of “medical Darwinism” 
– saw the publication of a large number of medical articles, books, reviews, and letters on 
“Darwin”, “Darwinism” or “evolution” in leading journals such as the British Medical 
Journal and the Journal of American Medical Association (Zampieri 2009a). This flow of 
publications, however, radically came to a halt in the aftermath of the Second World War, 
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 The most direct application of Darwin’s theory of inheritance to disease is Ross (1872) and his graft 
theory of disease which he based on the hypothesis of pangenesis.  
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 See Benjamin Ward Richardson’s Diseases of Modern Life (1889).  
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save for a noticeable peak in the mid-50s on the occasion of the centenary of the 
publication of On the Origin of Species. It will have escaped no one that eugenics – the 
idea of artificially selecting for (or against) specific (presumably) heritable traits among 
human populations – was a major force in shaping the relations between the medical 
sciences and evolutionary biology from the publication of Darwin’s Origin until the mid-
1940s and beyond (Harwood 1989). The idea of an organized selective mating process 
emerged, and gained wide acceptance, within the particular context of Victorian society, 
in which scientists, lay persons, and politicians of all allegiances expressed concerns about 
the forces of degeneration they perceived to act on the mental, the physical, and indeed 
the moral, abilities of individuals. In Britain, but also outside it, a large fraction of the 
population regarded rather anxiously the long-term impact of medicine on the 
preservation of the “less-fit” (e.g. the so-called “feebleminded”), as much as they feared 
its larger effects on the economy, politics, and society writ large.  
The then-perceived consequences for society of tampering with the law of natural 
selection weeding out ill-adapted or diseased individuals, and permitting them instead to 
live and to reproduce, were regularly addressed from a medical point of view. For 
instance, in 1869 the Birmingham surgeon Lawson Tait (1845-1899) asked whether “the 
law of natural selection by survival of the fittest failed in the case of man”.61 Tait, a 
pioneer of ovarian surgery, corresponded widely with Charles Darwin whose theories he 
painstakingly sought to support through his own medical work (Shepherd 1982). In his 
1869 essay, however, Tait was primarily concerned with the apparent tension that 
“medical science enables the diseased to live, those whom it saves from dying 
prematurely it preserves to propagate dismal and imperfect lives” (Tait 1869). Darwin was 
not estranged to these discussions although he did not himself encourage the practice of 
eugenics. In The Descent of Man (1871), he expressed the same concerns as those voiced 
by Tait and others before him about the effects of a prolonged relaxation of natural 
selection – partly made possible thanks to medical advances (e.g. small-pox vaccination) – 
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 The possibility that natural selection does not operate in human societies was already addressed a year 
earlier by William, R. Greg in a polemical essay “On the failure of natural selection in the case of man 
(1868). This essay, not written by a medical man, contains remarks that parallel Tait’s reasoning. For 
instance, Greg notes in his conclusion that “medical science is mitigating suffering, and achieving some 
success in its warfare against disease; but at the same time it enables the diseased to live” (1868, 362).   
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for the march of societies toward progress (1871, 168). However, and in contrast, Darwin 
noted that the sympathy instincts that lead us to give protection to the “imbecile, the 
maimed, and the sick” are themselves the product of evolution by natural selection, and 
suppressing those instincts would be impossible “without deterioration in the noblest 
part of our nature” (1871, 168-9).  
In 1869, Francis Galton (1822- 1911) – who was Charles Darwin’s cousin and who 
coined the word “eugenics” in 1883 – published The Hereditary Genius, a very influential 
book in which he inquired into whether human abilities were heritable, separating for the 
very first time the realms of nature and culture, and stressing, against Darwin, the “unity 
of type” over individual variations. Faithful to his eugenics utopia, Galton saw the use of 
artificial selection as the easiest and quickest way to achieve what natural selection would 
eventually realize (Gayon, forthcoming). Some medical men had more temperate views 
on how one should envision the relations between evolution and the medical sciences, 
however. In his Bradshaw Lecture on “Darwinism and Medicine” delivered at the Royal 
College of Physicians in 1909, J.A. Lindsay raised doubts regarding the ability of doctors to 
effectively control births and maintain “the purity of the race”. Amidst subtle ethical 
overtones he warned, though, that “the possibility of reversion and degeneration will 
always have to be reckoned with” (1909, 1331). A few years later the biometrician and 
then-director of the Francis Galton Eugenics Laboratory in London, Karl Pearson (1857-
1936), gave a Cavendish lecture at the West London Medico-Chirurgical Society titled 
“Darwinism, Medical Progress, and Eugenics”. In his talk, Pearson did not hesitate to 
argue that Darwinism and medical progress are radically “opposed forces” and that the 
tension between them could indeed only be resolved through the implementation of 
strict eugenics policies of birth control (1912, 27).  
With the rediscovery of Mendel’s laws of inheritance circa 1900 and the beginning of 
genetics Pearson’s project of birth control became to a large extent a social and political 
reality for countless individuals.62 In effect, at the turn of the twentieth century positive 
and negative forms of eugenics practices (e.g. sterilization laws) blossomed in several 
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 Pearson, however, was fiercely opposed to Mendelian genetics. On the debate between biometricians 
and Mendelians see Olby (1988).  
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North American and European countries, including the United States, Canada, Sweden, 
Britain, and Denmark (Kevles 1985). When the association of Nazi crimes during the 
Second World War with a number of eugenics movements was brought to light, the 
application of Darwinian concepts to “medical” questions became for a time morally 
untenable, at least publically. Possibly, this is the main cause of the discernible “oblivion” 
of evolutionary approaches to medicine in the second half of the twentieth century (see 
Zampieri 2009a, 24). 
 Eugenicist concerns with racial degeneration, though publically dismissed, did not 
disappear at once after the war and the revelation of the concentration camps; such 
concerns continued to be promulgated by prominent medical scientists and geneticists 
until the 1960s in the United States, Britain, and Germany (Paul 1984), but also 
elsewhere, and afterwards. The Australian immunologist and Nobel Prize Winner Frank 
Macfarlane Burnet (1899-1985), for instance, expressed strong eugenicist opinions, not 
too dissimilar from those of Pearson and others before him, during a symposium on The 
Impact of Civilization of Man held in Canberra in 1968. As the chairman of the meeting 
Burnet argued that given the social patterns in today’s society there was no hope of 
avoiding “genetic deterioration”, and consequently scientists would fail their 
responsibilities if “opportunities for rational birth control are not made equally effective 
through all classes of all human communities” (1970, xvi-xix).  
Forty years on, while new work in genetics and genomics is giving rise to further 
medical applications such as pre-natal testing, genetic screening for various hereditary 
diseases, and so on, attempts are frequently made to separate the new genetics from the 
old eugenics (see Hansen, Janz, Sobsey 2008). Yet while the new genetics is often branded 
as being individually empowering, medically predictive, voluntary, protective of individual 
rights, and based on accurate science, it is not always possible to demarcate it sharply 
from old eugenics (Ekberg 2007). In the light of the complex and problematic history of 
medical progress and evolutionary thinking during the twentieth century, it hardly comes 
as a surprise that one of the constant challenges faced by any kind of evolutionary 
approach to health and disease nowadays is to safely distance itself from this eugenicist 
past. Randolph Nesse and George Williams were fully aware of the potential misreading 
of their project when they labeled it “Darwinian medicine” (Williams and Nesse 1991). As 
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they wrote, one of the main obstacles for physicians to embrace an evolutionary 
perspective is that “of course, whenever evolution and medicine are mentioned together, 
the specter of eugenics arises” (Nesse and Williams 1998, 92). Although eugenics was 
certainly a powerful factor, both in making and dissolving the relations between medicine 
and evolutionary biology, more subtle evolutionary approaches to disease have crossed 
the twentieth century, relatively unaffected by the political turmoil (chapter 4, 5). In 
subsequent sections I will instead try to depict how the relations between evolutionary 
biology and medicine were remade once again from the early 1990s onwards and how we 
can detect significant historical and conceptual continuities between these new research 
projects and the way in which Darwin’s work was read by medical doctors in the late 
nineteenth century.   
 
EVOLUTIONARY MEDICINE  
Evolutionary medicine is the study of the evolution of diseases, to use Bynum’s 
terminology, and it focuses on the large and increasing number of illnesses that 
evolutionary biology’s conceptual and methodological resources can shed some light on. 
Typical examples include the evolution of infectious diseases, antibiotic resistance, the 
evolution of virulence, etc. In that sense, evolutionary medicine has a long tradition that 
predates the birth of Darwinian medicine by many decades. Indeed, although Charles 
Darwin himself said little about medicine per se, evolution-oriented accounts of infectious 
diseases, for instance, were progressively advanced by medical doctors and 
epidemiologists a few decades after the publication of On the Origin of Species, as 
discussed above (Bynum 1983). On this view, germs that cause disease result from long 
evolutionary processes through which they have progressively acquired (or lost) their 
pathogenic power. Similarly, in vivo laboratory experiments provided evidence that 
changes induced in microorganisms were heritable. In this sense, Louis Pasteur’s 
laboratory experiments on variable virulence in bacterial strains could also be regarded as 
an early example of evolutionary medicine, where evolutionary thinking provided new 
ways of intervening on disease, for instance, by controlling the level of virulence in the 
production of standardized vaccines (Mendelsohn 2002). Across the twentieth century, 
attempts to understand the origin, evolution and decline of infectious diseases from 
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various viewpoints such as bacteriology, molecular biology, or ecology underline the 
history of evolutionary medicine from the late nineenth century up to the present day. 
As I see it, evolutionary medicine does not stand out as a new scientiﬁc ﬁeld of its 
own, however. To put it differently, evolutionary medicine is not a theoretically uniﬁed 
scientiﬁc domain but, rather, a collection of different research agendas. Scientists doing 
evolutionary medicine draw on different ﬁelds such as population genetics, microbiology, 
bacterial genetics, ecology, immunology, and, of course, evolutionary biology to 
understand and regulate medical problems. Accordingly, today’s evolutionary ecologists 
and epidemiologists interested in the dynamics and ecology of infectious diseases, 
emergent diseases (e.g., HIV-AIDS, H1N1 ﬂu, Ebola virus, etc.), and host-pathogen 
coevolution are engaged in evolutionary medicine, sometimes without knowing it. It 
would therefore be a mistake to think that evolutionary medicine has a strong internal 
cohesion in terms of epistemology and methodology. Applying Buller’s description of 
evolutionary psychology, evolutionary medicine is not a synthesis but, rather, “a loose 
confederation of research programs that differ signiﬁcantly in theoretical and 
methodological claims” (2007, 255).  
What is central, though, is that in this broader sense, evolutionary theory is 
employed to provide an additional axis of research to medical researchers, health care 
practitioners, clinicians, policy makers, and others. What unites evolutionary medicine is 
mainly the attempt to articulate questions about health and disease with concepts and 
methods drawn from evolutionary biology in order to devise practical solutions to 
pressing medical problems. Evolutionary biology provides medicine with an additional 
level of explanation for disease that can lead to new technological applications, not a 
broad theoretical worldview as to why we get sick. In applying evolutionary principles in 
contemporary environments, for example, in hospital wards, intensive care units, and so 
on, evolutionary medicine seeks to address “real time” evolutionary issues of medical 
signiﬁcance such as the prediction and control of the evolution of infectious diseases or 
the evolution of resistant bacterial strains. In that sense, evolutionary medicine is 
characterized by what I call a “forward looking” mode of evolutionary explanation. 
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DARWINIAN MEDICINE  
There is a more uniﬁed tradition of evolutionary studies of medicine called 
“Darwinian medicine”, however. As mentioned above, this tradition is recent and began 
with the work of psychiatrist Randolph Nesse and evolutionary biologist George Williams 
in the early 1990s. It is now pursued by Stephen C. Stearns, Stanley. B. Eaton and others. 
Although this tradition is more recent, it also has historical roots and predecessors in the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century biology. Indeed, Darwinian medicine, 
at least as initially conceived, is in many ways analogous to the study of diseases of 
evolution in the late nineteenth century. Today, practitioners use the neo-Darwinian 
theory to understand the genealogical patterns of disease transmission; to determine 
why individuals are, or become, maladjusted to their environment; and to provide an 
evolutionary explanation of disease susceptibility framed in terms of our evolutionary 
past. Understanding patterns of disease in the light of the evolutionary trajectory of 
humankind stands out as a distinctive feature of Darwinian medicine and reflects its 
historical origin in one of the late nineteenth century answers to Darwin’s work.  
Whereas the forerunners of Darwinian medicine during the second half of the 
twentieth century were largely unsuccessful in promoting evolution-based medicine 
among larger audiences, Nesse and Williams’s Evolution and Healing: The New Science of 
Darwinian Medicine (Nesse and Wiliams 1996 [1994]) rapidly gained worldwide 
recognition. Nesse and Williams’ approach to disease benefited from several recent 
developments in medical genetics and medical anthropology. Given that their work drew 
on the work of Harvard evolutionary biologist Edward O. Wilson, who attempted to apply 
evolutionary principles to human behaviour, it is unsurprising that questions about 
human evolution, behaviour, and psychology were often intertwined in Darwinian 
medicine.  
In contrast with evolutionary medicine, Darwinian medicine is united by a number of 
distinctive theoretical and methodological claims that can be summarized as follow:  
 Adaptationism (methodological) is a good heuristic principle in medicine;  
 Functional and evolutionary explanations must be systematically articulated in 
order to understand vulnerability to disease;  
 Evolution provides medicine with an organizing theoretical framework, and the 
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potential domain for the application of evolutionary principles is unbounded;  
 Evolutionary principles are applied from the vantage point of the Pleistocene 
epoch (backward looking explanations);  
 Humans are generally maladapted to the modern environment (the mismatch 
hypothesis).  
In what follows, I will consider the ﬁrst three claims one-by-one and then the fourth 
and ﬁfth claims jointly.  
 
AN ADAPTATIONIST PROGRAM  
Following the evolutionary biologist Stephen J. Gould and population geneticist 
Richard C. Lewontin (1979), Williams and Nesse have described Darwinian medicine as 
being an “adaptationist programme” [1991, 3). Darwinian medicine’s adaptationism is 
primarily methodological. A methodological adaptationist assumes that “looking ﬁrst for 
adaptation is a useful research strategy” (Forber 2009, 156). In other words, it is “a 
suggestion about how […] best to organize investigation” (Godfrey-Smith 2001, 338). 
Williams and Nesse seem to satisfy the condition for being methodologically adaptationist 
by making the following recommendation: “When confronted with a biological 
phenomenon, try to envisage it as an aspect of an adaptation” (1991, 3). Applying this 
research strategy to medicine, they argue that “the adaptationist program predicts 
otherwise unsuspected adaptive processes” to be medically signiﬁcant (1991, 3; Nesse 
and Williams 1996, 21).  
In effect, methodological adaptationism leads to the reconsideration of the nature of 
a number of pathological reactions. One of Darwinian medicine’s central claims is that 
“many manifestations of illness are not defects in the body’s mechanisms, but 
sophisticated adaptations” (Nesse 1999, 353). This adaptationist stance is intended to 
provide a new way of looking at symptoms of bodily disease (e.g., pain, fever, iron 
deﬁciency, etc.) or mental disorder (e.g., panic attack, depression, etc.). Instead of 
thinking about these conditions in terms of symptoms of a disease, adherents of an 
adaptationist perspective stress instead their selective advantage (Nesse 1999). All this 
suggests a practical role for adaptationist thinking in clinical medicine (Nesse and Williams 
1996, 245–48). In effect, Williams and Nesse have argued that “clinical practice will also 
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beneﬁt from an evolutionary perspective” in the sense that evolutionary theory has 
“immediate practical utility when considering what to do about a low iron level in a 
person with a chronic infection, whether to suppress cough in a person with pneumonia, 
or when to adopt new technology” (1991, 17). For Williams and Nesse, “the 
adaptationist” doctor is thus better equipped to understand why diseases occur (ibid.).  
Treatment of disease, however, is unlikely to rest on evolutionary considerations 
alone (Gammelgaard 2000), as Darwinian medicine’s advocates themselves now 
recognize (Nesse and Stearns 2008). For instance, deciding whether or not to block fever 
will depend on a constellation of factors which are only very loosely related to the fact 
that fever is an evolved mechanism. In choosing to suppress fever, the nature of the 
disease and the patient’s sex and age—in addition to his general state of health and other 
conditions—are arguably of greater relevance than evolutionary knowledge. In cancer, for 
instance, fever is commonly associated with a high mortality rate (Dalal and Zhukovsky 
2006). Although the beneﬁts of applying adaptationist thinking to clinical medicine will 
require some more empirical work, Williams and Nesse rightly point out that it can lead 
physicians to better “appreciate compromises that are responsible for much disease” 
(1991, 17). Overall, Darwinian medicine rarely offers practical guidelines; its aim is to 
guide research instead (Nesse and Stearns 2008, 31).  
 
FUNCTIONAL AND EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATIONS OF DISEASE VULNERABILITY  
The goal of Darwinian medicine is to gain a better understanding of why members of 
our species get sick and to do so from an evolutionary standpoint (Nesse and Williams 
1996). In other words, Nesse and Williams wonder why the body is not better designed; 
why has natural selection left us vulnerable to disease? Using Ernst Mayr’s terminology 
(Mayr 1961), they argue that functional (or proximate) biology does not sufﬁce to explain 
disease, and so they urge that “each disease needs a proximate explanation of why some 
people get it and others don’t, as well as an evolutionary explanation of why members of 
the species are vulnerable to it” (Nesse and Williams 1998, 93). The case of sickle-cell 
anaemia is one of the clearest examples that bridge the gap between evolutionary and 
functional (or proximate) explanatory schemes. This emphasis on disease vulnerability is 
one of the most salient aspects of this research tradition. The idea is that “natural 
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selection shapes structures and functions that, being imperfect, are vulnerable to 
disease” (Zampieri 2009b, 348).  
Nesse and Stearns have distinguished six main reasons for disease vulnerability 
(2008), each one couched in terms of what natural selection can and cannot achieve. First 
and foremost, natural selection cannot (1) overcome the mismatch between genes 
inherited from the Pleistocene and modern environments because the response to 
selection is too slow. The speed at which selection operates also explains why (2) 
pathogens continually ﬁnd ways to circumvent our evolved defences. A number of (3) 
structural constraints and (4) historical trade-offs limit what natural selection can do to 
decrease disease vulnerability. Finally, the authors argue that natural selection (5) 
maximizes ﬁtness, not health, and (6) that a number of defences like pain and fever “are 
useful despite causing suffering and complications” (2008, 38). In brief, disease is not 
something that can be completely avoided and pathological situations are sometimes the 
inevitable downside of evolutionary adaptations.63  
The emphasis on the principle of natural selection to explain disease is perhaps 
overstated, however. Clearly, in most cases, natural selection will not be the causal factor 
that doctors will pick up on to explain the occurrence of pathologies among individual 
patients (but perhaps so at the population level). Counterfactually, though, a charitable 
interpretation of Darwinian medicine could grant that had the evolution of our species 
(including our commensal microbes) been different, we may have been less prone to 
some diseases but perhaps also would have been much more susceptible to others. In 
that sense, evolutionary biology does account, if only on very general grounds, for why 
members of our species are vulnerable to disease.  
 
APPLYING EVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES IN MEDICINE: AN UNBOUNDED PERSPECTIVE  
Another noticeable aspect of Darwinian medicine is that from its perspective, 
evolutionary biology is relevant virtually to every medically related discipline. In effect, for 
Nesse and Williams, “there is no branch of medicine that cannot beneﬁt substantially 
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 For a discussion of how to test and apply evolutionary hypotheses in medicine and in biology see Nesse 
(2011).  
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from an evolutionary approach in its research and, sometimes, its current clinical 
practice” (Nesse and Williams 1997, 664). In particular, “evolution provides an otherwise 
missing paradigm for understanding why our bodies are vulnerable to disease” (Nesse 
and Stearns 2008, 31), in addition to a “natural framework that “can link diverse aspects 
of medicine” (Williams and Nesse 1991, 18). Paraphrasing population geneticist 
Theodosius Dobzhansky (1973), Nesse and Williams have claimed that “nothing in 
medicine makes sense except in the light of evolution” (Nesse and Williams 1996, 249). I 
will return to this formulation in the conclusion of this chapter. The book edited by 
Trevathan et al. (2008) exempliﬁes the scope of Darwinian medicine’s research tradition 
(despite being titled Evolutionary Medicine and Health). Indeed, the introductory chapter 
announces that an evolutionary perspective is crucial to understanding a number of 
issues in medicine, such as infectious diseases (including, in this regard, vaccines, viruses, 
antibiotic resistance, and host-pathogen coevolution), psychological disorders (including 
depression, anxiety, and mood disorders), nutrition (diets), reproduction (including 
pregnancy, childbirth, infancy, and childhood), chronic diseases (including cardiovascular 
diseases), etc. In other words, evolutionary principles are used to investigate whether 
various biological, behavioural, sexual, and psychological aspects of human life are 
normal or pathological. From a Darwinian medicine perspective, there are no limits on 
the extent to which evolutionary explanations can be employed in medicine.  
However, it is sometimes unclear in what sense evolutionary principles are 
explanatory and/or useful. In his Evolution in Health and Disease, Stearns asserts that 
“Human sexual behaviour, reproduction, and the assurance of parenthood are affected 
by evolutionary forces, often with consequences for the welfare of sons versus daughters. 
Some of the reasons for the neglect and abuse of children are evolutionary” (Stearns 
1999, 6). No one would deny that the abuse of children is a very important and 
preoccupying social problem with potentially profound consequences for those children’s 
behaviours and psychologies. But it is not clear that child abuse is a medical problem in 
the same sense that heart disease is. In fact, Stearn’s example illustrates that in 
Darwinian medicine, social, familial, and psychological problems are insufﬁciently 
distinguished from genuinely medical ones. Moreover, it illustrates how the methodology 
of Darwinian medicine is related to that of Evolutionary Psychology.  
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THE MISMATCH HYPOTHESIS AND BACKWARD LOOKING EXPLANATIONS  
Unsurprisingly, for Darwinian medicine’s theoreticians, the way in which human 
beings have evolved is of central concern. This facet is reﬂected in their support of the 
mismatch hypothesis.64 It is signiﬁcant that some have argued that the most “crucial 
argument” in Darwinian medicine is that there is a “mismatch” between our genes, 
inherited from the Pleistocene era, and “present environmental conditions” 
(Swynghedauw 2004, 134) that causes a number of diseases (Eaton et al. 2002; Nesse 
2001, 45). Categories of mismatch range from nutrition to reproductive behaviour 
(Trevathan et al. 2008). In their ﬁrst coauthored paper, Williams and Nesse (1991) made a 
distinction between the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA) (see Bowlby 
1969), usually thought of as corresponding to the Pleistocene epoch (1.8 million to 10,000 
years ago), to which humans are allegedly “optimally” adapted, and the modern 
environment, which is “abnormal”, even “unnatural”, and plagued with the “diseases of 
civilization”, such as diabetes, obesity, cancer, drug addiction, and so on (Williams and 
Nesse 1991).  
The historian of medicine Charles Rosenberg once remarked that early Darwinian 
explanations of pathologies in the late nineteenth century conceptualized disease from 
the perspective of “humankind’s distant biological past” and attempted to derive 
“normative lessons about disease prevention and pathogenesis” based on “speculative 
models of prehistoric biological and social development” (Rosenberg 1998, 338). These 
remarks can be applied to Darwinian medicine as well. In effect, very much in the manner 
of Evolutionary Psychologists, Darwinian medicine’s theoreticians argue that humans are 
generally “maladapted” to modern environments and are, in contrast, well adapted to life 
in Pleistocene-like environments. Indeed, for Williams and Nesse, “human biology is 
designed for Stone Age conditions” (1991, 1). Both Darwinian medicine’s theoreticians 
and Evolutionary Psychologists appeal to the EEA concept to contrast variations in health 
                                                                
64
 It should be noted that Gluckman et al. (2009) are using a different concept of “mismatch” that brings in 
epigenetic and other developmental processes. Whereas Gluckman’s concept of mismatch concerns 
individuals who can be mismatched to their environment to various extents, Nesse’s concept bears on 
Homo sapiens. It is the latter concept that is being discussed in this section.  
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and disease between past and present societies. For example, they argue that “the 
current epidemics of arteriosclerosis, stroke, hypertension, diabetes, obesity, alcoholism, 
drug addiction and eating disorders result from the mismatch between our bodies and 
the environment in which we live now” (Nesse 2001, 45). On this view, the time lag 
between the evolutionary past of human beings and modern society signiﬁcantly shapes 
current states of health and disease among human populations. The argument usually 
given is that human biology was “optimally” designed by natural selection to meet a 
number of challenges under environmental conditions that no longer exist. At a more 
fundamental level, however, this view also seems to suggest that what is “normal” and 
what is “pathological” ought to be delineated in the light of this distant and somewhat 
hypothetical biological past. In other words, it is as if the idea of the normal was shaped 
during the geological era known as the Pleistocene, so that any deviation from this prior 
evolutionary state ultimately results in disease, pathology, or abnormality. This is at odd 
with the emphasis Darwin’s theory of natural selection places on the idea that biological 
forms are not fixed but are fluid and changing, and that organisms create new norms of 
life by adapting to different environments (Canguilhem 1991 [1966]).   
The mismatch hypothesis affects how health is understood, how it should be 
measured, and how such studies should be conducted. Firstly, for Darwinian medicine, 
the Pleistocene is the gold standard—the environment relative to which health and 
disease states are to be evaluated. In other words, the Pleistocene epoch operates as a 
benchmark in understanding common diseases in modern societies. As some have 
argued, “the most rewarding research [for understanding health differences] involves 
contrasts between present and previous humans” (Eaton et al. 2002, 115). This is typical 
of backward looking explanations in the sense that evolutionary principles are applied 
from the vantage point of the Pleistocene epoch. Secondly, because the paleontological 
and anthropological records of preagricultural societies are incomplete, contemporary 
hunter-gatherer populations are used as proxies for understanding the human 
evolutionary past. “When looking for risk factors for common disease”, Nesse and Stearns 
contend, “the ﬁrst question is whether the condition is equally common in hunter-
gatherer populations” (Nesse and Stearns 2008, 39). Again, Eaton et al. (2002, 113) have 
argued that “in order to provide an evolutionary foundation for preventive 
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recommendations [in medicine], the most pressing research need is to identify, contact, 
interview and examine remaining hunter-gatherers and other traditional people 
throughout the world”.  
Although Williams and Nesse do not “advocate a return to any earlier way of life” 
(1991, 14), it is clear that the proponents of Darwinian medicine account for health and 
disease variations on the basis of whether individuals comply with regimens, life styles, 
etc. that prevailed in the social environments of the Stone Age. Cancer research specialist 
Mel Greaves, for instance, stresses that “the mismatch that increases the risk of breast 
(and ovarian) cancer falls on women in modern or afﬂuent societies who do not conform 
to hunter-gatherer lifestyles with respect to reproductive patterns, including breast-
feeding” (Greaves 2008, 283). This view, thus, has normative implications regarding what 
is normal and abnormal beheviour in terms of health, and suggests that a number of 
diseases result from changes in social and physical environmental conditions broadly 
construed. One of the challenges this backward looking style of explanation faces, 
though, is to give empirical content to the EEA concept on which the mismatch argument 
rests.  
There are, however, a number of well-known worries associated with the EEA 
concept. Firstly, it “discards human evolution” before and after somewhat arbitrary cutoff 
points (Strassmann and Dunbar 1999, 101), even though human evolution almost 
certainly began long before and continued on after the Pleistocene era (Downes 2010). 
From an evolutionary point of view, other transitions, such as to agricultural modes of 
life, probably played a more crucial role in shaping human health and disease (Strassmann 
and Dunbar 1999). Interestingly, the evolution of adult tolerance for lactose and 
resistance to malaria (the latter among heterozygous individuals) are linked to the spread 
of agriculture and evolved after the end of the EEA, that is, during the last 10,000 years 
(Ibid.). More importantly, the Pleistocene argument provides a generally inadequate 
picture of what it means to say that organisms are “adapted” to their environment. In 
effect, to say that a trait is “adapted” to a particular environment “is simply shorthand to 
say that the trait was selected over alternative traits in that environment” (Buller 2005, 
435). Thus, saying that the EEA is the normal and natural environment of the human 
species by no means entails that the phenotypes and genotypes of Homo sapiens were 
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“designed” for or “optimally” adjusted to their Stone Age surroundings. All it can possibly 
mean is that some variants of particular traits scored higher in terms of ﬁtness than 
others did in that particular environment. But just as some traits that evolved during the 
Pleistocene era are now maladaptive, others may be even better adapted today, as amply 
demonstrated by the reproductive success of the human species.  
Finally, to suggest that hunter-gatherer populations were “optimally” adapted to 
their environment gives the incorrect impression that the Stone Age was a sort of golden 
age. Anthropologists sometimes (unintentionally) reinforce this perception. For instance, 
Kiple writes that “early humans were blessed with nutritional plenty and a life relatively 
untroubled by disease” and that “hunter-gatherers were relatively disease-free” (Kiple 
2006, 11–24). While Darwinian medicine’s advocates do not hesitate to describe the EEA 
in empirical terms, they acknowledge at the same time that they “rarely have enough 
information about past environments and past lifestyles to make a strong assertion about 
the environment of evolutionary Adaptedness”. Yet, they maintain that “such hypotheses 
are interesting and worth further exploration” (Stearns and Ebert 2001, 427). In light of 
the conceptual and empirical problems raised by the concept of the EEA one has to be 
careful in making medical recommendations such as “Stone Age diets”, etc., on the basis 
of the mismatch hypothesis alone (Eaton et al. 2002). However, the main point of the 
mismatch hypothesis is that bodies are more vulnerable to disease when they exist in 
environments which differ from those in which they evolved. And this point remains valid 
despite the series of problems that faces the mismatch concept.  
 
A FORWARD LOOKING VIEW: THE EVOLUTION OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE  
We have seen that a backward mode of disease explanation is a central and 
somewhat problematic aspect of Darwinian medicine. But whether humans have evolved 
their physiological features during a particular era is largely irrelevant for a physician in 
his day-to-day practice. Proximate medicine, so to speak, is usually sufﬁcient for treating 
disease. Yet, it may be that to successfully treat and/or prevent disease, health 
professionals will sometimes need to understand ongoing evolutionary processes. In this 
section, I introduce another way of thinking about the role of evolution in medicine by 
drawing on the notion philosopher of science Paul Grifﬁths called a “forward looking” 
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explanation. This approach is underpinned by the idea that what matters for the 
promotion of health and reduction of disease is not only that organisms are “things that 
have evolved”—the evolutionary history of which we should reconstruct—but also that 
they are “things that are evolving” (Griffiths 2009, 14). Unsurprisingly, forward looking 
explanations are mostly used in the context of the interactions of humans and 
microorganisms (viruses, bacteria, and so on) that can potentially induce health problems. 
By focusing on the different and much smaller reproductive timescale of these entities we 
can see evolution at work.  
Consider the recent studies on antibiotic resistance and one of its consequences, the 
spread of nosocomial (i.e., hospital-acquired) diseases. Because the generation time is 
much shorter for bacteria than for humans, however, pathogens eventually ﬁnd ways to 
circumvent our immunological defences. The evolutionary aspect of antibiotic resistance 
in bacteria has long been recognized by microbiologists and remains one of the best 
examples of evolution in “real time”. However, the selection of resistance genes in 
bacterial populations continues to be largely under-appreciated by physicians, as a recent 
study demonstrates (Antonovics et al. 2007). While antibiotic resistance largely remains 
unacknowledged as a formal “clinical problem”, it nonetheless has begun to be 
recognized as a “long-term evolutionary issue”, notably in intensive care units where it is 
most problematic (van Saene et al. 2005, 597).  
Resistance to drugs means that the efﬁcacy of antibiotic treatments against bacterial 
infections is decreasing and new treatments have to be developed in order to ﬁght the 
continually emerging resistant strains that make common diseases more difﬁcult and 
expensive to treat (Kollef 2006). In effect, from the 1960s until today, bacteria have been 
developing multiple resistances to a large number of antibiotic classes, including 
macrolides, methicillin, vancomycyn, and more recently, linezolid (Genereux and 
Bergstrom 2005). The evolution of drug resistance has many causes, but three main 
mechanisms are responsible for the augmentation of resistance: (1) the occurrence of 
mutations on single nucleotides; (2) homologous (or intraspecies) recombination; and (3) 
heterologous (or interspecies) recombination (Bergstrom and Feldgarden 2008). At the 
population level, conditions conducive to the development of resistance include the 
utilization of broad-spectrum antibiotics (i.e., targeting both gram-positive and gram-
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negative bacteria), the over-the-counter availability of antibiotics (in many developing 
countries), unnecessary prescriptions (e.g., for upper-respiratory infections that are often 
of viral origin), and large-scale agricultural use (Cohen 2000).  
The massive use of antibiotics in hospitals, however, is now widely acknowledged as 
one of the main factors in the evolution of resistance (Goosens et al. 2005). Indeed, the 
hospital environment creates a formidable selective pressure, which favours the survival 
and the reproduction of the most resistant bacteria and thereby diminishes the efﬁcacy of 
the available treatments. For example, the widespread use of b-lactam antibiotics in 
clinical contexts has prompted the evolution of resistant strains. The response to this 
selective pressure has been the evolution of b-lactamase enzymes (encoded by the TEM-1 
gene) capable of degrading a large number of b-lactam antibiotics and rendering them 
inactive (Barlow and Hall 2002a).  
One of the most direct consequences of this massive use of antibiotics, and 
consequently the evolution of resistance, is the increasing number of nosocomial diseases 
(e.g., blood infections, urinary and respiratory tract infections), which pose a threat to 
patients, especially in intensive-care units (ICU) where they are immunocompromised and 
acutely ill (Bergstrom, Lo, and Lipstich 2004). As many as 90,000 patients may die of 
nosocomial infections each year in the U.S. alone (Bergstrom and Feldgarden 2008, 
125).65 Indeed, the presence of resistant bacterial strains that are well adapted to the 
hospital environment (e.g. methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus) stimulates the 
multiplication of this particular type of infection. But frequently, nosocomial infections 
result from commensal bacterial ﬂora that become “pathogenic when they multiply in 
normally sterile sites such as the lower respiratory tract or the blood” (Lipstich, 
Bergstrom, and Levin 2000, 1938). Hand washing, isolation, and the use of narrow-
spectrum antibiotics are among the earliest measures tailored to prevent the spread of 
infections in hospitals. Recently, more sophisticated methods aimed at counteracting 
bacterial resistance, based on evolutionary theory and natural selection, have been 
developed. These include in vitro, or “directed evolution”, models (Barlow and Hall 
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 There are a number of difﬁculties concerning how to measure the ways in which nosocomial diseases 
affect mortality, morbidity, and costs that I shall put to one side; see Marshall and Marshall (2005). 
99 
 
2002a) and “cycling” and “mixing” antibiotics (Kollef 2006). Whereas the former draw 
extensively on genetic tools and molecular biology, the latter appeal largely to ecological 
theory to predict the evolution of resistance. This illustrates the heterogeneity of 
methodologies and approaches in evolutionary medicine. I outline each of them in turn.  
 
IN VITRO EVOLUTION: MIRRORING NATURE 
In vitro evolution is about engineering resistant genes in order to “predict” antibiotic 
resistance. This technique was precisely developed “for the speciﬁc purpose of predicting 
how resistance genes will evolve in nature” (Barlow and Hall 2002b, 1237). TEM-1 
resistant genes, in particular, have been extensively studied because they confer 
resistance to b-lactam antibiotics such as penicillin, which are widely used in the clinic to 
treat a large number of infections because of their nontoxicity. In vitro evolution consists 
in evolving a gene (e.g. TEM-1) in a host (usually E. coli) by inducing a number of 
mutations through a mutagenesis technique. Plasmids are used to express the genes of 
interest, which are then classiﬁed into “libraries” where they are subjected to a number 
of different antibiotics to see whether resistance mutations will be selected. The in vitro 
evolution method is based on the assumption that evolution in the lab and evolution in 
nature are analogous processes. This assumption rests on some evidence provided by 
Barlow and Hall (2002a; 2002b). Their basic idea was to see whether in vitro evolution 
would recover the same mutations as those that occurred in nature. In the case of b-
lactams, phylogenetic methods had demonstrated that nine amino acid mutations arose 
multiple times in response to a set of antibiotics known as extended spectrum 
cephalosporins (2002a, 829). In their experiment, Barlow and Hall recovered seven of the 
nine mutations that occurred in nature. This is consistent with other work on protein 
evolution, which has shown that mutational pathways are evolutionarily constrained 
(Weinrich et al. 2006). Barlow and Hall concluded that their work provides evidence to 
support the view that in vitro evolution mimics in vivo evolution and that this result 
allows them to “begin making predictions about the evolution of antibiotic resistance” 
(2002a, 830).  
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CYCLING AND MIXING ANTIBIOTICS: ACHIEVING HETEROGENEITY IN HOSPITAL WARDS  
During the last two decades, a number of physicians and health care practitioners 
have investigated the effects of applying different antibiotics in rotation in order to limit 
the spread of resistant alleles, an approach that is grounded in evolutionary thinking. The 
underlying assumption of this method is that varying antibiotics over a determinate 
period of time “can minimize the emergence of resistance because selection pressure for 
bacteria to develop resistance to a speciﬁc antibiotic would be reduced as organisms 
become exposed to continually varying anti-microbials” (Niederman 1997). Cycling is thus 
one method of achieving heterogeneity in a given environment. The use of speciﬁc 
antibiotics for a given period of time and then withdrawing and reintroducing them at a 
later stage prevents bacteria from becoming adapted to their environment. Although 
some studies have reported signiﬁcant reductions in resistance (see Kollef (2006) for 
references), this approach is not without limitations. Clinical microbiologists have pointed 
out that antibiotic cycling raises a number of methodological issues related to the 
mechanisms of antibiotic resistance, the dynamics of a particular ICU (e.g. transmission 
between patients and between patients and medical staff), the composition of the 
antibiotics, etc., that need to be carefully considered if antibiotic cycling is to be effective 
(van Saene et al. 2005). This is consistent with recent mathematical modelling suggesting 
that due to the ecological dynamics of the hospital setting, antibiotic resistance is unlikely 
to decrease with cycling (Bergstrom, Lo, and Lipstich 2004). In effect, while standardizing 
antibiotic administration over a period of time increases “long term” heterogeneity in the 
hospital, it does not increase “local” heterogeneity at the patient level (Bergstrom and 
Feldarden 2008, 135). These ecological models suggest, however, that “mixing” 
antibiotics (rather than cycling) holds promise. “Mixing” roughly amounts to 
administering “all or most available antimicrobial classes” (Kollef 2006, 85) to different 
patients in order to create a more heterogeneous environment to which bacteria cannot 
adapt as easily (Bergstrom and Feldgarden 2008, 135). In other words, mixing imposes 
different selective pressures (at the “local” level) on bacterial strains as compared to 
cycling. The example of antibiotic resistance shows how evolutionary biology can help us 
gain a better understanding of a complex medical problem—drug resistance—which is 
inﬂuenced by “ongoing” evolutionary processes. It provides a basis on which to examine 
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proposed alternatives and to devise future solutions. Moreover, antibiotic resistance 
explains better why in some cases medicine can hardly do without “forward looking” 
evolutionary explanations; even a “medical creationist” cannot avoid the consequences of 
natural selection on resistant strains of bacteria that are continually evolving.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
Following an analysis of the dual reception of Charles Darwin’s work by medical 
doctors during the late nineteenth century (i.e. diseases of evolution and evolution of 
diseases), this chapter sketched how eugenics concerns have shaped the complex, and 
often disturbing, relations between medicine and evolutionary biology up to the postwar 
period, examining how medical advances came to be progressively seen as acting against 
the Darwinian law of natural selection by allowing “unfit” individuals to live longer and to 
reproduce. The sole alternative to degeneration found by Francis Galton, Karl Pearson 
and others to counter the artificial relaxation of natural selection was the promotion of 
restrictive measures of birth control and selective breeding. This project, politically 
levered, translated into a harsh social reality in the first half of the twentieth century. 
While Darwin was not himself a eugenicist thinker, no more than many of his 
contemporaries at least, his scientific work, and particularly his idea of a constant, gradual 
improvement of organisms by natural selection in the “struggle for life”, provided 
sufficient room to allow for various and sometimes incompatible social and political 
interpretations of his theory to be promoted at once. Following the forty-year long 
“eclipse” of Darwinism in medicine after the Second World War, medical doctors have 
recently witnessed the flourishing of new evolutionary approaches to health and disease, 
outside a eugenicist context.  
    In the second part of this chapter, I have shown that Darwinian medicine and 
evolutionary medicine are distinct research traditions that emerged from two distinct 
ways of applying Darwin’s theories to medicine, and I have explored several points of 
contrast between them. First, Darwinian medicine generally applies evolutionary 
principles from the vantage point of the Pleistocene epoch, while evolutionary medicine 
studies real time evolution occurring in contemporary environments such as hospital 
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wards or laboratory settings. Second, whereas Darwinian medicine systematically 
articulates evolutionary and proximate causes to explain why humans are vulnerable to 
disease and extends those principles to (social) issues such as child abuse, evolutionary 
medicine uses the theory of evolution by natural selection to target speciﬁc medical 
problems. Third, evolutionary biology provides a general paradigm to make sense of 
disease for Darwinian medicine’s theoreticians, whilst from an evolutionary medicine 
perspective, it offers an additional axis of research. Fourth, whereas Darwinian medicine 
relies extensively on backward looking explanations, evolutionary medicine depends 
mostly on forward looking explanations. Importantly, in evolutionary medicine, health 
and disease are not assessed on the basis of a comparison between different lifestyles or 
different environments, where one is considered “natural” and “normal” and the other 
aberrant. Fifth, there is a sense in which Darwinian medicine is committed to a particular 
vision of Homo sapiens. This vision shapes the way in which questions about health and 
disease are investigated and articulated within an evolutionary framework. For example, 
Darwinian medicine considers humans to be generally maladapted to modern 
environments but optimally adapted to live in Pleistocene-like environments. 
Evolutionary medicine, in contrast, is agnostic as to whether humans are maladapted to 
modern environments. In fact, as pointed out before, just as some traits that evolved 
during the Pleistocene era are now maladaptive, others may be even better adapted 
today. Finally, Darwinian medicine is a ﬁeld of research uniﬁed by a set of methodological 
and epistemological commitments whereas evolutionary medicine is a collection of 
diverse research programmes working with heterogeneous models.  
In spite of these differences, sometimes there is overlap between the two research 
traditions in terms of the problems they wish to solve or investigate and in terms of 
individual collaborations, as reﬂected in recent publications (see Nesse et al. 2010). For 
instance, antibiotic resistance is recognized by Darwinian medicine as a relevant problem 
to be tackled from an evolutionary point of view (Nesse 2007). Also, researchers engaged 
in evolutionary medicine may need to use a form of the backward looking mode of 
explanation (e.g., to construct microbial phylogenies), although such a style of 
explanation does not rest on a comparison between past and present human populations. 
Overall, I would argue that we would gain much by looking at Darwinian medicine and 
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evolutionary medicine as different research traditions situated on a historical continuum 
that are both attempting to shed light on medical issues by drawing on Darwinian 
evolutionary theory. Again, this argument is not intended to create divisions among 
practitioners but rather to highlight the fact that there are several ways in which the 
relations between evolutionary biology and medicine can be envisaged.  
To ﬁnish, let me turn to an aphorism that is often used rhetorically (Nesse and 
Williams 1996, 259; Gluckman, Beedle, and Hanson 2009, 257) but that, unfortunately, 
distorts the role of evolutionary biology in medicine. Does nothing in medicine make 
sense outside the light of evolution? One could imagine that Nesse, Williams, and others 
were simply making a play on Dobzhansky’s words. However, the way they characterize 
the relationship between evolutionary biology, biological sciences, and medicine reveals 
the basic role they think evolutionary biology has to perform in medicine. In effect, they 
assume that “evolutionary biology is, of course, the scientiﬁc foundation for all biology, 
and biology is the foundation for all medicine” (Nesse and Williams 1998, 86). Things may 
not be so straightforward, however. For instance, although biology and medicine have 
become increasingly intertwined, medicine continues to be largely an art focused on the 
individual while evolution looks primarily at the fate of populations. Interestingly, the 
population approach needed to understand the evolution of resistance illustrates the 
tension between the individual and population levels because what is good for a patient 
(i.e. receiving antibiotic treatment) does not line up with what is good for the population 
(i.e. increase in overall resistance). The ethical and methodological challenge is thus to 
strike a balance between providing appropriate treatment and “avoiding the unnecessary 
administration of antibiotics” (Kollef 2006, 82) that increases resistance. Solving this 
problem would have obvious consequences for medicine and for public health measures 
more generally. In fact, applying evolutionary concepts and methods to public health 
might be even more useful than to clinical medicine, because practitioners think precisely 
in terms of interacting populations, and their evolution.   
Finally, what does making sense of something mean? In his article, Dobzhansky 
(1973) primarily intended to contrast two types of explanations for the diversity of life on 
earth, namely, the Darwinian theory of evolution with the theories of “special creation” 
(Griffiths 2009). He argued that only when looking at the diversity of life from the lens of 
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evolutionary biology can one make sense of the patterns seen in biogeography and 
comparative anatomy. There is little doubt that evolution can throw some light in various 
ways on medicine and maybe also on disease patterns. But to say that “nothing in 
medicine makes sense except in the light of evolution” makes little sense and perhaps no 
sense at all if we consider medicine to be primarily a practical discipline, that is, “an art at 
the crossroad of many sciences” (Canguilhem 1991, 35). At any rate, and paraphrasing 
Wouters (2005), functional medicine without evolution remains incomplete in the sense 
that it leaves unanswered many questions about disease but not in the sense that no 
aspect of disease can be understood without invoking evolution.  
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTS IN FLUX AND OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS IN THE LIFE 
SCIENCES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers of science have traditionally been concerned with clarifying scientific 
concepts and stripping them of their ambiguity through logical analysis of language. This 
was usually done by providing a definition of the scientific concepts. Defining a concept, 
according to Carl Hempel, is “the most natural and maybe the only adequate method to 
characterize a scientific concept” (1996, 134 [1966]). Efforts devoted to conceptual 
clarification were frequently realized by means of logical analyses of language and the 
production of a descriptive or stipulative definitions, the former seeking to fix the 
meaning and the usage of a term; the latter attributing a new signification to a term 
(Ibid.). During the twentieth century, this concern over the need to define terms 
unambiguously was often addressed in the context of theoretical reductionism and unity 
of science to ensure one could reduce the sciences to one another (i.e. reducing the 
“special sciences” such as biology to another, more fundamental, such as physics).66  
In contrast, today’s philosophers tackling the problem of terminological change argue 
that clarification is an essential task to pursue in order to ensure fruitful collaborations 
between distinct scientific communities or research domains. For instance, Potochnik 
(2011) argues that terminological clarification is crucial for the process of what she calls 
“sorting out evidential relationships” across different disciplines and fostering genuine 
collaborative, integrative work in order to grapple with the complexity of the natural 
world. Potochnik claims that in some cases “differences in terminology can block the way 
to effective evidence-sharing” (2011, 309), and so hamper collaboration between 
different fields of science. This argument is echoed by scientists’ own avowed desire for 
precise and standardized nomenclature which they think will facilitate communication 
among peers and across disciplinary boundaries (see Shaner et al. 1992). Remembering a 
discussion that took place at the 7th International Conference on Plant Pathogenic 
Bacteria in Budapest (Hungary) in 1989, Schaner et al. report that during a session, one of 
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 See Nagel (1979); Oppenheim and Putnam (1958).  
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the molecular biologists was challenged by plant pathologists to apply her studies to the 
problem of “virulence”. In response, the molecular biologist asked what “virulence” was. 
As a result, she was given three different definitions of the term by well-known plant 
pathologists. She then asked how she was supposed to go about studying virulence if 
none of her interlocutors could agree upon what it was (Shaner et al. 1992, 48). This 
example is by no means an isolated case. If anything, it indicates that precise definitions 
matter for scientists (not only for philosophers) in order to be able to communicate 
among themselves and to foster exchange of ideas across disciplinary boundaries, for 
instance at a meeting. 
To take a second example in the same field, another plant pathologist reacted 
strongly to the suggestion that changes to the concept of virulence and pathogenicity are 
in order. In his response to his peer’s proposition of a terminological change, he replied, 
referring to Anton de Bary, founder of pythopathology (the study of plant disease) in the 
late nineenth century: 
 
I believe, for the sake of effective communication, that we should attempt 
to stick with the definitions of terms and understanding of concepts that 
originated deep within our family tree. [...] We should bear in mind the 
possibility of confusing future generations with terminology rooted on 
shifting sands. A change in terminology [...] should provide a link between 
past and future (Hunt 1994, 874). 
 
Now, we should avoid thinking that scientists seeking to maintain tight links with the 
past of their discipline through terminology are necessarily engaged in some sort of 
glorification of this past (although this may sometimes be the case). 67 In fact, the remarks 
of the plant pathologists above are not so odd once placed in context: plant pathologists 
have debated at length the meaning of the terms pathogenicity and virulence since at 
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 A recent article on virulence and pathogenicity echoed this idea that terminological changes should 
provide links with the past, stating that “to achieve clarity, it is best to avoid changing concepts in 
terminology more than necessary. The solution should be based on precedence and unifying concepts 
within the literature” (Shapiro-Ilan et al. 2005, 1). 
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least the 1940s and this struggle can explain, in part, the desire to agree to some 
commonly shared terminology. For example, in the 1970s, The American 
Phytopathological Society advocated that other such research organizations agree upon 
the meaning of terms “virulence” and “pathogenicity” as defined by the Commissie voor 
de Terminologie of the Netherlands Society of Plant Pathology (Thomas and Elkinton 
2004, 147). But terminological change raises some more important questions about 
conceptual change as well which is, in turn, reflected into, and sometimes guaranteed by, 
concrete aspects of scientific practices. 
While I agree with Potochnik that identifying differences and overlaps in meaning is 
helpful to avoid drawing unjustified inferences, I also think that common terminology is in 
some cases impossible to achieve and that it can even be heuristically useful not to fixate 
the meaning of concepts too statically– and to maintain it in a state of flux instead – 
precisely in order to facilitate the cooperative, collaborative work she describes as being a 
desirable aim for science as a coordinate whole. As I will examine later in this chapter, 
consensus across scientific communities regarding the meaning of virulence and 
pathogenicity today is scarce, which does not mean, however, that these concepts are 
imprecise or lead necessarily to confusion. 
 In this chapter I examine whether the lack of a common definition of the concepts of 
virulence and pathogenicity have held back in some way advances and progress in areas 
such as evolutionary ecology, medicine, invertebrate pathology and plant pathology 
where the use of these concepts is widespread. More generally, this chapter investigates 
whether unified, general concepts are necessary to the development of scientific fields, 
other than to facilitate communication among and between different groups. It asks, on 
the contrary, if ill-defined concepts be heuristically useful to the growth of knowledge. 
Combining a Canguilhemian and Rheinbergian perspective on the logic of concepts and 
practice (chapter 1), and following other philosophers of science (Chang 2009; Feest 
2010), I argue that a key aspect of the epistemically productive scientific concepts is their 
operational potential. More precisely, the claim is that the epistemic value of scientific 
concepts often is revealed through their being amenable to accommodate a variety of 
goals in distinct empirical and theoretical contexts which, at first glance, may seem 
incompatible. In effect, some concepts, particularly in the life sciences, display a curious 
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polarity and lend themselves to different, almost opposite senses and can be 
operationalized in either reductionist or more holistic research contexts. Operationalizing 
concepts provides thus a window into aspects of scientific practices that would otherwise 
go unnoticed.   
Bringing together operationalism and the approach of concepts in flux as recently 
developed in historical epistemology (broadly construed) may appear inconsistent given 
that the main goal of operationalism is the disambiguation and clarification of scientific 
terms by means of operations (e.g. measurement), whereas “concepts in flux” values the 
productive plurality of meanings attached to the same term over time and across 
disciplines. However, these approaches can be rightfully combined although such 
combinaison has never been directly attempted (so far as I know). But it would be missing 
the point to think that concepts in flux or “fuzzy” concepts cannot be precisely defined. 
Correctly understood, operationalism or operational analysis is wholly compatible with 
the view that concepts in flux can have productive effects on science. Bridgman’s 
opeartionalism was criticized because, for him, each new operation presupposes the use 
of a distinct concept. However, we can view the situation differently, turning it on its 
head: it is because of the flexibility of concepts that operationalism still has currency and 
epistemic value. And the task of philosophers of science consists not (only) in finding a 
more precise definition to concepts but to see how they are operationalized in particular 
contexts.   
 I should indicate at the outset that what I have in mind is a more pragmatic concept 
of operationalism and operational analysis than what is usually understood. 68 Here, I will 
use the concept of “operation” as a guide for a historically-informed, practice-oriented 
philosophy of science, as recently suggested by Hasok Chang (2009). Focussing on 
“doings” and “happenings” instead of “objects” and “entities” to use Bridgman’s words, I 
argue that thinking in terms of operation provides a more dynamic perspective on 
scientific practice. Importantly, my goal is not to propose a new philosophy of 
operationalism but to highlight that operational analysis broadly construed captures 
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 In 1927 Percy Bridgman formulated a new approach to concept called “operationalism” (or 
operationism).  
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significant facets of scientific activity and scientific concepts. Paradoxically, a concept 
having an operational character is what allows it to reach out to other fields, that is, to be 
“theoretically polyvalent” as Canguilhem (1955 [1977]) once put it, and to contribute in 
the development and creation of new “epistemic spaces” of research. The general 
philosophical point here is that we can gain a better understanding of a number of 
scientific concepts such as virulence using an historical epistemology approach than by 
any attempts to craft a series of inclusive and exclusive criteria that more or less match 
the phenomenon we are interested in. 
What would an operationalist view of concepts be like in the life sciences? An 
extreme view of operationalism in the life sciences is that all biological concepts should 
be defined in terms of actual biological operations, to paraphrase the physicist R. B. 
Lindsay (1937), an early critic of Bridgman. A more moderate version of operationalism is 
compatible, though, with the view that the “formation, deformation and rectification” of 
biological and biomedical concepts, to use Canguilhem’s words, is connected to the realm 
of experimentation and the development of “experimental systems” (Rheinberger 1997). 
As a consequence, instrumentation and measurement techniques provide a privileged 
epistemic access to understand concepts “in action”. 
 
CONCEPTS IN FLUX 
Nowadays, half a century after the demise of logical positivism, and in the wake of 
the “disunity of science” (Galison and Stump 1996; Dupré 1993), philosophers continue to 
value clarity and exactitude in science but they have also come to the conclusion that 
concepts “in flux” (Elkana 1970; Rheinberger and Müller-Wille 2009: Müller-Wille, 
unpublished), “in tension” (Falk 2000), in addition to “boundary” concepts (Star and 
Griesemer 1988) and “loose” concepts (Löwy 1992) do not hold back the development of 
the sciences (or distort communication) but rather make it possible.69 In the opening of 
his article on Helmoltz, historian of science Yehuda Elkana illustrated the idea behind the 
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 Already in the 1930s, however, the Polish immunologist and bacteriologist Ludwick Fleck emphasized that 
concepts have different meaning when used by different “thought collectives”. The term “lipid”, for 
instance, has not the same meaning for chemists and immunologists. The variation of meaning attached to 
terms could, according to Fleck, “lead to scientific innovation” (Fleck 1937, in Löwy 1992, 373).  
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expression “concepts in flux” with a quote from Hendrik Anthony Kramers (1894-1952), a 
Dutch physicist who studied with Niels Bohr: “in human thought in general and in the 
physical sciences in particular the most fruitful concepts are those to which it is 
impossible to attach a well-defined meaning” (Kramer 1966, quoted by Elkana 1970, 253). 
According to Ilana Löwy this claim can be extended to the biomedical sciences where, she 
argued, “fuzzy concepts” that “remain imprecise for their whole life span” [...] can 
nevertheless “continue to play an important heuristic role in the construction of new 
knowledge” (1992, 373). The “strength of loose concepts” is manifests, for instance, when 
it contributes to forge new alliances and relations between distinct social groups. 70 
The labels “concepts in flux” or “boundary objects” capture different perspectives on 
the nature of concepts and their role(s) in the growth of knowledge. Taken together, 
however, they suggest that firstly, imprecise concepts can generate productive interplays 
between the unknown and the known in scientific research; and secondly, that this 
epistemic role rests upon them having a sort of fluidity or plasticity, both synchronically 
(they move across disciplinary boundaries) and diachronically (they change over time). If 
this succinct summary of concepts in flux is correct, then, perhaps the worries expressed 
by scientists and philosophers at the beginning of the chapter are not completely 
warranted. In other words, the concept of virulence may be heuristically usefull because 
its meaning is not fixed but fluctuates across disciplines. 
This shift from the need to establishing a unified meaning of concepts to the new 
paradigm of “concepts in flux” was strengthened by the “practical turn” in philosophy, 
history, and sociology of science instigated by Bruno Latour and Steeve Woolgar’s 
Laboratory Life (1979) by Ian Hacking’s Representing and Intervening (1983), and was 
quickly emulated by others (e.g. Shapin and Schaffer 1985).71 Famously, Hacking stressed 
the need to analyse the experimental side of science –which, he claims, has a “life of its 
own” –, not only ideas or theories, to understand scientific activity. The experimental side 
of science being closely associated with concrete operations and practices such as 
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 Löwy’s example is the concept of “self” and “non-self” in immunology.  
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 Godfrey-Smith suggested a link between Shapin and Schaffer’s book and Bridgman’s operationalism 
(2003, 131). 
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measurements, a renewed version of “operationalism” stands out as a relevant approach 
to analyse scientific practice further. 
The question one needs to ask then is why and how concepts in flux can enhance 
scientific development. It is obvious that this proposition runs against a very long 
tradition in philosophy of science starting with logical empiricism but also flies in the face 
of common scientific understanding. If fluid concepts are not epistemological obstacles to 
scientific progress in some ways, an important philosophical consequence follows: the 
well-intended efforts devoted by philosophers of science (and sometime scientists) to 
clarifying the meaning of concepts (either by providing finer grained definitions or unified, 
more general accounts) that they perceive were (or are) being handled without sufficient 
care, precaution and rigor by scientists, can be called into question (Rheinberger 2010b). 
That is not to say that conceptual clarification is not sometimes much (even badly) 
needed, but rather that the philosophical problem behind the definitional enterprise has, 
so far, not really been addressed at its roots and has remained in the background. 
To state the problem plainly it may be that the crux of the matter for epistemologists 
is not so much the realization that clear-cut definitions of concepts are rarely possible (if 
at all), or even unwanted in some cases, but rather to explain “how and why fuzzy 
concepts, half-baked definitions, or definitions that overshoot the mark can have positive 
effects in science” (Rheinberger 2010b, 156).72 The development of molecular biology 
provides an illustration of how a complex, immensely successful and fast-developing field 
of research has been organized and established around a key concept – the gene – whose 
meaning(s) shifted dramatically throughout the twentieth century and remains, so far, in 
a state of “productive tension” (Rheinberger and Müller-Wille 2009; Gayon 2007; 
Beurton, Falk and Rheinberger 2000; Morange 1998). Clearly, because the concept of 
gene in population genetics and in molecular biology do not overlap does not mean that 
scientists working in these two disciplines cannot communicate, cooperate and are 
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 For a recent philosophical attempt to introduce new gene concepts following conceptual analysis see 
Waters (2004).  
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completely at odds with one another;73 the deeper issue here is how despite this lack of 
conceptual unification can science develop and progress? The short answer is that this 
lack of unification, this conceptual polarization, is precisely what makes scientific 
collaboration and the development of new scientific fields possible. 
This aspect of concepts prompts the need for a historical epistemology perspective 
(chapter 1). In addition, this suggests that a good way of analysing scientific concepts is to 
look at how they change over time following the development of new research methods 
and techniques, but it also suggests that one should pay attention to the internal 
architecture of concepts so to speak, which maintains their meaning “in flux” and in doing 
so, creates polarized tensions that are conducive of scientific development. The above 
interrogations will lead the development of this chapter on the operational character of 
concepts in the life sciences, where the discussions and analyses will concentrate on the 
concept of virulence in particular. The final sections of this chapter will dissect the 
concept of virulence in more detail, insisting on its internal tensions, and how these 
allowed this concept to feature in different epistemic contexts, for instance during the 
bacteriological revolution at the end of the nineteenth century. 
 
THE DYNAMICS OF OPERATIONALISM 
Harvard physicist and professor of mathematics Percy Williams Bridgman (1882-
1961) encountered operational thinking in the context of understanding Einstein’s special 
relativity theory. According to Einstein, in order to judge that two events separated in 
space are occurring simultaneously, it is necessary to use a different operation than, say, 
to evaluate the simultaneity of two events happing in the same place (Chang 2009). The 
most famous example of operational analysis, however, is of a more day-to-day kind: the 
concept of “length”. Because of our “essential physical limitations” scientists are bound to 
use different types of measurements for the same concepts in different theoretical 
contexts, Bridgman claims. When dealing with objects of human size dimensions and 
moving at a relatively slow speed (with respect to the observer), length can be adequately 
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 Potochnik (2011) considers that according to Dupré (1993), the “incommensurability” of terms (e.g. gene) 
in several disciplines is such that it leads to the conclusion that science is so disunified that collaboration 
should be utterly impossible.  
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measured with rulers, meter sticks and other common measuring devices. However, to 
measure greater distances such as the distance from the Earth to the Moon, a whole 
different set of operations is required. To do so one has to infer the distance between the 
two celestial bodies from calculating the time light needs to go to the moon and come 
back. As Bridgman said beautifully, “the space of astronomy is not a physical space of 
meter sticks, but is a space of light waves” (1927, 67, in Chang 2009). The meaning of the 
concept of length, therefore, changes accordingly with the corresponding methods used 
to operationalize it. 
In his Logic of Modern Physics (1927) and elsewhere, Bridgman famously depicted the 
idea behind operational analysis as follow: “we mean by any concept nothing more than a 
set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations” 
(1927, 5). Without specific criteria permitting its operationalization a concept is devoid of 
meaning.  While this version of operationalism was widely criticized by philosophers and 
scientists alike, it remains that operationalising concepts is a central aspect of scientific 
practice. Developed in the context of the rise of logical positivism and pragmatism, 
operationalism was unsurprisingly taken up by many as a new “theory” of meaning (Hull 
1968), and Brigman’s ideas soon became very influential in scientific circles outside 
physics, especially in psychology and in biology, and were hastily taken up by a number of 
philosophers of language as well (Chang 2009). Bridgman’s ideas underpinning 
operationalism were not, however, directed to provide a new philosophical theory of 
meaning as such, but rather to insist on the operational character of concepts in scientific 
practice. Indeed, Bridgman did not attempt to market his approach in terms of a 
philosophical system or a doctrine; he saw his work as the result of some “reflections of a 
physicist”. As he recalls in 1954, he tried to promote “an attitude or point of view 
generated by continued application of operational analysis”. He said he “abhor the term 
operationalism or operationism” because they seemed to imply “a dogma, or at least a 
thesis of some kind” (1954, 224). The notion of “operationalism”, once stripped of its 
problematic theory of meaning, therefore, holds promises for exploring several aspects of 
today’s scientific practices such as the use of instruments and measurement apparatuses. 
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THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS 
The empiricism that pervades operationalism is intended to test the applicability of 
scientific concepts to concrete problems. Bridgman’s idea that a concept is synonymous 
with a corresponding set of operations came rapidly under scrutiny. One criticism 
launched against it was that to follow Bridgman’s idea of a concept as being nothing more 
than a given set of operations will lead one into multiplying concepts ad infinitum. For 
example, it seems to ensue that each measurement yields a different concept of 
“temperature” (at T1 … T2 … and so on). The problem is that according to this principle 
such measurements cannot be correlated; that is, on Bridgman’s account, measuring 
temperature using different apparatuses boils down to investigating different 
(ontological) phenomena (see Sober 1984; Chang 2004). This problem is very close to the 
ones scientists are facing when measuring virulence in a variety of ways while trying to 
capture a single underlying aspect of nature. 
Another aspect of this problem is what exactly is captured by the operations. How 
can we say that what the instruments measure is indeed “temperature”, “intelligence”, or 
“virulence”? Hacking once asked, rhetorically, “do measurements measure anything real 
in nature, or are they chiefly an artefact of the way in which we theorize”? (1983, 233) 
For instance, psychologists have tried to measure what we call “intelligence” by devising 
IQ tests (see Feest 2005; 2010 on this). The problem, however, is that even if IQ tests are 
taken to be the set of operations by which a concept (i.e. intelligence) is measured, there 
is no guarantee that these tests provide any indication whatsoever into what the pre-
theoretical concept of intelligence is (Sober 1984, 71).  
As pointed out by Hull, to relate a concept to a set of operations by stating their 
synonymy is problematic because synonymy is a relation that holds between linguistic 
entities, not between concepts and operations. Following Hull we can reformulate 
Bridgman’s point as follow: “the meaning of a concept is this set of operations” (1968, 
438). Even more precisely, what Bridgman meant is that a concept must be defined “not 
in terms of properties, but in terms of the operations by which it is made known” 
(Hearnshaw 1941, 45). To apply it briefly to the example of virulence, one could say that 
virulence is the result given by the measure of a LD50 test or by the variable “α” in the 
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trade-off model (see chapter 4 and 6).74 This reformulation of Bridgman’s approach places 
emphasis on the concept of “operations”. But what are operations? 
Bridgman (1927) distinguished between two broad categories of operations: on the 
one hand, “instrumental operations” such as types of measurements and uses of 
observation devices, and on the other, “paper-and-pencil” operations (including mental 
experiments, verbal operations, logical inference, etc.). Bridgman thought that the former 
was epistemically superior to the latter which was labelled” symbolic operations” 
(Hempel 1954, 215). Instrumental operations allow different scientists to perform these 
operations publicly (giving objective reality to the phenomenon), whereas symbolic 
operations take place in a person’s head, so to speak. In brief, not all operations are 
public as one would imagine – some are private, in a Wittgensteinian sense. Hasok Chang 
(2009) noted rightly that this classification lacks precision; what is needed is a more 
precise taxonomy to distinguish (minimally) simple from complex operations. 
At any rate, to operationalize a concept means, in one way or another, to find a way 
to measure it by specifying a procedure to achieve such measures. A straightforward 
definition of operation could be the following: an operation is an action, involving 
instruments and reading devices, that allows one to assess whether a concept applies or 
not, or to what degrees it applies. Analysing operations, in turn, provides a window into 
the meaning of the concept in use, as well as into the nature of the phenomenon itself. 
Indeed, scientific instruments and measuring devices play a crucial role in “creating 
phenomena”, as Hacking would say (1983). The term “phenomeno-technique”, defined 
by Bachelard (see chapter 1) refers to this co-productivity between techniques and the 
object or concept under investigation. 
 
OPERATIONALISM IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 
Operationalism was mostly discussed and applied in physics where it originated with 
the work of Bridgman, and in behavioural psychology during the first half of the twentieth 
century (Hearnshaw 1941). To some extent these debates are still alive and well (see 
Feest 2005). Although it is more rarely discussed by commentators, operational analysis 
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 This test refers to the number of deaths above 50% after inoculation.   
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was also strongly advocated in the life sciences, especially in genetics and systematic (e.g. 
Stadler 1954; see Hull 1968 for references). This is hardly surprising that operationalism 
was successful in biology and the life sciences given that a number of central biological 
concepts (including gene, species, individual, niche, and organism, to name a few, – and 
as we have seen, virulence –) in biology and medicine are well known for having a 
fluctuating meaning, both diachronically and synchronically. Moreover, in order to apply 
these concepts one often needs to rely on an operational definition or a set of 
operational criteria. For example, in the case of the biological species concept (as defined 
by Mayr) the operational criterion of a group of organisms for being a distinct species is, 
roughly, the (im)possibility for this population to reproduce (or not) with another, 
geographically separated population. This illustrates that for operationalism to be 
successful one needs to provide a way to decide which operations are relevant, and which 
aren’t, when applying a concept. Moreover, as David Hull put it: “In fact, the whole notion 
of a set of operations defining a concept presupposes some way of deciding when the 
same operation is being repeated and when two operations are different operations.” (in 
Müller-Wille, unpublished manuscript) 
Drawing on Bridgman’s work biologists started to criticize biological concepts for 
lacking an operational definition. For example, Paul Ehrlich and R.W. Holm complained 
that “there are numerous definitions of biological species in the literature, but none is 
operational, since they all include the idea of “potential breeding” and this cannot, by 
definition, be tested” (1962, in Hull 1968, 448; emphasis added). While this claim 
admittedly requires further explanation than what can be provided here, the authors 
later recognized that “like all present-day scientists” their thinking was “influenced by the 
writings of Bridgman”. Although they rejected operationalism as a “philosophy of 
science” they agreed that “operational definitions are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for progress”. Yet, if central concepts in biology such as species, niche, and 
community “are to be useful to biologists”, they contended, then “their operational 
definition is a sine qua non” (1963, in Hull 1968, 450). Arguably, it is in genetics – and with 
the concept of gene – that operational analysis was most fruitfully applied in the life 
sciences. As Jean Gayon echoed, the meaning of the concept of gene “has dramatically 
changed over time” and it was given many “operational definitions” in various empirical 
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contexts (2007, 82). One of the strongest statements in this sense was made by Petter 
Portin who claimed that “all definitions of the gene require operational criteria” (in 
Rheinberger 2010, 155; emphasis added).  
Providing operational criteria for a concept, I suggest, is another way of 
understanding concepts “in action”. Not only the meaning of scientific concepts can be 
accessed through operational methods but concepts can be used as “tools” in scientific 
research (Stotz 2009). In other words, giving an operational definition of a number of 
central scientific concepts is one thing; but the use of concepts is itself an operation. 
Within the operationalist approach the function of concepts in scientific practice ceases 
to be only about representing the natural world to also engaging with it in a productive 
way.75 To recast this point differently, concepts are not about representation (alone) but 
also about intervention. Concepts are not innocuous although they may seem so; 
concepts and their use can have powerful effects both in scientific contexts and in 
society.  
Focussing on the bacteriological “revolution” in the late nineenth century, the next 
section will outline how and why the concept of virulence was understood in an almost 
purely operational way, and will draw some philosophical consequences regarding the 
use of concepts in flux in shaping scientific domains.  
 
REVISITING THE BACTERIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 
The bacteriological “revolution” of the late nineteenth century is often hailed as one 
of the landmarks of modern medicine. For the late historian of medicine Roy Porter the 
upbringing of bacteriology as a field is “one of medicine’s few true revolutions” (1997, 
428) which, according to Charles Rosenberg, “transformed every aspect of medicine” 
(1987, 141; quoted in Worboys 2007, 21). Indeed, after the formulation of the germ 
theory of disease by Pasteur, Koch and Lister, public health workers, physicians and 
epidemiologists were on firmer grounds to assessing the specific, biological causes of 
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 As Uljana Feest recently argued, concepts can be enacted as “research tools” not only in analysing data 
but also in generating data. She claims that concepts perform an epistemic function the same way 
measuring instruments do (2010, 181). 
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infectious diseases such as anthrax, cholera, tuberculosis, and many others. In the context 
of “laboratory medicine” which proceeded to a redefinition of disease identity by shifting 
the focus to their (microscopic) cause (Cunningham 1992), the (so-called) Koch’s 
postulates provided a way to identify specific, necessary (and not only sufficient) 
determinants of disease (Carter 1985).76 As a consequence of this one-organism, one-
disease model, bacteriology also operated a redefinition of the concept of a healthy 
organism as one free from those putative pathogenic germs (Gradman 2001).  
Parenthetically, the adoption of this epistemological position by the European 
founders of medical bacteriology marks the beginning of the exogenous style (chapter 5) 
in which the virulence of a disease is correlated to an organism’s structures or functions 
in virtue of which it is said to be pathogenic (or virulent). The belief that pathogens form a 
distinct class of organisms which can be identified by laboratory techniques such as 
Koch’s postulates led the way into the development of the molecular style of thinking 
about virulence and infection. On this view, pathogenic mircoorganimes possess 
structural or functional properties which place them within a particular class of living 
things. In contrast, the exogenous (or ecological) style (chapter 4), also growing out of 
medical bacteriology, blurs this distinction by insisting that parasistism (of which 
infectious diseases are one example) is a relative category that reflects either a lack of 
adaptation beween two species or, in contrasts, a successful adaptation on the part of the 
pathogen to its ecological niche. The line between pathogenic and non-pathogenic 
organisms, however, is one that cannot be drawn once and for all because the nature of 
the association between two different species changes depending on the environment.  
To come back, the germ theory of disease had deep political and social consequences 
in how best to handle the waxing and waning of epidemics and to limit the spread of 
infectious diseases among populations.77 Recently, however, the idea of a unified “germ 
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 The Koch’s postulates can be summarized as follow: 1) a specific microorganism must always be found in 
the diseased tissue, cell, or organ; 2) this specific microorganism must be cultivable in pure culture; 3) the 
pure culture, when inoculated to a healthy organism, must cause the disease specifically; 4) the same 
disease-causing microorganism can be recover from the inoculated organism (see Carter 1985; Worboys 
2007). See chapter 5.  
77
 How best to prevent the formation of epidemics remained a thorny issue on which “contagionists” and 
“infectionists” were long divided (Gaudillères and Löwy 2001, 1). 
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theory” of disease was challenged: it was argued that there was no such thing as a 
bacteriological revolution in the late nineteenth century. The concept of “revolution”, in 
the sense of Thomas Kuhn (1962) began to be used by professional historians in the 1970s 
although it does not reflect the complexity of the situation, not just in England (Worboys 
2000) but admittedly in the rest of Europe as well (Worboys 2007). What Worboys 
argues, examining four paradigmatic diseases at the end of nineteenth century, is that the 
decade of 1880 was not characterized by radical shifts in preventive measures derived 
from laboratory knowledge as the term “bacteriological revolution” suggests. Instead, this 
so-called “bacteriological revolution” is imbued with conceptual and practical continuities 
and spans a longer time period, that is, from 1870 until 1910. 
But others have revised the usual historiography of bacteriology on still another 
count. Bringing to the fore the (largely neglected) role of experimentation, control 
measures and manipulation in bacteriology, Andrew Mendelsohn (2002; 2005) provided 
an original interpretation, with far-reaching philosophical consequences, of the period 
circa 1880-1930. If Mendelsohn is right, the development of bacteriology both in France 
and in Germany was not based on the development of a unifying germ theory of disease – 
often seen as forming the theoretical core of this transformation – but rather on an “old 
concept given new meaning: virulence”, loosely understood as the capacity for a 
pathogen to cause disease in a host (2002, 4). Mendelsohn argued that during the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century the concept of virulence was an “intellectually 
empty, almost purely operational concept” in the sense that “virulent cultures  killed, 
attenuated ones did not” (2002, 5; emphasis added). This dichotomy between virulent 
and avirulent cultures was conceived as the result of within species biological variations – 
a concept that was then recently problematised by Darwin in On the Origin of Species 
(1859).78 
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 I stress “within” species because Pasteur did not believe that microorganisms could transform into 
one another at will. Circa 1880, however, bacteriologists and most famously Nägeli, advocated the 
doctrine of pleomorphy which stated that a same organism could exist under different form. “Bacteria 
are inconstant and continually lose themselves in one another” (Nägeli 1879, in Farley 1974, 145). As a 
consequence of this doctrine the concept of species was difficult to apply to microorganisms. The 
development and application of the technique of “pure culture” by Robert Koch was one of the ways 
bacteriologists found to control variation among microorganisms (Gradmann 2001).  
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The laboratory context of the Pasteur Institute provided an ideally controlled 
environment to study variation in virulence in experimental animals which were inoculate 
with bacterial strains. After serial passages of the strains in these laboratory animals (the 
order was usually rabbits, sheep and guinea pigs) experimenters could observe either an 
increase or a decrease in the level of virulence of the original strain. The attenuated effect 
of a strain, however, could be limited to one or two organisms, and more puzzling still, 
the strain could in some cases often revert to its original virulence. Such returns were 
interpreted by some in broad, evolutionarily terms (see chapter 4). 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century “there was no standard unit of measure, 
no ‘meter’ or ‘ohm’ of virulence”, however (Mendelsohn 2005, 87). Although methods of 
attenuation varied a great deal among bacteriologists, and despite the lack of a common 
standard unit of measure for virulence “the anthrax vaccine […] was uniform” 
(Mendelsohn 2005, 87; emphasis in original). Laboratory induced modifications of 
virulence were considered lasting and heritable (although some could revert to the 
original type) as they were conserved in the final product: the vaccine. Using host’s death 
and other observable signs, scientists were able to distinguish between virulent and 
avirulent cultures well enough –had they been incapable of doing so, the production of 
vaccines would have been utterly impossible. The development, production and use of 
vaccines, in effect, rested to a large extent on technical means, laboratory procedures and 
institutional structures (i.e. Institut Pasteur) that allowed to firstly, attenuate the 
virulence of a given strain by serial passages; and secondly, to guarantee that the 
attenuated organism (i.e., its level of virulence) will remain constant. 79 The history of 
Koch’s tuberculin is a case in point (see Gradmann 2004).80 In the middle of the twentieth 
century, many continued to acknowledge that “[virus] virulence is almost indefinable and 
practically impossible to measure”. These were the exact words of Stuart-Harris in the 
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 Scientists also had to ensure that when the vaccine will react within the host’s system it will not trigger a 
virulent reaction from the immune system.  
80
 Koch identified tuberculosis bacillus in 1882, establishing his reputation worldwide. Ten years later, he 
announced the discovery of a cure to tuberculosis in summer 1890, which was quickly followed in 
November by the release of the substance able to yield this effect, i.e. tuberculin. This success story was 
short-lived, however, and patients inoculated with the medicine started feeling ill and a number of them 
died. By today’s standards, “tuberculin can cause death in a few hours” (Gradmann 2004, 474).   
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opening talk of a Ciba symposium on Virus, Virulence and Pathogenicity held in London 
(1960, 3). Nevertheless Stuart-Harris pointed out in his concluding remarks that there are 
practical reasons for thinking about how virulence can be defined and measured, chief 
among which is the possibility of creating attenuated vaccines, for instance to cure polio 
(1960, 12). 
To sum up, at the Pasteur Institute researchers like Roux, Chamberland, Pasteur and 
others conducted experiments on infectious diseases with guinea pigs and other model 
organisms, investigating the changing nature of virulence. Changes in bacterial cultures 
were controlled and induced artificially by serial passages through animals but this 
variation could also be controlled and manipulated in these systems to the extent that 
large-scale production and distribution of vaccines, within and outside France, became 
possible (see Mendelsohn 2005).81 Although virulence is perhaps the “theoretically 
emptiest of key concepts” in the life sciences and was recently ranked as “the least 
defined and remembered element of early bacteriology” (Mendelsohn 2002, 6-17), this 
concept “was the hub of a theory”. In effect, “upon it turned a whole structure of 
etiological, epidemiological, and biological explanation” (Ibid. 18). In other words, despite 
its lack of theoretical underpinning (or perhaps because of it) the concept of a “variable 
virulence” became the “signature of disease explanation at the Institut Pasteur” (2002, 9). 
Indeed, Pasteur reported that by successive passages through an animal “new 
virulences and new contagions can be created”. Moreover, variations of virulence could 
“explain how certain great epidemics [typhus] have appeared at one time or another” 
and how “smallpox, syphilis, plague, yellow fever appeared across the ages” (Pasteur, 
Chamberland, Roux 1881, 435, quoted in Grmek 1995, 270). As it turned out, the concept 
of virulence (although ill-defined) offered a dynamic, flexible explanatory framework to 
account for the origins of disease germs and disease causation, not merely in 
(reductionist) terms of germs as invading agents, but as the consequence of ongoing 
(evolutionary but Lamarckian) interactions between host, pathogens and changing 
environmental conditions (Moulin 1992). 
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 A similar argument could be made in the case of Koch (see Gradmann 2001). 
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THE ROLE OF CONCEPTS IN SHAPING THE LIFE SCIENCES  
If Mendelsohn’s account is sound, it strengthens two important philosophical theses. 
Firstly, that science does not necessarily develop by formulating abstract theories to be 
later put to test by precise experiments (as Popper would, roughly, have it) but by 
reformulating old concepts; and secondly, that operational concepts can also have a 
positive effect on the development of science. Let us start with the first one.  
Philosopher Karl Hempel famously defended the idea that scientific disciplines 
emerge thanks to the formulation of abstract laws of nature. In his paper on “The 
theoretician’s dilemma” (1958), for instance, he claimed that 
 
the early stages in the development of a scientific discipline usually 
belong to the former level, which is characterized by the search for laws 
(of universal or statistical form) which establish connections among the 
directly observable aspects of the subject matter under study (1958, 41). 
 
From the previous discussion it is plain that bacteriologists at the Pasteur Institute 
did not try to “test” the so-called germ theory of disease by experimenting with changes 
in virulence; the experimental practices developed around the problem of controlling and 
understanding variation in virulence did not rest on there being a body of theory (or not) 
to explain these variations in degrees of infectiousness. Nor were they trying to formulate 
general laws about the behaviour of microorganisms in infectious diseases. The formation 
of the bacteriological paradigm was not organized around a well-defined body of 
theoretical knowledge but rather on a loosely defined concept: virulence. In Logic of Life 
(1970) the Nobel Prize laureate in Physiology and Medicine François Jacob emphasized 
that the development of the life sciences is more often than not organized around the 
formation of concepts rather than theories (Rheinberger 2010, 45). 
However, this does not mean that theories (or theoretical terms) had no role to play 
in the organisation of research in this field; what it means is that, more broadly, in the life 
sciences, experiments and theories are so “intricately interwoven that the function of 
experiments as an instance of testing hypotheses appears to be largely marginal” (Hagner 
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and Rheinberger 1998, 363). 82 This last point appears to be precisely what Mendelsohn 
has in mind when he suggests that a whole field of research like bacteriology was 
organized around a single “ill-defined” concept that is being operationalized in various 
ways by distinctive methods, skills and laboratory procedures (2002, 18). The bottom line 
here is that bacteriology emerged as distinctive and coherent scientific field of research 
by constructing what is now called “experimental systems” (Rheinberger 1997). According 
to Rheinberger, an experimental system is the “smallest functional unit of research” that 
enables researchers to perform a set of operations in order to investigate (and partly, 
create) specific phenomena. An experimental system consists of instruments, scientific 
apparatuses, measurement techniques, experimental organisms which become research 
tools in this context, control procedures, and so on. Such concatenation of technical, 
conceptual and other means allows for controlling and decomposing the ontological 
complexity of the phenomena studied (the “epistemic thing”), while at the same time 
retaining its complexity, epistemically so to speak, through the features of the 
experimental system (Rheinberger 1997).83  
Another central aspect of an experimental system is that “it helps us to understand 
how new knowledge – that is knowledge that in essence cannot be anticipated – is 
generated in the process of research” (Rheinberger 2011, 13). This feature of 
experimental systems relates to the idea that concepts can be in a state of flux, 
characterized by undefined meaning, and still be in a position to drive science further into 
open-ended research avenues. In sum, the growth of science (at least the life sciences) 
and its applications are not contingent upon developing abstract, general theories, or 
fully coherent theoretical concepts but rather on the construction of historically-localized, 
practice-embedded “systems” and “concepts” which provide control over the 
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 At that time, in the context of the Pasteur Institute, there was at least one other theory seeking to explain 
inflammation and response to infection: the phagocytocis theory of Ely Metchnikoff. A full historical 
account of the connections between immunology and bacteriology is still lacking but see Mazumdar (1995).  
83
 The engineering and use of “model organisms” in the life sciences is the typical example of how reducing 
complexity (i.e. investigating smaller-scale organism under experimentally-controlled conditions) can yield 
general knowledge by providing insights into the function, evolution and development of a whole range of 
so-called “higher organisms” (see Ankeny and Leonelli 2011).  
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phenomenon under study. Hence this is why a careful attention to the materiality of 
science and scientific practices is crucial for historical and philosophical reconstruction of 
particular episodes across shorter or longer time periods. 
 
DRIVING SCIENCE FORWARD 
The second philosophical thesis supported by Mendelsohn’s reading of the 
bacteriological “revolution” is that theoretical concepts are not (always) the main drivers 
in moving science forward: operational concepts too can have a positive impact on the 
development of particular fields of inquiry – in virtue of them not having a precisely fixed 
meaning, but rather by being in a state of productive tension.  
The distinction advanced here between “theoretical” and “operational” concepts 
may seem artificial and can recall a naïve version of instrumentalism, so let me clarify it 
briefly. Jean Gayon remarked that philosophers “distinguish observational and theoretical 
terms in scientific theories” (2007, 81; Nagel 1979; Hempel 1958). Whereas the meaning 
of observational terms (e.g. “temperature”; “pressure”) is fixed by observational, 
empirical procedures, the meaning of a theoretical term like gene changed over time and 
was constantly redefined in many different “operational ways” (2007, 81). Other like 
Bridgman emphasised that some theoretical concepts have only indirect links with 
operational procedures (e.g. wave function in quantum mechanics or strain and stress 
inside a solid body) at all and were, as such, “not amenable to direct operationalizations” 
(Chang 2009). David Hull, for example, asks how evolutionary biologists operationalize 
“theoretical terms” like fitness (1999, 489), while Elliott Sober emphasized that 
“theoretical claims ought to be testable – i.e., rendered ‘operational’” (1984, 82). It would 
seem, thus, that both observational and theoretical terms can be defined by a set of 
operational criteria. Regarding the example discussed here, virulence was (according to 
Mendelsohn) however “almost a purely operational concept”, i.e. nearly wholly devoid of 
theoretical content. While virulence in the work of Pasteur was almost entirely 
observational, it acquired some theoretical content following its inscription into a 
mathematical equation (see chapter 4) and following its operationalisation through 
concepts like “virulence gene” or “pagthogenicity islands”.  
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I will thus, for the moment, oppose theoretical and operational concepts, bearing in 
mind that theoretical concepts also have to be operationalized in various empirical 
contexts. There is another reason to hold on to this opposition: philosophers not only 
argued that theoretical terms are less operational than others but that it is in virtue of 
this that can they accomplish their “systematizing function” in science (see Hempel 1958; 
Hull 1968, 438). The fact that theoretical terms cannot (always) be operationalized is even 
seen as “essential”, it is claimed, if “scientific theories are able of growth” (Hull 1968). 
Indeed, one strong criticism of Brigman’s operationalism is that operational concepts are 
not the ones driving science forward; this role, on the contrary, is played by theoretical 
concepts: “theoretical terms [...] are not completely operational, but they are necessary 
for the progress of science (Hull 1968, 455; emphasis added). To use the words of the 
systematists Michler and Donoghue, rephrasing Hull’s point: “a concept cannot be 
completely operational and still be useful for the growth of science” (1982, 494). In brief, 
there is a strong assumption among philosophers of science that theoretical concepts (in 
contrast to operational ones) are essential to the development of scientific knowledge. 
Underneath this assumption is the older idea that theoria is prior to praxis. However, in 
the history bacteriology one finds the opposite (Mendelsohn 2002; Moulin 1992). 
Traditionally, the value of operational concepts and operational analysis was 
downplayed by philosophers of science. Indeed, influential thinkers including Poper, 
Hempel, (1954), Hull (1968), and Sober (1994; 1984) have openly criticized operationalism 
on a number of counts (for a review, see Chang 2009; Feest 2010). In his (1968) Hull was 
very sceptical regarding the real value of operational analysis, for both science and 
philosophy. Indeed, even if he agreed that operational analysis could sometimes yield 
interesting perspectives, he thought a great deal of it was plain “non-sense”. As he put it 
in the case of genetics: 
 
The fate of the various operationally defined units in genetics [muton, 
cistron, etc.] has been either to depart from their original operational 
definitions and become theoretical entities or to retain their operational 
character and decrease in importance (1968, 446). 
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David Hull has a curious love/hate relationship with operationalism that was not 
picked up by commentators (see special issue in 2000 in Biology and Philosophy). In his 
Science as a Process, Hull stated that Bridgman created “a Frankenstein monster that had 
gotten away from him” (1988, 126). In his (1968) he offered a robust attack on 
operationalism in physics, biology (especially in systematic and genetics) and psychology. 
Thirty years later, however, he stated that if his colleagues could move on with traditional 
philosophical issues such as the Twin Earth problem and incommensurability “they would 
find this topic [operationalism] rewarding” (1999, 489).  Moreover, Hull argued that it is 
an essential task for philosophers to understand how to operationalize concepts in 
science as well as in philosophy (Hull 1998). 84 Indeed, in an insightful comment Hull 
pointed out the relevance of taking an operationalist perspective in order to gain a better 
understanding of science as a set of practices (not his expression). In a paper on Popper’s 
philosophical legacy Hull observed that one of the problems in operationalising concepts 
is that “very little has been said by philosophers of science or scientists for that matter 
about how to operationalize concepts” (1999, 489). He agreed that, on the one hand, as a 
theory of meaning operationalism is “bankrupt” but, on the other, “we have said precious 
little about how concepts are to be operationalized”. Part of the reason for why this is, 
according to Hull, is that focussing on operations will lead philosophers to think in a very 
different way than what they are used to. In effect, it leads them to analyze historically 
and temporarily localized practices and knowledge production. As Hull says, 
operationalism “seems highly contingent and particularized, the very sort of phenomena 
that we philosophers shy away from” (1999, 489). Obviously, looking at localized, 
historical knowledge and practices goes against the long-held idea of scientific knowledge 
as being concerned with finding general, abstract laws of nature through the means of a 
(a)temporal scientific method. In a far-reaching remark he pointed out that “scientists 
themselves just do it, they operationalize their concepts without saying much how they 
do”. Recognizing this situation as one needing an explanation, Hull urged philosophers of 
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 “Empirical investigation requires the operationalizing of the concepts we are attempting to apply. 
Philosophers have contributed to our understanding of science by showing that theoretical terms cannot be 
operationally defined in a literal sense of ‘definition’, but this impossibility proof is not enough. We still 
need some discussion of how to operationalize our concepts” (Hull 1998, 211). 
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science to look into “how” scientists actually develop ways of operationalising concepts 
over time and in different empirical contexts. 
As we will become clear in the next sections, despite several attempts by scientists 
to provide clearer definitions, the concept of virulence remains very much operational. It 
is, however, “intellectually empty”, to use Mendelsohn’s expression, only if one believes 
that scientific concepts must be defined in an unequivocal an unambiguous way in order 
to provide a handle on nature, and/or to contribute to the growth of science. I should 
indicate, again, that the main point of this chapter is neither to provide a full defence of 
operationalism nor to argue that every concept ought to be operationally defined in order 
to be meaningful, or simply useful. I do not want to erase clarity and precision from the 
list of scientific (and philosophic) epistemic values. More down-to-earth, my contention is 
rather that for a concept to have what Mendelsohn called “an almost purely operational 
meaning” is not necessarily unfortunate, at least from a philosophical point of view. 
 
THE CONCEPT OF VIRULENCE 
The concept of virulence is old and comes from a very distant past. For centuries, it 
designated at once chemical reactions occurring inside organisms and the parasitism of 
one species by another (Arloing 1891). Nineteenth century Littré dictionary (online) states 
that virulence derives from the latin “virulentia” which means “poison” (Casadevall and 
Pirofski 2001). In The Bacterial Cell microbiologist René Dubos devoted an entire chapter 
to discussing the nature of virulence, which he characterized as an “immensely complex 
property, the summation of many complementary attributes” (1945, 228). Dubos noted 
that the concept of virulence was used before the formulation of the germ theory of 
infectious diseases to designate “the poisonous quality of an agent” or the “severity of a 
disease or of an epidemic” (Dubos 1945, 188). Dubos knew, however, that virulence could 
not be explained (only) in terms of a property of the invading microorganism. Following 
the American bacteriologist Theobald Smith he argued that in order to understand the 
nature of virulence, the properties of the invaders are not sufficient; the biology of the 
invaded host had to be taken into account as well (1945, 189; Smith 1934). As he would 
put it in a later work, virulence is an “abstract concept” that refers to the relation 
between host and pathogen (1959, 78). At the beginning of his career Dubos worked with 
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Oswald Avery at the Rockefeller Institute on the changes in virulence in pneumococcus 
culture and was also aware that virulence was related to a material support in the cell 
(chapter 5). He acknowledged, however, that cellular, organismal and ecological contexts 
had to be carefully considered (chapter 5). 
 Nowadays, any microbiologist asking “what is a pathogen and what is meant by 
virulence will meet with derision at best and will probably be declared a heretic bereft of 
his sense” (Isenberg 1988, 40). As microbiologist Isenberg pointed out, for most people, 
harbouring doubts about “the meaning of pathogenicity and virulence seems 
inappropriate, if not ridiculous” (Ibid.). And yet, the meaning of the concept of virulence is 
still debated (Poulin and Combes 1998; Read 1994), although the concept continues to be 
applied widely. Reviewing the multiple definitions of the concept of virulence 
microbiologists Casadevall and Pirofski (1999) suggested looking at the history of this 
concept through the changing perspectives of the “pathogen-centred view” and the 
“host-centred view”. According to the authors, early definitions of virulence in the 
twentieth century were “pathogen centred”, i.e., they were “based on the assumption 
that these characteristics [virulence and pathogenicity] were intrinsic properties of 
microorganisms” (1999). Virulence, they claim, was conceptualized as being a particular 
property of the pathogens, unrelated to hosts’ defence mechanisms or immune system. 
The pathogen-centred view of virulence predominated during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, Casadeval and Pirofski contend, because of the emergence of 
numerous diseases due to “toxigenic” bacteria (e.g. diphtheria), against which the 
immune system was almost always deficient, and because of the strong emphasis the 
germ theory placed on the causative power of microorganisms in producing disease 
(1999, 3703-4).  
 However, this reconstruction is partly a historical artefact. Indeed, microbiologists 
became very early on aware of the fact that virulence is not “absolute” but “relative” (to 
the host) and that it results from “the conflict between two living beings”, namely the 
host and the pathogen. A number of factors including the age, the nature and overall, the 
“individuality” of the whole animal in which virulence is expressed have to be considered, 
as Emile Duclaux pointed out (1896, 379). Similarly, Dickinson, an English physician, 
concluded his article in Lancet on “The seed and the soil” (1902) by stating that most 
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interactions between living things “can be looked at from two points of view – the donor 
and the recipient, the attacking and the attacked, the seed and the soil”. However, he 
continues “one who desires to see the whole of what is before him must have regard to 
both” 1902, 1301). These were not attempts to promulgate an indistinct form of holism in 
biology but rather expressed the conviction that virulence result from an interaction 
between living systems. 
Recently, discussions about the concept of virulence have been conducted from 
various perspectives, including empirical and theoretical ones (Combes 1998). The 
“received view”, so to speak, defines virulence as “the ability of a pathogen to multiply 
and cause harm to its host” (Calow 1998 in Combes and Poulin 1999, 474).85 However, the 
concept of virulence raises further definitional issues in several fields, including medicine, 
plant pathology, evolutionary biology, pathology, and microbiology (Shapiro-Ilan et al. 
2005). In their review (1999) already mentioned Casadevall and Pirofsky observed that 
virulence could be define according to many criteria such as the degree of pathogenicity; 
the strength of pathogenic activity; the relative capacity of pathogens to overcome 
available defences; as disease severity assessed by a reduction in host fitness following 
infection or as percent of death per infection. Virulence can also be understood as a 
synonym for pathogenicity; as a property of invasive power of microorganism; as a 
measure of the capacity of a microorganism to infect or cause damage to a host or as the 
relative capacity to enter and multiply in a given host. Finally, the authors suggested 
defining virulence as “the capacity of a microbe to cause damage in a host” (1999, 3704). 
This multiplicity of meanings is perhaps not so surprising because the concept of 
virulence is invoked in the explanation of pathogen’s mode of transmission; the adaptive 
dynamics of host-pathogen interactions (within-host and inter-host); in the evolutionary 
models of virulence (kin-selectionist, multilevel-selectionist, nested models, and multiple 
infections model, and so on) as well as in infectious diseases management by public 
health services, medicine, veterinary and agriculturalists (see Dickmann et al. 2002 for 
overview). In fact, it could be stated with bacteriologists working in the 1930s that “the 
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 It should be noted that the concept of “harm” remains vague (like in political theory) and is still in search 
of an appropriate characterization and operationalization. 
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problem of virulence has been and still is among the most arresting and fundamental 
subjects in the study of infectious diseases” (Arkwright 1929, 5541). In spite (or perhaps 
because) of the centrality of the concept of virulence in the field of infectious diseases, 
medicine and evolutionary ecology there is no generally accepted definition of virulence 
yet (Ebert and Bull 2003; Gandon et al. 2002; Poulin and Combes 1999). As British 
bacteriologist W.W.C. Topley has put it nearly one hundred years ago, virulence remains 
“an elusive term” (1919, 4).  
 
VIRULENCE AND PATHOGENICITY 
One conceptual difficulty in defining and measuring virulence is that it can easily be 
conflated with closely related concepts such as “pathogenicity”, “infectivity” and 
“toxicity” (Stuart-Harris 1960). The persistency of this situation is confirmed by the 
several papers published during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s (Ball 1943; Dudley 1924; 
Arkwright 1929; Topley 1941-42; 1919a,b,c; Thiele and Embelton 1913) attempting to 
clarify and detangle these issues by providing more clear-cut definitions of the terms 
involved. How to discriminate virulence, infectivity and pathogenicity is still matter of 
debate nowadays (Ulvestad 2007). At any rate, biologists seem to suggest that virulence 
comprises two main features: “invasiveness”, i.e. “the ability of the organism to establish 
itself and propagate in the host tissues” and “toxicity”, i.e. “the ability of the organism to 
destroy or damage tissues or impair their physiological functions” (Hawker and Linton 
1979, 310). Later on this distinction was made on the basis of the concepts of “‘infectivity’ 
(i.e. the ability to colonize and invade a host) and ‘severity’ of the disease that is 
produced” (David et al. 1990, in Read 1994). Along the same lines, Kirchner and Roy 
(2002) have recently argued that a pathogen’s virulence has two components: 
“infectiousness”, meaning roughly the “aggressiveness” of a pathogen in transmitting 
itself from one host to another; and “lethality”, namely the “severity” of the pathogen’s 
“impact on its host’ lifespan” (2002, 28). 
What these different definitions indicate is that virulence can still be “viewed as a 
property of the pathogen, or as a property of the host-parasite interaction (and thus as 
much a consequence of host resistance as of any parasite traits” (Read 1994, 73). In 
effect, the first part of each of the definitions given just above designate the ability of a 
131 
 
pathogen to infect a host and transmit itself to other hosts whilst the second part indicate 
the degree of harm or disease caused to the host following its interaction with a 
pathogen. The dualism resulting from the preceding analysis confirms that virulence is “a 
relative term” (Hawker and Linton 1979, 310). This dualism overlaps with the definition of 
virulence and pathogencity, the former being described in qualitative terms, and the 
later, formulated in quantitative terms, expresses the power of a pathogen to invade a 
host’s defence system. One may ask, however, why virulence and pathogenicity are so 
often conflated, identified or sharply separated. To understand this point it is worth going 
back to the article of British virologist Stuart-Harris mentioned above. In this article he 
supported Miles (1955) who distinguished virulence and pathogenicity as follow: 
pathogenicity should be regarded as “an attribute of a species, genus” or other grouping 
and reserving the use of virulence for the “expression” of pathogenicity (Stuart-Harris 
1960, 3). In other words, pathogenicity is the “power” to produce pathological effects in a 
host whereas virulence is the “evidence” of such power as measured by the observation 
of signs, symptoms, and degree of illnesses or host-death (Ibid. 3-4). The distinction 
between the power of a microorganism to cause harm (pathogenicity) and the degree of 
harm that is being caused (virulence) was recently revived and debated again (Shapiro-
Ilan et al. 2005; Thomas and Elkinton 2004). The distinction proposed by many is that 
pathogenicity is an all-or-nothing feature (i.e. a pathogen is pathogenic or it is not); 
whereas virulence comes by degree. The following table (from Shapiro-Ilan et al. 2005) 
reflects this distinction. 
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Table 1. Concepts of pathogenicity and virulence (adapted from Shapiro-IIan et al. 2005) 
Reference Pathogenicity Virulence 
Steinhaus 
and 
Martigoni 
(1970) 
The quality or state of being pathogenic. The 
potential ability to produce disease 
The disease producing power of an organism. 
Degree of pathogenicity within a group or 
species 
Aizawa 
(1971) 
... the ability of a strain or species of micro-
organism to produce disease in various hosts 
(term is used qualitatively) 
Degree of pathogenicity against a specific species 
host in controlled conditions within a group or 
species of microorganisms (term used 
quantitatively) 
Cantwell 
(1974) 
The quality of being pathogenic The quality of being virulent; the quality of being 
poisonous; the disease producing power of a 
microorganism 
Tanada and 
Fuxa (1987) 
The ability to invade and injure the host’s 
tissues. Applies to groups or species of 
pathogens 
The disease producing power of the pathogen, 
the ability to invade and injure the host’s tissues. 
The degree of pathogenicity within a group or a 
species 
Tanada and 
Kaya (1993) 
Nearly synonymous with virulence but applied 
to groups or species 
The disease producing power of a 
microorganism. The ability of a microorganism to 
invade and cause injury to the host. The relative 
capacity of a microorganism to overcome the 
host defence mechanism... The degree of 
pathogenicity with the group or species 
Lacey and 
Brooks 
(1997) 
The quality or state of being pathogenic. The 
potential ability to produce disease. Applied to 
groups or species 
The disease producing power of an organism. 
Degree of pathogenicity within a group or 
species 
Thomas and 
Elkinton 
(2004) 
The number of dead individuals relative to the 
number exposed to the pathogen 
The number of dead individuals relative to the 
number of infected 
 
 
Table 1 show that the terms virulence and pathogenicity can be distinguished 
analytically, although in practice they often tend to overlap or to be used as synonymous. 
The confusion of these terms denounced by many, moreover, is only apparent. In effect, 
although the concept of virulence is in flux its meaning can be fixed through the use of 
concrete measurements. In other words, it can be made clear on a case-by-case basis 
when the operations in measuring virulence (or pathogenicity) are specified. As Shapiro-
Ilan et al (2005) noted “operational definitions are useful in identifying empirical 
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approaches to determine whether an organism fits the criteria of pathogenicity and 
virulence” (2005, 3). The next section will illustrate how the division of labour among 
scientific field also plays a part in creating the impression that virulence is a confused or 
confusing concept. When the context in which the term is used is stated clearly, confusion 
regarding its meaning hardly occurs. In brief, on can have both a concept that remains “in 
flux” without having to give up precision in its meaning. This dual characterisation has, 
however, a broader historical and philosophical meaning. It gestures towards the two 
styles of reasoning I presented in the introduction. Virulence can either refer to the host-
pathogen’s relation in a given ecological environment, or it can refer to various properties 
of the pathogen, such as the capacity to breach a host’s cellular defences (pathogenicity). 
One could say that there is an ecological and a functional conception of virulence at play 
here.  
 
DIVISIONS OF LABOUR AND THE PROBLEM OF MEASUREMENT 
The epistemological importance of the act of measuring in science was perhaps only 
recognized in the mid, even late nineteenth century (Kuhn 1977b). As Lord Kelvin once 
suggested, “when you can measure what you are speaking about, you know something 
about it; when you cannot measure it [...] your knowledge is of a meagre and 
unsatisfactory kind” (Kelvin 1889 in Hacking 1983, 242). Kelvin’s comment directly applies 
to the problem of virulence addressed in this chapter. In fact, measurement is sometimes 
not only the best, but the only way of gaining insight into the nature of a phenomenon. 
For instance, because it is no material object as traditionally conceived, virulence can only 
by understood satisfactorily by measuring, comparing, scaling or ranking different levels 
of virulence against a previously established standard. In response to Thomas and 
Elkinton (2004) who stated that useful definitions of terms like pathogenicity and 
virulence must be conducive of explicit ways of measuring them, Shapiro-Ilan et al (2005) 
argued that “there is no requirement that a scientific term be quantitatively measurable 
in order to be useful” (2005, 4). 
In this section I argue that the distinction between pathogenicity and virulence 
described above is neither the result of historical necessity nor ontological reality; it 
reflects to a large extent a division of labour among scientists and how each scientific field 
134 
 
chooses its own way of measuring and comparing the phenomena they study. As pointed 
out already the choice of one definition over another is discipline-dependent and varies 
according to the goal(s) of the field, the research questions and the methods employed to 
inquire into natural phenomena such as virulence. To phrase it differently, although it has 
been widely recognized that the definition of virulence often depends on whether the 
scientist is a microbiologist, an epidemiologist, a parasitologist, a plant biologist, a 
zoologist, an immunologist, an evolutionary biologist, etc. (Alizon et al. 2009; Read 1994), 
it has largely gone unnoticed that this state of affair results mainly from different 
measuring techniques. This section provides a brief overview of how the concept of 
virulence is used in different scientific fields.  
The way scientists talk about virulence is linked to the way they measure it, or assess 
it. Even when technical means of measuring were lacking, observations (e.g. symptoms, 
mortality) could allow classification of a disease as being virulent or not. As already 
mentioned, the most straightforward measure of the virulence of a disease is host’s 
death. Lesions can also be used to determine the level of virulence (e.g. myxoma virus in 
rabbits; see chapter 4) but unless they can be ranked quantitatively, they provide only a 
rough estimate of the degree of virulence in a (viral or bacterial) strain (Stuart-Harris 
1960, 12). Host’s death, however, provides a reliable, if crude, method of measuring the 
virulence of a bacterial or viral strain.  
As Thomas and Elkinton advanced, what matters in defining pathogenicity and 
virulence is that they should “yield explicit ways to measure them” (2004, 149). As an 
example of this, they remark that insect pathologists and vertebrate pathologists have 
long equated virulence with LD50 and LC50. The former refers to the dose required to kill 
50% of the insects that are being exposed to the pathogen. This is either done via 
injection of exposure to the pathogen during bioassays. The latter concerns the time 
(estimated) to kill 50% of the animals. When bioassays are done by exposing organisms to 
a pathogen, then the LD50 measure inevitable includes transmission (from one host to 
another), as Thomas and Elkinton pointed out (2004). This, however, conflicts with 
another prominent way to assess virulence developed by evolutionary ecologists, 
especially May and Anderson (chapter 4 and 6). According to them, there is a trade-off 
between the level of virulence and the transmission of the pathogen. Yet the coupling 
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between virulence and transmission makes little sense, Thomas and Elkinton argue, 
because transmission is an intrinsic aspect of the LD50 measurement technique. Plant 
pathologists, therefore, measure virulence not in terms of “damage” caused to a host 
(like zoologists and physicians do) but in terms of “transmissibility”, i.e. the “capacity to 
infect” (Sacristan & Garcia-Arenal 1999, in Alizon et al. 2009, 249). Thomas and Elkinton 
noted that no matter how virulence is measured and defined it inevitably depends on the 
interaction between host, pathogen, and the environment (2004, 149). More importantly, 
a virulent disease does not always lead to the death of its host but to a recognizable set of 
symptoms and signs. How then can scientists measure virulence if the only available 
criterion was host’s death or the time needed to achieve it? As Hull noted, very often 
scientists are silent as to how they operationalize their concepts – they just do it.  
In order to ascertain the virulence of pathology a physician collects information, for 
instance by observing the symptoms of the patient. Medical doctors generally describe 
virulence, therefore, in terms of host’s (i.e. patient) damage or “pathogenic effect” 
(Combes 2010), not in terms of the properties of the infecting agent, or in terms of host’s 
death. In order to provide a more reliable measure that combine both the pathogen’s 
biology and the host’s immune response on the one hand, and that take into account the 
fact that most infections are not fatal on the other, microbiologists Casadeval and Pirofski 
have used the concept of “damage” as the “operational construct to define virulence and 
immunity” (2001, 341). For them, virulence relates to the relative capacity of a pathogen 
to induce damage and pathogenicity refers to whether the pathogen possesses this 
capacity, or not (1999). 
Other scientists can also be interested in measuring virulence but no so much in the 
development of the disease in the host. Typically, evolutionary biologists and ecologist 
will equate virulence with the measure of pathogen’s fitness. In turn, the measure of 
fitness can be the one of the host or the one of the pathogen but they are most likely to 
be concerned with pathogen’s one but it needs not always be the case. For example, 
while botanists (Burdon 1987 in Read 1994, 73) emphasize pathogen’s fitness (where 
virulence means the ‘infective capacity’ of a pathogen), zoologists generally define 
virulence in terms of the “reduction in host fitness caused by pathogens” (Frank 1993, in 
Read 1994). When virulence is measured as the effect on host’s reproductive success (or 
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fitness) like in evolutionary biology there may not even be observable damage (or 
symptoms) on the host. This definition is thus distinct from the one used in medicine. 
Indeed, if one defines pathogenicity as the capacity of a pathogen to cause damage in a 
host, and virulence as the relative degree of this capacity then a pathogen can be highly 
pathogenic (interferes with the host reproductive success) but of low virulence (causes 
little damage). So pathogenicity and virulence “need not co-vary, although they often do” 
(Ulvestad 2007, 157). 
It was long recognized that measuring virulence can be done at (at least) two levels: 
whole populations and individual level (Stuart-Harris 1960, 4). At the population level 
incidence and mortality from infectious diseases are often taken as indicators. Tables of 
mortality provide essential quantitative information about the virulence of a particular 
disease during an epizootic outbreak. These measures of the virulence of an epidemic 
must be weighed with a number of variables including age and previous exposure to the 
disease – which can lead to immunity and thus to the idea that the disease is less virulent. 
So when a disease changes in incidence it is problematic to assert whether this change 
results from a modification of the infectious agent or to a variation in the host (Stuart-
Harris 1960, 4). The phenomenon of herd immunity – i.e. level of immunity obtained at 
the level of the whole after vaccinating parts of the population – adds to the complexity 
of measuring virulence at the population level. At the individual level (medicine) virulence 
is defined on the basis of signs and symptoms, speed of infection and progression of the 
disease. 
To sum up, virulence and pathogenicity are neither entities nor material objects in 
the conventional sense of the word; their magnitude cannot be directly assessed before 
some standards of comparing and measuring are provided. There are material supports of 
virulence, also called “virulence factors”, or even “virulence genes” and “pathogenicity 
islands” (Kaper 1999). These concepts derive from what I call the “molecular vision” of 
virulence (chapter 5). Notwithstanding the fact that material conditions realize virulence 
in the host so to speak, the nature of virulence is better expressed as a relative property, 
than as a “thing” or an “entity”. Broadly speaking, therefore, the concept of virulence is 
often defined operationally as an indicator or an observable measure of disease severity. 
These measurements vary and include, for example, the assessment of host mortality, 
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reduction in host fitness, tissue damage, and so on. Thus, success in providing a standard 
terminology for these concepts is complicated due to the fact that virulence and 
pathogenicity are operationalized in different and sometimes, incompatible ways. 
Virulence remains an almost purely operational concept, but this does not mean that it is 
“intellectually empty”. As can be expected, this chapter does not end with a “better” or 
more “unifying” definition of virulence; on the contrary, the claim in this chapter is that 
virulence is best understood as an elusive phenomenon whose meaning does not derive 
from a precise definition but rather through a series of concrete operationalizations. 
Operationalizing concepts is a crucial aspect of scientitif practice and maintaining a 
concept in a state of flux contributes to its operationalization in distinct epistemic 
contexts.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
According to philosophic orthodoxy science can only progress thanks to the 
“systematizing function” of abstract theoretical terms. The operational role played by the 
concept of virulence in the late nineteenth century (and throughout most of the 
twentieth century) suggests, however, that this entrenched position in the history and 
philosophy of science should be amended. A more nuanced combination of theoretical 
and operational terms is needed to account for the development of fields such as 
bacteriology but also microbiology and immunology. Indeed, one of the key findings here 
is that in the case of virulence what happened is the opposite of what Hull described for 
genetics: the concept of virulence did not become fully theoretical but it’s being 
operational did not lead the concept of virulence to fade out of scientific research either. 
It is precisely this operational aspect that empowered it to be enacted as a research tool. 
Let us not be mistaken however: the concept of virulence did acquire some theoretical 
content, for instance when it became embedded within an epidemiological model as a 
mathematical variable (with the trade-off model, see chapter 4). And yet, it retained at 
the same time its operational character (i.e. virulence still had to be measured to be 
heuristically useful and meaningful). The concept of virulence did not decrease in 
importance but remains one of the most central concepts of today’s health sciences, 
particularly in the field of infectious diseases, but also evolutionary ecology, molecular 
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pathology and so on. The puzzle, then, is how to explain the persistence through time of 
scientific concepts once believed to be inapt in contributing to the growth of knowledge.  
In this chapter, I have argued that a straightforward consequence of applying 
operational analysis is that it explains why general, all-encompassing accounts of 
concepts are harder than ever to obtain (if possible at all). In the present case, a unified 
and general account of virulence (and other related concepts like “pathogenicity”) as 
some are seeking, that is, a concept that would cover the meaning of these terms across 
disciplinary boundaries and over time, is highly improbable due to the fact that such 
concepts are operationalized differently within and across disciplines. This, however, is 
not problematic for operational analysis once it is acknowledged that “concepts in flux” 
(Elkana 1970) are also generative of scientific growth, whereas static definitions of 
scientific terms may be much less adequate to fit the different needs and goals of 
particular research programs. Moreover, although biologists worry that because virulence 
and pathogenicity are defined in different, non-overlapping ways – a situation, they think, 
can cause confusion (Thomas and Elkinton 2004, 146) – appealing to the measure of 
virulence on a case-by-case basis allows for disambiguation, while retaining the epistemic 
value of concepts “in tension” to use Falk’s expression (2000). 
 To conclude, I would like to return briefly to Mendelsohn’s comments mentioned in 
the opening of this chapter. There are two ways of interpreting his claim that virulence is 
an “operational concept” (2002). Firstly, if one understands Mendelsohn in the sense that 
the concept of virulence lacked a precise definition, then yes, it was an “intellectually 
empty” concept. It should be noted, however, that taken in this sense the concept of 
virulence is still as “empty” as in Pasteur’s time, because it is vague, not well defined and 
that its significance is constantly negotiated and debated by microbiologists and 
evolutionary biologists, among others. If, however, one sees this concept “in action” so to 
speak, then this judgment is unwarranted. As I understand it Mendelsohn probably has 
the second option in mind: for him the concept of virulence does not derive its meaning 
from a set of clear-cut definitions but rather through a series of concrete 
operationalizations.  This last point goes together with Canguilhem’s remark that 
scientific practice is constantly re-shaping the concepts it uses in different contexts, and 
that such changes are then reflected in the scientific practice itself. Because of the 
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changing nature of scientific knowledge, however, one should not expect the meaning of 
scientific concepts to be transparent, well-defined and constant, contrary to what many 
philosophers have sought. Scientific objects, as Rheinberger has argued in his reply to 
David Bloor, function as such “by virtue of their opacity, their surplus, their material 
transcendence” (2005, 406). The operational aspect of the concept virulence indicated by 
Mendelsohn vindicates this point and opens up a space for the development of a history 
and philosophy of science that is more in tune with the intricate and dynamic relations 
between scientific practice and the formation of concepts.  
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CHAPTER 4: THEOBALD SMITH AND THE “LAW OF DECLINING VIRULENCE”: 
SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES ON THE EVOLUTION OF DISEASE – 1880-1980 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Why do pathogens harm their host? Analogue in some ways to the broader, and 
somewhat older, question of “why do diseases exist?” this question is recurrent in 
evolutionary ecology.86 Pathogens, to be sure, often bring about debilitating effects in 
hosts in ways that suggest a biological paradox. While exploiting their resources, 
pathogens frequently destroy their hosts, for instance during an infection. Although the 
annihilation of the host by the pathogen could be depicted as a crude example of “the 
survival of the fittest”, situations where the host dies often amount to a “pyrrhic victory” 
for the pathogen (Lederberg 1988, 349), however, because colonies harboured by the 
host will die with it, a most intriguing phenomenon from an evolutionary standpoint.87 
Both species, indeed, share the same evolutionary fate as most pathogens need a living 
host to reproduce their kind. Living at its neighbour’s expenses, a parasite is analogue to 
“a poor person who needs help to survive, but who nevertheless does not kill its chicken 
in order to have the eggs” (Van Beneden 1885, quoted in Alizon et al. 2009, 246). In killing 
the host (too fast) the pathogen runs the risk of jeopardizing its own transmission and 
reproduction, a situation some have regarded as a form of biological suicide (Grmek 
1969). A dead host is thus, from a pathogen’s point of view, something of an evolutionary 
dead end.  
The destruction of the host by the pathogen during infection raises important 
questions for evolutionary biologists. In effect, why would natural selection favour high 
virulence if this inevitably results in both the host and the pathogen’s deaths? How could 
the evolution of parasites even be conceivable should organisms die before passing down 
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 For recent discussions see Alizon et al. (2009); Kirchner and Roy (2002); Bull (1994).  
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 The terms parasite, pathogens, and infectious disease are frequently used interchangeably in ecology, 
population biology, and evolutionary theory to describe organisms living at the expense of others, often at 
the host’s detriment. 
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their genetic, hereditary material to their offspring? Very much along these lines, 
infectious diseases – a form of predation often fatal to hosts – have become understood 
in the first half of the twentieth century as being temporary biological accidents, or 
transient pathological states, which will naturally decline given enough time.88 The Lives 
of a Cell of British physician and science writer Lewis Thomas (1913-1993) reflected this 
conviction that “there is nothing to be gained, in an evolutionary sense, by the capacity to 
cause illness or death” (1974, 77). For Thomas, disease is a natural but contingent 
phenomenon, one that “usually results from inconclusive negotiations for symbiosis, an 
overstepping of the line by one side or the other, a biologic misrepresentation of borders” 
(1974, 76). In other words (infectious) diseases are either indicative of an imperfect or 
incomplete Darwinian adaptation between hosts and pathogens, or reflect the situation 
of a pathogen which has gone astray, venturing into a new ecological niche where it is 
only poorly adapted.89 But in the natural world, Thomas continued, “pathogenicity is not 
the rule” (Thomas 1974, 76). Thomas’ views on the nature of disease as evolutionarily 
contingent were once widespread among medical scientists.90   
While host’s death from communicable (or infectious) diseases frequently occurs 
worldwide, and particularly so in developing countries, scientists have long argued, 
however, that Nature is not always red in tooth and claw but also exhibits an opposite 
(evolutionary) tendency to Darwinian competition, one where hosts and pathogens 
naturally co-evolve towards mutual tolerance. Opposing Thomas Huxley’s “gladiatorial” 
view of nature as wholly governed by the law of natural selection, anarchist Russian 
scientist Peter Kropotkin, for instance, argued at the turn of the twentieth century that 
“mutual aid” is a crucial “factor in evolution” (Borello 2004; Sapp 1994). Relying on 
Darwin’s concept of an “entangled bank”, those who emphasized cooperation over 
conflict and competition have tended to describe organisms’ ecological interactions in 
terms of “uneasy equilibrium” or “unstable balance” (Burnet 1940, 13; Crist and Tauber 
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 For classic statements of a natural decline of infectious diseases see Cockburn (1963); Smith (1921). 
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 Following Smith, Hans Zinsser also urged that infectious diseases should be regarded as the “result of 
parasitism in which no such mutual adaptation has taken place” (1906, 8).   
90
For examples of the concept of infectious diseases as biological accidents, see Elek (1959, 313); Burnet 
(1946, 126).   
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1999; Park 2006). For, during the last century, most biologists considered that, all else 
being equal, pathogen’s evolution towards harmlessness should be the expected 
outcome of long-term associations as it would benefit the host as well as the pathogen, 
thus ensuring the survival of both species (for references: Ewald 1994).  
“Given enough time”, microbiologist René Dubos said, “a pacific state of coexistence 
eventually becomes established between any host and any parasites” (1965, 190).91 
Similarly, for Frank Macfarlane Burnet (1889-1985), an Australian immunologist and 
Nobel Prize winner, “it is self-evident that if both host and parasite are to survive, a mild, 
rather long-lasting infection, which does no serious damage to the host and provides 
adequate opportunity for the parasite to be transferred to other hosts, is the most 
advantageous relationship for both” (Burnet 1953, 176). Hosts and parasites, in the long 
run, are expected to become adapted to each other so that only minimal harm is felt on 
both sides. Rephrasing an idea he borrowed from American bacteriologist Theobald Smith 
(1859-1934), the Dutch parasitologist N.H. Swellengrebel stated at about the same time 
that “the efficient parasite is a non-pathogenic organism”, avoiding both “harm to its host 
as well as to itself” (Swellengrebel 1940, 466).  
Nowadays dismissed as an example of “naïve adaptationism” (Sober and Wilson 
1999, 43; Ewald 1994), this conventional wisdom was, however, widely accepted by some 
of those who pioneered the development of bacteriology, immunology, ecology, and the 
modern evolutionary synthesis in the twentieth century, up until the early 1980s, 
orchestrating an “ecological vision” of infectious diseases (Anderson 2004).92 The 
conventional wisdom, moreover, “helped to spread the idea that virulence is subject to 
evolution” (Sigmund et al. 2002, 3), on the one hand, acting as an impetus to think about 
disease in broad ecological and evolutionary terms, on the other. Indeed, it provided an 
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 For Dubos “it is not very enlightening to say of a particular microorganism that it has a high or low 
virulence. A more meaningful statement is that a given pathogen is generally highly destructive in a given 
population when the pathogen and population come into contact, and the severity of the infectious process 
tend to decrease as contact between the two components of the system is continued over several 
generations (Dubos 1965, 165; emphasis added).  
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 The expression “conventional wisdom” was first used by epidemiologists May and Anderson (1983) to 
characterise the received, and rather unidirectional view of host and parasite co-evolution towards 
harmlessness.  
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explanation of one of the largest natural experiments in evolution: the decline of 
virulence in the myxoma virus among Australian rabbit populations during the 1950s and 
1960s (Fenner and Fantini 1999). First extremely deadly, the virus evolved within a few 
years only towards intermediate levels of virulence: hypervirulent strains rapidly 
reproducing its kind killed the host too fast, whereas mild strains causing only minor, 
unsustainable infections failed to transmit to new hosts. Together, these ecological 
factors fostered the evolution of strains of intermediate virulence (Fenner 1983). Yet 
despite the broad acceptance of a natural decline in virulence over time and the evolution 
of harmless relationships between species, a comprehensive study of those who 
supported it is still lacking. Taking a somewhat different approach, the present chapter 
traces the history of the concept of virulence, as seen through the lens of this influential 
hypothesis, across disciplinary boundaries, linking biomedical concepts and practices 
throughout twentieth century’s life sciences. 
 
FROM THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM TO THE TRADE-OFF MODEL 
Although “intuition suggests that parasites should evolve to be benign whenever the 
host is needed for transmission” (Bull 1994, 1423), most biologists writing on the ecology 
of host and pathogen interactions nowadays advocate the mathematical model of the 
trade-off developed in the late 1970s (Alizon et al. 2009).93 This more recent model is 
based on the idea that pathogens face several compromises (or trade-offs) between the 
mode of transmission and the degree of disease severity (i.e. virulence) they can inflict 
upon their hosts without compromising their own (evolutionarily) interests. These 
ecological constraints, on the one hand, interfere with the assumed tendency towards 
harmlessness, and the competition between different strains within a single host (i.e. 
multiple infections), between-host competition, and host’s recovery rate, on the other, 
supply additional complexity for epidemiologists to consider when constructing ecological 
models of infections (Alizon and van Baalen 2008). Balancing the level of virulence 
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 The trade-off model was challenged some years ago, however, on the grounds that it was, on the one 
hand, too general to permit the development of realistic virulence management strategies (models should 
be “species-specific”) and because it was too “simplistic”, on the other (Ebert and Bull 2003). For a recent 
discussion of the model as formulated by May and Anderson, from a philosophical point of view, see 
Thompson (2011).  
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between host and pathogen the way the avirulence model suggests, thus, is not always 
feasible and is not regarded anymore as the expected, natural outcome of evolution by 
natural selection. Empirical and theoretical evidence suggests, on the contrary, that for a 
parasite to be successful evolutionarily, many paths or coevolutionary endpoints are 
possible (May and Anderson 1983). This more recent approach underpins the 
development of programmes on virulence management seeking to redirect pathogen’s 
virulence by intervening, for instance, at the level of disease transmission (Dieckmann et 
al. 2002).  
 One of the main differences between the two models sketched above is that, on the 
one hand, there is no obligate evolution toward avirulence in the latter and that virulence 
is a trait that can either increase, decrease or become stabilized at intermediate levels as 
a result of the interactions between different factors and selective pressures. In sharp 
contrast with the most fundamental assumption of the conventional wisdom, on the 
other, the trade-off model claims that novel biological associations between distinct 
species will tend to be less virulent, less fit, and overall less infectious over time (Ebert 
and Herre 1996; Ewald 1994). The shift from one model of disease evolution to another 
raises important historical and epistemological questions: When, and in which context, 
was the avirulence model initially advanced? What are the factors that fostered the 
development of a new, mathematically-oriented model during the late 1970s? Following 
the rise of this new model of disease evolution, can we identify significant changes in the 
concept of infectious disease itself? Is a new understanding of the concept of virulence 
emerging altogether? I return to the question of the transition between the two models 
in the conclusion and I suggest that despite the fact that biologists consistently oppose 
them, one can still detect significant conceptual continuities between these models. What 
the change from the avirulence hypothesis to the trade-off model firmly established, 
however, is that the former is only a special case of the latter and not a general model of 
disease evolution, as many have assumed in the past century.  
 Beginning with a short description of the avirulence model, I will then contextualize 
the debate on the nature of virulence by relating this concept to some key issues in the 
life sciences and public health during the late nineteenth century such as the cause(s) of 
epidemic disease, the evolution of germs and the concept of disease specificity, as they 
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began to be addressed in the light of evolutionary theory. Replacing Smith’s contributions 
within bacteriology, and particularly his study of cattle fever, within the broader context 
of public health medicine, and evolutionary thinking I will trace the history of the 
avirulence hypothesis from the work of Smith up to its widespread acceptance in the mid-
twentieth century, and until its downfall in the 1980s. Exploring this theoretical 
rearrangement in virulence studies not only illuminates an important episode in the 
history of disease transmission that remains largely uncharted in recent scholarly 
anthologies (e.g. Gaudillère and Löwy 2001), but also sheds light on the intermingled 
relationship between evolutionary biology, ecology, and medical bacteriology in the past 
century, while providing at the same time a much needed initial appraisal of Theobald 
Smith, a forgotten figure in contemporary U.S. medical history. Building on the work of 
historian of science J. Andrew Mendelsohn (2002) this article also supports the view that 
the category of “virulence” in biomedicine occupied a central (but neglected) place in the 
establishment of a number of disciplines in the life sciences during the past century.  
 
A LASTING MODEL OF HOST-PATHOGEN (CO)EVOLUTION 
During his Presidential Address to the Western Society of Naturalists at Stanford 
University on “Parasitism and Evolution” the American zoologist Gordon H. Ball 
summarized the then-prevalent ecological model of host and pathogen interactions with 
remarkable clarity, and stressed its evolutionary dimension: “I am referring to the view 
that pathogenicity to the host is really a disadvantage to the parasite and that 
consequently, long-standing parasites, by the process of evolution, have much less of a 
harmful effect on the host then have recently acquired ones” (1941, 345; emphasis 
added). Where this view comes from, Ball confessed, was difficult to determine 
precisely, but he suggested that “perhaps van Beneden (1809-1894) in his Animal 
Parasites and Messmates of nearly 70 years ago was one of the first to set forth the view 
[of the avirulence model] fairly definitively” [...] (1941, 346-7). In the last quarter on the 
nineteenth century, amidst the rise of several social associations in Britain and France, 
such as trade unions and mutual aid associations (mutuelles), Van Beneden coined the 
biological concept of “mutualism”. Unlike his son Edouard who was openly Darwinian, 
Pierre-Joseph van Beneden believed in the theory of special creations (Hamoir 1999). He 
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remained, indeed, a “lifelong opponent of the view that evolution resulted from a 
‘struggle for life’ and natural selection” (Sapp 1994, 20). For him, mutualisms such as 
plovers eating leaches from crocodiles’ teeth or lichens (composed of a fungi and an 
algae), are the result of God’s benevolent intent: “All these mutual adaptations are pre-
arranged” van Beneden said, “and as far as we are concerned, we cannot divest 
ourselves of the idea that the earth has been prepared successively for plants, animals, 
and man” (1875, xxvii, quoted in Sapp 1994, 18). As was already mentioned, however, 
the avirulence hypothesis is an evolutionary model of disease, and thus van Beneden 
cannot strictly speaking be pictured as its precursor, despite Ball’s suggestion.  
In contrast, and notwithstanding the importance of Van Beneden’s concept of 
mutualism, the work of American bacteriologist Theobald Smith stands as a much more 
likely candidate for the origin of the avirulence model. In effect, not only have several 
biologists pointed out that “the evolution of a disease tends toward development of a 
symbiotic relationship” (Bang 1959, 352) was an idea initially proposed by Theobald 
Smith, but Smith himself formulated an evolutionary hypothesis he came to call “the law 
of declining virulence and advancing parasitism” (Smith 1904). The novelty of this 
perspective on disease evolution was immediately recognized by medical doctors, 
although some identified predecessors. Ball himself believed that “Theobald Smith did 
much to popularize it (1921) and to apply it to modern concepts of epidemiology” (1941, 
347). Smith’s views remained largely unchallenged for about eighty years and they 
profoundly contributed to the development of other fields outside medical pathology and 
parasitology. In addition to his views about a natural decline in infections over time, his 
concept of “evolving parasitism” and his “law of declining virulence” were influential in 
immunology, bacteriology, virology, epidemiology, and public health medicine.94  
In the past century, scientists frequently turned to Smith as a point of departure for 
discussing host and pathogen interactions and coevolution.95 For example, the 
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 In addition to renowned virologists like Burnet and Fenner, prominent epidemiologists like Major 
Greenwood, in England, and Simon Flexner, in the U.S., endeavoured to study epidemics along the 
evolutionary lines as promoted by Smith (Anderson 2004; Mendelsohn 1998).  
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 See Musgrave (1908); Zinsser (1914); Swellengrebel (1940); Ball (1941); Dubos (1959); Bang (1959); 
Andrewes (1960); Lederberg (1993); Ewald (1994); Alizon et al. (2009). 
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“philosophical statement” of disease evolution attributed to Smith is “to a large extent 
true”, epidemiologist and virologist Frederik Bang concedes – and it applies 
paradigmatically to the case of myxomatosis –, even if it admits a number of exceptions, 
however (Bang 1959, 352). A few years before, during a Ciba symposium on Virus, 
Virulence and Pathogenicity, the British virologist Christopher H. Andrewes, co-discovered 
of the viral nature of influenza (Smith, Andrewes, Laidlaw 1933), had remarked that 
“nowadays we all accept Theobald Smith’s dictum that the natural tendency of a host-
parasite relationship is towards a mutual tolerance which will permit a survival of both 
partners” (1960, 34). Andrewes’s comment did not elicit any questions or critical remarks 
during the discussion that followed, quite to the contrary (see pp.39-42).96  
This should not be surprising since Macfarlane Burnet (who chaired the meeting) 
provided influential support to this view from the mid-1930s onward, emphasizing the 
role of the environment as a powerful determinant of health and disease. Working on 
psittacosis, a disease affecting mostly parrots held in captivity, Burnet was struck by the 
fact that when living in the wild, the animals were sometimes seriously infected with 
psittacosis viruses without, however, displaying any disease symptoms (Park 2006, 511). 
The healthy carriers (parrots) and the virus had learned to cohabit, developing a state of 
“stabilized equilibrium” or “mutual tolerance” over the course of many generations (Ibid.) 
In Virus as Organism Burnet wrote (still without referring to Smith) that “the normal end 
result of long-period interaction under approximately constant conditions between host 
and parasite is a state in which the host suffers no significant disability and the parasite 
persists long enough to ensure transfer by one or other method to a new susceptible 
host” (1946, 26).97 Once formed, however, this fragile, inter-species ecological 
equilibrium could easily be disturbed should the environmental conditions come to 
change too radically, upsetting the delicate balance slowly brought about by evolution. 
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 In his address Andrewes took some careful distance with Smith’s (and Burnet’s) model, however, 
remarking that natural selection does not necessarily favour the least possible virulent virus, but rather an 
“intermediate, optimal virulence” (1960, 36). 
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 Many who shared Theobald Smith’s idea on declining virulence, including Burnet, Dubos, Fenner, and  
Lederberg, knew each other personally but often failed to quote each other’s work (Anderson 2004). In his 
autobiography Burnet confessed having read Smith’s Parasitism and Disease only after he published his 
own book on infectious disease (1968, 23).  
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More recently, in the opening chapter of Emerging Viruses, the Australian microbial 
geneticist Josh Lederberg (1925-2008), also Nobel Prize winner, remarked that “since 
Frank MacFarlane Burnet, Theobald Smith, and others [...] we have understood that 
evolutionary equilibrium favours mutualistic rather than parasitic or unilaterally 
destructive interactions. Natural selection, in the long run, favours host resistance, on the 
one hand, and temperate virulence and immunogenic masking on the parasite’s part, on 
the other” (1993, 3). 
 An important insight deriving from this model is that the observable level of virulence 
is linked to the length of the biological association between two species: virulent 
associations are phylogenetically recent, whilst benign ones are much older. As Ball 
(1943) suggested, the level virulence came to be seen as a reliable temporal marker of the 
length of biological associations. For example, according to Asa C. Chandler – author of an 
Introduction to Human Parasitology (1936) – “a high degree of pathogenicity may be 
considered prima facie evidence of a recent and still imperfect development of the host-
parasite relation” (quoted in Ball 1943, 346). The same year, H.B. Fantham asserted boldly 
that “a parasite pathogenic to its host is considered to be relatively new to it”, concluding 
that “in parasites long resident in their hosts, a mutual state of harmony or tolerance is 
set up to a greater or less degree”, and that “the newer parasite is to its host, the less is 
the harmony that exists between them” (Fantham 1936, 324 in Ball 1943, 348; emphasis 
added). This model eventually boils down to the idea that infectious diseases result from 
an incomplete Darwinian adaptation between two organisms which, on an evolutionary 
timescale, have only recently been brought together. 
 It is only by the end of the nineenth century and the birth of bacteriology that the 
concept of virulence moved to central stage, contributing to the development of several 
fields of research in the first half of the twentieth century. On the one hand, experimental 
changes in virulence in microorganisms and host’s resistance provided an explanation for 
the severity of the disease during epidemics; on the other, such modifications could also 
account for the creation of novel diseases (i.e. originating de novo). In addition, the old 
medical concept of disease specificity was re-defined through an evolutionary lens, 
fostering at the same time a new understanding of infectious diseases as historical (i.e. 
evolved) entities. Examining these entangled issues will provide both a scientific and 
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philosophic background for an in-depth discussion of the work of Theobald Smith, and in 
particular his concept of an “evolving parasistims” and his law of “declining virulence”, 
which can be seen, in part, as a response to these problems. 
 
THE CONCEPT OF VIRULENCE IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY: EPIDEMICS, GERMS, AND 
SPECIFICITY  
 
EXPLAINING EPIDEMICS: THE SEED AND THE SOIL PERSPECTIVES 
Between 1880 and 1920, bacteriologists and epidemiologists emphasized different 
causes as being responsible for the waxing and waning of epidemics: while 
bacteriologists’s explanations postulated changes in the germ’s virulence, epidemiologists 
focused on changes in the environment instead (Amsterdamska 2004). This 
epistemological quarrel notwithstanding, causes of epidemics began to be more precisely 
circumscribed with the recognition that germs are causal agents of disease, although 
epidemiologists continued to insist that “laboratory bacteriology is not the conclusion of 
the whole matter” (Crookshank 1920, 183). The work of Robert Koch and Louis Pasteur, 
primarily structured by the concept of virulence, and not by a general theory of infectious 
diseases, provided such links between disease processes and microorganisms 
(Mendelsohn 2002). Disease-causing power in microorganisms, however, varied widely, 
and Pasteur and his colleagues knew that the virulence of a microorganism could be 
experimentally enhanced or decreased, through serial passages in a host. Since these 
induced modifications could be passed on to the next generation changes in virulence 
became associated to the issue of the inheritance of acquired characteristics and the 
possibility of pleomorphism (i.e. the thesis that there are no bacterial species).  
Although changes in virulence had sometimes an unmistakable Lamarckian gloss, 
especially in laboratory contexts, 98 they were, however, also frequently interpreted from 
a Darwinian point of view. In Britain, for instance, the concept of evolution by natural 
selection fostered new, genuine explanations of virulence during epidemic outbreaks. In 
an insightful paper on “infection considered from a Darwinian point of view” (1878), 
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London Medical Inspector Hubert Airy (1838-1903) suggested that the germ theory of 
disease recently developed by Pasteur and Koch addresses a “complex problem of natural 
selection” (1878, 253) involving two “interdependent” variables: “man and microzyme”. 
Foreshadowing the avirulence model, Airy argued that through the course of generations 
there is a general tendency toward “asusceptibility” to particular diseases provided that 
the least susceptible individuals are more likely to survive and to reproduce successfully, 
passing on the resistance capability to their offspring. While human populations is likely 
to evolve toward greater “asusceptibility” the parasite will, however, “step by step attain 
new virulence” (1878, 254). According to Airy the “fatality and virulence” of “nearly all the 
outbreaks of pestilence” such as this one are due to the fact that the “constitution of the 
race has not had time or opportunity to adapt itself” (1882, 255). This ongoing process of 
“parasitic adaptation”, Airy argued, is liable to an eventual “compromise” by means of 
natural selection which will maintain both the host and the pathogen alive and with 
sufficient variation of each side. Fiji Islanders, for instance, when were first exposed to 
measles, became severely diseased as they lacked appropriate level of immune 
protection European communities had developed following a prolonged contact with the 
malady. Assuming that hosts and pathogens populations co-evolve toward equilibrium 
allowed Airy to explain why Fiji Islanders were more susceptible than other populations to 
particular pathogens: natural selection did not have enough time to fit “man and 
microzyme” together, but might eventually do so.  
 
BIOLOGICAL VARIATION IN DISEASE AND RETURN TO TYPE 
The role of germ’s virulence in causing epidemics relates to another one frequently 
framed in terms of whether diseases can change or return to their “original type”, for 
instance following environmental changes. The work of Williams Roberts (1830-1899), 
who was M.D., Fellow of the Royal College of Physician and Fellow of the Royal Society, 
provides an interesting case of such approach to virulence. Before delivering an address 
at the British Medical Association meeting in 1877 in which he ventured an explanation of 
why two bacteria apparently alike in both their morphological and physiological aspects 
can cause different diseases, Roberts wrote to Charles Darwin, with whom he used to 
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correspond regularly, to inquire about the possibility for a harmless bacteria to produce 
(or “sport”) a pathogenic form (quoted in Bynum 2002, 61).  
According to Roberts, Darwin’s “laws of variation seem to apply in a curiously exact 
manner to many of the phenomena of contagious diseases”. One of these laws, he 
continued, is the vertical transmission of a variation from parents to offspring; another 
“law”, however, is the tendency for a given variation “to revert once more [...] to the 
original type” (quoted in Nash 1915, 81). 99 By means of the concept of “reversion to 
original type” Roberts (1877) wanted to explain outbreaks of disease like cholera. If germs 
are living organisms, he reasoned, then a highly virulent bacterium could under specific 
environmental circumstances revert to the original “non-parasitic” (saprophyte) type of 
its species (explaining the decrease in virulence) and similarly, an avirulent bacterium 
could sport a virulent and pathogenic form (explaining the outbreak of an epidemics). 
Roberts argued that if “contagia were organisms” then they must exhibit variation, 
including in their potential to cause disease. His key example was Bacillus subtilis (used by 
Pasteur in his experiment on spontaneous generation) and B. anthracis (the bacillus 
causing anthrax), two species of bacteria which, according to the microbiologist 
Ferdinand Cohn were identical “in form and development” despite producing different 
pathogenic effects (Bynum 2002).  
Using an analogy with plants to explain this transformation Roberts saw “no more 
difficulty in believing that the B. anthracis is a sport from the B. subtilis than in believing, 
as botanists tell us, that the bitter almond is a sport from the sweet almond – the one a 
bland innocuous fruit, and the other containing the element of a deadly poison” (Robert 
1877 in Bynum 2002, 61). He thus believed that bacterial species could evolve into new 
diseases, for instance as a function of the type of environment (or “soil”) in which the 
germ is planted. Hereditary changes in bacterial types, however, were seen as going 
against the older idea that diseases have specific causes, an idea which underwent 
significant challenges from an evolutionary standpoint in the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century.  
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Despite the possibility for germs to undergo significant transformations of 
evolutionary nature it was also clear that diseases (and so, germs) did maintain some of 
their key characteristics over time. For Armand Trousseau (1801-1867), an influential 
French physician who placed the concept of specificity at the core of medical practice, 
diseases have “specific characters, absolute and invariable, distinguishing them from one 
another, irrespective of the gravity of the illness” (1873, 500). This absolute specificity, in 
turn, is aetiologically determined by its morbific cause (Ibid). The formulation of Robert 
Koch’s postulates provided new support for the doctrine of disease specificity, i.e., the 
idea that each disease has a particular causative agent.100 After Darwin, however, the 
question of biological variation launched several discussions and inquiries concerning the 
“evidence of variability” and the “persistency of type”, not only in biology but also in 
public health, epidemiology, bacteriology, and medicine. For example, in Stevenson and 
Murray’s treatise on Hygiene (1893) T.W. Thompson suggested that “the older notion of 
the absolute immutability of species being now indefensible, we cannot fail to be 
impressed by the variations from time to time exhibited by epidemics”; but on the other 
he urged that if “it is necessary to abandon the absolute immutability of diseases, it is of 
the utmost importance to avoid falling into the opposite error of underestimating the 
relative fixity of type which some of them have evidently acquired” (Thompson quoted in 
Hamer 1906, 32).  
A decade later the epidemiologist William Hamer (1862-1936), a well-known critic of 
bacteriology, concluded his Milroy lectures with a plea for reconciliation in the 
explanation of epidemics between “the extraordinary persistency of disease types with 
the no less remarkable variability of the organisms to which the bacteriologist attaches 
importance as cause of disease” (1906, 72). This tension between persistence and 
variation also reflected political, even epistemological quarrels between bacteriologists 
and epidemiologists each of whom drew on distinct medical traditions and methods in 
order to explain epidemics (Mendelsohn 1998), emphasizing, on the one side, the 
                                                                
100
 Koch stated that “each disease is caused by one particular microbe – and by only one. Only an anthrax 
microbe can cause anthrax; only a typhoid microbe can cause typhoid” (Koch 1876, quoted in Evans 1993, 
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constancy of the germ and the changing environmental conditions, on the other. At about 
the same time, however, the internal coherence of the concept of specificity began to be 
challenged on the basis of evolutionary theory.  
 
RE-FRAMING THE CONCEPT OF DISEASE SPECIFICITY IN THE LIGHT OF EVOLUTION 
William Collins, a London physician, was one of the first to openly question the 
concept of specificity from an evolutionary point of view asking, in The Lancet, whether 
“the theory of specificity” is not “swallowed up in the larger theory of evolution” (1881). 
After the publication of this short piece Collins wrote a longer essay on Specificity and 
Evolution in Disease (1884), dedicated to philosopher Herbert Spencer, 101 where he 
argued that the concept of specific diseases is 
 
But a reiteration in the language of Genesis that in the beginning were 
created the germs of specific diseases “each after his kind,” that each has 
propagated itself in strict genealogy from that time to this; and if we are to 
follow Dr. W.B. Carpenter we must also believe that there were at the 
same time created specific susceptibilities to each and every one of these 
said diseases in our earliest progenitors, and ample provision made for the 
perennial perpetuation of the same (1884, 7).  
 
Collins’ argument was that once we accept the doctrine of disease specificity we have 
to believe that germs and predisposition to disease were created at the same time, a view 
he rejected as untenable. The core of the problem, however, and if we follow Collins, is 
that the theory of specificity “can never explain the development of specific diseases” 
(1884, 7; emphasis added), that is, their coming into being, or their emergence in 
individuals. Emphasizing the importance of the “soil” over the “seed”, Collins called upon 
the theory of evolution to explain both the origin and the development of disease agents 
into recognizable, specific forms.  
Collins’ ideas about evolutionary pathology were not immediately accepted by 
medical doctors (see Collins 1920), but especially by bacteriologists. For instance, W.W.C. 
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 Spencer thanked Collins for the dedication of his essay, and regarded his conception as “thoroughly 
philosophical” in that it “promises to open the way to a considerable reform in pathology” (letter of 
Spencer to Collins, reprinted in Collins 1884). 
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Topley, then working at the Chairing Cross Hospital in London, argued that the spread of 
bacterial infection is better explained by postulating an increase of virulence by natural 
selection (1919), whereby a coevolutionary process hosts acquire progressive immunity 
and pathogens gain in virulence power. In his response to Collins, and trying to reconcile 
the notion of specificity with evolutionary thinking, Topley suggested that “an 
evolutionary hypothesis, in which especial emphasis is laid on changes in environment, 
does not exclude a belief in specificity, provided that this doctrine is not applied with an 
unintelligent rigidity” (1920, 1136). Yet even Collins, although he rejected the idea of an 
“absolute specificity”, was open to the idea of a “relative specificity” which was, “as true 
as ever”, once “rightly understood and studied in the light of evolution” (Collins 1884, 28).  
The evolutionary view advocated by Collins and others opened the door to the possibility 
that disease specificity can have a history of its own. In summary, the concept of virulence 
was, on the one hand, particularly useful in constructing explanations of a number of 
biological phenomena in the late nineenth and early twentieth century, including the 
nature of hereditary processes, bacterial variation and disease causation, especially 
during epidemic outbreaks. On the other, however, the concept of virulence had an even 
deeper impact as it troubled existing models of disease specificity, and provided 
alternative explanations based on individual constitutions, predispositions and evolution. 
In the next section I will examine how the work of Theobald Smith provided a way out to 
reconcile the concept of specificity with Darwinian evolution while at the same time 
proposing one of most important operational approaches of host-parasite interactions 
and infectious diseases.  
 
THEOBALD SMITH: LIFE AND WORK 
Theobald Smith was not awarded a Nobel Prize for having identified for the first time 
in medical history an arthropod-borne disease, but he was once regarded as one of 
“America’s foremost bacteriologist” (Bulloch 1979, 398). Born in Albany from German 
immigrant parents, he did brilliant studies and obtained a scholarship to enter Cornell 
University in 1877. Trained as a pathologist “in the biology of the Darwin-Huxley 
tradition” (Zinsser 1936, 264) Smith was a scholar in natural history and medicine but was 
relatively ignorant of the new science of bacteriology (Clark 1961, 120), a field in which he 
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eventually made great scientific contributions. After graduating from the medical school, 
and supported by his mentor from Cornell, microscopist Simon Henry Gage (1851-1944), 
Smith obtained a position in Washington in 1884 at the Bureau of Animal Industry (B.A.I.) 
where he stayed until 1895, working under Daniel E. Salmon. Thanks partly to his 
knowledge of French and German that allowed him to read the original articles he quickly 
became acquainted with the methods of bacteriology developed by Pasteur and Koch 
which he introduced into the U.S. in the early days of bacteriology. From 1885 to 1915 he 
worked at the Harvard Medical School in Boston where he experimentally challenged the 
“absolute identity” of the tubercle bacilli affecting mammals and demonstrated that, 
contrary to Koch’s claim, tuberculosis comes in both a human and a bovine type (Smith 
1898). Finally, Smith assumed the directorship of the Rockefeller Institute of Medical 
Research in Princeton until the end of his life. Smith’s work was respected by 
epidemiologists and bacteriologists and in 1933 he received the Copley Medal from the 
Royal Society of London for his “original research and observation on animals and man”.   
 
SOLVING THE TEXAS FEVER PROBLEM 
Theobald Smith became especially renowned for his detective work on Texas fever 
carried on from 1886 to 1893 and published as Investigation into the Nature, Causation 
and Prevention of Texas or Southern Cattle Fever (Smith and Kilborne 1893). 102 
Originating from Spain, West Indies and Mexico, the disease was possibly introduced by 
cattle brought to America during the seventeenth century (Doleman and Wolfe 203, 99). 
In South Illinois, in the summer of 1868, a particularly violent epizootic episode of cattle 
fever broke out causing the death of at least 15, 000 animals, in addition to substantial 
economical loss. An early report by the New York State Commissioner Dr. Cresson Stiles 
published the following year indicates that the kidneys of the sick animals “were deeply 
congested”; the urine was “of glutinous character”; and no red blood discs could be 
observed in the blood of the animals (in Dolman and Wolfe 2003, 103). Stiles died from a 
mental disorder in 1870 and his analyses were left incomplete, however. During the ten 
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 The controversy regarding the precise role of Kilborne in this episode or the decision of Salmon to 
include his own name on the report cannot be examined here (see Dolman and Wolfe 2003, chapter 6). 
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years following the outbreak of cattle fever, reports on the nature and the causes of the 
disease were regularly issued. Although the observations and conclusions differed to 
some extent, most of them dismissed the “tick theory” as a ludicrous, implausible 
explanation of the mode of transmission of the disease (Dolman and Wolfe 2003, 101; 
Haygood 1986, 555).  
Smith turned his attention to the aetiology of cattle fever in September 1886, when 
the spleen of two animals who died of the disease was delivered at the B.A.I. The autopsy 
performed on the enlarged organs revealed that one of them showed “in or on many red 
corpuscles small round bodies, perhaps 1 μ in diameter [...] which stain poorly in an 
aqueous solution of methyl-violet, very well in aniline-water methyl-violet”. These bodies 
“resemble microccoci in size and form”. When “unstained they can be seen as mere 
transparent spaces in the corpuscles” (Smith and Kilborne 1937, 345). Upon embarking on 
his research into the cause of Texas fever, after reviewing the available evidence, Smith 
considered three plausible hypotheses (Ibid. 430). According to him, the disease could  
1- Have a bacterial origin, with bacteria producing toxins acting directly on the blood 
corpuscles of the animals.  
2- Result from the production of a toxic substance by bacteria multiplying in the 
intestinal tract of the host and dissolving the red blood cells. 
3- Be the result of a microparasite invading the red blood cells, destroying the 
corpuscles.  
With great precaution, Smith concluded after a large number of precise histological 
microscopic observations that Texas fever was not caused by a bacterium but by a 
microscopic protozoan (Pyrosoma bigeminum) which grows inside red blood cells and 
ultimately destroys them.103 He warned that diagnostic of cattle fever should go beyond 
the signs and symptoms and be made by the counting of the red corpuscles, the 
physiological changes these typically undergo during infection, and the presence of the 
parasite, established through microscopic examinations. Figure 1 represents the different 
                                                                
103
 Nowadays biologists have reclassified this organism as two distinct species belonging to the genus of 
Babesia: Babesia bovis and Babesia bigemina (Haygood 1986, 556).  
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forms Texas-fever parasite can take when stained with methylene blue, and figure 2 
shows the technique to obtain blood sample on cover glasses.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Intraglobular forms of the Texas-fever            
parasite (Smith and Kilborne 1937, 449). 
 
     
     
 
   
   
 
  Fig. 2 Methods of preparing blood on cover    
             glasses (Smith and Kilborne 1937, 415). 
 
Smith announced his preliminary findings regarding the causative agent of Texas fever 
at the Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association of the Brooklyn Institute 
in 1889 as follows:  
 
There is a continuous or paroxysmal destruction of red-blood corpuscles 
due to an intraglobular parasite, and the disease results mainly from the 
incapacity of the internal organs, primarily the liver, secondarily the spleen 
and kidneys, to transform and remove the waste products resulting from 
such destruction. In milder cases the protracted anaemia, which results 
from the loss of corpuscles, may become the chief cause of exhaustion and 
death (Smith, quoted in Dolman and Wolfe 2003, 105).  
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The causal explanation of the cattle fever still required the discovery of the 
mechanism of transmission of the disease, however. This ecological aspect of the problem 
Smith, Kilborne, and Salmon tackled was the following: when cattle from southern States 
– including South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Indiana, and 
Louisiana – which were apparently healthy, were taken to the northern States (Virginia, 
North Carolina, Tennessee), the northern cattle started to be decimated. Similarly, when 
northern cattle were moved to southern States, they soon started to become infected 
and died of fever and anaemia, despite the fact that southern cattle with which they 
interacted did not display any visible sign of disease. In contrast with the opinions voiced 
in the various reports on the cause of Texas fever, popular knowledge at the time was 
that this phenomenon was linked to the ticks with which the southern cattle were 
covered. In a manner similar to Edward Jenner (1749-1823) who learned from 
countrymen that cowpox could provide immunity to smallpox, Smith considered the tick 
hypothesis seriously. 
 
THE TICK HYPOTHESIS  
Designing disease transmission experiments at the B.A.I. Smith constructed enclosed 
fields to test the tick hypothesis as a possible vector of the disease. His experiments, 
beginning in summer 1889, aimed at answering three distinct but related questions: can 
Southern cattle transmit the disease to Northern cattle without the intervention of ticks? 
Can the disease transmit to Northern cattle in the absence of the Southern cattle? Can 
Northern cattle acquire the disease by having ticks artificially placed on them? (Smith 
1937, 480) All possible combinations were carefully tested and explored thanks to the 
experimental fields Smith and his colleagues designed at the Bureau of Animal 
Investigation. Summarizing the results of the several experiments conducted in 1889, 
Smith concluded that a field must be infected with ticks for Texas fever to appear in the 
first place and also that this was sufficient to cause disease in Northern cattle in the 
absence of Southern animals. When Southern cattle from which ticks had been 
mechanically removed and tick-free Northern cattle were together placed in the same 
field, none of them developed (nor transmitted) the disease. The 1889 experiments 
established that Texas fever comes from the permanently infected territories (i.e. 
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southern States) and is transmitted by the animals up north through the ticks, maturing in 
the bovine and acting as a vector (fig. 3). “It took four years of slavery at the microscope, 
at autopsy, at watching ticks hatch from the egg” (Smith 1937, 346), but he finally 
established the complete life cycle of the parasite and identified the ticks as the vehicle of 
the disease transmission. Knowing that a vaccine against Cattle fever was unlikely to be 
developed because the microparasite “cannot be cultivated” (Smith 1937, 537), the 
discovery of the disease vector withheld significant public health consequences, for it 
meant that to eliminate or for cattle to avoid contact with the ticks could help preventing 
the parasite causing Texas fever to spread.  
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Enclosed fields at the B.A.I for the 1889 experiments with Northern 
cattle covered with ticks (or not) to study the role of infested fields and 
Southern cattle in the transmission of the disease (Smith and Kilbourne 
1937, 484). 
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The most fascinating epistemological point of the cattle fever episode, though, was 
perhaps not so much the discovery of how the disease was caused but rather “how 
apparently healthy animals could transmit a fatal disease to others?” (Haygood 1986, 
558) The puzzle was about acquired immunity, a topic Smith was acquainted with from 
his previous work with Salmon (Salmon and Smith 1886). It was found that the protozoan 
present in the blood of northern cattle that causes disease is also present in the southern 
ones, with however no apparent pathological consequence on the animals. The Southern 
animals are immune to the disease, and this immunity last well beyond a few years (Smith 
1937, 533). In contrast with northern cattle those animals living South are continually 
exposed to ticks bites, starting very early in life. Being repeatedly infected throughout 
their existence by several insects’ bites southern cattle progressively developed a 
transitory form of acquired immunity that requires continuous attacks on the part of the 
ticks. “Eventually” as Haygood notes “a tenuous balance is reached” between the 
pathogen population thriving in the bloodstream and the immune system of the hosts 
(1986, 559). In Smith’s words, “the repeated mild attacks to which they [young calves] are 
subjected finally makes the system indifferent to the virus” (1937, 555).   
 The cattle fever episode played a crucial role in shaping Smith’s ideas about 
parasitism, evolution and disease, providing him with a concrete biological example of the 
harmlessness of a long-term association between an organism and its parasite. As 
microbiologist and biographer of Theobald Smith, Claude Dolman noted, Smith’s 
contention that “the symptomatology of an invasive disease reflected the degree of 
disequilibrium in a host-parasite relationship” derives from his work in Washington where 
“mild cases and the carrier state proved to be missing links in the riddle of Texas fever” 
(1984, 578). Moreover, this experiment allowed Smith to generalize his views on disease 
and evolution understood in terms of both ecological and physiological “equilibrium”. In a 
paper read before the first meeting of the Society of American Bacteriologist a few years 
later, Smith suggested that  
 
The mutual dependence of host and parasite upon one another as to the 
weapons which each will use to restrict the inroads of the other leads us 
to assume that the final result of continued association of a certain 
parasite with a certain host will be a delicate equilibrium which is 
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dependent on the special nature of the bacterium, as well as upon the 
host, and is likely to continue unchanged as long as these two agents 
remain the same. The final definitive relationship furnishes us with the 
various types of disease which remain fairly constant from year to year, 
from generation to generation (1900, 106).  
 
As this quote illustrates, Smith explained the constancy of disease patterns on the 
basis of the “continued association” between host and pathogens – just like in the case of 
the Texas fever. In turn, this results in the various “types of disease”, each having its own 
specific and individual characteristics. Disease specificity, as defined above, started to be 
conceptualized not as something forever “given” but rather as the end product of a long 
evolutionary process. Solving the puzzle of cattle fever thus enabled Smith to put 
together an original evolutionary view of parasitism which was soon followed. 104 He 
explained changes in virulence not by providing a more fine-grained definition of the 
concept but by infusing evolutionary dynamic into it, and this evolutionary dimension 
provided the basis a “generalized parasitic theory of disease”, to use John Farley’s 
expression (1989). For Smith wanted to bring together “all alien invaders and parasites of 
the animal body and deal with them and the disturbances they produce under some 
unifying principle” (Smith 1963, vii).  
 
THE LAW OF DECLINING VIRULENCE AND THE CONCEPT OF EVOLVING PARASITISM  
Advocating the importance of looking at diseases from a biological standpoint, Smith 
warned that parasitism should not be regarded “as a pathological manifestation” per se 
but rather as “a normal condition, having its roots in the interdependence of all living 
organisms”, and when some forms of parasitism bring about pathological effects those 
are only “incident in a developing parasitism” (1934, 2-4). Discussing the differences and 
the connections between various forms of parasitism and saprophytes (i.e. organisms 
feeding on decaying matter) Smith argued that the former evolved from the latter. 
According to Smith there is a spectrum onto which we can map the level of adaptation a 
parasitic species has reached, by looking at the extent to which such species can survive 
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 Musgrave (1909); Fantham (1936); Chandler (1940); Burnet (1946). 
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without the presence of a host ranging from the “strictly parasitic” forms of parasitism 
that cause “diseases which are very slow in their progress, often lasting for years and 
frequently checked and cure” such as tuberculosis, syphilis and leprosy (1887, 7), to the 
bacterial species that can survive without a host but which can cause great harm if they 
found themselves in the wrong environment. The mechanism by which parasitism evolves 
is “the universal struggle of living things” (1934, 19). 
 Smith suggested that the capacity for “living and multiplying upon dead matter” was 
an ancient adaptation and “that all pathogenic bacteria were derived by a process of 
natural selection from the innumerable harmless species everywhere peopling the air, the 
soil, and the water” (1887, 4; emphasis added). In other words, there is a natural, steady 
progression in the making of a parasitic and commensal way of life. Earlier in his career 
Smith also observed that “the better adapted the parasite becomes, the more compatible 
will it be with the host and the less capable of carrying on an independent existence” 
(1887, 7). Highly pathogenic bacteria, thus, are either “incomplete adapted parasites” or 
some kind of parasites which have “escaped from their customary environment” and are 
trying to adapt themselves to a new milieu, and “to establish some equilibrium between 
themselves and their host” (1904, 828). “The less complete the adaptation”, he concluded 
“the more virulent the disease produced” (Smith 1904, 828). In the case of Texas fever 
the adaption between the ticks and the Southern cattle was optimally adjusted, 
generating no pathological effects whatsoever. To explain this progressive adaptation 
between host and parasite Smith relied on the concept of “balance” understood as an 
adaptive state established by the process of evolution by natural selection. For example, 
“the highly adapted microorganism which depends upon one host for its existence – as, 
for example, the still unknown smallpox organism – has through natural selection 
established between itself and its host a certain balance or equilibrium” (Smith 1921, 7; 
emphasis added).  
Smith expressed his own views about the “law of a declining virulence” most clearly 
in a paper on the “Problems in the life history of pathogenic microorganisms” (1904, 832). 
Discussing the relations between different mechanisms for pathogens to invade, 
reproduce and escape the host, he reasoned as follow with respect to the idea that a 
pathogen would be disadvantaged (on evolutionary grounds) if it remains too virulent: 
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In fact the more virulent the microbe, the more rapid the death as a result 
of invasion, the less the opportunity for escape. Hence there will be a 
selection in favour of those varieties which vegetate whence they can 
escape [...] That some such process of selection has been going on in the 
past seems the simplest explanation of the relatively low  mortality of 
infectious diseases. These individuals or races of microbes which invaded 
the host too rapidly and caused death would be destroyed in favour of 
those which vegetated more slowly and in tissues permitting escape of the 
microbe after a certain time (1904, 825; emphasis added).  
 
The end result of this process of adaptation or evolving parasitism, as far as health and 
disease are concerned, is either the establishment of a “harmless parasitism” or some 
disease “of little or no fatality”  and a reduction of mortality through the operation of 
biological processes  (1904, 828). The evolutionary dimension of Smith’s was rapidly 
noted by physicians as being of “direct interest to medical men”. The “law of declining 
virulence and advancing parasitism”, for example, was discussed in relation to medicine in 
the editorial of The Journal of the American Medical Association in August 1905 
(Anonymous 1905, 405). The lesson to be drawn by physicians and pathologists, 
according to Smith, is that infectious diseases are contingent things, that is, they “are 
merely epiphenomena in an evolving parasitism, by– products which tend to lessen and 
disappear as the parasitism approaches a biologic balance or equilibrium” (Smith 1921, 
6). Accordingly, “mortality from infectious diseases would be greatly reduced through the 
operation of natural causes” (Smith 1904, 838). Smith was careful to emphasize, however, 
that “how rapidly this evolution [towards avirulence] may progress we have no means of 
knowing” (Smith 1921, 6).  
This possibility of a natural decline in infections was obviously important to Smith as he 
came back to it in an address delivered a few years later entitled “The decline of 
infectious disease in its relation to modern medicine” (1928). He knew all too well that 
many factors concurred to foster the worldwide decline in infections. Considering three 
of them as particularly relevant, Smith discussed the “changes in economic conditions”, 
the “application of medical science”, and the “interplay of natural forces”. In this last 
category of biological causal factors, Smith included those factors that are “largely 
164 
 
unknown and not controlled by human foresight” and which “tend to raise the resistance 
of the host and reduce the virulence of the parasite” (1928, 286).  
  
THE LEGACY OF THE AVIRULENCE MODEL IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
 Theobald Smith was clearly not the first bacteriologist to theorize about how 
virulence can either decline or increase, but he inspired generations of evolutionarily-
minded scientists working in microbiology like MacFarlane Burnet, René Dubos, Frank 
Fenner, and others (Anderson 2004). In contrast with most of the bacteriologists and 
immunologists of his time, however, Theobald Smith drew more on the concepts of 
balance and equilibrium, than on the metaphor of the war between man and his 
microbial inhabitants, an attitude that reflected perhaps his overall pacifist philosophy.105 
The importance of taking into account the ecological interactions between organisms and 
their milieu broadly construed in order to understand disease began to be recognized in 
the first half of the twentieth century. Emphasizing the ecological standpoint, Burnet, for 
instance, argued that “there are no virulence genes as such”, and that virulence should 
only be address “in relation to the full totality of the environment” (Burnet 1960, 1-2). 
This position was shared with a number of colleagues, some of whom attended the Ciba 
workshop on Virus, Virulence and Pathogenicity in London in 1960 mentioned previously.   
In addition to bacteriology and virology, where the work of Burnet contributed to 
maintain its momentum, the avirulence hypothesis became entrenched within 
evolutionary biology itself, particularly during the coming into being of the Modern 
evolutionary synthesis in the 1940s and 1950s. Quoting Burnet’s Virus as Organism the 
Russian geneticists Theodosius Dobzhansky – in the third edition of his Genetics and the 
Origins of Species (1951, 285) – argued that parasitic relations between host and 
pathogens were evolutionary unstable and “would tend to disappear and to be replaced 
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 See for instance Nicholas Kopeloff’s Man Versus Microbes (1929). Even Burnet argued that “the general 
point of view which we must adopt in regard to infectious disease” is that it “is a conflict between man and 
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in which both species would survive indefinitely” (Burnet 1953, 24; emphasis added). Smith’s views on the 
First World War are somewhat mixed: he described the war as “the debacle of our nineteenth century 
civilization”, accepting invitations to join the Committee on War Prohibition, on the one hand, while 
harbouring some pro-German sentiments, on the other (1917, in Dolman and Wolfe 2003, 427-29).  
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by cooperation and mutualism” (quoted in Sapp 1994, 156). Similarly, at the First 
symposium on host specificity among parasites of vertebrates held in Neuchâtel 
(Switzerland) in 1957, the German evolutionary biologist and Harvard Professor Ernst 
Mayr remarked, approvingly, that “many of the speakers mentioned repeatedly that 
there must be perfect balance between the host and the parasite. If the parasite becomes 
too successful it will kill the host, and if the host becomes too successful, it will eliminate 
the parasite” (1957, 314). Also significant is the parasitologist J.F.A. Sprent who, writing 
on the occasion of a centennial commemoration of Darwin’s Origin of Species, noted that 
“it is widely accepted that the longer an association has been in existence in the 
evolutionary sense, the more likely it is to be a relationship unaccompanied by excesses 
on either side. Indeed, this is to be expected because associations involving damage or 
death, either for host or for parasite, would by natural selection eventually tend to 
disappear” (1962, 155). To argue for this point further, Sprent relied on Julian Huxley’s 
book on Evolution – the Modern Synthesis (1942).  
It is perhaps no coincidence that Sprent had referred to Huxley’s book as the latter 
was an early advocate of this disease model, also outside strict scientific circles, for 
example in The Science of Life (1929) which he coauthored with the novelist H.G. Wells 
and G.P. Wells. This scholarly informed book expounded the view that not only bacteria 
play an important role in the “economy of nature”, but that “parasitism might evolve into 
a symbiotic relationship that benefited both the host and parasite” (Park 2006, 502). The 
book was carefully read by people like Macfarlane Burnet, Frank Fenner and Joshua 
Lederberg. In Biological Aspects of Infectious Disease Burnet mentioned that his book 
“expresses the same general point of view that runs through Wells, Huxley and Wells’ The 
Science of Life” (1940, ix quoted in Park 2006, 502), while for Lerderberg, it was “was the 
most influential source” of his “perspective on biology and man’s place in cosmos, seen as 
evolutionary drama” (1993, 895). In his bestselling biography of the thyphus fever Rats, 
Lice and History (1934), Hans Zinsser also supported the thesis of his mentor and friend 
Theobald Smith, stating that evolution can only progress “toward a more perfect mutual 
tolerance between invader and invaded” (1934, 46).  
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During the second half of the twentieth century, the law of declining virulence and 
the concept of evolving parasitism also exerted far reaching, but still rather 
underappreciated, influence in the field of public health. Indeed, Smith’s ideas about the 
evolution of disease by “natural forces” have informed and preceded the launching and 
organization of eradication programmes by the World Health Organization in the 1950s, 
offering indirect support to the view, (in)famously expressed by (or attributed to) the U.S. 
General Surgeon William Stewart in 1967, that “we can now close the book on infectious 
diseases”. While Smith refrained from making any concrete prediction about the future of 
infections, others like Stewart were less careful, however. A few years before Stewart’s 
declaration, the respected British anthropologist and epidemiologist Aidan Cockburn, 
who was at the time Assistant Commissioner of Health in Cincinnati (Ohio), had argued 
that within one hundred years most human and animal diseases could be eradicated. 
According to Cockburn, who referred to Smith, “we can look forward with confidence to a 
considerable degree of freedom from infectious diseases at a time not too far in the 
future”. For Cockburn, “[...] it seems reasonable to anticipate that within some 
measurable time, such as 100 years, all the major infections will have disappeared” (1963, 
150).  
While this statement is often regarded by medical authorities on emerging diseases 
as being at best naive (Fauci 2005) Cockburn identified a crucial downside of 
eradicationist views for, once a disease is successfully eradicated, Cockburn wrote, “new 
ones will certainly appear, for we live in a world swarming with potential pathogens in 
many forms” (1963, 150). And yet, to those in the 1970s who voiced concerns regarding 
the possible resurgence of infections, Burnet responded that although in principle “there 
may be some wholly unexpected emergence of a new and dangerous infectious disease” 
we should expect “nothing of the sort that has marked the last fifty years” (Burnet and 
White 1972, 263). The eradication of smallpox in 1979 and the greater control over a 
number of other infectious diseases, including malaria, underlined these enthusiastic 
perspectives further ahead. Despite considerable support from several high profile 
scientists this evolutionary model of disease remained in search for an empirical test that 
would underwrite its generality and scope. The case of the myxoma virus provided such 
evidence. 
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MYXOMATOSIS: THE FIRST EXPERIMENT IN EVOLUTION 
The introduction of European rabbits (Oryctolagus cuniculus) in Australia in 1859, 
coinciding with Darwin’s publication of On the Origin of Species, was disastrous for the 
vegetation of the country. The situation amplified and took such dramatic proportions in 
the following decades that the Australian government organized a contest, promising a 
prize of 25 000 pounds to whoever could provide a suitable method to control the 
growing rabbit population. In no time Pasteur wrote a letter in a newspaper stating his 
intention to help Australia getting rid of the rabbits (délapinisation) using a biological 
method based on the introduction of fowl’s cholera. He trusted the task of conducting the 
early field and laboratory experiments (and the negotiations of this project) to his 
nephew and assistant Adrien Loir who embarked onto his journey to Australia in February 
1888. Australian authorities, however, probably skeptical to the idea of introducing 
foreign microorganisms into the country, declined Pasteur’s help in 1889 (Chaussivert 
1991).  
After the Second World War the project of eradicating the rabbit populations surfaced 
once again. This time, a group of scientists from the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research led by the zoologist Francis Ratcliffe obtained the authorization to deploy one of 
the first biological weapons: the myxoma virus, originating from South America. Following 
a few unsuccessful attempts, the virus transmitted by mosquitoes spread rapidly among 
rabbits. It became established by December 1950 and reduced the population of 5000 
individuals near Lake Urana in the Murray Valley to 50 individuals by the end of the 
second year (Fenner and Ratcliffe 1965). During the first two years after the inoculation, 
data obtained at this location revealed that the virus was 99% of the time deadly, thus 
supporting the view that recent associations between hosts and pathogens are more 
virulent than older ones. At the same location the rabbit population increased to 550 
individuals during the next spring although it was subsequently reduced to 60 by 
December 1952, which means that the second outbreak “produced a mortality of about 
90%” (Fenner 1983, 264), a noticeable difference if compared to the 99% mortality rate of 
the previous year. Campaigns using highly virulent strains continued after 1952.  
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However, the naturally selected type of strain was neither the most virulent one (grade 
I), nor the least ones (grade IV-V) but the “moderately virulent grade III” (Fenner 1983, 
265). The explanation given of this phenomenon is that on the one hand, highly virulent 
strains killed rabbits too rapidly to be efficiently transmitted and propagate themselves. 
On the other, attenuated strains did not harm rabbits much and regressed quickly. The 
fact that the virus was deadly when it was released and that its virulence gradually 
decreased over a few years was considered by many, however, as “the best evidence 
supporting the generalization that disease tends to evolve toward a harmless 
relationship” (Bang, 1959; see also Ewald 1994, 45). Moreover, it correlates positively 
with the fact that myxomatosis is harmless in its South American natural host, Sylvilagus 
rabbit. Yet Fenner’s conclusion was more nuanced. For him, “the co-evolution of virus and 
host does not necessarily lead to a situation of harmlessness’ parasitism” […] “at least in 
the short run” (1983, 269), suggesting that given more time the myxoma virus and the 
Australian rabbits could evolve toward a state of commensalism. Likely, Fenner 
attempted to harmonize a conservative view of the evolution of virulence with the 
growing challenges faced by the “conventional wisdom”. 
 
CHALLENGING THE AVIRULENCE MODEL: EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL VIEWPOINTS  
Despite the fact that Smith’s hypothesis was strongly supported during the twentieth 
century from different perspectives, critics have been voiced against it. For instance, 
already in the 40s, the zoologist Gordon Ball lamented that this model, based on the 
observed degree of virulence, leads to incorrect phylogenies. Citing a large number of 
counterexamples, Ball was adamant that “one cannot maintain that relative harmlessness 
is prima facie evidence for long parasitism, and severe pathogenicity equal evidence for 
its relative newness” (1943, 349). He noted, elusively but correctly, that a parasite may 
“find aggressiveness more attractive and more valuable than an existence of peace and 
symbiosis” (1943, 361). Ball, however, had no alternative model of host-parasite to offer 
and his criticisms of the received view were largely ignored. Prior to a fuller development 
of the Modern evolutionary synthesis in the 60s, new work in ecology of host and 
pathogens in the 70s, and a global pandemic triggered by a new disease entity (AIDS), 
alternatives to the avirulence model were indeed hard to conceive. In reality, beyond the 
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persuasive rationale underlying the avirulence model, several empirical observations lent 
support to it, including the well-known studies on Plasmodium falciparum by Allison 
(1982) and the myxoma virus, at least initially. Today, emerging diseases – including 
Legionnaires’ disease, Lyme disease, and pneumonia – continue to support the avirulence 
model as those diseases are often the result of parasites or commensal organisms which 
have been associated with human history over a relatively short period of time (Levin 
1996).  
These observations are somewhat anecdotal (P. falciparum aside), however, and 
while they seem to lend support to evolution towards harmlessness, they fail to 
demonstrate the converse, namely that older associations are typically avirulent (Read 
1994). Besides, other empirical observations appear to plainly contradict the avirulence 
perspective: tuberculosis, for instance, interacts with human populations since hundreds 
of years and continues to be deadly. This optimistic view of the evolution of disease 
rapidly came under scrutiny and was challenged by the dramatic rise of emerging 
diseases, especially AIDS, but also dengue fever, and the evolution of antibiotic resistance 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Dengue fever, which has infected human populations at least 
since the eighteenth century, was until the 1950s followed by lifelong immunity. Yet 
partly as a result of the opening up of new routes of transmission for the virus and the 
increased mobility of human populations, the virulence of dengue fever has considerably 
augmented since the last fifty years, giving rise to outbreaks of dengue hemorrhagic fever 
and dengue shock syndrome, two previously unknown diseases (Snowden 2008, 16). The 
recent concept of emerging diseases (or emerging infections) reminds us that the natural 
world is constantly changing, although in ways that are not necessarily aligned with what 
our concept of human health is.106 It is amidst this context of emerging infections, 
although somewhat also independent from it, that the trade-off model of virulence 
introduced at the beginning of this article was developed by ecologists and evolutionary 
biologists, and challenged the avirulence hypothesis further, and from a more theoretical 
angle.  
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 On the concept of emerging disease see Snowden (2008); Fauci (2005); Grmek (1993).  
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THE TRADE-OFF MODEL 
Since pathogens have short generation timescales and exhibit sufficient genetic 
variation for natural selection to act, the evolution of virulence became a major topic for 
evolutionary ecologists in the past forty years, following the upbringing of the Modern 
evolutionary synthesis. The main architects of the trade-off model all had biological 
training in population ecology, epidemiology, or evolution, and include Sir Robert M. May, 
Roy Anderson (May and Anderson 1979, 1983), Simon Levin, David Pimentel (Levin and 
Pimentel 1981), and Paul Ewald (Ewald 1983). Developed at the end of the 1970s, this 
cost-benefit model explains the evolution of virulence not by a lack of adaptation, but by 
postulating a series of ecological compromises between the level of disease severity and a 
pathogen’s mode of transmission, its rate of transmissibility, the speed of the host’s 
recovery, within (and between) host selection, and so on. On this view, natural selection 
can foster high virulence in a system either by causing illness to the host in ways that 
facilitate the disease to spread, or as a consequence of maximizing transmission (Read 
1994). A byproduct of a pathogen’s growth, reproductive rate, and transmission (Kirchner 
and Roy 2002, 27), virulence results ecologically from intense host’s exploitation, while 
from an evolutionary standpoint it is the measure of the reduction in host’s fitness 
induced by the pathogen (Galvani 2003, 132). With the development of the trade-off 
model the concept of virulence became operationalized in yet another way, this time as a 
mathematical variable.  
Importantly, the trade-off model applies primarily to pathogen’s population and their 
evolution, not on the host, although a better understanding of changes in virulence 
requires considering host evolution as well (Ebert and Herre 1996). The reason for this 
neglect is that generation time for hosts (here, humans) is much longer and so evolution 
in the host population is likely to be slow. Another dimension of the model is that it does 
not concern itself with morbidity (at least not explicitly). Thus, symptoms like pain or 
injuries are not taken into account by the trade-off model and are implicitly integrated 
with other variables like host recovery and parasite transmission (Levins 1996). This 
assumption impacts on the ways in which the concept of virulence will be measured, 
understood, and operationalized.  
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The most fundamental assumption of the model is that the evolution of pathogens 
crucially depends on the positive coupling between transmissibility and virulence. The 
following, given in Levin (1996), is the equation based on which biologists can represent 
virulence evolution on an optimal trade-off curve:  
                    ßN 
R0 =     -----------------  
                           α + b + v 
 
Fig. 4 Where R0 is the number of infections caused after a first infection 
and serves as a measure of Darwinian fitness; α is the level of virulence; b 
the rate of parasite independent-mortality; and v the rate of recovery of 
the host. Those variables are linked. The measure of Darwinian fitness (R0) 
is directly proportional to its transmissibility (ß) at any host-density 
population (N) (Adapted from Levin 1996, 95). 
 
For microparasites (bacteria, viruses, protozoa) R0 is the basic reproductive rate of 
the pathogen’s fitness. This coefficient refers to the average secondary infection after 
introduction of a pathogen in a wholly susceptible population. If R0 – the rate of 
pathogen’s reproduction – is greater than 1, then pathogens “can persist, maintain its 
population, and, as it were, emerge” (May 1993, 58). In such context there will be an 
observable chain of infection up to the point where there are no more hosts to infect. 
However, if R0 is less than one than the infection will not be self-sustaining and will die 
out. If the parameters of this model were independent from each other, the equation 
would be compatible with the conventional wisdom. Indeed, if the degree of virulence 
was not connected to transmissibility (β) one would maximize R0 by keeping α as close to 
0 as possible, that is, by keeping the host alive, and this would lead to least virulent 
strains over time. However, when virulence is positively coupled with the mode and rate 
of transmission, keeping α close to 0 is not always the best (optimal) strategy for the 
pathogen, and therefore natural selection can maintain some level of virulence. In other 
words, killing the host – and increasing virulence – can be profitable for the pathogen in 
certain situations, but not always. 
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Reflecting on the case of myxomatosis, the trade-off model’s theoreticians indicated 
that the virus did not actually become avirulent or harmless in the sense of Smith or 
Burnet. Firstly, if compared to other vectorborne diseases of humans the mortality rate of 
the myxoma virus was comparable with yellow fever and malaria (Ewald 1994, 45). 
Secondly, and more importantly, the level of virulence did not radically drop but was 
stabilized at intermediate levels because of strong selection for transmissibility (Anderson 
and May 1982). More recent assessments, however, indicate that the virulence has 
increased (Fenner and Fanitni 1999), suggesting an evolutionary arms race may be taking 
place between the rabbits and the virus (Sabelis and Metz 2002). Research using game 
theory analysis contributed to developing the trade-off model further using mathematical 
tools (Bremermann and Pickering 1983) and evolutionary ecologists pointed out that 
there are (at least) seven different possible explanations of the decrease in virulence 
observed in the Australian rabbit population, including the possibility that progressively 
acquired host resistance alone could account for the decline in mortality (Sabelis and 
Metz 2002).  
Following the development of the trade-off model biologists continued to cling for 
some time onto the idea that strategies of exploitation in which the host is destroyed by 
the parasite cannot evolved by natural selection.107 In fact, proponents of the avirulence 
hypothesis often framed their argument in terms of what is “good” for the species or the 
group, as Ewald remarked (1994). Acting for the good of the species (i.e. altruistically), 
however, amounts to subscribe to group-selectionist theories which are still problematic 
today. According to Ewald (1994) and others (Sober and Wilson 1999), George Williams’ 
powerful critic of group selection in the 1960s worked as a deterrent in identifying a 
logical flaw in the avirulence model. Yet the controversy over whether the myxoma virus 
evolved by group-selection (or not) is far from being resolved as, in principle, the virus 
could equally have evolved through conventional individual selection (Wilson 2004), and 
so it seems unlikely that this element was really key in challenging the avirulence model. 
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 See Alexander (1981, 115). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 By the first half of the twentieth century, an “ecological vision” of infectious diseases 
was firmly established in medical laboratories across Australia and America (Anderson 
2004). This ecological approach to communicable diseases grew mostly out of veterinary 
pathology, bacteriology, parasitology, tropical medicine, and immunology. Drawing on 
concepts like mutualism and competition and on inter-organismic interactions to explain 
epidemics in both ecological and evolutionary terms, practitioners strongly emphasized 
the role of the environment, natural selection, population density, and so on, to account 
for the changes in health and disease states.  Typically, scientists attempted to develop a 
biologically oriented epidemiology, focusing not on the properties of the germ alone but 
also, and especially, on the multidimensional ecological relations between hosts and 
pathogens.  
The main architects of the ecological vision were René Dubos, Frank MacFarlane 
Burnet, and Frank Fenner endorsed and promoted the avirulence hypothesis, a model of 
host-pathogen interactions introduced earlier by Theobald Smith which they applied in 
virology, microbiology, evolutionary biology, and ecology. From this perspective, the 
concept of virulence reflected mostly the loss of differential fitness in the host. In 
contrast, the mechanisms by which virulence is brought about remained a marginal focus 
of research. Scientists such as Dubos, Burnet and Fenner tended to characterize virulence 
as the result of complex biological interactions, and not just dangerous pathogenic 
strains. Taken together, they developed what I have called, more broadly, an exogenous 
style of reasoning. According to the thesis of the centrality of the endogenous, when 
constructing explanations of disease environmental factors are privileged over molecular 
or genetic constituents of the pathogens. The internal factors of virulence evolution (e.g. 
virulence genes), indeed, continue to be put largely to one side even today, as 
practitioners focus mostly on the selective pressures that can drive virulence upwards or 
downwards. 
 The development of the trade-off model in particular offered new insights into the 
evolution of and changes involved in virulence, and emphasized how crucially they 
depend on the route of transmission, the host’s immune system, as well as on a number 
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of other epidemiological parameters. Building on this model experimental evidence 
accumulated in the 1990s (Bull 1994) and the view that pathogen and host populations 
always co-evolve towards a state of commensalism progressively faded away. This model 
rests on the view that evolution does not work for the good of the species, on the one 
hand, and that virulence can either increase, decrease or become stabilized at different 
levels, on the other (Sabelis and Metz 2002). Commensalism is no longer generally seen 
as the ideal and obligatory end-point of evolutionary processes. Indeed, virulence is seen 
as highly context-dependent, and relative to the environment and other ecological 
parameters (e.g. population density) that impinge on the rate at which pathogens can 
reproduce, transmit to other hosts, and cause disease.  
 To sum up, in this chapter I have explored from a longue durée history perspective 
how, in the late nineenth century, a number of issues in apparently disconnected fields 
such as medical bacteriology and epidemiology started to be addressed in the light of 
evolution, on the one hand, and how the work of Theobald Smith articulated some of 
these questions within the broader framework of the “law of declining virulence and 
advancing parasitism”, on the other. Smith’s experiments on cattle fever were linked 
further to his evolutionary views about health, disease, and host-pathogen relations. 
Having described the experimental basis of this model of parasitic diseases I then 
provided additional evidence that underlie its broad acceptance during the first half of 
the twentieth century and beyond. Much more remains to be said, however, about the 
other contributions of Theobald Smith to medicine, public health, and bacteriology.   
 In guise of concluding remarks, I would like to suggest that the conventional wisdom 
acted as a sort of “epistemological obstacle”, in Gaston Bachelard’s sense (1938), to the 
development of the trade-off model. In the early 1980s, the global phenomena of 
emerging diseases, the AIDS pandemic, and drug resistance have considerably weakened 
the idea of an obligate evolution of hosts and pathogens toward avirulence and the 
decline in infectious diseases, but it took a mathematical demonstration to overcome this 
long-held model of disease. Everyday experiences and intuition strongly testify against 
any reason to assume that pathogens should harm the host that supplies them with vital 
resources, as this would amount to a pyrrhic victory. On this view diseases are 
evolutionary accidents, maladapted states awaiting the operation of natural selection. 
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This fundamental assumption that was profoundly challenged by the mathematization of 
host and pathogens’ relations, giving rise at the same time to a new and more flexible 
understanding of virulence, the outcome of which is undetermined and open to several 
evolutionary possibilities. And yet, the dismissal of the avirulence model as a general 
framework from which to look at host-pathogen interactions does not mean that the level 
of virulence never declines; that is, the trade-off model did not supersede or replace the 
avirulence hypothesis altogether in a paradigm shift type-of-way. On the contrary, and 
perhaps paradoxically, the development of the trade-off model broke with the previous 
model by circumscribing the ecological conditions under which the co-evolution toward 
harmlessness would be possible, and it further explained how these two competing 
models can perhaps even be reconciled. In effect, models that predict the evolution of 
intermediate levels of virulence also envisage that the relation between parasites and 
hosts will become less virulent over time (Lenski and May 1994). What has changed, 
however, is that while it was once regarded as a general model of host-pathogen 
interactions, the law of declining virulence turned out to be a special case of the evolution 
of disease. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE FORMATION OF THE ENDOGENOUS STYLE: THINKING ABOUT 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES FROM A MOLECULAR BIOLOGICAL AND BACTERIAL 
GENETICS VIEWPOINT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
During the first decades of the twentieth century, another style was slowly formed 
and eventually gave rise to a second, parallel approach to the problem of virulence and 
infectious diseases: the endogenous style. This other approach, in contrast, provided a 
molecular biological and bacterial genetics (and somewhat reductionist) understanding of 
virulence, operationalizing the concept from a very different viewpoint. The steps 
through which virulence was materialized (and operationalized) within cells and 
expressed by genes through other intracellular objects, like pathogenicity islands and 
plasmids do not form a linear, steady progression within a single discipline. As discussed 
in this chapter, those concepts were coined in close relation with the emergence of three 
disciplines in particular: molecular biology, bacterial genetics, and genomics, but also 
evolutionary biology. Indeed, although the endogenous style was established relatively 
independently of the exogenous style it obviously did not develop in isolation from the 
rest of the life sciences. On the contrary, the search for the minute constituents of 
virulence grew within the progressive establishment of what historian of science Lily Kay 
(1993) has called the “molecular vision” in the life sciences.  
I should stress that many key actors who contributed to this other style of reasoning 
equally belonged, at one time or another, to the exogenous approach as defined in the 
introduction. This should not be surprising because one interesting aspect of styles of 
scientific thinking is that they can provide conceptual and practical continuity between 
distinct research programmes, old and new. In other words, styles can be made and 
remade at different places, by different, or sometimes the same people, carrying further 
some older ways of doing they partly inherited. For instance, before turning into an 
ecologically oriented biologist, Burnet had been trained in genetics of bacteriophage and 
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he worked for many years on virulence in microorganisms from a genetic point of view.108 
Dubos followed a similar path: first working in Oswald Avery’s laboratory at the 
Rockefeller Institute on enzymes before turning his attention to global, ecological 
problems in his later writings, emphasizing the need to “think globally and act locally”. 
And so did Lederberg who began his career working on genetic recombination in bacteria 
and who coined the concept of plasmid a few years later, prior to becoming one of the 
first scientists (trained in a molecular tradition) to ring the alarm bell on the ecological 
problem posed by emerging diseases in the early 1990s. Overall, one could say that there 
is a sense in which the exogenous style was “preformed” within the endogenous style to 
which it gave rise. 
 This chapter discusses the concept of virulence as it was developed within the 
endogenous style throughout the twentieth century. Looking at the distinction between 
pathogenic and non-pathogenic organisms, it traces how the distinction was progressively 
elaborated and modified according to a series of conceptual innovations which, at the 
same time, were permitted by technological apparartuses. After providing a brief 
historical overview of molecular biology this chapter focuses on the work of Fred Griffith 
and the role of the polysaccharide capsule as a physiological determinant of virulence in 
cells, and on the concept of plasmid and pathogenicity island. Emphasis is placed on how 
those concepts opened the door to an evolutionary understanding of virulence. In brief, 
both plasmids and pathogenicity islands are hypothesized as elements acquired through 
either endosymbiosis or lateral gene transfer. From this perspective, virulence is not the 
result of a lack of adaptation, but results from the rather good fit between a pathogen 
and its ecological niche – the host – which is being colonized thanks to some specific traits 
that were acquired by the organism over evolutionary time. We have seen in the previous 
chapter that the American bacteriologist Theobald Smith explained the decline in 
pathogenicity by the loss of corresponding physiological functions (even organs) on the 
part of the microorganisms which become progressively adapted to a particular host, 
having lost the occasion to exercise their pathogenic capacities. The gradual 
disappearance of the capacity to produce toxins is, according to Smith, an evolutionary 
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 Burnet published part of his PhD results in a paper on “Smooth-rough variation in bacteria in its relation 
to bacteriophage” in the Journal of Pathology and Bacteriology in 1929.  
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process which is followed by a reciprocal law-like decline in virulence and “advancing 
parasitism”.109 In this chapter, I describe how bacteria (and viruses) can, in contrast, be 
transformed into virulent, disease-causing agents by gaining some new intracellular and 
genetic material such as, for instance, a polysaccharide capsule, a large plasmid, or a 
pathogenicity islands. Nowadays, in the light of endosymbiosis and lateral gene transfer, 
microbiologists claim that we can observe “evolution in quantum leaps” (Groisman and 
Ochman 1996). While acquiring the capacity to cause disease thanks to new genes is a 
crucial aspect of how organisms become pathogens, it must not be forgotten that this 
capacity can occasionally also result from genomic deletion (or gene loss) (e.g. so-called 
“black-holes”, see Maurelli 2006).110  
 In conclusion, we will see that the line between pathogenic and non-pathogenic 
remains blurry, despite new concepts in the life sciences that permit a better 
understanding of the mechanism of virulence in both bacterial and viral diseases. The 
separation between pathogens and commensals is often unclear: on the one hand, it is 
common in almost any microbial species that some members are pathogenic while others 
are not (Hacker and Kaper 1999), and from an ecological standpoint virulence is host-
dependent and relative to a given environment, on the other.111 For instance, 
pneumococci are normal inhabitants of the human respiratory tract but they can become 
highly pathogenic and cause severe infections (such as lobar pneumonia) if the host 
becomes immunocompromised. It is thus particularly important, in terms of prevention 
and public health measures, to understand how (and why) commensal organisms can 
become pathogenic or virulent or vice-versa.  
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 Bacteriologists in the first decades of the twentieth century defended this thesis which I believe was 
widespread. For instance, F.W. Andrews in his Presidential Address in front of the Royal Society for 
medicine, wrote: “the natural tendency seems to be towards loss of virulence in the absence of opportunity 
for its exercise, and the mechanism by which animal passage revives the power would seem to be one of 
natural selection in its crudest form” (1913, 4).  
110
 As the number of genes in bacterial species remains roughly constant over long periods of time, it is 
postulated that gene gain is balanced by gene loss. 
111
 Smith recognizes however that the terms virulence and pathogenicity “should be used in a comparative 
sense: a microbial population is more (or less) pathogenic or virulent than another population” (1978, 
13/6). 
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WHAT MAKES AN ORGANISM A PATHOGEN?  
 The great majority of microbes are harmless but a fair number of them can cause 
severe diseases in humans, plants, and animals. Distinguishing pathogens from non-
pathogenic organisms is crucial from a public health point of view. The concept of a 
pathogenic organism is often operationalized with reference to specific genetic or 
functional features. For instance, it is sometimes asserted that pathogens have 
“biochemical processes which set them apart from other microorganisms and determine 
disease production” (Smith, 1978, 13/2).112 Since the the birth of microbiology, 
pathogenic organisms have been routinely identified and classified. For instance, Robert 
Koch discovered anthrax (1872) and the tubercle bacillus (1882) while at the same time 
Louis Pasteur identified fowl cholera (Brock 1990). On this view a pathogen is any 
member of a biological species capable of causing disease, and each disease has a specific 
cause. To determine the etiology of infectious diseases Robert Koch developed four 
theoretical postulates which must be fulfilled in order to assert that a specific pathogen is 
the cause of a disease. Koch’s postulates (formulated by his colleague K. Loeffer) can be 
summarized as follows:  
 a specific microorganism must always be found in the diseased tissue, cell, or 
organ;  
 this specific microorganism must be cultivable in pure culture;  
 the pure culture, when inoculated to a healthy organism, must cause the disease 
specifically;  
 the same disease-causing microorganism can be recovered from the inoculated 
organism (adapted from Worboys 2007).  
 
 Koch’s theoretical postulates provided a useful heuristic to link infectious diseases 
with identifiable causal factors, such as bacteria or parasites. In the case of tuberculosis, 
for instance, Koch argued that  
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 This scientist should not be confused with Theobald Smith.  
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In order to prove that tuberculosis is a parasitic disease caused by the 
invasion of the bacilli and primarily influenced by the growth and 
proliferation of the latter, the bacilli had to be isolated from the body and 
cultivated in pure culture until devoid of all adherents products of disease 
originating from the animal organism; and, finally, through transfer of the 
isolated bacilli to animals, the same clinical picture of tuberculosis as is 
obtained empirically by the injection of naturally developed tuberculosis 
material had to be produced (Koch 1882, 861 quoted in Broadbent 2009). 
 
 But despite the theoretical appeal of the postulates, their application to concrete 
cases was not always possible (sometimes the organism could not be cultured; see 
chapter 4), and causation was also not necessarily vindicated when the postulates were 
fulfilled (the postulates provide a necessary, but not sufficient condition for infection to 
occur) (Broadbent 2009). On the practical side, however, Koch made a lasting 
contribution to microbiology and bacteriology with the invention of plate technique. 
Using nutrient broth mixed with gelatin Koch was able to grow and isolate pure bacterial 
cultures derived from a single cell on those plaques (before him, potatoes were often 
used as a growth medium but they were often contaminated). It is with a combination of 
solid culture media such as the plate technique, the theoretical postulates and a number 
of other sterilization and purification procedures that Koch identified causal agents of 
disease such as Vibrio cholerae (Brock 1990, 28). (Parenthetically, it is worth noting that 
although Vibrio cholerae is often taken as a typical pathogenic or virulent organism, its 
toxin only seriously affects humans’ gut epithelium; the disease is not seen in most other 
animals. The virulence of Vibrio cholerae thus depends as much on the host’s response as 
on the properties of the bacterium). 
     Historians of science often reported that following his mentor Ferdinand Cohn, Koch 
promoted a rigid and fixed concept of bacterial species in order to defend a doctrine of 
disease specificity (Smith 1932; for references see Mendelsohn 2002). In the context of 
his work on anthrax, for instance, Koch stated that “each disease is caused by one 
particular microbe – and by only one. Only an anthrax microbe can cause anthrax; only a 
typhoid microbe can cause typhoid” (1876, quoted in Evans 1993, 20). The adoption of a 
monomorphist stance was a move intended to oppose the defenders of pleomorphism 
(Mazumdar 1995). Indeed, accepting pleomorphism, namely the continual 
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(trans)mutation of one species into another – a point of view endorsed by Koch’s rival, 
the German botanist Carl Nägeli – would prevent any rigorous and strict identification of 
a germ with a disease. However, an over-rigid concept of bacterial species would equally 
prevent both the study and the recognition of significant biological variations in bacterial 
cultures (Andrewes 1913). This historical claim regarding Koch’s concept of species must 
be revised, however: recent scholarship has demonstrated that Koch’s (and Pasteur’s) 
concept of species willingly admitted intra-species biological variation, in particular 
regarding changes in virulence (Mendelsohn 2002). The disease-causing propensity – or 
virulence – was shown by Pasteur to have flexible boundaries and could be altered using 
various techniques of either attenuation or enhancement of microorganisms’ pathogenic 
powers, for instance through serial passages of bacterial strains or by exposure to 
oxygen.113 
 
THE ASEPSIS THESIS AND ITS CRITICS  
 During the late nineteenth century, although they were usually harmless, most 
microorganisms were considered to be, potentially at least, pathogenic, and were often 
even depicted as being antagonistic to mankind’s health.114 The “asepsis thesis” as Jan 
Sapp has called it (1994) – the claim that healthy organisms or healthy tissues are germ-
free – was well-entrenched in experimental practices in bacteriological laboratories in 
Paris, Berlin, and London (Gradmann 2001; Cunningham 1992), and resulted in part from 
this belief in a clear-cut, naturl distinction between pathogen and non-pathogen. The 
development of Koch’s postulates sharpened the dichotomy between healthy (germ-free) 
and diseased (presence of germ) organisms – in terms of whether an organism harbours 
germs or not – still further. However, problematic cases in which individuals harbouring 
germs without developing a disease those germs are associated with led progressively to 
the abandonment of this dogma during the first decades of the twentieth century, while 
also casting double on bacteriologists’ equation that “one germ = one disease” (Strick 
2000; Mendelsohn 2001). Indeed, how possibly could one hold that harbouring a germ is 
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 A detailed description of Pasteur and Koch’s experiments on changes in virulence can be found in 
Mendelsohn (2002) and Gradmann (2009). 
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 For a recent philosophical defense of the role of microbes in human’s health see Dupré (2011).  
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a necessary and sufficient condition for disease causation when individuals could harbour 
many agents classified as pathogenic without displaying any symptom?  
 One of the most famous cases was that of “Typhoid Mary”, a nickname given to Mary 
Mallon (1869-1938), an American cook who between 1901 and 1907 was belived to have 
caused more than 25 cases of typhoid in the houses where she worked. The police 
arrested Mary in March 1907 upon order from the Department of Health. She was 
immediately taken to the bacteriological laboratory of William Hallock Park in 
Mannathan. The urine and feces samples were searched for traces of thyphoid and it was 
found that “she carried an almost pure culture of Salmonella typhosa in her bowels” 
(Strick 2000, 324). Following this investigation Park recommended adopting global 
measures such as pasteurization to contain infectious diseases in cases like Typhoid Mary 
– that is, to control asymptomatic carriers – which were surely too widespread to be 
controlled on an individual basis. What was needed was thus a global, even ecological, 
and not individual, solution. From his study of the Typhoid Mary case Park drew an 
important conclusion for the thesis there is an absolute distinction to be made between 
pathogenic and non-pathogenic organisms. The topic of asymptomatic carrier already 
appeard in the first edition of the microbiology textbook of another prominent 
bacteriologist: Edwin Oakes Jordan. From an ecological point of view, Jordan wrote, 
criticizing Koch’s postulates, that   
 
The conception of a pathogenic microorganism is a relative, not an 
absolute one; that is to say, no microbe is known that is capable under all 
conditions of producing disease in all animals [...] The power of a microbe 
to produce morbid effects or changes depends, therefore, primarily, 
upon the nature of the host (1908, 11-12, quoted in Strick 2000, 32). 
 
 Drawing on the case of Typhoid Mary, Jordan continues to relativise the concept of 
pathogenic organism:  
 
Thypohoid bacillus, when swallowed by a man, can produce a serious, 
often mortal illness; when fed to cattle, it produces no effect. As a 
consequence, no sharp line can be drawn between pathogenic and non-
pathogenic microorganism (Ibid.) 
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  The thin line between pathogenic and non-pathogenic was also criticized at the turn 
of the past century from yet a different standpoint: the evolution of symbiosis or 
biological associations. In the late nineteenth century, most people had to recognize that 
they lived in a world swarming with microorganisms invisible to the naked eye. What is 
more, the great majority of these newly identified natural entities were harmless, 
although numerous bacteriologists wrote about the antagonistic relation between man 
and microbes, as mentioned above (see Kopeloff 1930). Others like microbiologist Carl 
Flügge, however, emphasized the role played by microorganisms in the “economy of 
nature” and “the existence of mankind” (1890, 5).  
 The study of symbiosis grew thanks in particular to the work of the Belgium naturalist 
Pierre van Beneden, and the French biologists Pierre Portier and Noel Bernard (Sapp 
1994). These lines of research intersect with the work described previously in the ecology 
of virulence but they also share some epistemic affinities with the endogenous style of 
reasoning. Indeed, endosymbiosis – the process of integrating free-standing cellular 
entities such as mitochondria, plasmids, and pathogenicity islands that reproduce at the 
level of the whole – has recently become one of the most researched areas in the 
evolution of virulence (often termed “pathogenomics”), as a recent US report on 
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents indicates (2010). As an example of this 
phenomenon consider the transfer of a gene encoding a virulence factor from one species 
of fungi to another. Scientists located that this transfer of genetic material, which 
occurred in 1941, was conducive to the formation of a fungal pathogen population whose 
virulence was significantly enhanced and which, in turn, led to the emergence of a 
genuinely new disease for wheat cultures (Friesen et al. 2006). Endosymbiosis and lateral 
gene transfer provide incalculable opportunities for organisms to acquire new genetic 
material that may cause disease. This second like of criticism challenges the division 
between pathogenic and non-pathogenic, pathological and normal states, differently, 
namely by demonstrating that what was once a free-living, potentially harmful living thing 
could, through and by evolutionary time, become part of the normal functioning of an 
organism.  
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ON THE INTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF VIRULENCE   
 Today’s biologists often claim that there are a number of straightforward, objective 
differences between commensal and pathogenic organisms: pathogens are organisms 
that have come to possess certain pathogenic traits, like the capacity to produce toxins or 
adhesins in host’s cells, while commensal organisms lack such phenotypic traits. Virulent 
factors, in some cases, can be readily identified: for example the so-called virulence 
genes, facilitating entry into a host, multiplication within the tissues, and/or the evasion 
of host immunity. Pathogenic traits encoded by virulence genes are often, in turn, 
embedded within pathogenicity islands which are groups of genes located on the 
chromosomes; or alternatively, they can be located in free-replicating, mobile elements 
like large plasmids, or transposons. These networks form virulence regulatory systems 
within organisms. Harbouring (or not) one or many pathogenicity islands – sometimes 
forming an “archipelago” (Parsot and Sansonetti 1999) – and/or plasmids could therefore 
explain at a lower, and more fundamental level of biological organisation why some 
organisms are pathogenic while others are not.115 Genetic and physiologic differences 
currently form an operational basis upon which one can distinguish between pathogens 
and other organisms. In other words, whilst in the ecological tradition or the exogenous 
style described previously virulence was operationalized in terms of unsuccessful, or 
incomplete, adaptation of a pathogen to its host, the functional or endogenous style 
described in here draws the line between virulent and avirulent organisms differently, 
namely by focusing on the biologic, cellular, genetic or genomic determinants of 
virulence.  
 The search and identification of the molecular basis of infectious diseases were 
carried on over several decades throughout the twentieth century by various 
practitioners, culminating with the formulation of a molecular version of Koch’s 
postulates (Falkow 1988) and the sequencing of a large number of bacterial and viral 
genomes, in a search for virulence genes. Led to a large extent by microbiologists Jörg 
Hacker, who is head of the Center for Infectious Disease in Würtzburg (Germany), and 
James Kaper, the field of “pathogenomics” has emerged as the most recent (reductionist) 
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approach within the endogenous style. Bacterial pathogenomics, the study of bacteria’s 
pathogenesis is now in full swing, thanks to new genomics tools and the construction of 
data bases (Pallen and Wren 2007). Indeed, since the mid-90s pathogenomics seeks to 
use the wealth of data obtained by gene-sequence analyses to discover the genes 
responsible for infections in both plants and animals. Aside from coining the term 
“pathogenicity island”, Hacker and Kaper co-edited an important book on Pathogenicity 
and Other Mobile Virulence Elements (1999).  
   
THE EVOLUTION OF VIRULENCE AND ITS MATERIAL BASIS  
 According to most biologists all organisms, pathogenic or not, are the outcome of 
millions of years of evolution. A virulent phenotype is an evolved trait influenced by 
selective pressures. The capacity to cause disease is thus the result of some organisms 
which have evolved over long periods of time having the capacity to use other organisms 
(i.e. hosts) both as a source of nutrition and as a locus of reproduction and transmission; 
in other words, as an ecological niche. In this sense, pathogenicity ensures a selective 
advantage provided that the pathogen, unlike commensals, can use the host’s resources 
without having to compete with other organisms for nutrients (Falkow 1999, xii). As 
Stanley Falkow puts it, the key distinction between pathogens and commensals is that 
“the pathogen, through evolution, has gained the inherent capacity to breach host cell 
barriers, while commensal species and opportunists ordinarily cannot do so” (1997, 239). 
Although the boundary between pathogenicity and harmlessness cannot always be 
sharply drawn, organisms belonging to each kind can be relatively well distinguished with 
respect to their evolutionary history. The challenge is then to understand the origin of 
those functional differences (Falkow 1997; Groisman and Ochman 1996).  
 This point illustrates how even if research within the endogenous style focused 
primarily on the molecular constituents of virulence there was, nevertheless, scope to 
address and explore evolutionary questions. The origins of infection mechanisms were 
investigated through a combination of molecular techniques and phylogenetic analyses, 
with the goal of unravelling the evolutionary path to acquisition of specific pathogenic 
features within cells and organisms. As I argue throughout this thesis the alleged rift 
between medicine and evolutionary thinking throughout the twentieth century is now in 
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the process of being bridged by experimental practices coming from several disciplines. 
Drawing on tools, concepts, and methods developed in bacterial genetics, biochemistry, 
and later molecular biology, scientists working in the endogenous style of reasoning tried 
primarily to establish what the material bases of virulence in infectious diseases were, 
and how they evolved. One of the first microbiologists to argue that virulence has an 
evolved material basis, or a physical component in the pathogen, was Charles Nicolle in 
1939, although he did not identify any such physical structure himself. Nicolle wrote:  
 
We have thus good reasons to believe that virulence is linked to a 
material basis. Do not we see it sometimes undergoing rapid variations, 
which we can give the meaning and the name of mutations, and these 
properties being translated at the level of the organism by the 
acquisition of wholly new pathogenic properties regarding the animal 
species it infects” (1939, 66; emphasis mine).  
  
 In the making of this new research space scientists mapped out the nature and the 
intimate molecular mechanisms of infectious processes. In order to understand the path 
leading to the concept of virulent genes, pathogenicity islands, and other such new 
scientific objects I will briefly place the development of the endogenous style within the 
broader framework of molecular advances in the life sciences between 1920 and 1970.  
 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY AND THE FORMATION OF THE ENDOGENOUS STYLE 
 This section introduces some aspects of the development of molecular biology and 
some of its key concepts which turned out to be of central importance from an 
epistemological point of view in the formation of the endogenous style. Applied to 
bacteria and viruses this style of reasoning looks for the inner constituents of virulence 
and constructs explanations where the inner structures of living entities are epistemically 
privileged over context or environment. Historians generally disagree about how to 
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reconstruct the history of molecular biology but we can identify at least two schools: the 
structural school and the informational school (Stent 1968).116  
The history of molecular biology has been told many times by historians, 
philosophers, and sociologists of science.117 In his book on The History of Molecular 
Biology Michel Morange gives the following definition: molecular biology is “all those 
techniques and discoveries that make it possible to carry out molecular analyses of the 
most fundamental biological processes – those involved in the stability, survival, and 
reproduction of organisms” (1998, 1 [1994]). This “quasi-tautological” definition, as 
Rheinberger (2009, 7) put it, highlights the fact that molecular biology is largely (if not 
mostly) concerned with the coming into being of new ways of investigating (and 
intervening on) key organismic processes, not on the formation of a distinct field of 
research per se, although things might have been different in the early phases of the 
development of molecular biology, circa 1940. Nowadays, molecular biology rests 
primarily on the development of new techniques – or technologies –, and how these were 
at a later stage deployed to carry out molecular analyses of biological phenomena within 
other constituted fields of research across the life sciences. Morange’s definition also 
reflects how Warren Weaver, the mathematician and then director of the natural 
sciences division at the Rockefeller Foundation, envisaged the new field for which he 
coined the term molecular biology in 1938: 118  
 
Among the studies to which the [Rockefeller] Foundation is giving support is 
a series in a relatively new field, which may be called molecular biology, in 
which modern techniques are being used to investigate ever more minute 
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 For instance, we can also divide it up according to three phases, following molecular biologist Gunther 
Stent, between a “romantic phase: 1938-1952” (dominated by Max Delbrück and the seach for the material 
basis of heredity); a “dogmatic phase: 1953-1963” (the discovery of the double helix by Crick and Watson); 
and an “academic phase: from 1963” (securing the knowledge from the previous two phases) (Stent 1968, 
393-394).  
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 See Rheinberger (2009; 1997); Powell et al. (2007); Strasser (2006); Burian (2005); de Chadarevian 
(2002); Creager (2002); Kay (2000; 1993), Morange (1998); Fox-Keller (1990); Abir-Am (1985). 
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 Also known for his collaboration with Claude Shannon on communication theory, mathematician Warren 
Weaver (1894-1978) is often credited for having coined the expression “molecular biology” (Rheinberger 
2009).  
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details of certain life processes (Weaver 1970, 582, quoted in Powell et al. 
2007, 11; emphasis added). 
 
The molecular tools, concepts, and analytical procedures were mostly developed 
over a period of 25 years, that is, between 1940 and 1965. Once they were designed, 
however, scientists needed less than a decade to apply “these battery of techniques” 
(Burian 1993) to the whole of biology which they now pervade (Kay 1993). Accordingly, 
the history of molecular biology could be divided between a period of discovery, 
modelling, and concept-formation (1940-1965) and a period of application of these 
concepts, models, and techniques (1972-1980). However simplified this may be, provided 
that concept formation and their applications usually evolve in more continuous and 
intertwined ways, this framework will be useful to keep in mind. Following these 
“analytic” and “synthetic” phases, a third stage spanning the global, collaborative large-
scale uses of molecular techniques and molecular data (so-called “data-driven” research), 
and the bridge with genomics, synthetic biology and systems biology, in addition to 
pathogenomics, could rightly be identified as a new step in the history of molecular 
biology. However, the formation of these new disciplines does not perfectly mirror the 
emergence of molecular biology itself (Morange 2009).  
 
INSTITUTIONS, INFLUENCES, AND THREE KEY FEATURES OF MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 
Molecular biology, as defined above, emerged between the 1930s and 1950s 
especially, from the research conducted at, and funded by, the Rockefeller Foundation 
and the California Technology Institute during the same period (Kay 1993). Warren 
Weaver, for instance, was at the Rockefeller Institute while both Max Delbrück (phage 
group) and Linus Pauling (X-ray crystallography; α-helix) were at Caltech, in Pasadena. 
Research on the operon model developed by François Jacob, Jacques Monod, and André 
Lwoff, however, was conducted at the Institut Pasteur in Paris. Soraya de Chadarevian 
(2002) studied the research effectuated in still another European institution: the Medical 
Research Council (MRC) Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge, while Angela 
Creager (2002) focused on Wendell Stanley’s laboratory in Yale and his work on the 
tobacco virus. Unusually for the life sciences, the development of molecular biology was 
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intellectually pioneered by prominent physicists (Fox Keller 1990), including Erwin 
Schrödinger, Max Delbrück, Salvador Luria, Leo Szilard, and Niels Bohr, some of whom 
turned their attention to the life sciences in the aftermath of the Manhattan Project, 
particularly virology (see van Helvoort 1992) providing at the same time a strong impetus 
in the creation of the field of molecular biology.  
In addition to Borh’s lecture on “Life and Light” in 1932, Schrödinger’s book What is 
Life? (1944) suggested a new “informational culture” for which the notions of code, 
message, and programme are indispensible (Morange 2008). When this informational 
language, which pervaded scientific culture and developments in computing, became 
sanctioned by the discovery of the double-helix and the cracking of the genetic code, the 
writings of Schrödinger came to be seen as having opened-up, or at least facilitated, the 
establishment of molecular biology from an intellectual point of view.119 By the late 1950s 
the name molecular biology was in common use among biologists (Astbury 1952). The 
breakthrough of Watson and Crick in 1953 was possibly a “defining moment” in the 
history of molecular biology and the constitution of the field (Powell et al. 2007, 12), at 
least in retrospect. From a more institutional perspective, the creation of the Journal of 
Molecular Biology in 1959 and the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Peruz, Kendrew, Crick 
and Watson in 1962 cast molecular biology under a prestigious and authoritative light 
among other disciplines in the life sciences, even if some continued to disagree with the 
label.120 
A number of characteristics of molecular biology and its influence on the life sciences 
as a whole are noteworthy. Firstly, this new biology opened-up a wider spectrum of 
possibilities to investigate life forms and their processes at the micro-level, while it 
emphasized at the same time the fundamental unity of all living phenomena (Kay 1993). 
As the Nobel Prize co-winner Jacques Monod famously said, what is true for a bacterium 
is equally true for an elephant. The universality of the genetic code contributed to assert 
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 Abir-Am (1985), in contrast, argued that Schrödinger was depicted as a founding father of molecular 
biology not because of his real influence on the formation of the field, but rather to provide some 
prestigious scientific roots, and thus to assert and legitimize its authority further.  
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 For instance, Conrad Waddington, the father of epigenetics, battled (without success) for the use of 
“ultrastructural biology” instead of molecular biology (Waddington 1961, in Powell et al. 2007, 12).  
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further the relatedness, from both an evolutionary and a molecular point of view, of all 
living and extinct forms of life.  
Secondly, while working out the mechanisms, biochemical pathways, and other 
cycles proper to organisms, explanations of living phenomena were cast at the lowest 
possible level of biological organization: the molecular level. Concepts like reproduction, 
evolution, and growth were investigated from a bottom-up perspective. The concept of 
“gene” from classical genetics turned molecular and came to occupy a central epistemic 
place in this new biological arrangement, providing a window into both the mechanisms 
of hereditary changes and ontogenetic or developmental processes, although its 
definition remains in a state of “flux” (see Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 2009).121 
Borrowing techniques, concepts, and theories from neighbouring fields such as genetics, 
physiology, immunology, and microbiology, molecular biology moved away from the 
traditional concerns of evolutionary biology and ecology which addressed biological 
problems from a population and more historical perspective. This shift from whole 
organisms and populations to the smallest, functional constituents of living entities was 
not in itself new, but it indicated a radical change of scale in the life sciences. With the 
development of wholly new techniques, this shift was itself accompanied by a change in 
vocabulary to describe a number of then unknown molecular structures and, in a way, to 
characterize a new order of life. As Canguilhem noted in the late 60s “messages, 
information, programs, code, instruction, decoding: these are the new concepts of the life 
sciences” (1994, 316 [1968]; Stent 1968).  
Thirdly, the development of those techniques marked a significant departure from 
biology as practiced until the 1930s. In addition to petri dishes and microscopes, 
molecular biology introduced new apparatus and instruments within the laboratory such 
as the ultracentrifuge, electron microscope, electrophoresis, isotopes, scintillation 
counters, and many more (Kay 1993; Rabinow 1996; Rheinberger 2010). The 
development of X-ray crystallography to study macromolecular structure was, however, 
developed in intimate relations with scientific computing methods and mathematical 
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models. This battery of new technological instruments changed the way biology was done 
in practice and brought to the fore with exceptional clarity the links between concept 
formation, models, and more generally, “experimental systems” (Rheinberger 1997). 
Science, it turns out, generalizes from locally produced knowledge in specific, practical 
and experimental arrangements (which can be characterized as “phenomeno-
techniques”) into near-universally accepted claims. Model organisms are, in this respect, 
tools to generate knowledge between sometimes phylogenetically distant related 
organisms (Ankeny and Leonelli 2011). 
 
LIFE: FROM DECODING TO REWRITING 
The first phase of molecular biology mentioned above focuses on deciphering the 
“book of life”, to quote again Lily Kay (2000) and the processes that underlie life forms in 
all their diversity and functions. The second phase starting in the 1970s, however, 
operated differently. Above all, it dramatically shifted from an observational 
“understanding” of metabolic and other intra-cellular processes to one of “re-writing” life 
itself (Rheinberger 1995, 253). For instance, the coming into being of synthetic biology, 
popularized and fostered by Craig Venter is a direct attempt to build life forms from 
scattered bits of DNA and other macromolecules which have become available thanks to 
the tools of genomics and proteomics. Synthetic biology thus represents an offshoot of 
the latest developments of post-genomics technology in molecular biology (O’Malley 
2011). Strikingly, the tools to rebuild organisms – plasmids, enzymes and so on – are 
themselves “parts and indeed constituents of the metabolic activities with whom, at the 
same time, they interfere” (Rheinberger 1995, 252). In that sense, synthetic and systems 
biology can be seen as the latest attempts to “naturalize” the organic world (Morange 
2009, 51).  
The reconstruction of the Spanish influenza virus by Jeff Taubenberger and his team 
(chapter 6) in Washington D.C. builds onto this second phase or rewriting in the history of 
molecular biology, as it continues to generate promises in terms of medical applications 
such as, for instance, identifying and controlling the genes for virulence in influenza virus. 
These attempts to reconstruct life from scratch, although they may provide a new way to 
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naturalize Nature, do not go about without raising some serious concerns in terms of 
biosecurity, however. As discussed in chapter 6 and 7, molecular pathologists drew 
heavily on these tools to unravel and remake the code of the virus that spurred the 
Spanish flu pandemic, raising questions as to whether, and to what extent, it was safe to 
resurrect a deadly virus that caused millions of deaths worldwide (Selgelid and Weir 2009; 
Aken 2007; 2006; von Bubnoff 2005; chapter 7).  
Molecular biology was probably never (except at its very beginning) a unified, 
intended and planned project in the sense in which the Human Genome Project was. In 
fact, it is perhaps more akin to an “assemblage” of techniques, disciplines, objects and 
concepts, to speak with Rheinberger again (2009), himself referring to Paul Rabinow.122 
Today, the internal coherence of molecular biology as a discipline is sometimes 
questioned, partly because of the several meanings attached to the gene concept (Gayon 
2007; Beurton, Falk, and Rheinberger 2000). If molecular biology is primarily 
characterized by a large number of specialized techniques, or by an arsenal of methods, it 
is striking to note that this new mode of doing biology has colonized every possible 
domain of the life sciences. Molecular techniques are now routinely used to investigate 
normal as well as pathological processes. Indeed, from the outset molecular biology’s 
success was closely bound to the potential applications in medicine such as gene therapy, 
genetic testing, therapeutic (and reproductive) cloning, and stem cell research. The 
physical chemist Linus Pauling was the first to promote the idea of identifying and 
treating “molecular diseases” like sickle-cell disease (Strasser and Fantini 1998). These 
promises were not all fulfilled but the sequencing of the human genome, jointly 
announced in Nature and Science in February 2001, contributed to the revival of those 
possibilities and fulfilled several expectations, not least among the public. At the center of 
molecular biology, this newly opened space of research is the question of the structure(s) 
and function(s) of the gene, a problem well-known to structural chemists and geneticists. 
The concept of gene was often depicted as a concept that provides a “handle” on some of 
the most peculiar functions of organisms, including reproduction. More than just a 
cultural, iconic symbol exemplified in the double-helix pictogram, the gene became a 
                                                                
122
 Rabinow himself (2004) borrowed this term from Gilles Deleuze.  
193 
 
research tool in twentieth century life sciences (Moss 2003; Beurton, Falk, and 
Rheinberger 2000).  
Another key concept whose role came into the broader picture of molecular biology 
only through the 1960s is the concept of plasmid, a term coined by Joshua Lederberg 
(1952), to designate both a symbiotic component of cells, and a heredity unit of the 
organism. 123 Plasmids, we now know, encode virulence genes that can be laterally 
transferred between bacteria. In this sense, bacterial evolution can progress in “quantum 
leaps”, acquiring massive sets of genes that can alter virulence altogether (Groisman and 
Ochman 1996).  The more recent field of pathogenomics turns the concept of virulence 
from an ecological to a molecular one, identifying “virulence factors” and trying to 
vindicate a molecular version of Koch’s postulates. It is straightforward to conceive how 
this new vision of life was central to the development of the endogenous style: working 
within this new molecular approach, scientists set out to study how pathogens penetrate, 
control, or manipulate the host’s defences altogether, seeking to identify which genes, or 
group of genes, underline these complex, systemic processes. In fact, this approach to the 
biologic and physical determinants of virulence cuts through many different fields and 
disciplines, making use of concepts and methods developed in the initial phases of 
molecular biology. The exogenous style is thus intimately connected to advances in 
molecular biology, and in systems and synthetic biology. Even if it were possible to trace 
the origins of this style of inquiry into the problem of infection in the last decades of the 
nineenth century and before, I will begin the historical and epistemological reconstruction 
of this style of reasoning in the late 1920s, looking first at the work of Frederick Griffith in 
bacteriology (1877-1941), before moving on to the discovery of the nature of DNA and 
plasmids, and how these new objects permitted a renewed understanding of the 
evolution of virulence from the 1960s until the present.  
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the general consensus regarding the concept of plasmid (instead of “episome”) in the late 1960s see Grote 
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PROBING THE “SUGARCOATED MICROBE”  
At a time where the term molecular biology did not yet exist, the experiments of 
Griffith in the late 1920s strengthened the view that virulence is typically associated with 
physical structures in bacteria, in particular with a polysaccharide capsule. This was a view 
already brought forward by Oswald Avery and his colleagues at the Rockefeller Institute 
in the early 1910s. Although it is unclear who first realized that a polysaccharide capsule 
“was a sine qua non for the virulence of the pneumococcal cell”, (McCarthy 1985, 63), “by 
1930 it had been established that the virulence of pneumococci was dependent on the 
capsular polysaccharide” (Downie 1972, 7). Evidence for the role of the sugar capsule in 
pathogenesis accumulated further when it was shown that pneumococci, through 
“bacterial dissociation”, can lose their polysaccharide capsule and become avirulent.124 
The fact that unencapsulated bacteria were harmless to mice – usually fatally affected by 
streptococci – even when millions of them were injected into their bloodstream, strongly 
suggested that the capsule plays a crucial role in pathogenicity. In effect, once deprived of 
the polysaccharide capsule, the natural defenses of the mice were able to seek and 
destroy the bacteria, a process called “phagocytosis” by the Pastorian immunologist Elie 
Metchnikoff. Otherwise the injection of a single encapsulated pneumococcus was enough 
to cause rapid death in mice. Encapsulated and unencapsulated came to be associated 
with “smooth” (S) or “rough” (R) aspects of bacterial colonies respectively, and eventually 
S and R became synonymous with “virulent” and “avirulent” (McCarthy 1985, 63-65).125 
Virulence in pneumococci thus results from them having (or not) a specific physiological 
configuration, in this case a sugar capsule. The “sugar-coated” aspect of this microbe as 
Avery put it was the unmistakable sign that it was highly virulent, especially in mice but 
also in other animals (see McCarthy 1985). All this led Avery to conceive that by 
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experimentally breaking down the capsule one could conceal the capacity for virulence, 
leading to the development of new treatments of bacterial infections.  
When René Dubos visited Alexis Carrel at the Rockefeller Institute in the spring of 
1927 he was introduced to Avery who was then very interested to learn that Dubos was 
working on soil microbiology for his doctoral dissertation at the New Jersey Agricultural 
Experiment Station. Dubos was then doing research on bacteria capable of decomposing 
cellulose – a key component of the polysaccharide capsule of pathogenic bacteria. And 
Avery speculated that such bacteria capable of dissolving the polysaccharide capsule 
could be found in soil (McCarthy 1985, 69). From then on Avery made it possible for 
Dubos to come to the Rockefeller Institute, and by September 1927 he became a member 
of Avery’s lab, co-authoring several papers with Avery over the following two decades. 
Dubos, at a later stage, became an advocate of global and ecological approach to 
biological problems, coining the slogan “Think Globally, Act Locally”. However, his first 
training was carried on in one of the most reductionist areas of microbiology where 
biological functions were seen as being the result of specific immunologic or chemical 
reactions. 
  
CRAFTING IMMUNOLOGICAL SPECIFICITY  
By the early 1910s the existence of several immunologically distinct strains of 
pneumococci had been demonstrated (Neufeld and Handel 1909; 1912; Avery 1915). To 
establish this fact, serum from infected organisms was extracted and antibodies from it 
were sampled. Such experiments were motivated by the possibility and the need to 
develop a serum to treat bacterial infections. As there were still no antibiotics available it 
was hypothesized that this serum could provide immunity against infectious or 
communicable diseases. It turned out that mice inoculated with the serum obtained by 
Neufeld and Handel were protected against pneumonia after injection of strains of 
pneumococci, although they remained susceptible to other strains. This phenomenon was 
analogous in its effects to the inoculation of uncapsulated bacteria in mice. Through a 
combination of techniques and experimental practices, the capsular material became 
firmly related to the virulence or avirulence of bacterial strains. 
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 The results of Neufeld and his co-workers provided initial evidence for the existence 
of at least three immunologically distinct serological types (Downie 1972). In a Rockefeller 
monograph Avery, Chickering, Cole, and Dochez confirmed those early results. In fact, the 
authors identified four types of strains after the examination of cases of pneumonia: 
Types I, II, II, and a heterogeneous Type IV.126 To determine the type of strain under 
study, the serum from infected animals, often horse, was cultivated and mixed with the 
type of cell used to cause the infection. As the antigen-antibody relation is specific, if the 
two agglutinate this means that antibodies in the sera are binding with their 
corresponding antigens in the bacterial strain. This serological method served as a reliable 
basis for the immunological specificity thesis Avery would defend over at least two 
decades. A few years later, Griffith (1922) obtained roughly the same classification of 
pneumococcal types in London as the team of Avery at the Rockefeller Institute.  
When publishing his report on the observed changes in pneumococci in 1928, Griffith 
was investigating pneumococcal infections leading to pneumonia.127 Griffith’s experiment 
(below) was carried out during this period where the fixity and permanence of bacterial 
Types (in pneumococcus) was being established, and where the possibility for bacteria to 
undergo what is usually called “reversion to type” (i.e. to go from R to S or vice-versa) was 
highly debated. More generally, the question was whether the changes in bacterial 
virulence should be regarded merely as physiological adaption to a particular milieu, or 
whether they reflected more lasting, profound, hereditary changes (i.e. genetic 
mutations).128 Although it was often pointed out that Griffith’s explanation of 
transformation was misconceived, it is not trivial to note that his analyses of the change 
in serological types invoked the concept of “adaptation”. Griffith’s understanding rested 
on evolutionary (but not necessarily Lamarckian) considerations. 
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 The clinical picture of influenza (chapter 6) results from the joint action of viral (influenza) and bacterial 
(pneumococcus) infections working together and producing the typical symptoms associated with the 
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 To contextualize Griffith’s experiment on the transforming principle accurately within 
bacterial genetics, some of the research by Avery conducted at the Rockefeller Institute a 
decade before must be retold, if only briefly. Avery is vividly remembered for his lasting 
contribution to the life sciences, although he began his career in medicine, and was 
constantly driven by the medical applications that could be derived from fundamental 
research in biology (Amsterdamska 1993). After more than fifteen years of 
experimentation with bacterial transformation, he established that the transformation of 
one type of pneumococcus (avirulent) into another (virulent) was the result of the action 
of a deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, and not protein (Avery, MacLoed, McCarthy 1944).129 
The isolation of “a pure gene in the form of desoxiribonucleic acid” was “an extremely 
exciting discovery” as Burnet once put it (1968; quoted in Downie 1972, 6). However the 
discovery was also indicative of still a broader shift in the life sciences. As Burnet 
recognized in his autobiography, the work of Avery prompted a change of direction and 
was a turning point in the making of molecular biology:  
 
in retrospect, the discovery that DNA could transfer genetic information 
from one type of pneumococcus to another almost brought the end of 
one field of scholarly investigation, medical bacteriology, and heralded 
the opening of molecular biology which has dominated scholarly thought 
in biology ever since (1968, 81, 59, quoted in Amsterdamska 1993, 5).  
  
 We can see here that not only molecular biology has made significant contributions 
to the development of the endogenous style, but that this style itself contributed to 
shape molecular biology. In particular, Oswald Avery’s work was decisive in shaping the 
endogenous style of reasoning about virulence, as it emphasized the need to bring 
molecular and chemical approaches to bear on the study of infectious diseases.130 
Focusing his attention at the chemical level of explanation Avery’s own experiments with 
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 “It was largely due to his work [Avery’s] that microbial parasitism evolved from an ecological concept 
into a body of facts and doctrines which define in physiochemical terms the mechanisms of host parasite 
relationships” (Dubos 1956, 41). 
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bacteria provided additional support to the view that distinct strains of pneumococci 
coexist and can be immunologically demarcated, a thesis often referred to as 
“immunological specificity”. 
 The doctrine of immunological specificity was articulated by Avery, Neufeld, Handel, 
and Dochez in the 1910s and 1920s. Following Dubos, we can summarize it as follows:  
 There exists a definite correlation between the virulence of pneumococci and their 
possession of a capsule detectable by microscopic and immune-chemical 
techniques. 
 The non-capsulated variants are more rapidly killed than the capsulated forms, 
both in vivo in the normal animal, and in vitro in mixtures of normal serum and 
leucocytes. The capsule participates in virulence by increasing the resistance of 
the bacteria to phagocytosis.  
 Encapsulated pneumococci can be separated into several different serological 
types by virtue of chemical differences in their capsular substances. All these are 
polysaccharidic in nature.  
 Specific antibodies directed against the capsular polysaccharides protect against 
infection by neutralizing the ability of the capsules to interfere with phagocytosis 
(Dubos 1956, 38). 
  Avery’s approach to changes in virulence (and its evolution) and immunological type 
departed considerably from ecological considerations as he focused especially on the 
development of cellular specialization and its role in pathogenicity. As Dubos reported, 
“the constant theme throughout all these interests [of Avery] was the possibility of 
analyzing infection not only as an ecological phenomenon, but also in terms of the cellular 
components of the parasite which affect the host and against which the host reacts” 
(Dubos 1956, 40; emphasis mine). More specifically, Avery aimed at analysing virulence 
separately from the host and the ecological context. According to Dubos the greatest 
interest in Avery’s work was “the recognition that virulence and immunity can be 
analysed apart from the parasite cell as a whole, in terms of some highly specialized 
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cellular component” (Dubos 1956, 39; emphasis mine). Interestingly, this view was later 
contested by Dubos himself.  
 In an early paper (1915) on biological classification of pneumococci Avery 
emphasized that serological types are based on “well defined immunological differences” 
that should be taken into account in epidemiological studies. The exactitude with which 
the strains studied are conform to those types indicates, for Avery, “the extraordinary 
uniformity and comparative fixity of the specific groups” (1915, 816). Furthermore, the 
chemical basis of immunological specificity and the differences in antigenic properties 
provided not only a “reliable method” to determine the variety of bacterial strains but 
also “the only rational basis for the study of immunotherapy in pneumococcal infection” 
(Ibid.) Although this looks like a rather rigid classification, the evolutionary aspect of the 
origin of the immunological types was not completely left out by Avery, although it was 
not given full treatment either. In the concluding paragraph of a single-authored paper, 
Avery mused on the possibility that those types themselves have an evolutionary history. 
Although he refuses to provide an interpretation of those types in terms of their 
“phylogenetic significance” he thinks that whether the subvarieties of type II he studied 
are strains which have independently acquired some adaptive properties, or if they are 
related to “to each other and to the fixed type” by common descent “is interesting”. 
Avery refrained from formulating “any hypothesis as to origin” (1915, 818) but he raised 
the question nevertheless. 
 A comment is in order here to clarify the significance of Avery’s remarks on the 
concept of “type” in immunology. It is remarkable how Avery’s (and other’s) terminology 
of “fixity of type” resonates with a number of discussions that were taking place at the 
time outside bacteriology and immunology. Specifically, the problem of “reversion to 
type” was widely used and discussed in evolutionary biology and genetics. The concepts 
of “type” and “reversion” may at first glance appear to be rather anti-Darwinian in that 
they seem to caution against the existence of fixed natural types to which varieties can 
depart or return within some determinate limits. Nevertheless, according to Gayon 
“during at least fifty years, namely from 1859 (first edition of On the Origin of Species) 
until the triumph of Mendelian genetics, theoretical debates about Darwinism were 
marked by the ubiquitous vocabulary of ‘throwback’, ‘return’, ‘reversion’, ‘regression’, 
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‘retrogression’, and degeneration’” (Gayon, forthcoming). In brief, the concept of type 
was used as a basis to understand intra-species variation. Discussions concerning the 
nature and scope of variations in bacteria were common among bacteriologists at the 
time, and they were largely indebted to Darwin’s work (Andrewes 1913). In immunology, 
however, the doctrine of specificity and type appeared to be more entrenched. The 
reluctance to admit changes among serological types cannot be understood without 
taking into account the agglutination techniques that linked specific antibodies with 
specific antigens. Moreover, the serum obtained from a culture would only confer 
protection to infections caused by the same type of strain. This thesis was to be 
challenged by Griffith’s findings, however, leading to one of the most important discovery 
in the twentieth century: genes are made of DNA, not of proteins.  
 
FRED GRIFFITH AND THE TRANSFORMING PRINCIPLE 
The work of Fred Griffith (1877-1941) has not been extensively studied by either 
historians or philosophers of science, and in fact he remains a rather marginal figure in 
the history of the twentieth century life sciences.131 Indeed, his contributions to 
microbiology are most of the time mentioned in passing, or merely as a prelude to the 
discovery that the active substance in the “transforming principle” was DNA. Born in 
Cheshire in 1877, Fred Griffith was an English medical bacteriologist with strong interest 
in public health and epidemiology. He trained in medicine in London, graduating from 
Liverpool University Victoria University in 1901, and then obtained a doctorate at Oxford. 
Firstly house-physician and house-surgeon in Liverpool he then worked as Alexander 
Fellow in Pathology at the Thompson Yates Laboratory. Previously, this position was 
occupied by his brother and the two of them carried out scientific research together 
under the Royal Commission on Tuberculosis, a very deadly disease in the first decades of 
the past century. In 1910 Griffith was appointed to the Ministry of Health as Medical 
Officer (Anonymous 1941, 691). His bacteriological laboratory in London was relatively 
small but extremely active and busy during the inter-war period. Working in close 
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collaboration with his associate and friend William M. Scott, Griffith was a lone worker, 
rarely working with a research team, in contrast with other scientists like Avery. Both 
Griffiths and Scott died in 1941 when Griffith’s London flat was bombed by the Germans 
(Downie 1972). 
In this section I place Griffith’s experiments on the transformation of serological 
types in bacteria within the broader context of research on the material basis of 
infectious diseases (particularly pneumonia), both from an epidemiological, 
immunological, and molecular point of view. Griffith’s work was fundamental in providing 
a new understanding of changes in bacterial virulence and that this episode significantly 
contributed towards shaping the endogenous style as it singled out a particular material 
component for virulence phenotypes: the polysaccharide capsule. 
 
USING BACTERIOLOGY TO ANSWER EPIDEMIOLOGICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH QUESTIONS 
In the aftermath of the influenza pandemic of 1918-19 several governmental 
programmes were launched both to increase surveillance of other potential pandemics, 
and to develop vaccines against viral and bacterial infections like pneumonia, a then-
leading cause of death induced by pneumoccoci.132 As Brock commented, this organism is 
a “classical example of a pathogen whose virulence is principally connected with its ability 
to initiate a massive invasion of vital tissues” (1990, 215).  
Griffith’s work on transformation in pneumococci took place in the midst of the 
“excitement over lobar pneumonia following the great influenza pandemic of 1918” 
(Brock 1990, 218). Carrying out “Pasteur’s virulence-based research program” in England 
(Mendelsohn 2002, 29) Griffith was working on the etiology of lobar pneumonia when he 
made an intriguing, even startling observation that would, 16 years later, lead to the 
identification of DNA as the basis of the hereditary material in cells.  
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 At the time the viral nature of influenza was still unknown, and until the 30s its cause was believed to be 
Pfeiffer’s bacillus (Smith, Andrewes, and Laidlaw 1933). 
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Griffith was a bacteriologist interested in immunology but his work was 
fundamentally driven by epidemiological considerations.133 He was convinced that his 
research on pneumonia has practical applications in terms of “bacteriological diagnosis” 
and preparation of “antibacterial sera”. However, he also thought that his analyses bore 
on “others issues, probably of greater importance” such as, for instance, “the occurrence 
and remission of epidemics”, “the appearance of epidemic types in certain diseases”, and 
the “attenuation of the infecting agents”. Griffith’s 1928 report on the transforming 
principle also sought to provide answers to different questions relative to serological 
types: for instance, are types only stages in the normal life-cycle of a bacterium, or are 
they instead the response of bacteria to changes in the host’s immune system (1928, 
148)? Griffith believed that answering these questions, through a close investigation of 
bacterial virulence in relation to variation in serological types, would greatly benefit the 
“epidemiology of disease” and would provide insights into “the rise and fall of 
epidemics”. His final conclusion in the transformation paper was that the decline of 
epidemics among populations results not only from a decrease in the number of 
susceptible individuals, but also reflects also “an alteration in the character of the 
infective organism” (1928, 157) – hence the need to study the material and structural 
bases in virulence and pathogenicity to understand infective processes.  
In contrast with Avery, Griffith did not hesistate to view serotypes form an 
evolutionary standpoint. In a paper on scarlatine epidemics, Griffith noted that “the 
evolution of serological types in nature is an interesting subject for speculation”. For him, 
there was a co-evolution between humans and the scarlatine’s pathogen (Streptococcus 
pyogenes) which was “originally much more virulent and toxigenic” but in consequence of 
strepctococcal infection being “more common in crowded urban communities” 
individuals developed a significant degree of “herd immunity”. The resistance of the 
population, in turn, promted “the development of the multiplicity of serological races” 
(1933, 582). And each type exhibits a certain degree of variability, just like biological 
species, varieties, or races. Griffit used the language of evolutionary biologists and 
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established a clear analogy between races in biology and the serological types in 
immunology. Finally, he contended that immunity was a two-way process involving hosts 
and pathogens: “the spread of disease in a community means ultimately not only 
increased resistance on the part of the host but also alteration and attenuation of the 
parasite” (1933, 583). There is thus, according to Griffith, an evolutionary adaptation that 
is being established between a human population in Britain and a pathogen which was 
once very virulent. Indeed, during the 1930s, most epidemics of scarlatina in Britain were 
caused by type I and 2, and there is “considerable evidence” that some types have caused 
toncilities without rashes and thus, that “types can lose their toxigenicity”. Griffith 
concluded very much in the spirit of the avirulence model that “if the present tendency is 
maintained” scarlatina, eventually, “will disappear as a clinical entity” (1933, 583). A 
closer look at the nature of his experiment will allow for the links between bacteriological 
techniques and the structural basis of virulence to emerge more clearly. 
 
GRIFFITH’S EXPERIMENT 
  Having contextualized the field of immunology and bacterial geneticls in the early 
decades of the twentieth century, we can now turn to Griffith’s experiments. “In 1932 a 
bombshell exploded in the field of pneumococcus immunology” (Dubos 1956, 40). These 
words of Dubos figured in Biographical Memoirs on Oswald Avery and referred to 
Griffith’s report in which the author claimed that through laboratory manipulations, 
bacteria can in fact change their immunological specificity, and that these changes were 
heritable.134 Indeed, Griffith’s serological experiments demonstrated that nonvirulent 
bacteria (Pneumococci) can be transformed into virulent types when mixed with 
previously heat-killed bacterial strains of a virulent type. Griffith knew that immunity can 
be obtained through injection of cells from sera, and that the relation between antibodies 
and antigens is Type-specific. (In other words, the sera obtained from an animal injected 
with Type II cells will be immunologically effective only against Type II cells.) When 
experimenting with cellular cultures he sometimes encountered some cultures displaying 
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a rough aspect, however. The bacteria in those cultures were avirulent. Griffith found the 
following:  
 When he injected mice intraperitonally with a living strain of Type I, smooth (S) the 
animals died. When he injected living, rough-like culture (R), however, the mice lived. 
Similarly, when injecting mice with heat-killed Type I (S), the mice lived. However, when 
he injected mice with a mix of heat-killed virulent, (S), Type I pneumococci and with live, 
Type II non-virulent, (R) pneumococci the mice died. This was a surprising finding. 
Extracting serum from the blood of mice Griffith isolated strains of pneumococci Type I of 
S form. The bacteria had apparently changed their genetic signature in the process, that 
is, they reverted from Type III to Type I. These findings raised many questions and Griffith 
repeated his experiment a number of times with several controls each time. The 
explanation of this apparently strange phenomenon is that bacteria, through a form of 
lateral gene transfer, can pick up DNA from the environment, integrate it within their own 
genome, and pass down this new genetic information to the next generation. The 
“transforming principle” was later considered by bacterial geneticist Joshua Lederberg to 
be a case of “infective heredity” (Sapp 1994, 158). 
 Neufeld, who previously distinguished the four serological types, visited Griffith in 
London and was made aware of the curious results he obtained and through which 
experimental procedures. Once he was back in Berlin at the Koch Institute, Neufeld 
replicated the experiment, obtaining the same result which he published a few months 
only after Griffith’s own paper appeared in print (Neufeld and Levinthal 1928). As soon as 
they received a copy of Griffith’s paper Avery’s team rapidly set out to replicate his 
experiment at the Rockefeller Institute. Avery, however, was at first very sceptical of the 
possibility that immunological types could undergo heritable, genetic changes. It may be 
that Avery’s initial rejection of Griffith’s findings was based on his belief that the 
experimental protocol was flawed. More likely, however, Avery’s initial scepticism was 
due to the fact that he had devoted much of his professional life to developing the 
“doctrine of immunological specificity” (Dubos 1956, 40; Downie 1972, 3). Indeed, the 
results obtained by Griffith plainly contradicted the doctrine of immunological specificity 
Avery sought to develop over two decades of research. Once the team in Avery’s lab 
replicated Griffith’s result, however, and with other confirmations having come from 
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different laboratories, Avery and his colleagues embarked on a 15 year-long journey to 
characterize the nature of the transforming principle. This work was in a large part 
dedicated to understanding virulence from a chemical and molecular point of view. As 
Amsterdamska noted Avery’s team wrote a massive report on the transforming principle 
and “the entire report on research on transformation is devoted to explore virulence” 
(1993, 33).  
 
BACTERIAL HEREDITY: RETHINKING THE PLACE OF BACTERIOLOGY IN THE LIFE SCIENCES 
 The broader implications of Griffith’s experiment need to be spelled out in a little 
more detail and placed within the wider context of the life sciences. Joshua Lederberg 
once used the expression “infectious heredity” – two categories usually separated in 
bacterial genetics and genetics during the 1940s-50s – to characterize the transmission of 
hereditary material in bacteria via different mechanisms such as through phage, plasmid, 
or other extra-chromosmal transmission. As there was no synthesis between work in 
bacteriology and in development or heredity during the 1920s, this connection could only 
be made in retrospect. In fact, according to Lederberg, Lederberg and Cavalli (1953), 
Griffith’s own findings belong to this in-between category of being both of infectious and 
hereditary nature: “Infective inheritance was first described 25 years ago (Griffith 1928) 
(quoted in Brock 1990, 246).  
 The terminology deployed to assess the changes in immunological types in Griffith’s 
experiment and elsewhere, in effect, betrays some resemblance to other (and older) 
experimental approaches to hereditary phenomena such as Gregor Mendel’s experiments 
with peas. The parallel between the vocabulary and the method used by bacteriologists 
and the one Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) had used 50 years earlier suggests a different 
perspective on the significance of Griffith’s experiment within the wider context of the 
life sciences during the interwar period. It is well-known that Mendel (1865) designed his 
own experimental system using peas which had either a “rough” or a “smooth” 
phenotypic aspect.135 The two “characters”, he showed, are heritable in a specific ratio of 
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3/1, a rate that turned out to be generalizable to a large class of organisms, and not only 
plants. When the ratio 3/1 was obtained, it was said that the organisms “breed true”, that 
is, according to Mendel’s “laws” of independent-assortment and segregation. It is thus 
interesting to note that Macfarlane Burnet, in the conclusion of an early paper on 
bacteriophage, observed a similarity between the R (rough) and S (smooth) variation and 
Mendel, and more generally between the normal and wild-type variety. Morever, he 
understood this difference in genetic terms such as “mutation”. Burnet said: “It is 
probably legitimate to consider the typical S form as the normal genetically complete 
form and all other variants as mutations by loss of certain units comparable to the genes 
of Mendelian theory” (1928, 41).  
 Mendel’s experiment consisted primarily in artificially crossing varieties of peas to 
determine and measure the heritability of specific phenotypic characters (i.e. smooth or 
rough) – an approach that led him to formulate the two laws of inheritance. Similarly, 
Griffith’s experiment with serological types involved crossing (i.e. mixing) those 
immunologically distinct (segregated) types together to see whether the changes 
obtained could be transmitted from one generation of bacteria to the next. Griffith did 
not (obviously) discover a “law” of inheritance as such but he provided strong evidence 
that phenotypic changes in serological types (R or S) were heritable, without however 
being able to fully explain why this was so. (Note, however, that Mendel himself lacked a 
concept of hereditary unit to explain the changes he observed.) The discussion part of 
Griffith’s 1928 report contains unexpected concepts and modes of reasoning which are 
more in tune with evolution, heredity and phylogeny than with bacteriology as 
traditionally conceived. In this sense, Griffith’s experiment does not exclusively belong to 
epidemiology, bacteriology, or immunology, but also to genetics and perhaps even to 
evolution. His work was a kind of (bacterial) genetics avant la lettre, and it provided the 
impetus to research for 15 years the nature of the “transforming principle”, which turned 
out to be, in addition, the basis of hereditary material.  
 Regarding changes in serological types as being not only temporary physiological 
adaptations to new environments but also genuine hereditary phenomena places 
bacteriology (and microbiology) alongside disciplines like bacterial genetics. Mendelsohn 
(2002, 21) has already noted that once the methods and epistemology of bacteriology are 
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correctly understood, a different view of the disciplines of the life sciences in the late 
nineenth century suddenly appears. For, according to Mendelsohn (2002), Griffith carried 
on to some extent Pasteur and Koch’s conceptual and experimental project on virulence 
through the first decades of the twentieth century. It is thus not so surprising that his 
work also provides a different reading of the relations between disciplines in the life 
sciences during the interwar period.  
 The links between the molecular and the physiological bases of infective processes 
were strengthened following the characterization of the polysaccharide capsule as a “sine 
qua non” condition for the expression of a virulence phenotype in bacteria. The capacity 
of bacteria to pick up loose threads of DNA from the larger environment will allow them 
to acquire new infective capacities. Because of the heritable component those changes 
can be passed on and this new variation provides raw material on which selection can 
operate. Although the endogenous style leaves out selective pressures and focuses on the 
internal and sometimes heritable changes in virulence, it makes room for evolutionary 
considerations, and in particular, for understanding the path, if not the mechanism, of 
evolution.  
 What is more, the subsequent discovery that the changes in serological types were 
heritable brought together problems that were traditionally addressed by distinct 
disciplines in biology and medicine. To put it plainly, after 1944 the level of virulence in 
bacteria could no longer be separated from a physical, intra-cellular structure. This trend 
in associating the inner components of cells with virulent phenotype was amplified into a 
full-blown endogenous style of reasoning following the emergence of bacterial genetics 
and the second phase of molecular biology in the 1950s and 1960s. The development of 
these new practices in biology further led to the coming into being of new scientific 
objects and contributed overall to shaping a distinct style of reasoning in the twentieth 
century. I now turn to another part of this history, focusing on how plasmids, a “discursive 
ploy” (Sapp 1994, 160) became central in understanding the development and evolution 
of infectious diseases, before exploring the concept of “pathogenicity islands”, as 
introduced in the 1980s, a few years before the rise of genomics and pathogenomics.  
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FROM BACTERIAL GENETICS TO GENOMICS AND PATHOGENOMICS 
This section analyses the concept of “plasmid” in relation to infectious disease, and 
other biomedical concepts like “pathogenicity islands”. Taken together, these two 
concepts bear directly on the problem of virulence understood from a functional and 
evolutionary point of view. However, as is the case in the exogenous style as defined in 
the present work, the ecological context (e.g. selective pressures) and more generally the 
environment are not the main or immediate epistemic jumping board to understanding 
changes in virulence, including evolutionary changes. But, as we will see, it is plain that 
the origin of plasmids and pathogenicity islands were considered. To understand the 
nature of virulence and its cause(s), research in the endogenous style places more 
emphasis on the internal structures of biological entities than on the larger context in 
which they are embedded. This seems to imply a commitment to the idea that structures 
are typically more explanatory than context. However, as the example of pathogenicity 
islands will illustrate, the hope of finding a definite structural difference between 
pathogenic and non-pathogenic microorganisms within their core genome is rendered 
problematic due to the fact that many of these structures exist in most microbial species 
and not just in virulent ones; these structures, however, perform different functions 
depending on the (ecological) context.  
 
JOSHUA LEDERBERG’S CONCEPT OF PLASMID  
The intersection of the history of plasmid research and infectious disease in the 
context of bacterial genetics is the focus of this section.  
Lederberg was already a well-known figure in bacterial genetics by the 1950s. His 
early work with bacteriologist Edward Tatum in 1946 demonstrated that bacteria have 
genes which could be crossbred (Sapp 1994, 157). Especially because of his work on genes 
recombination in bacteria and on bacterial mating and evolution, Lederberg received the 
Nobel Prize, together with Tatum and geneticist George Beadle, in 1958. During the 1950s 
and 1960s, and following the work of Lederberg, three modes of gene transfer between 
bacteria between became known: transformation (DNA from one cell induces change in 
another one, as in Griffith’s experiment); transduction (DNA is transmitted between 
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bacteria by vectors such as phages or plasmids); and conjugation (DNA is transmitted by 
cell to cell contact, a classic example of lateral gene transfer).  
In his review of cytoplasmic inheritance, and amidst the proliferation of related 
concepts like pangenes, bioblasts, plasmagenes and proviruses, Lederberg suggested 
plasmid “as a generic term for any extra-chromosomal hereditary determinants” (1952, 
403).136 Lederberg’s aim in 1952 was to reconcile, within the wider question of the scope 
and meaning of cytoplasmic inheritance, the conceptions of virus and plasmagenes. 
Discussing the concept of plasmid as a “symbiotic organism” (Ibid.), that is, as being both 
infectious and inheritable, he also wanted to relativise the concepts of parasitism, 
symbiosis and their evolution as, for him, “evolutionary pathaways are not 
unidirectional”. Thus, he believed that to consider plasmids as viruses (or we could say, 
with Burnet (1946) to consider viruses as organisms) does not conflict with the idea that 
“a virus has become a normal constituent of the cell” (1952, 425). Indeed, plasmid can 
transfer virulence genes or resistance factors.  
It is intriguing, however, that plasmids, through transduction, partake of the evolution 
of endosymbiosis – the process by which distinct biological entities (e.g. mitochondria) 
were integrated into today’s life forms – while at the same time serving as a vector for 
infectious hereditary diseases. How could these extra-chomosomal elements be at the 
same time part of the normal genome of a microorganism and one of the sources of 
infection? This possibility should lead bacterial geneticists to reconsider theic concept of 
the (normal) organism and its borders, for, Lederberg asked: “if a pathogenic virus arises 
de novo tomorrow, shall we insist that the normal constituent from which it arose was 
not a latent virus yesterday?” (1952, 425) For Lederberg, however, this question is 
“almost unanswerable” because “plasmids may evolve”. This concern suggests an overlap 
with the evolution towards avirulence as within the exogenous style. In effect, the 
frontier between the normal and the pathological undergoes a rectification on the basis 
on evolutionary novelties, such as those generated by the process of endosymbiosis, 
whereby what was first considered to be a pathogenic virus becomes a normal and 
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inheritable part of an individual organism. The problem raised by the emergence of new 
viruses was, to be sure, one that “strains our conception of the normal” (Lederberg, Ibid.)  
The questions raised by Lederberg resonate with the discussion in ecology and 
parasitism, and with the work of Theobald Smith and Frank Burnet. For instance, recall 
that Smith also wanted to consider parasitism as a “normal” phenomenon, ubiquitous in 
nature. Although Lederberg was acquainted with the work of Burnet he did not, however, 
mention the contributions of Smith or his ideas on the nature of parasitism and disease. It 
is only forty years later that Lederberg will bring these perspectives together in the 
context of emerging infectious diseases. For then, he was still working through the lens of 
the endogenous approach to infection and virulence, although his reflections indicate a 
first convergence between the two styles. According to Lederberg, the frontiers of the 
(normal) individual organism, in fine, will be delineated by pragmatic and technical 
considerations, however, not by definitions. Moreover, the possession of a plasmid 
cannot in itself serve to demarcate pathogenic from non-pathogenic organism because it 
is susceptible to undergo (or have underwent) evolutionary change. Nevertheless, as the 
next section will discuss, both the concept of plasmid and R-factors led to the 
development of a molecular version of Koch’s postulates, and thus to such rebranding. 
  
RESISTANCE (R) FACTORS  
Although papers on the physiology of virulence appeared throughout the 1920s, it 
was only during the 1950s and 1960s that scientists began to establish a more direct link 
between physiological (phenotypic) traits, and the underlying genetic structures of 
bacteria or viruses (genotypes) and their evolution. The concept of plasmid, although 
going through a phase of eclipse between the 1950s and the late 1970s when the term 
“episome” was used instead (Grote 2008), was nevertheless useful to rethink the 
distinction between pathogenic and non-pathogenic organism.  
Three classes of plasmids are noteworthy for the purpose of the present study of the 
material basis of virulence: The fertility (F)- factor of E. coli, discovered by Lederberg and 
William Hayes plays a role in genetic recombination; the colicin (Col)- factor, carrying 
genes for specific toxins; and R-factors, or resistance factors which confer drug resistance 
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abilities and spread widely, particularly in hospital contexts (in Grote 2008, 408). The 
phenomenon of drug resistance (R-factor) offered an initial link between public health 
concerns and the genetic basis of infection, drawing attention to the divide between the 
ecological and the molecular perspectives on infectious diseases. As Stanley Falkow 
remarks in the opening of his book on Infectious Multiple Drug Resistance – the first book 
on this topic from a molecular point of view – “it has often been a burden for the 
newcomer to relate the genetic, molecular, and functional properties of R-factors with 
their ecology and public health significance” (1975, preface).  
R-factors were discovered in 1963 by Tsutomu Watanabe, a Japanese researcher, 
working on Shigella bacteria (Brock 1990, 107).137 The species of Shigella bacteria was 
linked to phenomena of antibiotic resistance but could not be fully explained by an 
evolutionary or selection argument. It was observed that bacteria could lose the ability to 
be virulent at once, while many rounds of mutations and selection are usually required in 
order to evolve a mutant strain with the ability to resist drugs. Moreover, the unsual 
aspect of the Shigella strains studied by Watanabe was highlighted by the fact that some 
bacterial strains were sensitive to all classes of antibiotics and others to none. These 
phenomena did not reflect evolutionary processes, at least not the kind of processes as 
promoted by the Modern synthesis, i.e. mutation and natural selection. Something else 
was going on. The hypothesis pursued by the Japan team, and quickly experimentally 
confirmed, was that Escherichia coli present in the gut had, by conjugation (cell to cell), 
transferred its resistance to Shigella bacteria. It was concluded that due to the specific 
nature of the transfer (nothing else but the resistance factor was inherited) that multiple 
drug infection became understood as a kind of “infective heredity” (Brock 1990, 107). 
Following the work of Watanabe it was known that plasmids, these self-replicating 
and heritable entities, play a key role in the process of virulence and resistance, for 
instance in Shigella bacteria. Led by microbiologist Philippe Sansonetti, now at Collège de 
France, his research team demonstrated that a large plasmid was indeed required for 
Shigella to be virulent. They were the first to devise an experimental system able to show 
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 Watanabe relates his findings not to the concept of plasmid but to “episome”, a term suggested by 
François Jacob and Ellie Wollman. On the difference between plasmid and episome see Grote (2008).  
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that the possession of a large plasmid (120 kb) in Shigella sonnei bacteria is related to the 
expression of a virulent phenotype. In this case, the plasmid allows the bacteria to 
penetrate host’s epithelial’s cells. With Samuel Formal from Washington (D.C.), 
Sansonetti (who was then a postdoctoral researcher) confirmed this finding and using the 
method of bacterial conjugation he was able to transmit the plasmid to E. coli bacteria 
and even reconstruct a fully virulent Shigella (Sansonetti, Kopecko, and Formal 1918). 
Identifying the genetic profile of this pathogen, he demonstrated that without the large 
plasmid (form I) Shigela. sonnei bacteria remain non-virulent.  
 
KOCH’S POSTULATES TURNED MOLECULAR 
With the development of molecular biology techniques, such as molecular cloning 
(using plasmids), it became possible to target more specific (putative) genes responsible 
for virulence in bacteria. Microbial geneticists now routinely sequence, isolate, purify, and 
amplify bacterial DNA in in order to establish which gene or group of genes are involved 
in pathogenic processes related to infectious diseases. In other words, they want to know 
which genes are responsible for disease and virulence. Using contemporary molecular 
tools, biologists pursue, in fact, the rather old project of distinguishing between 
commensal organisms and pathogens from an anatomical or structural standpoint. A 
pathogen, from this perspective, is an organism that harbours genes which produce 
disease in a host. The distinction between pathogenic and non-pathogenic organisms was 
remade with the discovery that plasmids are key virulence factors and can also encode 
the so-called R-Factors. As microbiologist Stanley Falkow 
 
Thus, in some but not all strains the acquisition of these two plasmids was 
enough of an addition to a strain’s genetic potential to tip the balance 
from that of a non-pathogenic commensal of the normal flora, to that of a 
strain now capable of producing overt disease (Falkow 1975, 253; 
emphasis in original). 
 
Falkow did not completely reinvent the famous Koch’s postulates – but he 
reformulated them in a way so as to make them applicable to genetic analysis of bacterial 
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virulence in the context of modern microbiology. The molecular Koch’s postulates 
(hereafter MKP) were introduced by Falkow in a short piece that appeared in Reviews of 
Infectious Diseases (1988, 274) 
 (1) The phenotype or property under investigation should be associated with 
pathogenic members of a genus or pathogenic strains of a species; 
 (2) Specific inactivation of the gene(s) associated with the suspected virulence trait 
should lead to a measurable loss in pathogenicity or virulence; 
 (3) Reversion or allelic replacement of the mutated gene should lead to 
restoration of pathogenicity; 
 
Falkow attempted to link virulence and its measurement to the presence (or absence) 
of specific genes. Like for Koch, the virulent property is associated with certain members 
of a species and, like in nineteenth century bacteriology, the inactivation of a gene 
(instead of the attenuation of a germ) should lead to a decrease in virulence. Conversely, 
replacing a previously remove allele coding for virulence, is expected to restore 
infectivity. In sum, virulence genes are seen as necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
production of a virulent microbial phenotype. Ten years later, however, the MKP were 
not vindicated but challenged on the basis of genomics’ new findings, chief among which 
is the discovery that a number of genomic regions initially thought to carry specific 
virulent genes are widespread across species. These genomic regions, called 
“pathogenicity islands” (PAIs), and as Falkow (1997) recongized, contributed to blurr the 
distinction between pathogens and non-pathogens further. 
 
PATHOGENICITY ISLANDS: ECOLOGICAL SITES OF INFECTION WITHIN THE GENOME 
 After the discovery in the 1960s and 1970s that plasmids and phages could transmit 
resistance and virulence factors between bacteria and viruses, the material bases of 
infectious diseases were progressively elucidated. In the following decades, drawing on 
molecular approaches, substantial effort was devoted to understanding which region(s) in 
the genome is (are) associated with pathogenicity. The distinction between commensal 
and virulent organisms was investigated at the micro-structure level, focussing on groups 
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of genes potentially responsible for high disease severity. Crowning this research is the 
concept of “pathogenicity islands”, coined by Jörg Hacker and James Kaper in the 1990s, 
although the work had already begun in the early 1980s with the German biologist 
Werner Goebel who directed the PhD thesis of Hacker.  
 In effect, the molecular tools developed during the “genomic” revolution have 
allowed the generation of extensive sets of genetic and genomic data for specific bacteria 
and viruses. Haemophilus influenza was the first bacterium to be sequenced (1995), soon 
followed by many others (Strauss and Falkow 1997). The Influenza Genome Sequencing 
Project has, as of August 2011, sequenced 7472 avian isolates which are now available in 
GenBank, the NIH genetic sequence database.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: a pathogenicity island. Where tRNA is transfer RNA; virA and virB 
are virulence factors; mob is for mobile or mobility gene; int is integrase 
gene; the thin black line represents the core genome, and genes are 
represented as individual gray boxes (from Hacker and Kaper 2000, 643). 
PAIs are genomic regions that distinguish pathogenic from non-pathogenic 
strains of different (or the same) bacterial species. Increasingly, however, 
biologists have discovered that these regions have multiple functions 
which are contingent on ecological context. Consequently, the term PAIs 
was further divided into sub-units like symbiotic islands, metabolic islands, 
and resistance islands (from Hentschel and Hacker 2001).  
 
 “Pathogenicity islands” (PAIs) are sequences present in genomes of prokaryotic 
bacteria that encode a host of virulence factors, and are often described as representing 
“unique genetic elements which contribute to bacterial virulence” (Hacker et al. 1997, 
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1089). In uropathogenic and enteropathogenic E. coli, for instance (where PAIs were 
originally investigated in the early 1980s) the virulence factors include iron-uptake 
systems and capsular polysaccharide (Pallen and Wren 2007). These regions code for 
virulence-associated proteins (Vaps) and virulence-related locus (vrl). A pathogenicity 
island identified in Helicobacter pylori Type I strain, the agent causing peptic ulcer, was 
found to be carrying a major virulence factor (Hacker et al. 1997).  
The concept of pathogenicity islands started to be use on a large scale following the 
formulation of molecular Koch’s postulates (Falkow 1988) and the discovery that 
pathogenicity islands are capable of producing evolutionary innovations in “quantum 
leaps” (Groisman and Ochman 1996).  In effect, it was demonstrated that the integration 
of a PAI can, “in a single step, transform a normally benign organism into a pathogen” 
(Groisman and Ochman 1996, 791). However, it was only during the genomics 
“revolution” of the mid-1990s that the concept came into full swing, once a host of 
sequences became available to compare and contrast several pathogenic and non-
pathogenic bacterial strains with respect to genomic regions (Hacker and Kaper 1999, 8). 
Most PAIs have the following features in common (Hacker and Kaper 1999, 2): 
 They carry genes coding for one (or more) virulence factors (e.g. adhesins, 
invasions, iron uptake systems, toxins, type III and IV protein secretion systems, 
and so on); 
 They are present within the genomes of pathogenic bacteria but are absent from 
non-pathogenic species or related members of the same species; 
 PAIs occupy large genomic regions, that is, between 10 and 200kb, reflecting the 
possibility that those regions have entered the genome by lateral gene transfer; 
 The DNA of PAIs is often different from that of the rest of the genome (especially 
in terms of guanine and cytosine (G+C) content; 
 PAIs are often flanked by repeated DNA sequences which may have originated 
after the integration of the PAI into the genome; 
 Often PAIs are made of mosaic structures and are unstable, despite being well 
integrated in the overall genomic environment.  
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It is important to note that Jörg Hacker and James Kaper pioneered the study of PAIs 
both from a molecular and ecological-evolutionary point of view (Hacker and Kaper 
2000). They were led to this concept following the realization that specific genomic 
regions of pathogens carried virulence genes in ways that strongly suggested that lateral 
gene transfer had occurred (Hacker and Kaper 1999, 1). The discovery of PAIs in E. coli 
proved to be only the tip of the iceberg, however, as PAIs were also found in both Gram-
positive and Gram-negative bacteria causing disease in humans (Hacker et al. 1997). In 
fact, the genomic regions called PAIs have revealed a wholly unknown set of functions 
which partly depend on the ecological environment.  
 Indeed, those coding regions initially believed to belong only to pathogenic bacterial 
species have turned out to be widespread among non-pathogenic species as well. To 
account for this finding PAIs were later renamed “genomics islands” (GEIs) and sub-
divided into “ecological islands”, “saphrophytic islands” and “pathogenicity islands” (or 
symbiosis islands) (Hentschel and Hacker 2001). According to Hacker and Kaper the 
underlying mechanisms in PAIs are much more common that it was first believed and can 
be found in very diverse phylogenetically distinct organisms. For example, Yersinia pestis, 
the agent of plague, contains a “high pathogenicity island” (HPI) coding for virulence 
genes (an iron uptake system) which is also be found in roughly 30% of non-pathogenic 
members of the species isolated from human’s digestive tract (Hacker and Kaper 1999, 9). 
In other words, there may be pathogenicity islands hidden within the genome of non-
pathogenic organisms. It seems that in nature shades of gray are more prevalent than 
black and white distinction, and this is especially so in the case of bacterial virulence 
(Wassenaar and Gaastra 2001). Does the concept of PAIs collapse in the light of this 
finding? Not for Hacker and Kaper, for whom the question “what is a pathogenicity 
island?” can be answered as follows: “a pathogenicity island is what a good microbiologist 
terms a pathogenicity island” (1999, 10). While this is far from satisfactory from a 
philosophical point of view, it may be enough in scientific contexts to know that whether 
the term applies (or not) is mostly a matter of interpretation and operationalization.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 At this point, there are general conclusions to be drawn from the analysis of the two 
styles of reasoning as detailed in chapter 4 and 5. Firstly, we can conclude that within 
both styles, where and how to draw a line between pathogens and commensals is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. When placed in a new milieu, virtually any commensal 
organism can become highly virulent – a point of view often expressed by most 
ecologically oriented biologists. In a microbiology textbook of the early twentieth century, 
for instance, the author expressed the following view regarding the relative capacity to 
cause disease: 
 
The conception of a pathogenic microorganism is a relative, not absolute 
one; that is to say, no microbe is known that is capable under all 
conditions of producing disease in all animals […] The power of a microbe 
to produce morbid effects or changes depends, therefore, primarily, upon 
the nature of the host […]: the typhoid bacillus, when swallowed by a man, 
can produce a serious, often mortal, illness; when fed to cattle, it produces 
no effect. As a consequence, no sharp line can be drawn between 
pathogenic and non-pathogenic micro-organisms (Jordan 1908, quoted in 
Strick 2000, 324; emphasis mine).  
 
 It may be the case that the author’s position results from him having an “ecological” 
approach to infection (Strick 2000). This statement, indeed, is consistent with the views 
expressed by a number of scientists who have reasoned exogenously about virulence 
during the past century. And as we have seen, the line between virulent and avirulent is a 
fluid boundary at least as far as disease ecologists are concerned. One can also think of 
the ferocity of the myxoma virus that killed 99% of the infected rabbits in Australia upon 
its release in the field in the 1950s, while the same virus failed to induce disease into its 
natural host, the South-American rabbit.  
 Even from a molecular and systemic perspective provided by genomics and 
pathogenomics, however, the distinction between pathogenic and non-pathogenic 
organism, virulent and avirulent, will ultimately rest on the context in which the organism 
finds itself, not in the property of a gene sequence. As a recent U.S. report of the National 
Research Council titled “Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: a Brighter Line” 
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put it, the genomic sequence of so-called pathogenic organisms (or select agent) does not 
suffice to assert with certainty their pathogenicity or virulence: “Those regulatory systems 
are common both in pathogens and non-pathogens, so their detection by sequence 
analysis cannot be used as a reliable predictor of whether a microorganism is pathogenic” 
(National  Research Council 2010, 48). Therefore, one has to look deeper into the 
ecological context to ascertain whether an organism is pathogenic or not, and why it is so. 
As to the concept of pathogenicity islands itself, it turns out that it is a sub-group of a 
larger category of cellular units called “genomics islands”. What is more, the distinction 
between PAIs and other genomic island regions, when seen from an evolutionary point of 
view, becomes blurry. In effect, if the genomic region contributes to the microorganisms’ 
fitness in competiting with other strains it is better called a “fitness island”; if, however, 
the ecological niche within which the competition takes place is the human (or animal) 
host, and the result is an infection, then it is appropriate to term it a pathogenicity island 
(Hacker and Kaper 1999, 9). “Context matters” may be a simple but telling way to express 
the underlying idea of a pathogenicity island. 
 In addition, and secondly, a number (if not most) organisms possess a number of 
putative virulence genes without, however, being conducive of any apparent pathology. 
These organisms are, in a sense, “asymptomatic carriers” of a potentially virulent disease, 
to borrow a term from bacteriology.138 This problem that early bacteriologists faced is 
now also being addressed by molecular pathologists as well. Indeed, there is a strong 
conceptual continuity, in fact, between earlier views of bacteriologists such as Koch and 
Pasteur and the views expressed by bacterial geneticists like Falkow in the late 1980s. The 
formulation of the Koch postulates alone testifies of this continuity.   
 Thirdly, and to return to the question of operational analysis of concepts, chapter 4 
and 5 illustrated how the concept of virulence was differently understood and shaped 
through both the “ecological vision” and the “molecular vision”: the ecological style 
understood the concept of virulence as being the result of either a lack of adaptation to 
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its host or a successful pathogen. In turn, the molecular style shaped the concept of 
virulence by insisting on its material basis within cells. However, we can notice a 
convergence between the styles in as much as from a bacterial genetics point of view, 
virulence also expresses the successful (not the lack of) adaptation of a pathogen to its 
host, a point Falkow made in a paper on “The microbes’ view of infection” (1998). At any 
rate, focussing on concept formation understood as a form of scientific practice 
illustrated that the concept of virulence was operationalized in a variety of ways and 
through either environmental or large-scale approaches, or through more reductionist 
research programmes. As a concept in action, virulence indeed led to many developments 
in bacterial genetics, ecology or parasitology. Finding the explanation to the puzzling 
findings of Griffith necessitated undertaking a broader research approach based on the 
nature of virulence. In turn, this led to an even more surprising result: genes are made of 
DNA. As discussed in the general conclusion, the operationalisation of the concept of 
virulence led to the formation of several “epistemic spaces” or domains of research 
which, although not connected from the point of view of individual disciplines or 
individual researchers, are related in that they all address the problem of the nature and 
cause of infection which itself emerges as a central concern in biomedicine for most of 
the twentieth century.  Wheather from the inside of from the outside, the two styles of 
reasoning described here can be understood as being distinct attempts to unpack a 
concept, or to explore a problem. 
220 
 
CHAPTER 6: EMERGING DISEASES AND THE 1918-19 “SPANISH” INFLUENZA 
PANDEMIC: ARTICULATING ECOLOGICAL AND MOLECULAR EXPLANATIONS OF 
VIRULENCE – WITH INSIGHTS FROM EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In part because “many people find it difficult to accommodate the reality that Nature 
is far from benign” (Lederberg 1993, 3), the generality of the “conventional wisdom” was 
defended far into the second half of the twentieth century.139 In the last twenty years, 
however, a consensus has emerged among health scientists and physicians to the effect 
that the evolution of host and parasite into a commensal state is not the vanishing, 
obligate point it was once held to be, but is rather only one of the possible evolutionary 
outcomes (Anderson and May 1990). As Harvard biologist Carl Bergstrom pointed out, 
nowadays “we cannot count on evolution to do our work for us” (2008, 261). More 
generally, it is now plain that science and technology have not rid humanity of plagues 
and infections. This conclusion contributed in raising awareness among health 
professionals to what historians of medicine have called the end of an age of “hubris” 
(Snowden 2008). This age was characterized by a sense of effective control over most 
infectious diseases, thanks to the then new medical developments such as vaccines and 
antibiotics. Sixty years ago, it was not uncommon to read from experts on infectious 
diseases that fundamental research in this domain, and particularly on microorganisms, 
could be halted altogether. Funding further research into this area was seen as 
unnecessary. Frank Macfarlane Burnet, for instance, wrote in 1953 that  
 
Infectious diseases will always be with us, and there will always be room 
for further refinement in prevention and treatment; but as a major cause 
of death in the years of youth and maturity it is becoming relatively 
unimportant […] I believe that, provided the established mechanism of 
preventive medicine, medical care and drug production continued to 
function, fundamental work on the nature of microorganisms and on the 
disease they produce could stop today without influencing the current 
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process by which all the main infectious diseases except poliomyelitis are 
disappearing […]It is extremely unlikely that any new principle will be 
needed to maintain our present very effective control of infectious 
disease: in that sense fundamental research is not called for by an 
expressed human need” (1953, 103, quoted in Fantini 1993, 454; emphasis 
added).  
 
Burnet’s passage asserts that infectious diseases should not be regarded as a major 
cause of death any more, on the one hand, and that more fundamental research in the 
biology of microorganisms was unnecessary, on the other. Ironically, the growing 
importance infectious diseases have gained in the mid-1990s turned this perspective on 
its head: researchers now want more studies on pathogens to be funded and 
fundamental research on pathogenesis, virulence factors, the ecology of host-pathogen 
interactions, and mobile pathogenic elements, to be carried, both for preventive and 
prophylactic purposes. Microorganisms, indeed, are keys to understanding and 
preventing epidemics and pandemics worldwide. Their potential to cause disease was 
long downplayed during the past century because they were seen as static, unchanging 
entities (Weir and Mykhaloviskiy 2010; Snowden 2008; Creager 2005). 
The “very effective control of infectious disease” Burnet described, was thrown into 
disarray with the beginning of AIDS and other emerging infections at the turn of the 
1980s such as Ebola fever, SARS, and more recently with the return of HINI influenza, 
thanks partly to the unimaginable capacity of microorganisms to infect and to spread. The 
“established mechanism of modern medicine” is no longer appropriate in term of public 
health response, as nosocomial infections rise and drug resistance are spreading further 
(see chapter 2). The end of this age of hubris epitomized here by Burnet’s statement 
comes with the realization that infectious diseases continue to be a serious threat to 
human health, and that some diseases that were once believed to be eradicated could 
eventually return. No serious scientists today, unlike in the 1960s, would ask about and 
infectious disease: “does it still matter?” (Howie 1968) – even if the answer was positive.  
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THE 1918 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: ECOLOGICAL AND MOLECULAR APPROACHES 
Influenza pandemics are a recurrent threat worldwide, partly because of an 
evolutionary mechanism called antigenic shift that allows for distinct viral strains to 
combine, thereby producing a new pathogenic agent against which the body is ill-
protected. Nowadays, influenza pandemics are classified as emerging and re-emerging 
diseases (Webby and Webster 2003), and international efforts are being made to 
understand why the virus achieved the exceptional virulence it did back in 1918-19. The 
“Spanish” influenza pandemic – one of the three influenza pandemics of the past century 
– is one of the deadliest events to have ever dawned of mankind (McNeill 1976). The 
motivation behind the global efforts to gain a better understanding of the 1918 pandemic 
is to draw lessons from the past in order to be better prepared for the rise of future 
influenza and other viral pandemics (Taubenberger 2005), an outcome predicted by 
influenza experts. 140 During the emergence of new pandemic ecological and molecular 
factors play distinct, although to some extent still poorly understood, roles. As influenza 
specialist Bruce Webster recently put it: “Although we know the general mechanisms by 
which new influenza viruses emerge, our basic knowledge of how these viruses acquire 
human pandemic potential is minimal, and our molecular understanding of the virus and 
the host factors involved in successful transmission and spread is rudimentary” (2009, 
402). 
In this chapter, I use the 1918-19 influenza pandemic as an example of an emerging 
disease to demonstrate the enduring persistence of the two distinct “styles of reasoning” 
or “thought-styles” in the history of virulence I developed previously (chapter 4-5). Let me 
briefly outline how the exogenous and the endogenous styles come into play in the 
present case-study. As the war was still raging at the time the 1918 pandemic broke out, 
explanations of the rapid changes in virulence were attributed to these uniquely 
detrimental environmental conditions (Oxford et al. 2002) and to humans’ lack of 
immune responsiveness to this new infection (Kilbourne 1960; Burnet and Clarke 1942). 
Applying the trade-off model of the evolution of virulence to the 1918 pandemic, the 
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geographical area (e.g. country); whereas pandemics are epidemics occurring over larger geographical 
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biologist Paul Ewald has argued that “cultural practices” (e.g. the war) lifted the obstacles 
that limited the evolution of virulence: the proximity of soldiers in the trenches and in the 
military hospitals during World War I facilitated transmission from hosts to hosts; and a 
high viral replication rate was favoured by natural selection which resulted in 
exceptionally high virulence and mortality of the pandemic (Ewald 1996; 1994; 1991). 
Both Ewald and Oxford stress the need to consider environmental factors in order to 
understand the evolution of virulence, and both recognize that part of the problem 
comes from the ease with which influenza viruses can mutate.  
Yet, since the late 1990s, molecular pathology has provided an alternative viewpoint 
on the evolution of virulence in the 1918 pandemic. The identification of the viral DNA 
from frozen bodies and wax blocks in the U.S. and its further sequencing during the 2000s 
has led to a renewed emphasis on genetic and molecular determinants of the virus as 
being the most important cause of this dramatic event (see Holmes 2004). According to 
Jeffrey Taubenberger, one of the main protagonist in reviving the 1918 influenza strain, 
“it is possible that a mutation or reassortment occurred in the late summer of 1918, 
resulting in significantly enhanced virulence” (2005, 90). Indeed, Taubenberger believes 
that this “unique feature” of the 1918 virus – its extreme virulence – “could be revealed 
in his [genetic] sequence” (2005, 90). Neither of these “styles” appears to be sufficient, 
however, to provide a full explanation of the phenomenon. Public health workers and 
health scientists cannot in general make the economy of one of these approaches if they 
want to obtain a comprehensive picture of the many factors influencing changes in 
virulence during epidemics.  
 
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO EMERGING DISEASES 
Although they are often framed as alternative options to one another, these styles of 
explanations are not mutually exclusive. Despite the apparent divide, indeed, a recent 
convergence between the work of evolutionary ecologists and molecular biologists is 
becoming apparent. For instance, scientists attempt to “cross the line” between research 
on ecological contexts and selective pressures acting on host-pathogen systems, on the 
one hand, and the biological mechanisms of pathogens developed in response to these 
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pressures, on the other (Brown et al. 2006). This recent convergence in research methods 
results from the introduction of the concept of emerging disease which provided a 
platform to reframe the nature of infection, bringing together molecular and ecological 
approaches. Substantial political and scientific efforts were made to articulate ecological 
and molecular explanations as is particularly evident in the early reports and books 
published on emerging infections (Lederberg, Shope, and Oaks 1992; Morse 1993). A 
genuinely integrated approach was needed, they argued, to understand and respond 
adequately to the threat of emerging infectious diseases coming out of the microbial 
world. From its beginning in the U.S. context the concept of emerging disease was related 
to microbial genetics and molecular biology, while at the same time it was aligned with 
ecological thinking. In this respect, virulence was for the first time in the twentieth 
century, understood simultaneously from both an endogenous and an exogenous 
perspective. This broad perspective was politically and economically motivated by the 
consequences of the AIDS pandemic worldwide, and also by the growing recognition that 
infectious diseases were becoming again a major problem for public health in the West. 
Involving more people also meant bringing in more money. The integration of the 
molecular and ecological approaches was thus, in a way, a forced one.  
In fact, despite the political leverage the two research styles are still disconnected to 
some extent as the example of the 1918 influenza pandemic, which reverberates in 
today’s emerging infections, will show. It is not truly surprising, however, when seen in 
the light of the history of medicine and the life sciences in the past century, where those 
traditions have followed parallel and rarely intersecting routes. It would be unrealistic to 
expect ten or fifteen years of research to completely overturn this dynamic. Still, 
significant convergence in ecological and molecular research on influenza viruses can be 
detected, promising to bridge the gap between the endogenous and the exogenous 
thought-styles.   
After discussing the history of the concept of emerging disease, the next two sections 
will examine the history of the discovery of the viral nature of influenza and the biology of 
the influenza pandemic. These will be followed by a section on evolutionary epidemiology 
and the work of Paul Ewald, one of the earliest advocates of the trade-off model (chapter 
4), and then by an analysis of the work of the molecular pathologist Jeffrey Taubenberger 
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which will contrast the environmentally-driven style of virulence explanation with the 
molecular approach. Although the exogenous and endogenous styles are still very much 
in tension from epistemological and methodological points of view, one can see that 
ecologists are now working with molecular methods, and that conversely molecular 
pathologists are engaged in constructing complex phylogenetic networks picturing the 
ancestral genealogical relationship between various viral strains. This situation reflects 
both the use of the concept of emerging disease and also the two faces of the Darwinian 
explanation of organic change. 
 
ON THE CONCEPT OF EMERGING DISEASE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES  
The problem of new diseases is paradoxically an old one. As discussed briefly in 
chapter 4, de novo or new disease became a widely discussed topic amongst late 
nineteenth century’s epidemiologists and physicians. In fact, the appearance of “new”, 
previously unseen forms of pathologies (particularly epidemic diseases) has accompanied 
human evolution and shaped its destiny in many ways, ever since Paleolithic times (Kipple 
2007). During the past two-and-a-half millennia, human populations have witnessed a 
number of pathologic phenomena which regularly puzzled physicians because absent 
from the writings of Hippocrates, Galen and other medical authorities, such as the 
appearance of the plague in the fourteenth century and syphilis a hundred years later. 
The epidemic of cholera had a similar effect in the nineteenth century Europe, and so did 
Athen’s plague in the fourth century (B.C.) and the English sweating sickness in the 
eighteenth century (Grmek 1993; Temkin 1977). For, in each of these episodes just 
mentioned, an unrecognized disease entity came into focus, was inserted into a 
classificatory scheme, before vanishing and be replaced later by a new form of pathology. 
More recently, physicians and public health officers had to face AIDS, a disease no one 
had previously detected. This launched once again the discussion on the nature of new 
disease but this time framed as “emerging” (Snowden 2008: Cohen 2000; Grmek 1989; 
1988).  
This section briefly introduces and contrasts how the problem of new diseases was 
conceptualized in Antiquity, in the nineteenth century, and in the early twentieth century. 
Emphasis is placed on the historicity of the problem of new diseases and its different 
226 
 
interpretations before it occupied the foreground of the political arena in the mid-1990s, 
first in the U.S. and then across Western countries. From a longue durée history 
perspective, the epistemological shift occurring in the mid-1990s from known to unknown 
diseases is best understood, I argue, as one that completes a larger shift that began in the 
nineteenth century from a static to an evolving world.   
 
NEW DISEASES IN ANTIQUITY: PLUTARCH’S ALTERNATIVE 
The problem of new diseases was discussed by physicians during Antiquity. In the 
Tome V of this writings, Hippocrates, for instance, wrote that “it is certain that new 
diseases surface and ancient diseases go extinct” (quoted by Aglada 1869). The topic 
became particularly important after the unification of Mediterranean countries under the 
Roman Empire as new commercial routes were established between otherwise isolated 
lands, providing plenty of opportunities for previously isolated pathogens and “virgin” 
populations to come into contact. But, one may ask, are the diseases Hippocrates said 
they surface and go extinct genuinely new, or are they new only in the sense that they 
were previously undetected, or simply absent within a certain geographical area? Also, 
could they be explained away as biological variations of rather extreme forms of 
otherwise known diseases?  
In parallel with the geo-political reorganisations happening in Europe in the Antiquity, 
especially around the Mediterranean Sea, philosophers came close to think that the 
problem of new diseases is by nature impossible to solve, that it is precisely an aporie. 
Philosopher and writer Plutarch (46-120 A.D.) in chapter IX of book VIII of his Quaestiones 
convivales sets himself the task “to inquire into whether it is possible that new and 
unknown diseases are being formed and, if so, to look for the causes of their appearance” 
(quoted in Mugler 1967, 15). In the opening of the dialogue Philon, one of the 
protagonists, engaged the debate claiming that elephantiasis is obviously a new disease 
as ancient doctors wrote nothing about it. This assertion was immediately countered by 
Plutarch himself who argued that in the Traité des épidémies, Athénodore reported about 
the occurrence of both elephantiasis (leprosy) and even hydrophobia. We are thus left, 
according to Plutarch, with the following alternative: either there are new diseases which 
are real and constitute authentically new pathological facts, or their novel character is 
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merely illusory and results from their having escaped physicians’ attention (Plutarch, in 
Mulger 1967, 15). In fact, the way Plutarch framed the alternative subtly introduces a 
metaphysical principle. For him, indeed, the question as to whether new diseases can 
arise leads one to admit (or reject) a principle of change in the nature of things (Grmek 
1993, 283). Following Plutarch’s intervention, the other participants in the discussion 
agreed that the second branch of the alternative is correct, making their decision on the 
grounds that “with this kind of phenomenon [disease], more than anywhere else, nature 
is opposed to any innovation” (Plutarch, quoted in Mulger 1967, 15). Thus, new diseases 
could not have emerged de novo, but are solely the result of undetected cases. 
Nevertheless, Plutarch admits that new diseases can come from foreign countries, or 
even from outer space as Democritus himself once thought (Grmek 1993; Mulger 1967).  
Renaissance physicians remained faithful to the teaching of the ancients, even when 
syphilis – the “French” disease – swapped Europe in the sixteenth century, bringing up 
the problem of new disease once again. Movements of celestial bodies and God’s wrath 
were proposed as explanations of the new illness. However, physicians turned their 
attention away from these arguments and looked back into the writings of the ancients 
instead – Hippocrates and Galen – whose knowledge of medicine was deemed to be 
much superior to that of the moderns. They concluded that the disease was not genuinely 
new, but was possibly coming from America and resulted from a humoral imbalance (i.e. 
too much phlegm), suggesting either sweating or spitting as a cure to restore the balance 
of the body (Hays 2005, 72-73). This response of Renaissance physicians, however, 
ignores that Hippocrates himself believed in the possibility for new disease to be born and 
go extinct but it underlines the fact that the introduction of new forms of pathology in the 
natural world was difficult to accept.    
 
NEW DISEASES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: NATURAL HISTORY AND EXPERIMENTAL 
EVIDENCE  
  In contrast with the metaphysics of Plutarch, Renaissance physicians, and also 
eighteenth century nosologists who constructed rigid systems of disease classification 
(e.g. Boissier-de-Sauvages), nineteenth century medical doctors did not hesitate to argue 
for the coming into being of genuinely new diseases, and not merely previously 
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unrecognized cases or pathological variations. Rejecting a static and unchanging 
worldview as promoted by the Greeks, and the writings of the ancients, they adopted 
instead a more dynamic perspective on the natural world, including plants, animals, and 
diseases. Long before Charles Darwin, breeders had known that animals and plants could 
change or adapt under different local circumstances. Looking back into the history of 
medicine, physicians could similarly provide evidence of the sporadic appearance and 
disappearance of a number of diseases (e.g. plague, smallpox, scarlet fever, the English 
sweating sickness, and syphilis) some of which existing only in particular countries, 
establishing a parallel between diseases (pathology) and other (normal) forms of life.141 
 In 1836, Charles Boersch wrote an Essai sur la mortalité à Strasbourg [Essay on 
Mortality in Strasbourg] in which a large section of the book is devoted to the topic of 
maladies nouvelles. In this section, Boersch attempted to bring together animals and 
plants which exhibit variation and change and varieties of diseases. He wrote that  
 
There are animal and plant races which no longer exist in their primitive 
form; each day, art, education, and civilisation transform animal and 
plants living with us. Why would it be different in the case of diseases? 
Why could there not be historical diseases, just like there are fossils of 
plants and animal? Why, under the influence of provisional 
circumstances, would new and temporary disease not be born, just like 
new varieties of animals and plants do? This is perhaps the history of a 
great number of epidemics and contagions (Boersch 1836, 96 quoted in 
Anglada 1869, 33).    
 
 In the footsteps of newly-formed sciences such as geology and geography, and ten 
years after the publication of Origin of Species, the question of time began to enter mid-
nineteenth century medical discourses. Some thirty years or so after Boersch, in a 600 
pages volume on Études sur les maladies éteintes et les maladies nouvelles (1869) [Study 
on Extinct and New Diseases] the physician Charles Anglada stated the problem of the 
                                                                
141
 The French physician Charles Angalda listed a number of pathologies specific to some geographical 
areas: “La Plique de Pologne, le Bouton d’Alep, le Sibbens d’Ecosse, la Dadézyge de Norvège, la Lèpre 
d’Egypte, le Pian d’Amérique, le Yaws des côtes de Guinée, le Tara de Sibérie, le Waren de Westphalie, la 
Fégarite d’Espagne, le Mal de la Rose des Asturies, le Ginklose d’Islande, le Noma de Suède, la Chilolace 
d’Irlande” (1869, 10). 
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historicity of diseases as follows: “unless with side with the legend that diseases have one 
day befallen Earth like an avalanche, we have to acknowledge that they can only be the 
product [oeuvre] of centuries” (1869, 9). For him the existence of extinct (e.g. English 
sweating disease) and new diseases (e.g. cholera) is a “great fact of pathology” (1869, 1). 
Anglada conceptualized disease as being the result of a historical process, a development, 
though not yet an evolution in a Darwinian sense. This pathological development is 
presumably subject to natural laws, as everything else, however. Yet such laws are still to 
be discovered. According to Anglada, medical science has not yet been able to establish 
“the laws controlling the outburst of new epidemics, their momentous disappearance, 
their eventual returns, and their definitive extinction” (1869, 45).  
 Observation, according to Anglada, is the only way to understand past and present 
epidemics, and what it can teach us is that such banes are generally separated in space 
and time, and fortunately relatively rare. A full-fledged scientific explanation, in law-like 
terms, is however lacking, and “we are still waiting, and will probably be waiting a lot 
more for the Newton who will be able to calculate the evolutions [i.e. developments] of 
these odd meteors in the realm of pathology” (Ibid). It is plain that despite the Pastorian 
“revolution” in the nineteenth century no Newton of the epidemics came along, but as 
we have seen in chapter 2 and chapter 4 the work of Charles Darwin gave late nineteenth 
century physicians new conceptual tools to theorize about diseases in terms of historical 
change, while providing at the same time a firm basis to establish one of the most 
influential disease model in the twentieth century (i.e. the avirulence hypothesis) which 
would, however, lead to a different image of the future of infectious diseases. 
 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the problem of new disease was also 
addressed from an experimental point of view. It was known that experiments on changes 
in virulence by serial passages in animal bodies could lead to higher or lower level of 
disease severity. While English epidemiologists like William Farr emphasized that a virus’s 
virulence, through serial passages in animals, was slowly attenuated, Pasteur pointed out 
that, on the contrary, serial passages enchance the virulence, a phenomenon he believed 
was linked to epidemic outbreaks and even the creation of new diseases (Moulin 1992, 
290-291). Based on the belief that laboratory works translates into the natural world 
outside it (Latour 1983), Pasteur was inclined to think that his experiments with virus’s 
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virulence mimic natural process and could explain the origin of new diseases and 
epidemics across centuries:  
 
 What is an inoffensive microscopic organism for humans or for a certain 
animal? It is a being that can develop in our body or in the body of this 
animal; but if this microscopic being managed to penetrate another of the 
thousands and thousands of species in creation, nothing proves that it 
could not invade it and make it sick. Its virulence, reinforced by successive 
passages through individuals of this species, could reach a level at which it 
could kill one or another large animal, humans or certain domestic 
animals. By this method new virulences and new contagions can be 
created. I am inclined to believe that this is how smallpox, syphilis, plague, 
yellow fever appeared across the ages, and similarly that phenomena of 
this type explain how certain great epidemics, such as typhus for example, 
have appeared at one time or another (Pasteur, Chamberland, and Roux 
1881, quoted in Grmek 1995, 270; emphasis added). 
    
 
NEW DISEASES IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: BIRTH, LIFE, AND DEATH OF INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES  
While in the first half of the twentieth century virtually everyone in bacteriology or 
parasitology embraced, in one form or another, the corollary of the avirulence 
hypothesis, namely that infectious diseases are naturally declining (helped by modern 
medicine), microbiologist Charles Nicolle (1866-1936), Nobel Prize laureate in physiology 
and medicine in 1928, defended a different view, a view, however, very much aligned 
with that of his French medical predecessors in the nineteenth century, to the difference 
that he drew explicitly on the work of Darwin to discuss the origin of infectious diseases, 
both from a naturalist and an experimentalist point of view. In effect, Nicolle envisaged 
the unflinching dual process of upbringing and vanishing of infectious diseases – a 
conclusion he arrives at, paradoxically, based on the same premise as the avirulence 
hypothesis – namely that given enough time, infectious diseases evolve into a balance 
with their host: for Nicolle “infectious disease is a biological phenomenon. Bearing the 
characteristic of life attempting to preserve itself, it evolves and leans towards 
equilibrium” (Nicolle 1930, 218).  
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Nicolle is the author of a treatise of microbiology titled Élements de microbiologie 
générale (1901) written when he directed the Imperial Institute of Bacteriology in 
Constantinople. Working primarily on typhus upon his arrival in Tunisia in 1903, he 
identified the louse as the parasite vector of disease in man within ten years of research 
and was the first to use guinea pigs as experimental animals to assess the host range of 
the disease (Nicolle 1928). Intrigued by the impressive clinical variation in signs and 
symptoms among humans infected with typhus, on the one hand, and by the fact that 
inoculated guinea pigs sometimes failed to show signs of fever altogether, he was led to 
develop the concept of “inapparent infection”.142 This concept could be applied to 
experimental situations where the inoculated animal shows no other distinctive sign of 
the disease “than the virulence of the blood”. With this hypothesis that infection is 
hidden but real Nicolle could explain why typhus could reappear on a seasonal basis, 
pointing to the “possible existence of inapparent forms” of the disease. Nicolle also 
established that inapparent infection of typhus could confer a certain degree of immune 
protection to the animals, as it was known in the case of man. Pioneering the field of 
“subpathology” he regarded in retrospect his concept of “inapparent infection” as being 
“without a doubt” his most important discovery (Nicolle 1928). The conceptual situation 
is very similar to what Theobald Smith had described in the case of Texas fever where the 
Southern animals showed a resistance to the parasite transmitted by the ticks (chapter 4). 
Indeed, Nicolle’s concept means that infections are not always deadly.  
Besides his scientific achievements, Charles Nicolle became mostly known for his 
book on Naissance, vie et mort des maladies infectieuses [Birth, Life and Death of 
Infectious Diseases] (1929, 129), later augmented and republished as Le destin des 
maladies infectieuses [The Fate of Infectious Diseases] (1939). Nicolle wrote a comment 
often considered as prophetic regarding to the future of novel diseases: “There will thus 
be new diseases. This is a critical fact. Another fact, equally critical, is that we shall only 
be able to identify them when they are formed, adult, so to speak. They will appear ready 
                                                                
142
 It would be interesting to contrast and compare Nicolle’s concept of “inapparent infection” with 
Macfarlane Burnet’s concept of “subclinical infection”. But in fact, Burnet himlsef has used the concept of 
“inapparent infection” in the 1930s, in a paper titled on “Innaparent Virus Infections, With Special 
Reference to Australian Examples” (1936). See Park (2006, 513).  
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to strike like Minerva came out of Jupiter’s brain” (1930, 129). For Nicolle, infectious 
diseases are being born, they develop, and they eventually die, following a pathological 
life cycle, so to speak. Because Nature constantly attempts to adapt microorganism to 
their host, and because microorganisms exhibit a great amount of biological variation, 
new diseases will arise although we may not be able to predict their emergence as they 
will appear “ready to strike”. In the light of the history of the problem of new diseases 
this statement, however, is no more prophetic than any other similar statements made by 
physicians or epidemiologists before him. And yet, it was somehow different because it 
was in opposition with the idea that infectious diseases would naturally decline, on the 
one hand, and because after Nicolle, the age-old question of de novo diseases fell into 
oblivion for some forty or fifty years until the AIDS pandemic broke out (see Grmek 1989; 
1993), on the other. This oblivion is partly linked to the neglect of the microbial world as a 
source of new diseases.  
 
EMERGING DISEASE: A NEW DISEASE CATEGORY?   
The early 1990s are often considered as a significant point of rupture in the 
international context of global public health, where the concept of “emerging” and “re-
emerging” diseases have brought the problem of infectious diseases back into the 
foreground, where it long once stood. Historians and sociologists have characterized the 
period from 1992 onwards – where the concept of emerging disease was constructed and 
applied on a global scale – as marking a “distinctive era” in the history of public health, 
one where the Western world discovered that infectious diseases have not been defeated 
but that, on the contrary, “it [the Western world] remained painfully vulnerable and to a 
degree that had seemed unimaginable” (Snowden 2008, 8 and 12). For others, this period 
can be read off as an “epistemological break” in the field of international communicable 
disease, that is, a break from a world  “oriented to known diseases to one responsible for 
a microbial world full of potential and surprise” (Weir and Mykhaloviskiy 2010, 62).  
The institutionalization of the concept of emerging diseases is often credited to U.S. 
Institute of Medicine (IOM), and in particularly to Joshua Lederberg for whom emerging 
infectious disease are “clinically distinct conditions whose incidence in humans has 
increased” (Lederberg, Shope, Oaks 1992, 34). The expression “emerging disease” –soon 
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followed by “emerging infections” and “re-emerging infections” – quickly entered medical 
(and lay) terminology in North American and European countries. 143 In the mid-1990s the 
new concept replaced with two or three years the expression “communicable diseases” 
(Weir and Mykhaloviskiy 2010) and the century-old concept of “new” diseases (Grmek 
1993). After its introduction in the U.S. context the concept of emerging disease migrated 
to Canada before finding its way in 1994 to the World Health Organisation in Geneva (see 
Weir and Mykhaloviskiy 2010). Importantly, the concept of emerging disease frames the 
nature of emergence not in terms of the whole being more than the sum of its parts but 
in terms of potentiality. Emergence is about unpredictable processes. However, one could 
question whether this concept was as new as Lederberg wanted us to believe it. As the 
previous sections illustrated, the concept of new disease was already present and 
discussed in the Antiquity. Moreover, Richard Krause, who was director of the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in the early 1980s, had already predicted that 
infectious diseases would not decline and that new diseases may come into view. In The 
Restless Tide: The Persistence Challenge of the Microbial World (1981), Krause identified a 
number of causes for the rise of antibiotic resistance and infectious diseases, including 
changes and evolution in the genetic profile of microorganisms. Grounding his 
argumentation in the work of Lederberg conducted in the 1940s and 1950s in bacterial 
genetics and recombination, Krause put forward the view (already underlined by 
Lederberg) that microbes are not static entities but are “genetically flexible”, a view 
which was at odds with U.S. public health positions at the time (Weir and Mykhaloviskiy 
2010, 32). It is only 12 years later that Lederberg would fully develop the medical 
consequences of his previous work, a situation that highlights the gap between public 
health and bacterial genetics at the time, and more generally that between the medical 
sciences and evolutionary biology. 
Off the main scientific scene, the historian and physician Mirko Grmek suggested that 
the expression “new disease” – which is ambiguous – be replaced with “emerging 
disease” (1993). During his investigations of the AIDS pandemic Grmek noted, for 
instance, that the disease can be regarded both as a new and old disease: on the one 
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 See, for instance, the volume edited by Wison, Levins and Spielman (1994) on “Disease in Evolution. 
Global Changes and Emergence of Infectious Diseases.”  
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hand, AIDS is a new clinical (or nosological) entity in the sense that there was no way of 
conceptualizing AIDS before the elaboration of new set of concepts and tools resulting 
from molecular biology (e.g. study of RNA viruses); on the other hand, it is equally clear 
that AIDS is not “absolutely” new in the sense that the viruses responsible for AIDS did 
not appear ex nihilo but are derived (i.e. evolved) from biological ancestors sharing some 
common genetic features (Grmek 1993). Similarly, the disease known as Legionnaire’s 
disease – that killed war veterans who gathered in a hotel in Philadelphia in 1976 – is 
caused by a very common bacteria which is most of the time inoffensive unless the 
ventilation system of the hotel allows it to spread and replicate rapidly, bringing about a 
highly virulent (even deadly) disease to the people who assembled there. In order to 
achieve some conceptual clarification, Grmek argued, in a rarely quoted-paper (in French) 
by disease emergentist theorists, that “to avoid misinterpretations one should substitute 
the ambiguous notion of ʻnew disease’ with ʻemerging disease’” (1993, 281).  
Grmek further defined 5 historical situations in which a disease can be classified as 
emergent (1988; republished in 1993, 281) 
1- It existed before it could be first identified but was overlooked from a medical 
point of view because it could not be conceptualized as a nosological entity; 
2- It existed but was not noticed until a quantitative and/or qualitative change in its 
manifestation;  
3- It did not exist in a particular region of the world before its introduction from 
other regions;  
4- It never existed in a human population but only in an animal population;  
5- It is completely new – the triggering germ and/or necessary environmental 
conditions did not exist prior to the first clinical manifestations.  
 
The conceptual shift from “new” to “emerging” disease suggested by Grmek in 
1992,144 was greatly facilitated thanks to political and scientific leverage, for instance the 
publication of an influential report on Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in 
                                                                
144
 Grmek read his paper “Le concept de maladie émergente” at the International Symposium Emerging 
Infectious Diseases: Historical Perspectives held in Annecy (France), in 1992 (Grmek 1995). The paper was 
published one year later in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences (1993).  
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the United States co-authored by Joshua Lederberg, Robert Shope and Stanley C. Oaks 
(1992). The launching of scientific journals like Emerging Infectious Diseases and 
Ecosystem Health around the same time also contributed to this shift (Anderson 2004), 
while international conferences on emerging diseases helped in bringing infectious 
diseases to the attention of public health officers. Particularly important were the 
International Symposium Emerging Infectious Diseases: Historical Perspectives held in 
Annecy (France) in 1992 and the conference on Emerging Viruses: the Evolution of Viruses 
and Viral Diseases, the latter being jointly sponsored by The National Institute of Allergy 
and Infectious Diseases, the Fogarty International Center of the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), and the Rockefeller Foundation was held in Washington D.C. in 1989, and 
chaired by virologist Stephen Morse. The proceedings of the conference were later 
published as Emerging Viruses (Morse 1993). 
 
BRINGING THE TWO STYLES OF REASONING TOGETHER 
So far, chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis have dealt mostly with the problem of virulence 
in infectious diseases from two different perspectives – the ecological and the molecular 
– and it stressed how evolutionary thinking underlined and informed each of them. In this 
section I wish to sketch how the “ecological” and the “molecular” visions have, in the 
mid-1990s, started to come together, thanks to the concept of emerging disease.  
From the outset, the concept of “emerging disease” was criticized in the scientific 
and historical literature on the grounds that it draws “disproportionate attention” from 
media, medical communities, policy makers, and so on to a small number of exceptional 
diseases such as Ebola fever or Legionnaire’s disease (Woolhouse and Antia 2008). The 
Harvard professor Paul Farmer noted, for instance, that emerging diseases means nothing 
else than older problems appearing under new guise and not at all “emerging”. For 
Farmer, talking about emerging disease only makes sense if one ignores the Third World 
altogether where most of these infections are indeed very common (Farmer 1996). It was 
also argued that if disease emergence is defined in terms of a steep increase of a 
condition over a period of time and within a defined geographical area, then the concept 
should embrace more than just infectious diseases and should also be applied to chronic, 
or degenerative diseases as well (Toma and Thiry 2003). This suggestion goes hand in 
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hand with the recognition that a number of chronic diseases like cervical cancer and 
peptic ulcers have a viral origin, blurring the distinction between infectious and chronic 
diseases (Gold 1998). In spite of these limitations and some potential biases, the concept 
of emerging disease is now widely in use and we must ask what use it is good for.  
One of the things that made the concept of emerging disease appealing was the fact 
that it is an “active concept”, to use the words of sociologists Weir and Mykhaloviskiy 
(2010). It is such, in their views, because the concept has “provoked far-reaching legal, 
political, and technical transformations in international communicable disease control” 
(2010, 30). Their approach supports what I have called in the introduction an analysis of 
“concepts in action”. The idea is that although they may seem so, concepts are not 
inoccuous and can have powerful effects on various aspects of society. To understand 
concepts in action one thus has to look at the changes triggered by the introduction of a 
new concept in one or more scientific, social, ethical, or legal domains, and how the 
concept was later reshaped in the light of those transformations. But the concept of 
emerging disease did something else for the field of public health and medicine: it 
permitted to bring together two research traditions in the field of infectious disease that 
were previously disconnected, constituting isolated styles of reasoning. In other words, 
the concept of emerging disease not only rebranded infectious diseases in economic and 
political terms; it also opened-up a conceptual space to reconcile the molecular and 
ecological aspects of infection and virulence that were yet isolated. Bacterial genetics and 
microbiology were immediately brought to bear on the concept of emerging disease. 
However, ecological aspects of the problem were empahsized strongly in two of the most 
influential and fundamental texts that propelled the concept into the global arena, 
triggering, in return, a number of institutional changes.  
In the preface of his book on Emerging Viruses, Stephen More provided a vivid 
picture of the integrated approach that was needed in order to deal with emerging 
infections 
 
In attacking the problem of emerging viruses, scientific knowledge of the 
agent is essential, and the recent flowering of molecular biology and 
molecular genetics has provided powerful tools for analyzing and tracking 
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viruses, and is yielding fresh insights into viral evolution. But viruses are of 
necessity dependent on their hosts, requiring us to have an appreciation of 
the factors that may influence the interaction of a virus with a host. 
Although many of these factors are molecular or cellular, when the host is 
human, social factors can play a very significant role in both dissemination 
and expression of disease. On a larger scale, many epidemics can be 
understood only in their ecological context (Morse 1993, viii). 
 
Similar considerations were voiced by Lederberg and Shope in their report (1992). 
They remarked that emerging diseases results mostly from anthropocentric reasons than 
for changes in the biology of the viruses or bacteria causing diseases: 
 
In discussions about the emergence of “new” diseases, considerable 
debate has centered on the relative importance of de novo evolution of 
agents versus the transfer of existing agents to new host populations (so-
called microbial traffic). It is sometimes presumed that the appearance of 
a novel, disease-causing microorganism results from a change in its genetic 
properties. This is sometimes the case, but there are many instances in 
which emergence are due to changes in the environment or in human 
ecology. In fact, environmental changes probably account for most 
emerging diseases. 
 
Weir and Mykhaloviskiy (2010) do recognize that both scientists have from the outset 
argued that an integrated approach is needed. My argument is that this decision has a 
deeper historical signification because it crystalized two thought-styles that were 
previously divided for most of the twentieth century. The concept of plasmid coined by 
Lederberg (1952) provided public health medicine with a powerful tool to investigate the 
emergence of new diseases. The lateral (or horizontal) transfer of plasmids between 
bacteria, often containing several virulence factors, can give rise to new genetic 
combination able to infect humans and animals. And yet, this concept appeared in a 
research tradition (or style) where the focus was primarily on the biological mechanisms 
of bacteria (or viruses), not on the broader environmental context, or on the medical 
significance of these findings. Similarly, the epidemiologists Robert May and Roy 
Anderson, among others, constructed a new model of virulence evolution in the late 
1970s that can explain why in some ecological contexts, virulence can decrease, increase 
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or become stabilized. While the conceptual and modelling tools existed to explain, and 
possibly limit, the spread of infectious diseases worldwide, those two styles remained 
apart until the mid-1990s. I now turn to the history of the Spanish influenza pandemic of 
1918, an emerging and re-emerging disease whose exceptional virulence continues to 
puzzle scientists.  
   
THE SPANISH INFLUENZA PANDEMIC – AN EMERGING AND RE-EMERGING DISEASE 
The emergence of the (misnamed) “Spanish” influenza pandemic of 1918-19 is the 
first of the three major influenza pandemics that occurred during the past century – and 
is regarded as one of the most devastating episodes in medical history. Once described as 
“the biggest unsolved problem of theoretical epidemiology and public health practice” 
(Burnet and Clark 1942), the consequences of this dramatic event rendered many wary 
about the emergence of future respiratory disease pandemics (Webby and Webster 
2003).  
The name “Spanish” flu comes from the fact that Spain was neutral country during 
World War I, providing at the same time a scapegoat to take the blame for this calamity 
(Philipps and Killingray 2003, 7). In fact, it is only in Spain that the publication of medical 
reports on influenza was authorized during the war and as a consequence, it got blamed 
for the pandemic and was considered responsible for it. One of the first papers to appear 
in London Times (June 1918) was titled “The Spanish Influenza – a sufferer’s symptoms” 
(in Johnson 2006, 37). Using a concept coined by Grmek (1969), it could be said that the 
1918 influenza pandemic has ruptured the fragile “pathocenotic equilibrium” prevailing 
during the first decades of the twentieth century, creating at the same time a new 
ecological order among diseases on a global level.145  
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 Grmek defines the concept of pathocenosis as the “equilibrium in the frequency of all the diseases 
affecting a population”. This frequency “conforms to certain rules” and can be “studied using mathematical 
models” (1990, 156-8). Grmek famously applied this concept to explain the emergence of the AIDS 
pandemic (1990; 1989) and other emerging pathogens (1993; 1995; 1969). For a recent article on the 
influence of one disease on another see Noymer (2010) who argues that the 1918 pandemic was a 
significant factor in the decline of tuberculosis in the early decades of the twentieth century as it killed 
many individuals infected with T.B.   
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In addition to the 1918 famous Spanish influenza pandemic, two other influenza 
pandemics occurred in the following decades, one in 1957-58 (“Asian” influenza, H2N2) 
and the other in 1968 (“Hong Kong” influenza, H3N2). In comparison to the Spanish flu 
pandemic, the last two major pandemics were more benign, the former causing between 
1.5 and 2 million deaths, and the latter, one million. The recent H5N1 pandemic caused a 
few deaths only between 1997 and 2004 (Taubenberger 2005, 87). Despite the (crucial) 
fact that antibiotics were available during the second two pandemics, this raises the 
question: why was the 1918 pandemic so deadly?  
A significant amount of research in virology, parasitology, and more recently 
evolutionary biology has grown since the 1930s, attempting to explain the exceptional 
virulence of the 1918 pandemics. Very often the question is framed as follow: is the 
biological nature of the virus the key to explain the pandemic, or is the explanation of 
such unprecedented virulence more likely to be found in the equally exceptional 
(environmental, social, political, nutritional, and so on) conditions of the pandemic? 
Endogenous and exogenous thought-styles remain divided on this issue, and researchers 
(continue to) ignore each other’s work, as explanations are often polarized regarding the 
cause of the pandemic. Most of the time, only one of the above situations is cast as the 
sufficient (and the right) explanation of the emergence of the pandemic, while minimal 
attention is paid to other explanatory schemes. However, such complex phenomenon is 
unlikely to be explained by a single-sided approach. I believe these two perspectives can 
be combined, or integrated, in order to provide a deeper and better understanding of the 
situation, and perhaps contributing in avoiding another such devastating phenomenon. In 
fact, the epistemological and ontological complexity of a situation like this one requires a 
pluralistic, integrative explanatory framework that is able to bring together and make 
sense of the relations between the biological, the social, and even the political 
dimensions at stake. 
 
OPERATIONALIZING THE VIRAL NATURE OF INFLUENZA 
From the early 1890s to the early 1920s the cause of influenza was believed to be a 
bacterium: Bacillus Influenzae, also named Pfeiffer’s bacillus after the work of the 
German bacteriologist (a colleague of Koch) and physician Richard Pfeiffer (1858-1945) 
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who isolated the microorganism in 1892 from patients displaying flu symptoms.146 Even in 
the late 1930s, when convincing evidence (provided by Smith, Andrewes and Laidlaw in 
1933) demonstrated that influenza was not caused by a bacterium but by a virus, 
historians and bacteriologists continued to credit him with the discovery, and regarded 
his views on the status of influenza as largely correct and well established (see for 
instance Bulloch 1979, 390 [1938]). For instance, in his Textbook of bacteriology (1919) 
Hans Zinsser wrote that “the relationship between the clinical disease known as influenza 
or grippe and the Pfeiffer’s bacillus has been definitely established by numerous 
investigations” (1919, 540; quoted in Johnson 2006, 22). The bacteria held responsible for 
influenza, however, proved difficult to culture and it was not found in all patients 
diagnosed with influenza (Epps 2006). The idea that the causal agent of influenza was a 
bacterium remained long entrenched amongst bacteriologists, bacteria being identified as 
the cause of a number of diseases affecting humans such as anthrax, cholera and plague. 
This can be seen as a lasting effect of the influence of the “bacteriological paradigm” on 
influenza research during the first half of the twentieth century (van Helvoort 1993).   
In 1918, at a “Discussion” on influenza organized by the Royal Society of Medicine, 
the Chief Medical Officer Sir Arthur Newsholme summarized the situation concerning the 
nature of influenza and its cause(s) as follows: 
 
The first difficulty is to define Influenza. Is it one disease or a group of 
diseases? And is the disease now prevailing the disease which prevailed in 
the spring? […] These two questions cannot easily be separated. […] There 
can be no doubt that all these bacteria, often acting in conspiracy, have 
contributed greatly to the recent mortality from influenza, but whether 
there is in addition a hitherto undiscovered virus to which influenza is 
primarily due is still a moot point (1918, 1-2; quoted in Johnson 2006, 20).    
 
An important argument against the bacterial nature of influenza emerged from a 
series of experiments conducted in the early 1920s by Peter Olitsky and Frederic Gates, 
two American researchers at the Rockefeller Institute who provided a useful operational 
definition of the disease. In a string of papers (1921a; b; c; d; e; f) the authors 
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demonstrated that the “active substance” or the “active agent” they isolated could pass 
through the membrane of the filter Berkefeld (V and N). Moreover, this active agent 
could cause the same influenza symptoms in rabbits and guinea pigs inoculated with 
unfiltered material.  Importantly, it could also survive immersion in glycerol for up to nine 
months (1921, 371). Given that the membrane of the filter stops bacteria while allowing 
viruses and smaller organisms to get through, this suggested to Olitsky and Gates that 
they were handling an organism of a different nature without, however, drawing the 
conclusion that it was a virus. 
Another crucial step in the discovery of the viral nature of influenza came from a 
series of experiments with swine. In 1918, 1928 and 1929, epidemics of what seemed to 
be a disease of influenza were observed among pigs in Iowa, in the USA. The symptoms of 
this disease in pigs were so similar to human influenza that it was named “swine 
influenza”. Swine influenza was recognized as a clinical entity as early as 1918 (Koen 
1919). The relatedness of the two disease and the fact that it emerged shortly after the 
Spanish flu pandemic led some to believe that the virus spread from humans to swine in 
the fall of 1918; however, there is no conclusive evidence of such a jump yet 
(Taubenberger 2006, 94).  
Despite these researches on swine influenza and the work of Olitsky and Gates, the 
nature of influenza’s causative agent remained somewhat mysterious throughout the 
1920s. For a decade or so, scientists obtained mixed results when trying to discover and 
identify the agent of swine influenza. Reproducing results obtained by other research 
groups proved to be a complicated task sometimes. For instance, in a paper published in 
1920¸ Murray described swine influenza as resulting from a small Gram-negative coccus 
which (he thought) he had successfully inoculated to healthy swine. Others, however, 
failed to obtain the same coccus described by Murray in their cultures; they observed, 
rather, two types of organisms, none of which being able to produce the disease when 
inoculated nasally to swine, however (McBryde, Niles and Moskey 1928). The 
breakthrough came towards the end of the 1920s with the work of American 
bacteriologists Richard Shope and Paul Lewis.  
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Working on “hog” cholera, Shope and Lewis investigated the two devastating 
epidemics affecting swine that occurred in the autumn of 1928 and 1929 in Iowa. In a 
series of experiments described in three articles they demonstrated that swine influenza 
was not caused by Hemophilius influenza suis (or Pfeiffer’s bacterium) but by a virus. H. 
influenzae suis, however, was always found in animals who suffered from influenza. In the 
first paper (Shope 1931), Shope describes how he inoculated swine influenza intranasally 
to healthy animals using 8 strains taken from Iowa during the epizootic episode of 1928. 
“The experimental disease has the same feature as the epizootic” (1931, 358) although he 
observed variation among individuals regarding severity and mortality. The nature of the 
agent inducing swine influenza was still debated, however, partly because the agent held 
responsible for the disease sometimes failed to produce symptoms among healthy hogs.  
In the second paper (Lewis and Shope 1931), the authors reported their observations 
on the characters of the organism believed to cause the disease, or at least accompanying 
it. “The suspected organism was very similar to, if not identical with, H. influenzae” in 
terms of morphology and other characters (1931, 362-64). For instance, the cultures of 
biological samples taken to be infected with swine cholera revealed the presence of “thin, 
curved bacilli which varied considerably in length”. Moreover, this organism was found in 
the respiratory tracts of all experimental animals and those suffering from spontaneous 
influenza attacks. The authors suggested the name Hemophilius influenzae suis for this 
organism or swine origin (1931, 364).  Although “there is no real basis” for differentiating 
between H. influenza suis and H. influenza the two organisms differ serologically and 
pathologically. What is more, however, H. influenza suis alone was unable to induce 
disease in animals in which it was inoculated. Out of 13 swine that were inoculated 
intranasally, H. influenza suis held no pathogenic effect on 11 of them (1931, 370). The 
other two who fell ill had mistakenly received a mixture of H. influenza suis and the 
“filtrate agent” (i.e. the virus).  
In the third paper Shope (1931b) gives an account of the symptomatic differences 
between animal diagnosed with swine influenza and those he inoculated with the filtrate 
disease. The disease induced by the “filtrate agent”, that is, the agent that resulted from 
the filtrating process, “was definitely not typical swine influenza” (1931b, 374). In all cases 
it was “much milder than swine influenza”; there was no elevation of temperature 
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generally; some apathy was observable in addition to diminution in appetite; slight cough 
was also noticed. Yet, “the extreme prostration so common in swine influenza infections 
was not seen” (Ibid). The filtrate disease was, however, infectious and could be easily 
inoculated either intranasally or by contact.  
Importantly, in animals diagnosed with swine influenza, H. influenza suis was always 
found in the respiratory tracts but it was never found in animals inoculated with the 
filtrate disease alone (1931b, 375). Shope hypothesised correctly that “the combination 
of the organism and the filterable agent may be essential for the production of the 
natural disease” (Ibid.) He established this fact with the help of some more experimental 
animals inoculated with a mixture of H. influenza suis and the filtrate disease. Following 
this experiment, “a disease typical of swine influenza in all clinical and pathological 
respects and indistinguishable from that induced by unfiltered infectious material 
resulted in all instances” (1931b, 381). He concluded that swine influenza is due to the 
action of the filterable virus and H. influenza suis “acting together”. Their mode of action 
can either be that the virus creates an entry point for the bacterium to infect the host and 
determine the clinical picture of the disease; or that the virus is the most important 
vector in causing the disease, H. influenza suis only making things worse, so to speak. In 
other words, Shope demonstrated that the filtrate agent was a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to produce swine influenza. In his conclusion, he ventured the 
possible explanation that a similar dual-process could be at work in the case of human 
influenza: “a careful investigation would seem warranted of the possibility that Pfeiffer’s 
bacillus and a filtrable agent act in concert to cause influenza in man” (Shope 1931b, 384).  
The isolation of the actual causal agent of human influenza was made in the early 
1930s by a group of three British virologists working at the National Institute for Medical 
Research: Wilson Smith, C.H. Andrewes and P.P. Laidlaw. An epidemic of influenza at the 
beginning of the year 1933 provided them with ample material to study the disease 
experimentally. Their paper “A Virus obtained from Influenza Patients” was published in 
Lancet in July 1933. Building on the work of Shope and Lewis they provided conclusive 
evidence regarding the viral nature of influenza in humans. Using lung materials from 
deceased cases and throat gargling from suspected cases of influenza Wilson, Laidlaw and 
Andrewes attempted to inoculate mice, guinea pigs, monkeys, hamsters and rabbits 
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without much success, however. Intracerebral, intratesticular and intraperitoneal 
attempts to inoculate these animals with infectious material were tried in turn but also in 
vain. Wilson then decided to use ferrets as experimental organism.147 At the time, this 
animal was being used in his institute by his colleagues Laidlaw and Dunkin. It was also 
known that ferrets were highly susceptible to distemper, a virus affecting dogs (Burnet 
and White 1972, 208). Wilson also decided to inoculate the animals intranasally. Using 
throat-washings from C.H. Andrews who was ill, he inoculated two ferrets with influenza 
in February 1933. In his notebook he wrote “Ferret 1 looks somewhat seedy – crusts 
round nose and slight discharge with suggestion of pus – eyes also watery – sneezing”. A 
month later or so Wilson fell ill too – it is believed he catched it from a ferret! Collecting 
his own gargling he used it to inoculate ferrets with what became known as the Wilson 
Smith or WS strain (on this see Eden 1966, 482).  
This initial success set the stage for further research by the three co-workers, leading 
to the identification of the virus of influenza in humans. Using ferrets as experimental 
organisms they inoculated them with throat-washings obtained from patients who 
displayed influenza symptoms. These samples were filtrated and the filtrates were then 
inoculated, both subcutaneously and intranasally to ferrets. The animals soon became ill, 
showing influenza symptoms (1933, 66). Reasoning along the lines of Shope and Lewis, 
the authors asserted that “epidemic influenza in man is caused primarily by a virus 
infection” (1933, 68). Macfarlane Burnet and White observed that this paper opened up a 
new “epoch in the study of influenza” making it available to “experimental study”; 
influenza was “no longer a nebulous entity” (1972, 208).  
Research on influenza was facilitated by changing the “experimental animal”, that is, 
by switching from ferrets to mice. The latter was easier to standardize and also cheaper 
to obtain. Although it was not readily susceptible to the virus, experimenters could 
transfer the virus rapidly from individual to individual, artificially selecting the most 
virulent ones causing deadly pneumonia. The next technique in line was the use of 
chicken eggs to grow and culture the virus. The “egg technique”, developed by Burnet, 
provided an ideal environment for the virus to develop rendering influenza one of the 
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easiest viruses to grow and study artificially for a period of ten to fifteen years (Burnet 
and White 1972). As Burian emphasized many years ago, it is important for scientists to 
have “the right organism for the right job” (1993). 
 
THE BIOLOGY OF INFLUENZA  
In a sense influenza cannot be regarded as a “single disease” entity (Johnson 2006, 
10). Indeed, the family tree of influenza viruses contains two genera: one that includes 
influenza A and B viruses and the other influenza C viruses, and the two genera are 
distinct in terms of host range and virulence factors. Type A is the most common of all, 
and can infect a wide range of hosts, including, pigs, horses, seals, whales and birds. This 
type of virus is also the most redoubtable as it has the potential to cause pandemics. Type 
B is believed to infect only humans (especially young children) and Type C (another genus) 
can infect both humans and swine (Johnson 2006, 10).  
Influenza viruses are enveloped negative strand RNA viruses and belong to the genus 
Orthomyxoviridae (Taubenberger 2005). The virus of the Spanish flu pandemic belongs to 
the type A influenza, known as H1N1. Influenza A and B viruses contain eight discrete 
gene segments, coding for at least one protein. The surface of influenza A viruses are 
covered by three types of proteins hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidases (NA) and matrix 2 
(M2). The structural configuration of HA proteins is that of a triangular spike. These spikes 
allow the virus to bind to both host cells and red blood cells, causing the latter to 
agglutinate (whence the name hemagglutinin), facilitating entrance into the host, and 
triggering infection. Once the infection is over, antibodies responding to hemagglutinin 
spikes are formed, allowing the immune system to recognize the signature of the viral 
strain in case of another infection episode. Neuraminidases (NA) are instead shaped like 
small mushrooms. They also form spikes on the surface coat of the virus but the function 
of NA is to cleave glycoproteins into two so as to facilitate the propagation of the virus 
from cell to cell. It opens-up cells for infection. Antiviral drugs target NA in order to block 
their exit, and antibodies to NA are also produced after the infection.  
Influenza A viruses are further subdivided by serological types, which is the genetic 
characterization of the surface glycoproteins HA and NA. There are 16 HA and 9 NA 
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proteins known as of today. These surface glycoproteins define the virus's identity in 
terms of what the immune system detects and attacks. The different major families of flu 
are combinations of the two, hence the designation “H5N1” for the recent threat. The 
1918 virus was H1N1. The “offspring” of the Spanish flu pandemic viral strain were 
replaced in 1957 by the H2N2 subtype. This one circulated until 1968 before being 
replaced, in its turn, by a H3N2 pandemic strain (Taubenberger and Morens 2010). In 
1977, the H1N1 strain surfaced again (Webster and Kawaoka 1994).  
The genes coding for these glycoproteins can reassort (i.e. reshuffle) thanks to two 
processes known as antigenic drift and antigenic shift. The former consists in the 
accumulation of point mutations in the genome of the virus, modifying both the shape 
and the electric charge of viral surface antigens and preventing their recognition by the 
antibodies of the host that were developed in reaction to previous exposures to the virus. 
The need to update the influenza vaccines every year illustrates the “evolutionary 
success” of antigenic drift. The latter refers to the introduction of whole or part of avian 
influenza genes into viruses that circulate among human populations. In particular, the 
introduction of the hemagglutinin gene (HA) is often hailed as the responsible factor for 
increased virulence (Bush 2007). The fast reassortment of nucleotides and the high rate 
of mutation in influenza viruses results in influenza posing a continual threat for human 
and animal health. Because of this, influenza is regarded as being a continually “re-
emerging” disease (Webster and Kawaoka 1994).  
The natural history and ecology of influenza A virus has been extensively studied 
(Webster et al. 1992; Webster 1987). Its natural reservoir is believed to be wild water-
fowl, which is indicated by the fact that species of wild duck are not affected by the virus 
and remains “healthy”. The virus replicates inside the host, mostly in the intestinal tract, 
and is then washed into the ponds where ducks live (Webster 1993). The relative 
harmlessness of this (evolutionary) relationship is similar to the way myxoma virus is 
adapted to its natural host, as studied in chapter 4. Genetic reassortment (antigenic drift) 
occurs especially in swine which act as “mixing vessels” for the viral strains and are 
considered the intermediate host between birds and humans (Webster and Kawaoka 
1994). 
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A WESTERN ORIGIN  
A first important aspect of the 1918 influenza pandemic is its possible Western origin. 
In part because of the extensive pig-duck farming China was singled out as the possible 
origin of most influenza pandemics. Whereas most pandemics to have befallen man have 
come from China (Morse 1993, 17) the “Spanish” flu originated (likely) in ... France as 
early as 1916 causing acute respiratory symptoms closely resembling the phenotype of 
the disease during the 1918-19 pandemic (Oxford et al. 2005; 2002). Morse and his 
colleagues recently argued that there was an early wave of influenza in New York 
between February and April 1918 (Olson et al. 2005). The precise geographical origins of 
the 1918 pandemic are still a matter of debate, however. 148 
The world’s deadliest flu pandemic kicked off in October 1918 and after a few 
months only, the virus killed between 30 and 40 millions of people (Philips and Killingray 
2003; Crosby 1989; some estimate deaths to be about fifty millions, see McNeil 1976). 
Three successive waves of influenza swept all five continents in 1918, the second one 
being the most lethal of them. The first wave (or the “spring wave”) of the flu started in 
March in the U.S. (Mid West) before moving to Europe, then to Asia and North Africa 
before reaching Australia in July 1918. The second wave (or “fall wave”) was highly 
devastating and rapidly went extinct after causing millions of deaths worldwide. It started 
in late August 1918 and within one week there were reports of the virus coming from 
distant cities including Boston (US), Freetown (Africa) and Brest (France). This second 
wave lasted until November. The speed at which the virus circulated makes it difficult to 
pinpoint one specific location as being “the” source of the pandemic but, as pointed out, 
a Western origin appears to be the most plausible hypothesis. Early reports indicated a 
further third wave that hit in the first months of 1919 (Burnet and Clarke 1942; Barry 
2004a).  
 
AGE GROUP MORTALITY 
During an attack of influenza most people die of secondary infections as often death 
resulted from bacteria invading lungs of immunocompromised individuals (Burnet and 
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Clark 1942). During the 1918 pandemic the symptoms lasted generally between 2 and 4 
days and could, more rarely, be extended up to two weeks. The respiratory disease was 
characterized by fever, body pains and often severe headaches. Without the possibility of 
treating patients with antibiotics, bacteria turned “those vital organs [lungs] into sacks of 
fluids [...] effectively drowning the patient” (Philips and Killingray 2003, 5). People 
therefore died within a few days only of hemorrhagic pulmonary oedema and other lung 
afflictions (Bush 2007; see also Taubenberger et al. 2000). A second striking aspect of the 
1918 influenza pandemic is the young age of the victims, which was qualitatively 
distinctive: most of them were men, supposedly healthy, of between 20-40 years old 
(some say 25-35), irrespective of whether the country was involved in the war or not. 
Instead of forming a U shaped mortality curve, the shape of the 1918 pandemic was W 
shaped. An additional peak (the central peak in the W) represents the male victims of the 
flu. The figure 6 (below) shows the U shaped curve of 1917 and the W shaped one of 
1918.  The distribution of deaths on this curve reflects the virulence of the pandemic and 
underlines the pattern of mortality of a group usually not affected by seasonal flu.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Age distribution of death rates from influenza and 
pneumonia in the United States death registration area, 1917 and 
1918. Death rate is deaths per 100,000 person-years lived. Data 
from US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1956. In 
Noymer (2010, 141) 
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EXCEPTIONAL VIRULENCE OF THE PANDEMIC 
A third significant feature of the 1918 pandemic, already mentioned, is its lethality: 
the disease was of exceptional virulence and the pandemic made more victims than the 
First World War. This central aspect was recognized by virtually everyone as being 
somewhat unusual and very specific to this pandemic. Indeed, influenza type A viruses is 
not at all uncommon, as it already circulated in human populations since a few centuries 
when the 1918 pandemic broke out. In the United States only, annual death toll related to 
seasonal influenza are estimated to be about 30 000 individuals (Thompson et al. 2003). 
Seasonal outbreaks of influenza normally last a few weeks and then disappear abruptly; 
they result from influenza viruses present in human populations able to infect individuals 
thanks to antigenic drift. On occasions, however, the virus can infect up to 40% of the 
world population. During these pandemic years, in contrast, the number of deaths rises 
way above the average, causing millions of victims all around the globe. During seasonal 
epidemics strains of influenza type A and B can sometimes coexist, if at different 
frequencies among populations. 
In the mid twentieth century, leading British bacteriologist Wilson Smith, co-
discoverer of the viral nature of influenza in humans, cast doubts on the possibility that 
the exceptional virulence could be linked to a particular genetic or molecular structure of 
the virus alone; that is, he rejected a pathogen-centered (or wholly endogenous) 
explanation. According to Smith 
 
if we had the chance of getting a 1918-19 strain of virus now, it is at least 
conceivable that, on comparing with the Asian strain, we might find no 
difference in intrinsic virulence at all, but the conditions in the human 
population during the two epidemic periods might have affected the 
degree of heterogeneity displayed by viruses possessed of the same 
intrinsic virulence” (1960, 77; emphasis added). 
 
Smith was then commenting on a paper given by Edwin Kilbourne, also a British 
virologist specialist of influenza, who had just argued that the greater virulence of the 
1918 pandemic was due to a combination of “the emergence of a new antigenic type in a 
population with little specific immunity” and “the dislocation of and crowding of wartime 
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which favoured not only dissemination and high dosage of virus but spread of bacterial 
pathogens to an unusual degree” (Kilbourne 1960, 74). In his paper Kilbourne emphasized 
the role of host susceptibility in its environment when measuring the virulence of a 
pandemic and argued that “study of the host and his environment are more crucial to the 
interpretation of virulence than laboratory study of the virus itself” (1960, 71).  
Taking a broad exogenous point of view, Kilbourne had argued that the exceptional 
virulence could not be attributed to the viral structure alone, a widely spread position 
then. Indeed, Macfarlane Burnet, who attended this meeting too, had promoted the 
“ecological point of view” of infectious diseases since the mid-1940s, contributing in the 
formation of a distinctive thought-style. Reductionist attempts to locate virulence within 
specific genes or other mobile elements (i.e. plasmids) were met with scepticism by 
people like Burnet who were particularly interested in large-scale ecological processes 
and in the formation of evolutionary and physiological equilibriums between hosts and 
parasites. For Burnet “there are no virulence genes as such”. For him, virulence is “an 
epiphenomenon of the processes by which the virus survives in Nature in relation to the 
full totality of the environment”. The concept of virulence, finally, can only be clarified by 
“using this ecological approach” (Burnet 1960, 1-2). 
It is noteworthy that these reactions occurred in the 1960s. Ecologically-minded 
biologists like Burnet, Smith and Kilbourne were also reacting against the growing place of 
molecular biology since the 1960s and its characteristic vision of life process and the life 
sciences, as described in chapter 5. This is how we can interpret Edwin Kilbourne’s remark 
that “ironically in this era of molecular biology, the control of no infectious disease has 
yet depended on understanding its molecular mechanisms” (1977, 1228). Similarly, when 
Burnet gave a “tilt” at molecular biology in 1966, he criticized the “dogma” that “there is 
nothing substantial in biological research apart from working out the implications of the 
sequence of nucleotides in DNA” (1966, 37). For him, genes are not the whole story and 
researchers also must consider the ecological context in which host and pathogen’s 
relations develop.  
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EVOLUTIONARY EPIDEMIOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL EXPLANATIONS 
The trade-off model of virulence (chapter 4) was applied by “evolutionary 
epidemiologist” Paul Ewald to the case of the Spanish influenza pandemic. With this label 
Ewald attempted to bring together various disciplines including public health, ecology and 
epidemiology under a broader, more integrative and evolutionary perspective. I first 
describe the trade-off model in general terms before moving on to Ewald’s application of 
it to the case of the 1918 influenza pandemic.  
The development of the trade-off model provided new ways of measuring, predicting 
and, therefore, explaining the evolution of virulence in biological systems. The model 
rests on the idea that virulence cannot increase beyond a certain point without at the 
same time inflicting damage to the host which would, in turn, be harmful to the 
pathogen; there is a trade-off, or a compromise, between virulence and transmissibility. 
The highest possible level of virulence, however, is not always the best (optimal) strategy 
to increase parasite’s transmission, as the host is likely to die in the process. This was very 
much the reasoning behind the conventional wisdom. Yet, in cases where inflicting 
damage actually increases the chances of the parasite to be transmitted to a new host, 
high level of virulence is likely to be selected for (Combes 2010, 128). This model is 
neutral with respect to causes and only relates to observable effects, however. 
This model focuses primarily on pathogen’s population and their evolution, not on 
the host because generation time for hosts (here, humans) is much longer and so 
evolution in the host population is likely to be slow. Another dimension of the model is 
that it does not concern itself with morbidity (at least not explicitly). Thus, symptoms like 
pain or injuries are not taken into account by the trade-off model and are implicitly 
integrated (some would say collapsed) with other variables like host recovery and 
parasite transmission (Levins 1996). This assumption impacts on the ways in which 
virulence will be measured and operationalized. As indicated in chapter 3 virulence tends 
to be measured and defined differently by each discipline. Whereas for doctors morbidity 
(illness) is a key feature of virulence, for evolutionary biologists or population biologists 
host’s pathological factors do not need to be taken into account when measuring 
252 
 
virulence as what matters is host’s reduction in fitness. The trade-off model is often given 
in a mathematical formula as follows (chapter 4): 
 
               ßN 
R0 =     -----------------  
                     α + b + v 
 
Where R0 is the number of infections after a first infection. It serves as a 
measure of Darwinian fitness. What is below the lines are α (virulence), b, 
the rate of microparasite independent-mortality and v is the rate of 
recovery of the host. Those variables are linked. This equation states that 
the measure of Darwinian fitness (R0) is directly proportional to its 
transmissibility, ß, at any host-density population (N) (Levin 1996, 95). 
  
Infection where R0 is less than 1 will rapidly go extinct. In the case of the 1918 
pandemic, calculations suggest that R0 was equal to 2 (Morse 2007, 7314). This model of 
the evolution of virulence does not focus one-sidedly on either the properties of the host 
or the pathogen, but rather on the dynamic relations of these entities at a higher level of 
biological organization: the ecological level. From a trade-off perspective, the evolution 
towards avirulence postulated by Smith and Burnet for example, turns out to be only a 
special case of disease evolution (chapter 3) This newly-opened niche in the study of 
infectious diseases based on epidemiological, mathematical, experimental, and 
evolutionary models led, ten years ago, to the development of “virulence management” 
strategies (Dieckmann et al. 2002), and to the idea of “taming” pathogens by rendering 
them avirulent, for example by interfering with their normal route of transmission (Ewald 
1994; 1990; 1983). The latter was especially advocated by Ewald who founded a discipline 
he baptised evolutionary epidemiology (1988). Paul Ewald has a long-time interest in the 
biology of host-pathogen interactions and their implications for human health and 
disease. He was one of the most prominent critiques of the avirulence hypothesis, and he 
tried to motivate an ecological and evolutionary view of pathogen’s changes in virulence, 
drawing attention to the fact that so far, progress towards understanding the conditions 
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that favoured its exceptional virulence “has largely been limited to improved 
understanding of the genetic mechanisms of antigenic changes and the influences of 
these changes and host immunity on the occurrence of epidemics” (1990, 15). Ewald 
criticized the magnitude of the importance given to the endogenous thought-style.  
His early work on pathogen’s virulence and transmission applied the cost-benefits 
model of the trade-off to waterborne diarrheal diseases (Ewald 1980). His study was 
based on the concept of “cultural vectors” and on the assumption that parasites that do 
not rely on host mobility for transmission should evolve towards higher levels of 
virulence. A cultural vector is defined as “a set of characteristics that allow transmission 
from immobilized hosts to susceptible when at least one of the characteristics is some 
aspects of human cultures” (1994; 68; see also Ewald 1988).  In the case of waterborne 
transmission, cultural vectors include contaminated bed sheets in hospitals, sewage 
system carrying the pathogens, medical staff moving the contaminated water to water 
supplies, and so on. According to the cultural vector hypothesis, waterborne diseases can 
allow to become more virulent because they do not rely on host mobility for transmission 
(see 1994, 69), that is, the host can be isolated and still be highly contagious. In other 
words, a “healthy” host is not needed for transmission (in contrast with what was 
postulated by the avirulence model). For Ewald, acting on the cultural vectors could thus 
indirectly select for reduced virulence – for instance how the installation of mosquito nets 
can alter malarial diseases’ transmission (Ewald 1999). 
 
THE 1918 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC IN THE LIGHT OF THE TRADE-OFF MODEL 
Applying the cultural vector hypothesis to the case of the 1918 pandemic, Ewald 
argued that host proximity was a key element in the exceptional virulence. In his book on 
The Evolution of Infectious Disease (1994) he criticized three hypotheses attempting to 
explain the virulence of the 1918 flu pandemic. These explanations 1) postulates a recent 
entrance of the flu virus into humans; 2) identifies another pathogen as the cause of the 
1918 pandemic; 3) or specifies that virulence results from rapid serial passages in hosts. 
Pointing out limitations to each of these hypotheses, Ewald tried to grasp the problem of 
the evolution of virulence at a more global level. The first hypothesis is given only a short 
shrift by Ewald. This “proximate” explanation attributed to Steven (1981) postulates that 
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deaths occurred not because of the flu virus but because of another strain that struck at 
the same time, namely Hemophilius influenza. In most cases discussed by Steven, 
however, this bacterium is absent.  
The second explanation assumes a recent encounter between the flu virus and 
human populations (Gorman et al. 1991). It is based on a phylogenetic analysis of 
nucleoprotein gene sequences called neuraminidase (NA) in swine, birds and humans, 
and their evolution. The analysis of this paper supports the hypothesis of a common 
ancestor to swine and humans at the beginning of the twentieth century, and this 
ancestor is alleged to have entered the human species just before 1918, thus causing the 
pandemic. However, according to Ewald “there is no evolutionary basis for supposing that 
transmission from swine to humans should be associated with particularly high virulence 
in humans” (1994, 114). On the contrary, he continues, a recent entrance should favour 
lower level of virulence because the immune system should be able to block new 
pathogens attempting to enter our bodies. Ewald defends the hypothesis that the 
immune system should be able to fight back nearly all pathogens without “a history of 
adaptation to humans” (1994, 39). Accordingly, recent entry of avian flu virus’s genetic 
material into humans should, theoretically, have been controlled immunologically. 
Ewald’s argument turns the avirulence hypothesis on its head, as he predicts that recent 
associations will tend to be less virulent than old ones.  
The third explanation he considers stipulates that the exceptionally high virulence 
resulted from rapid passages in soldiers, recruits and wounded people in hospitals during 
the war, an hypothesis supported by both U.S. Office of the Surgeon General and 
microbiologists in the 1930s-1940s (see Burnet and Clark 1942). Yet according to Ewald, 
this explanation also leaves out an essential “evolutionary mechanism”: it is based on the 
analogy with rapid passages of a viral strain through a series of animals (i.e. guinea pigs) 
in laboratory that increase virulence. Again, his argument is based on the cultural vector 
hypothesis. Like biological vectors, cultural vectors enhance virulence by facilitating 
transmission. The key point about the serial passages is that it removes the “requirement 
that hosts be mobile to transmit their infections” (1994, 115). Once this obstacle is lifted 
nothing (a priori) stands in the way of a steep increase in virulence. In laboratory context 
this is achieved artificially by the experimenter who inoculates different animals with 
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artificially selected viral or bacterial strains; in the field, however, this selection process 
resulted from another cultural vector, namely the warfare conditions.  
From a trade-off model perspective, pathogens’ rate of replication within a host (R0) 
is balanced with the probability of its being transmitted to new host (May and Anderson 
1983). If transmission is not easily achievable, levels of virulence are expected to be 
rather low. But if transmission is facilitated, for one reason or another, then high 
replication (and so high virulence) is expected to occur. In the trenches during the Great 
War, conditions were such that transmission was maximized and with it, the observed 
level of virulence. As postulated by the trade-off model, the density of the population (N) 
influences the level of virulence. In this case, the high density resulted from the proximity 
of the soldiers in the trenches. This, in turn, resulted in the unusual situation that 
immobilized individuals who normally should not be able to infect new people (because 
they would be isolated in a hospital), were now easily able to transmit the infections.  
Similarly, removing wounded soldiers from the trenches and transporting them to 
war hospitals facilitated transmission. The constant arrival of new susceptible individuals 
into the population resulted in maintaining a high density of infected people; and as a 
consequence, an equally high level of virulence.149 Thus, for him, looking at broader 
context can better account for this sudden explosion of virulence than other 
(endogenous) kinds of explanation focussing primarily on genes or proteins’ structural 
specificity in the viral strain. By focussing on the specific conditions prevailing during the 
war, Ewald shifts the burden off the molecular determinants of virulence to larger scale 
processes.  
Ewald paints a dramatic picture of the evolution of virulence: unless measures are 
taken to monitor what drives evolutionary changes of virulence, he says, “we will pay the 
price in sickness and death not just until our activities change the environment back to a 
state that favors the benign forms, but rather until the evolutionary change toward 
benignness is complete” (1994, 115). The positive side of Ewald’s argument, however, is 
that granted that similar conditions do not prevail again we should not expect to see 
                                                                
149
 The constant arrival of susceptible individuals is what keeps the epidemic going on, as the epidemiologist 
William Hamer demonstrated in the early decades of the twentieth century using experiments with mice 
(on this see Mendelsohn 1998).  
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another such pandemic (Ibid.). Interestingly, the other two influenza pandemics of the 
twentieth century were not as deadly as the 1918-19 was.  
Ewald’s views on the evolution of virulence did not establish a consensus within the 
scientific community of evolutionary ecologists. One of the problems some detected is 
the overtly narrow view of virulence Ewald defended. Indeed, two reviewers of Ewald’s 
book complained that it was written in a very adaptationist tone – i.e. virulence is 
depicted as being always adaptive for the parasite. As a consequence, “alternatives such 
as virulence being non-adaptive, or virulence being a consequence of short-sighted, 
within-host evolution of the parasite are ignored” (Bull and Levin 1994, 1470). What these 
authors complained about is that virulence is a much more complex trait whose evolution 
can follow different routes, achieving different outcomes. According to evolutionary 
ecologist Dieter Ebert, virulence evolution falls within three broad categories: 1) virulence 
is coincidental, namely it results from a parasite finding itself in an environment in which 
he has not evolved to live in; 2) virulence is a parasite adaptation, i.e., it is parasite-driven, 
the host is too slow to evolve a response to selection. This categories comprises a) 
benefits-of-virulence, b) cost-of-virulence, and c) short-sighted evolution; finally, 3) 
virulence is the result of host-pathogen coevolution (Ebert 1999, 164). As the reviewers 
also pointed out, Ewald’s book lacked mathematical models to support his logical 
argument. Yet, it is possible to articulate his views with the trade-off model, as he himself 
does elsewhere (Ewald 1990).  
Another problem not mentioned by these authors, and possibly more important, is 
the lack of specific details in Ewald’s war explanation of the steep increase in virulence. 
To make his argument stronger Ewald needs more precise descriptions of the 
environmental conditions in the trenches (for instance, how close were the troops? How 
many soldiers were there?) Finally, Ewald has also to face the problem of the pandemic 
(or global) aspect of the Spanish flu: if warfare conditions determined the severity of 
influenza in 1918, why did it become pandemic granted that other parts of the world did 
not experience the same conditions?  
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Although Ewald’s account seems to suffer from a number of theoretical and empirical 
problems, it suggests an important point which is that changes in virulence can only be 
meaningfully understood, managed and therefore prevented, once the environmental 
conditions are specified. His argument is a pledge for greater attention to properties 
other than those of the virus, and without which we will not be able to understand 
changes in virulence. These factors partake to the ecological environment where the 
pandemic is believed to have emerged (in this case, the trenches, hospitals, and so on). 
This style of thinking reflects the idea that epidemiological explanations ought to be 
concerned with the global context in which biomedical phenomena occur and develop 
over time, not with the properties of the pathogens alone. While Ewald does not quote it, 
the work of John Oxford on what I would call the “War Hypothesis” supports and 
reinforces Ewald’s conclusion by feeding in some of the missing details.  
 
THE WAR HYPOTHESIS 
While many would agree that the war is a variable that must be included, in one way 
or another, in the larger explanation of the steep evolution of virulence of the 1918 
pandemic, Ewald is convinced that the influenza pandemic was “caused evolutionarily by 
the war rather than being just coincidental with the war” (1994, 115). Some ten years 
ago, the “War Hypothesis”, as we may call it, received new support from London 
microbiologist John Oxford (2001; Reid et al. 2002; Oxford et al. 2005). Oxford does not 
claim that the Great War caused the disease, evolutionarily or otherwise, but instead that 
the war created the right environment for the virus to become extremely deadly. When 
the 1918 pandemic broke out air travel was minimal and this suggests, according to 
Oxford, that “earlier ‘seeding’ has occurred” (2001, 1857). So far as I can see, Ewald and 
Oxford do not cite each other’s work. And yet, their respective contributions support each 
other by providing what is missing in each of them.  
Taking an environmentally-oriented approach to understanding the evolution of 
virulence, Oxford and his colleagues argued that the 1918 pandemic originated in France 
in 1916 before going global two years later. 150 Studying the sporadic outbreaks of 
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 This research was later criticized in turn by Barry (2004b) who argued that the Spanish influenza 
pandemic originated in Kansas and was taken to Europe by US soldiers in 1918. 
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respiratory infections at British base camp in the town of Etaples in Northern France in 
1916, Oxford argued that the disease’s clinical picture map very precisely onto the 
description of the 1918 influenza: not only were the 1916 respiratory disease extremely 
deadly, but post-mortem examination revealed in most cases clear evidence of 
bronchopneumonia, while histological analyses of lung tissues indicated “acute purulent 
bronchitis” (Oxford 2001, 1857).  
In an article published a few years later in the journal Vaccine, Oxford and his 
colleagues examined the situation one step further.  Asking whether “a particular 
virulence gene of influenza” could be help to identify future pandemics, they concluded 
that surveillance and detection of emerging influenza pandemic will be better served by 
understanding the context that give rise to pandemics, rather than by an analysis of 
genetic factors. In particular, concerning the 1918 pandemic, they noted that so far 
“there is no clear genetic indication of why this virus [the 1918 strain] was so virulent” 
and that they needed closer examination of the environmental and social conditions of 
the time such as “population movements” to explain the exceptional virulence. They 
asked specifically whether “the special circumstances engendered in the war itself have 
allowed or caused the emergence, evolution and spread of a pandemic virus” (Oxford et 
al. 2005, 941). For them, the “unprecedented circumstances” of the war in Europe were 
critical. Back in 1918, the front was  
 
a landscape that was contaminated with respiratory irritants such as 
chlorine and phosgene, and characterized by stress and overcrowding, the 
partial starvation of its civilians, and the opportunity for rapid “passages” 
of influenza in young soldiers would have provided the opportunity for 
small mutational charges throughout the viral genome [...] could have 
been important factors in the evolution of the virus into a particularly 
virulent form (Oxford et al. 2002, 113).  
 
In this quote, the authors bring together the mutations of virus, its rapid passage in 
soldiers, its evolution, and the role of the environment in enhancing virulence. The 
military camp of Etaples was subject to high traffic in 1916-1917. In addition to soldiers 
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moving up to the front and back, 23 0000 sick and injured individuals were in the 
hospitals “at any given time”, making the place overcrowded and allowing the virus 
plenty of opportunities for “rapid passages”. Overall, it is estimated that the region of 
Etaples hosted two millions soldiers who camped there during the war, in addition the six 
millions of others who occupied and fought in the trenches system that connected the 
English Channel with Switzerland (Oxford et al. 2005, 942).  In addition, as the camp had 
an “extensive piggery”, villagers could buy geese, ducks, and chickens, providing ideal 
conditions for the influenza virus to undergo antigenic shift. The extensive use of gases 
during the war (estimated to one hundred ton), some of which mutagenic, rendered the 
soldiers immunocompromised and more susceptible to influenza infections. Finally, 
demobilisation after the war sent soldiers back home by boat or by train, contributing to 
the spread of the disease by person-to-person contact (Oxford et al. 2005).  
 Taken together, these factors (overcrowding, immunocompromised, pig-duck 
farming, demobilisation) provided the conditions for the virus to go pandemic and 
achieve the virulence it did. Ewald had noted that if those circumstances were not 
recreated it is unlikely that such a severe pandemic will dawn again. What Oxford and his 
colleagues emphasized is that appropriate response to future pandemic cannot rest of 
finding genes for virulence alone; one has also to consider the context that will allow the 
virus to spread in a pandemic fashion. 
       
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
Ewald’s argument was developed in the mid-1990s when genomics was not yet the 
current paradigm for understanding health, disease and other biological processes. But 
what if the whole genome of this virus suddenly became available to scientists? Arguably, 
with large genetic and molecular data-sets at hand scientists would be in a better position 
to pinpoint the specific, molecular cause(s) of virulence in influenza pandemics so as to 
provide a full explanation of the pandemic. Nowadays, a renewed and stronger emphasis 
is put again on the molecular constituents of virulence, providing new impetus for 
pursuing the centrality of the endogenous further. Such factors, it is often argued, play a 
more important role in the emergence of disease pandemic and in causing death and 
morbidity worldwide, than environmental processes. Newly developed technology and 
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the availability of pathogenic viral and bacterial material facilitated the development of 
this approach towards explaining infectiousness. Once barely more than a thought 
experiment, this hypothetical scenario has, during the past fifteen years, grown into an 
international research programme, concluded with the publication of the complete 
influenza virus’ genome map in 2005, both in Nature and Science.  
As pointed out above, the viral nature of influenza was finally accepted in 1933; but 
all samples of the 1918 strain were thought to be long extinct and lost. Yet recently, bits 
of RNA of the virus were found and processed in order to generate a complete sequence 
of its genetic structure. After the discovery of frozen individuals killed by the 1918 
pandemic and preserved in permafrost, scientists have been working on the mechanisms 
enabling the influenza virus to achieve unprecedented levels of virulence. This work was 
led by the microbiologists Jeffrey Taubenberger of the National Institutes of Health and 
Terrence Tumpey from the Center for Disease Control, both based in the USA. (These 
teams also received unexpected help from a retired Swedish pathologist).  I now turn to 
this recent technological success, and its eventual failure to pinpoint any particular 
molecular feature of the flu virus of 1918 that could account for its exceptional virulence.  
 
TRACES OF THE SPANISH FLU: FROM (SERO)ARCHEOLOGY TO PCR AMPLIFICATION 
In the early 1950s scientific expeditions were organized to discover the remains of 
victims of the Spanish flu in the hope to find traces of the virus. One of these expeditors 
was a trained pathologist from Sweden who immigrated to Iowa in 1949 named John 
Hultin (1925- ). In 1951 he was preparing his expedition to the North Pole. As part of a 
project funded by the University of Iowa Hultin travelled to a small Inuit village whose 
population was decimated by the 1918 pandemic, killing 70 people in a week which 
amounted to 85 percent of the inhabitants. Hoping to find preserved corpses buried in 
the permafrost hosting traces of the virulent infection, Hultin travelled to the Seward 
Peninsular of Alaska in a village known as Teller Mission (Taubenberger 2003). Digging 
into the cemetery of the village he exhumed lung tissues from several bodies. All 
attempts to culture any remaining traces of the virus of influenza from these samples, 
however, failed to give any result.  
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Hultin moved on and became a successful pathologist. Forty years later, however, in 
the midst of the rise of the Human Genome Project, the idea of resurrecting the virus 
surfaced again. In 1997 a U.S. lab-group based at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 
in Washington (D.C.) led by the molecular pathologist Jeffrey Taubenberger published a 
paper in Science titled “Initial genetic characterization of the 1918 ʻSpanish’ influenza 
virus”. This paper provided a first and partial genetic map of the virus from “archival 
formalin-fixed, paraffin-embedded autopsy tissues of 1918 flu victims” (Taubenberger 
2003, 42). The examined samples were kept at, and provided by, the National Tissue 
Repository of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. As several mutations in 
hemagglutinin, especially on cleavage-sites, often contribute to the virulence (e.g. Hong 
Kong pandemic in 1968), it was hoped that the genetic make-up of the virus would 
disclose the secret of the exceptional virulence of 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic. The 
goal of the project was to characterize how the virus spread from birds to human, but 
also to understand the mechanism(s) of virulence. As stated by Taubenberger, their aim 
was to “first, to discover where the 1918 influenza came from, and how it got into people, 
and second, whether there were any genetic features of the sequence that would give 
insight into the exceptional virulence of the strain” (2003, 44).  
 
GENETIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE 1918 “SPANISH” INFLUENZA VIRUS 
This first publication describes the technique used to obtain, amplify (PCR), and 
sequence the genetic material. The main finding of this paper is the confirmation, through 
molecular phylogenetic analyses of gene segments, that the 1918 pandemic was caused 
by a strain of H1N1 influenza virus, supporting the hypothesis of an avian origin of the 
virus spreading first to humans and then swine in the fall of 1918 (1997, 1795). In their 
first article, Taubenberger randomly selected 28 cases or paraffin-embedded tissues 
collected from army servicemen who died during the 1918 pandemic for pathological 
review, searching for symptoms indicative of death by influenza. Most of the individuals 
examined died of secondary pulmonary infection, however, a common feature of victims 
of the 1918 pandemic. As we have seen, Shope demonstrated how bacterial infection 
works together with the influenza virus in delineating the clinical picture of the disease. 
One case, though (1918 case1), could be linked to viral pneumonia. This one case 
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exhibited symptoms of acute pneumonia in the left lung combined with an acute form of 
brochiolitis in the right lung. This lung pathological characteristic was typical of a “primary 
viral pneumonia”.  
Focussing on case1 researchers performed control amplification of reverse-
transcribed genetics of the nine gene fragments of the 1918 virus using the technique of 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR). They then carried out phylogenetic analyses based on 
the gene sequences to reconstruct the genealogical relationships between these 
elements. It was concluded that the genetic sequence of this strain was different from 
every other influenza strain, and that it was more closely related to strain in birds than in 
mammals. This partial analysis of the genetic map of human influenza was soon followed 
by a complete sequencing operation of the hemagglutinin gene (HA) – a gene long 
believed to be “pivotal” in the pathogenicity of influenza A viruses (Webster 1987; see 
also Cox and Bender 1995). This gene codes for a protein situated on the surface of the 
virus that plays a crucial role in allowing the virus to bind to host’s cells. If the virus is able 
to spread to another species this means it has somehow (through antigenic drift) acquired 
a new protein that enables it to bind on a different receptor.  
 
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE 1918 INFLUENZA VIRUS HEMAGGLUTININ GENE 
In 1999, the team published another article on the “Origin and evolution of the 1918 
“Spanish” influenza virus hemagglutinin gene”. Among the authors of the study– including 
Ann Reid and Jeffrey Taubenberger – is Johan Hultin, the pathologist who attempted to 
find traces of the influenza virus in Alaska in the early 1950s. After having read the 1997 
Science paper, Hultin wrote a letter to Taubenberger offering to go back to Brevig Mission 
in Alaska to look for fresh samples of people who died of the flu (Taubenberger 2003, 43). 
At the same time, another mission in the North Pole was underway. It was led by Kirsty 
Duncan, a geographer at University of Winsdor in Canada. Their goal was to uncover 
bodies buried in a mine in an island off Norway in the Polar Circle. The mission however 
planned in advance and well-funded, was largely unsuccessful. The ground in which the 
miners were buried was unlikely to yield any significant result given that it had thawed 
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and later refrozen, leaving scientists no hope to recover the virus “alive”, or in a condition 
suitable for future culture. 151 
Against all odds, Hultin was successful this time. After he received the approval of 
Taubenberger he set out to Alaska for a second time and there he found in situ frozen 
lung biopsies in August 1997. Once in the village, he was granted permission from the 
council to dig the graveyard again and with the help of a few villagers he unearthed the 
body of a thirty years old woman after four days of work. He called her “Lucy”. Opening 
up her chest he found two frozen lungs which he rapidly sent to Taubenberger’s 
laboratory in Washington, along with some tissues taken from three other frozen corpses.  
In the (1999) paper Reid et al. reported about the full sequence of the hemagglutinin 
gene using RNA fragments from case1 discussed in the first article. They investigated 
three cases histories to find evidence of influenza RNA. The first one was a 21 year-old 
man who died at Fort Jackson in South Carolina. The pathological records indicate he had 
pneumonia and influenza symptoms. He was admitted to the camp hospitals on 
September twentieth 1918 and died within 6 days. The autopsy records also indicate that 
his left lung showed he suffered from an acute and fatal attack of pneumonia, whereas 
his right one showed acute bronchiolitis and alveolitis – a clear sign, as mentioned above, 
of influenza infection. No RNA was found in the left lung. However, the team performed a 
minute microscopic analysis on the paraffin-embedded tissue of the right lung and 
discovered that the tissues tested positive for influenza RNA. The fragments of five genes 
(about 150 nucleotides long) were sequenced, amplified thtrough PCR and determined.   
The second case was also a male soldier. He was 30 years old and was based at Camp 
Upton in the State of New York. He was admitted with pneumonia and died within 3 days 
on the 23 of September 1918. Microscopic examination of his lungs by Taubenberger 
revealed acute pulmonary oedema and acute bronchopneumonia. Again, formalin-fiexed, 
paraffin-embedded samples of lung tissues tested positive for influenza RNA, the 
sequence of which were also no longer than 150 nucleotides.  
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 This piece of information is taken from an article “The virus detective” published by the San Francisco 
Gate, Sunday, February 17
th
, 2002. 
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The third case history was the one found by Hultin in Brevig Mission, Alaska. With the 
help of the villagers Hultin had exhumed the bodies of four victims of the influenza 
pandemic of 1918. To preserve the tissues, the biopsies collected in situ were placed in 
“formalin, alcohol fixatives, and RNAzol” (Reid et al. 1999, 1652). All tissues displayed 
clear signs of acute form of pulmonary haemorrhage and oedema. Only one of the cases, 
the female subject, “Lucy”, was positive to influenza RNA, however. Using the sequences 
of these three case-histories the Washington-based team worked out the genealogical 
relationships between them. Their analysis concludes that the avian virus that caused the 
pandemic entered human populations between 1900 and 1915, following the 
modification of the binding site on the HA protein. In 2005 Taubenberger and Tumpey 
published two separate articles in Nature and Science. The first one provided the 
complete genomic sequence of the 1918 influenza virus and the second one revealed the 
methods used to artificially reconstruct it. Yet, even before the complete genetic map 
became available, it became unclear whether the genes of the virus had disclosed the 
reasons of its exceptional virulence.  
 
THE MISSING MUTATION: THE LIMITS OF GENOMIC ANALYSES 
The Washington team reported that a cleavage-site mutation that plays a crucial role 
in the virulence of the Hong Kong pandemic in 1968 was not found in the strain obtained 
from the South Carolina case. Sequencing the cleavage site in the RNA of the virus 
obtained from the Brevig mission case and New York case also confirms that this 
mutation was absent. Inquiring into this mutation site (hemagglutinin) understood as a 
key determinant of virulence was a central motivation of Taubenberger. In effect, “it 
would have, as Taubenberger wrote, “offered an appealing explanation of the 1918’s flu 
virulence”. However, he concludes, “the 1918 strain (as confirmed by all three cases) does 
not possess a mutation at this site” (2003, 45; Reid et al. 1999). The (1999) paper ends 
elusively with some remarks about the complex, likely polygenic nature of what 
determines the virulence of a particular strain – and with the hope that more sequencing 
would “shed additional light on the nature of the 1918 influenza virus” (1999, 1656). In 
other words, the secrets of the Spanish influenza “remain elusive” as the virologist Robert 
Webster (1999) wrote in his commentary of the article. Webster commented that such 
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“biological properties” [i.e. virulence] may “not be resolved”. Furthermore, he suggested 
that the hype of the genome sequencing enterprise can only provides a partial 
explanation of this phenomenon. For Webster, “the entire gene sequence is unlikely to 
reveal the secret of the high pathogenicity of the 1918 Spanish virus” (1999, 1165). 
Another molecular explanation of the Spanish flu pandemic emerged in 1998 from 
another research team. Goto and Kawaoka, in the Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Science, published a paper on a “novel mechanism for the acquisition of virulence by a 
human influenza A virus”. They argue that a change in another protein – neuraminidase – 
able to increase the cleavage of HA can bring about higher levels of virulence. In fact, they 
even suggest that a change in a single amino-acid sequestering plasminogen may 
facilitate HA cleavage. The authors are careful, however, stating that they “do not 
conclude that single mutation will convert nonplasminogen-binding NAs to efficient 
plasminogen binders, thus rendering the virus highly virulent” (1998, 10228). Yet, they 
confess that it is “tempting to speculate that the 1918 pandemic strain [...] may have 
acquired its unprecedented virulence from the mechanism we describe” (Ibid).  
But as Taubenberger pointed out, such a change in amino-acid was not present (or at 
least not observed) in the 1918 neuraminidase sequence – a similar conclusion his own 
team reached the same year (2003, 45; 1988). Taubenberger and Tumpey, however, 
acknowledged the lack of evidence provided by the molecular structure of the virus:  
 
Sequence analysis of the 1918 influenza virus from fixed and frozen lung 
tissue has provided molecular characterization and phylogenetic analysis 
of this strain. The complete coding sequence of the 1918 nonstructural 
(NS), hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), and matrix (M) genes have 
been determined; however, the sequences of these genes did not reveal 
features that could account for its high virulence” (Tumpey et al. 2004; 
emphasis added).  
 
Yet there is something special about the HA protein that contributes to enhanced 
virulence: using a mouse model, another team of molecular pathologists (Kobasa et al. 
2004) showed that when the HA protein taken from a 1918 viral strain was inserted into 
mice it confers high pathogenicity and facilitates lung infections. Infected mice show 39, 
000 times more virus particles after infection with the 1918 strain than with other viral 
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strains like Texas virus. Moreover, all infected mice died after 6 days following infection 
with 1918 strain, while all survived when infected with the Texas virus (von Bubnoff 2005, 
794). The particular structure of the protein responsible for such pathological effect 
remains to be found, however.  
To sum up, the two most important glycoproteins allowing viruses to invade host’s 
tissues – hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) – are significant molecular 
determinants of the virulence of influenza pandemics in 1957 and 1968. Considerable 
explanatory power was placed on these special proteins that seemed to provide a 
firsthand, adequate, simple and elegant mechanism to account for the exceptional 
virulence of the 1918 pandemic. Indeed, the “most popular theory” was that the 1918 
virus had “unique pathogenic properties, most likely encoded within the hemagglutinin 
protein” (Holmes 2004). In addition, it was firmly believed that identifying molecular and 
genetic basis of virulence could not only provide a window into the most devastating 
epidemic of modern times, but also help to prevent and predict those to come. Overall, 
the remarkable technological success – i.e. the retrieving and sequencing of the 1918 
avian virus – promised nothing less than unlocking one of the oldest, well-kept secrets in 
the whole medical history. After sequencing the genome of the 1918 viral strain that 
killed perhaps up to forty million people, both factors were found to be lacking in the 
killer strain, however.  
 
THE TWO SIDES OF DARWINIAN EXPLANATIONS: COMMON DESCENT AND NATURAL 
SELECTION 
It would be misleading to conclude that his work is not informed by evolutionary 
thinking. In effect, Taubenberger’s team provided the first molecular characterisation of 
the genealogical tree of the Spanish flu virus – a Darwinian piece of work in some of its 
most orthodox aspects. But what kind of Darwinian thinking is this? Building on Michel 
Morange’s analyses I would like to suggest that there are two (compatible but separated) 
features of Darwinism at work in the research of Taubenberger and Ewald – and more 
generally in the fields of molecular pathology and evolutionary ecology where the focus is 
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on the concept of virulence.152 This divide between aspects of Darwinian thinking also 
reflects the larger divide between styles of reasoning.  
Michael Ruse (1992) has long pointed out that the term “Darwinism” carries two 
broad meanings. It can be used firstly in a metaphysical sense to characterize change, 
development and transformation in the natural world. In this sense, the concept of 
Darwinism is older than Darwin himself. This first interpretation is not immediately 
relevant for the present discussion. Another sense of Darwinism is important to 
acknowledge, however. In this second sense, Darwinism is a scientific notion that comes 
out directly of the work of Darwin and it can refer to the fact of evolution, the paths 
(phylogenies) of evolution, and the mechanism (natural selection) of evolution (1992, 77; 
Ayala 1985).  
According to this second interpretation, the work of Taubenberger, on the one hand, 
and that of Ewald and Oxford, on the other, falls on different side. While both accept 
evolution as a fact, the former is interested in the “path” of evolution, while the later 
focuses on the “mechanism” of evolution. As described above, the research of 
Taubenberger focuses on precise and minute description of the small steps that allows 
viruses to infect more than one species; this work focuses especially on tracking the 
changes in nucleotides and charting the genealogical relationships between the strains of 
influenza. Ewald, in contrast, takes a broader view and asks why those mutations were 
selected, what were the selective pressures that drove them to be passed on and 
conserved in the gene pool, and especially, what is the role of the milieu, largely 
understood, in shaping virulence. Living forms and their milieu being indivisible, 
understanding one requires understanding the other as well. These two approaches 
correspond to two different ways of introducing evolutionary questioning into functional 
biology (Morange 2010, 114).  
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 What Morange (2011) characterises as two possible definitions of Darwinism is firstly, the one centered 
on natural selection on small variations as the central force in the evolution of populations; the other, 
broader approach to Darwinism also includes epigenetic mechanisms, constraints, lateral gene transfer and 
symbiosis as important key evolutionary mechanisms. The contrast I have in mind is rather between 
describing small variations and explaining their adaptive advantage by identifying a mechanism (i.e. natural 
selection).  
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To put it differently, although the centrality of the concept of natural selection is not 
in dispute, the ways in which Taubenberger and Ewald (and other evolutionary ecologists) 
understand these processes differs significantly on one important point: whereas the 
former describes the small incremental steps leading to the high, observable level of 
virulence, the latter is “more ambitious” (Morange 2010, 114) and looks for a plausible, 
eventually testable evolutionary scenario leading to the accumulation and conservation 
of these small, gradual changes. In other words, the second approach seeks not only to 
describe organic changes leading to the formation of new viral strains, for example, but 
also attempts to give an account of the adaptive value of these transformations in the 
particular milieu in which the microorganisms lived, reproduced and eventually, died.  
These two faces of evolution are well known in the history of biology. According to 
Mayr this dichotomy was still very common in the 1960s “Even today, Mayr wrote “there 
still are some zoologists to whom the term “evolution” signifies little more than a 
determination of homology, common ancestors, and phylogenetic trees”. However, he 
agreed that “by far the majority of evolutionary biologists” [...] “have shifted their 
interests to a study of causes and mechanisms of evolutionary change and to an attempt 
to determine the role and relative importance of various factors” (1965). Generating 
molecular phylogenies is not doubt useful but it should not lead one to neglect 
environmental causes at once. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter I explored the history of the ancient and modern concept of emerging 
disease which was then applied to the example of the Spanish influenza pandemic. I 
argued that although the concept provided a platform to rethink the threats posed by 
infectious diseases in the mid-1990s, bringing together two distinct styles of reasoning to 
bear on the problem – the molecular and the ecological – genuine articulation of different 
explanatory frameworks remain marginal.  
In the face of the lack of evidence supporting a molecular mechanism of virulence, 
and in the light of the limitations of environmental-evolutionary explanations, however, 
one could expect researchers to seek support in each other’s work in order to 
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complement their researches, and moving beyond the epistemic limitations of their own 
disciplinary boundaries. Yet it is striking to note that Reid, Taubenberger et al. (1999), on 
the one hand, and Goto and Kawaoka (1998), on the other, reached a conclusion 
diametrically opposed to that of Webster (and Oxford as well): in order to explain better 
(if at all) the influenza pandemic, more sequencing is needed. Instead of considering 
other possible explanations of the exceptional virulence (i.e. ecological explanations) they 
persist in their attempt to provide a complete explanation within a single explanatory 
framework. Obviously, though, the research programme developed by Taubenberger, 
Tumpey and others could not be ended too soon, especially after gathering immense 
publicity and funding, even though it failed to provide the specific answers the research 
team was looking for. Their results and methods now enable world-wide researchers to 
understand the molecular differences between various influenza trains and have led to 
some interesting results. In fact, it is expected that these scientists will keep working 
within their “thought-style” until all possibilities of finding the key to the exceptional 
virulence have been looked at and examined in every detail. From this point of view their 
persistence in finding a molecular magic bullet makes perfect sense, although from a 
public health and biosecurity point of view, their research raises important ethical 
questions (Aken 2006). The next chapter will examine some of these issues in the light of 
dual-use technologies in the life sciences such as the ones that permitted the re-creation 
of the influenza viruses and other deadly pathogens.  
The divide between the two styles of reasoning is not yet fully resolved despite the 
role of the concept of emerging disease in bring both molecular and ecological 
perspectives on infection together. However, molecular pathologists sometimes try to 
integrate a more environmental perspective, with the result that evolutionary ecologists 
and molecular pathologists sometimes talk at cross purposes. For example, in one of the 
last publications of Taubenberger and his colleagues, the authors conclude that the 
diminution of severity of influenza pandemics over time “is surely due in part to advances 
in medicine and public health, but it may also reflect viral evolutionary choices that favors 
optimal transmissibility with minimal pathogenicity - a virus that kills its host too fast or 
sends them to bed is not optimally transmissible” (Morens, Taubenberger, Fauci, 2009, 
229; emphasis added). This statement is tantamount to saying that the biological 
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interests of the virus will be best served by evolving lower virulence over time in order to 
facilitate transmission to new hosts, an explanation that rests on the avirulence model 
(chapter 4). This is all the most surprising given that Anthony Fauci, on the authors, has 
long criticized this view (see Fauci 2005). We have seen why and how the new perspective 
on the evolution of infectious diseases challenges this core principle. According to the 
trade-off model infectious diseases that can infect people even when the host is immobile 
are likely to become more virulent over time (Ewald 1983). On the trade-off model the 
optimality of transmission is balanced with the optimal level of virulence that can possibly 
be achieved without paying too high a cost. Yet, if conditions are such that transmission is 
facilitated and does not depend on a healthy host moving around, then the levels of 
virulence are expected to rise significantly. This is the “evolutionary mechanism” that 
transformed an influenza epidemic into a world pandemic, at least according to Paul 
Ewald (1994).  
What looks as a sign of determination in science can also reflect a lack of 
communication between distinct scientific communities (if not an outright refusal to see 
how other kinds of explanation can be put into play), and more broadly reflect the 
problems of interdisciplinarity. This situation may be due to the fact that functional 
explanations such as those constructed in molecular biology tend to appear “self-
sufficient”, as Michel Morange recently put it (2011). This epistemological obstacle means 
that, for many, there is no need to complement molecular explanations with ecological 
considerations. The past 15 years of research in microbiology and many areas of the life 
sciences, indeed, seem characterized by a “deluge” of analyses of the molecular 
constituents of virulence, following the rise of bacterial pathogenomics (Pallen and Wren 
2007), and the launching of the Influenza Genome Sequencing Project. This project is 
hosted by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases where Taubenberger is 
now head of the pathogenesis and evolution section in the Laboratory of Infectious 
Diseases.  
But there is another, fast-growing approach to virulence which has developed since 
the 1970s in the wake of the AIDS pandemic and the end of optimism regarding the 
decline in infectious diseases. This ecologically-oriented trend developed the trade-off 
model and indicated the influence played by environmental changes broadly conceived 
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and other factors on the level of virulence. A recent article has underlined the divide 
between finding biological mechanisms for virulence and the selective pressures that led 
to their conservation and transmission, pointing out that “each of these topics is generally 
discussed with little consideration for the other” (Brown et al. 2006). Thus existing, 
complementary explanations of the exceptional virulence of the 1918 strain, are out 
there but the architect of the resurrection of the Spanish flu project remain somehow 
blind to them. Branches of sciences can sometimes be surprisingly disconnected, 
separated by epistemic gaps, professional or institutional barriers. It is plain that the bulk 
of the research on influenza nowadays is done on the molecular side. But can virulent 
factors alone provide a genuinely comprehensive explanation of the 1918 pandemic and 
the others that occurred during the twentieth century? Can the discoveries of (a few) 
point mutations in the virus’ genetic code also explain why they were selected and why 
the virus spread so fast across the globe? As experimental evolutionary biologist Richard 
Lenski nicely put it, “mutations alone cannot drive epidemics”. Indeed, “the necessary 
genetic variability of the pathogen must exist and so must the appropriate selective 
conditions for the spread of hypervirulent mutants” (1988, 73). To go back to Grmek once 
more, “certainly no one can explain the origin of an epidemic of an infectious nature 
without beginning to take into consideration the biological properties of the infectious 
agent. But that is only one step along a path that leads to a full historical comprehension” 
(1990, 156).  
One might want to ask how generalizable the analysis provided here is. The following 
quote is taken from a research on Yersinia pestis, the pathogen that causes plague or the 
Black Death in the fourteenth century. After sequencing and reconstructing the plague 
virus, the authors of the study came to a similar conclusion as Taubenberger regarding 
the gene-only explanation of changes in virulence over time.  
 
Regardless, although no extant Y. pestis strain possesses the same genetic 
profile as our ancient organism, our data suggest that few changes in 
known virulence-associated genes have accrued in the organism’s 660 
years of evolution as a human pathogen, further suggesting that its 
perceived increased virulence in history may not be due to novel fixed point 
mutations detectable via the analytical approach described here. At our 
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current resolution, we posit that molecular changes in pathogens are but 
one component of a constellation of factors contributing to changing 
infectious disease prevalence and severity, where genetics of the host 
population, climate, vector dynamics, social conditions and synergistic 
interactions with concurrent diseases should be foremost in discussions of 
population susceptibility to infectious disease and host–pathogen 
relationships with reference to Y. pestis infections (Bos et al. 2011; 
emphasis added). 
 
The authors of this article indicate that a molecular approach provides an incomplete 
picture when applied in isolation, and that a complementary ecological perspective is 
needed. Indeed, the study did not reveal any significant genetic or evolutionary change in 
600 years that could explain the virulence of plague in the fourteenth century. 
Furthermore, the conclusion of the study emphasizes precisely the point of this chapter, 
namely that a full understanding of the evolution of virulence in infectious diseases 
requires a multi-dimensional approach that address host’s resistance, ecological 
environment, and in the case of emerging diseases the interactions between the different 
diseases in a well-defined geographical area over a given time period.153   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
153
 The remark about the “synergistic interactions with concurrent diseases” calls for a renewed attention to 
the concept of pathocenosis as defined by Grmek in 1969.  
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CHAPTER 7: RECONSTRUCTING VIRUSES, CREATING DISEASES: SOCIAL AND 
ETHICAL ISSUES IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, GENOMICS, AND SYNTHETIC 
GENOMICS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This final and shorter chapter purports to explore some aspects of the social and 
ethical issues that arose during the reconstruction of the 1918 viral strain, particularly in 
the context of genomics and synthetic biology, but also in relation to the scope and 
meaning of the concept of emerging diseases more generally.  
In the early 1990s, both the U.S. Institute of Medicine report on Microbial Threats 
(Lederberg, Shope, and Oaks 1992) and Emerging Viruses (Morse 1993) stressed how 
emerging infectious diseases are posing a renewed threat to public health that needs to 
be addressed on a global scale, from the combined perspective of ecological and 
molecular approaches. At the same time infectious diseases were being rebranded as 
“emerging” they were related to questions of biosecurity. In other words, the discourse 
on emerging diseases was parallel to U.S. discourse on homeland security. Indeed, the 
IOM report (1992, v) was itself framed as a defensive document, proposing solutions to 
protect the U.S. citizens from the threat of emerging diseases – a threat seen as coming 
mostly from the South with the potential to infect the North. In fact, the problem of 
emerging diseases and biosecurity was being dealt with by the exact same two men who 
headed the influential report and the conference on emerging viruses – Lederberg and 
Morse – leading, as it were, to a reconceptualization of emerging disease in warfare 
terms. It is not surprising as, for many years before the writing of the the IOM report, 
Lederberg was science policy adviser to the U.S. government and also advised the NASA 
on questions of exobiology. Lederberg regarded emerging diseases and bioweapons as 
two domains where the operations of “containment” and “detection through 
surveillance” are necessary. Morse, on the other hand, was program manager in the U.S. 
Department of Defense at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Issues of 
emerging infections were thus from the very beginning intertwined with questions of 
gloabal biosecurity (Weir and Mykhalovski 2010, 38). 
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The concept of emerging diseases has focalized international efforts to contain 
infectious diseases within well-defined geographical and temporal limitations. Emerging 
diseases, understood as those whose incidence had increased in the past two decades, 
had to be kept outside the U.S. frontiers (Lederberg, Shope, and Oaks 1992). It is thus 
unsurprising that when the concept of emerging disease came about in the scientific and 
political spheres in the mid-1990s, starting in the U.S. and Canada before migrating 
overseas and reaching the World Health Organization a few years later, it was 
immediately linked to questions of homeland and global biosecurity. The question was: in 
a world where “diseases know no border”, how best to prevent communicable diseases 
from invading other countries? How can they be contained and controlled within specific 
geo-political borders in a world where ecological interconnectedness, thanks to global 
travel, reigns? 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW FORM OF BIOLOGICAL THREAT 
With the (re)creation of the Spanish influenza strain and a few others (e.g. Yersinia 
pestis, polio virus, Fouchier’s H5N1), a different form of biological threat arises, however, 
one that requires different political, institutional, and legal response mechanisms. In a 
word, while the threat of emerging infections was mostly perceived as coming from 
outside Northern-hemisphere countries, it now appears to be growing from within the 
heartland of Western countries itself. Instead of stressing possible disease invasions in 
previously unexposed countries (or with only low incidence of a particular disease), 
recently developed technologies in synthetic biology and genomics science have opened-
up the possibility to artificially create new disease, or to resurrect old ones such as the 
plague, the influenza strain responsible for the 1918 pandemic, and the polio virus (Bos et 
al. 2011; Taubenberger et al. 2005; Tumpey et al. 2005; Cello, Paul, and Wimmer 2002). 
This change in the nature of threat generated concerns regarding the desirability (and 
indeed, the feasibility) of disease eradication as both a desirable and worthy goal of 
public health medicine (Caplan 2009). 
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The combination of chemical analysis of genetic material and computer sciences 
allowed scientists to redesign the genome of some organisms like viruses, an approach 
often referred to as “synthetic genomics”. 154 Since 2002, scientists have demonstrated 
that it is technologically feasible to artificially synthesize a pathogen (e.g. poliovirus) using 
biochemical and in vitro procedures, by “solely following instruction from a written 
sequence” (Cello, Paul and Wimmer 2002, 1). With the development of synthetic 
genomics, researchers do not need sophisticated recombinant genetic technology 
anymore to recreate viruses or other pathogens in laboratory; they are free to pursue 
their research goals “without being bogged down in the underlying molecular 
manipulations” (Garfinkel, Endy, Epsin, and Friedman 2007, 7). However, this new 
technology raises serious concerns regarding the very real possibility “to generate Select 
Agents de novo” (NSABB Report 2006, 2). As Ian Ramshaw – on of the scientists involved 
in the mousepox experience in Australia (Jackson et al. 2001) – once summarized “you 
can send an e-mail stipulating the sequence you want synthesized. The DNA sequence 
comes back. You put it in a small plasmid and if it is a human pathogen, you inject it into a 
human and it makes the virus” (quoted in Selgelid and Weir 2009, 23). [See figure 7 
below]. Emerging diseases can thus be fabricated. However we understand the nature of 
these new technological possibilities they impact on how governmental institutions and 
public health international organizations like the WHO can (and should) respond to the 
threat posed by the life sciences today.   
Bringing old (and new) diseases back to life not only raises additional concerns for 
public health and biosecurity but also calls into question existing definitions and 
understanding of the concept of emerging infections itself. This possibility also challenges 
the possibility of establishing a list of select agents on the basis of their genetic sequence 
(because they can be modified). In his original article on the concept, in which he 
distinguished five historical situations where a disease can be classified as emergent, 
Mirko Grmek (1993) carefully added a sub-category that is now gaining currency: 
                                                                
154
 The field of “synthetic genomics” is defined as a combination of various experimental practices and 
methods to chemically analyze DNA with computer modeling that permits to redesign the DNA sequences. 
Synthetic genomics thus “could be used to introduce a cumulative series of changes that dramatically alter 
an organism’s function, or to construct very long strand of genetic material that could serve as the entire 
genome of a virus or, some time in the near future, even of more complex organisms such as bacteria” 
(Garfinkel, Endy, Epsin, and Friedman 2007, 7).   
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artificially or manmade emerging diseases resulting from dual-use technologies. 
According to Grmek, the category of wholly new diseases, in the strong sense of the 
word, includes the adaptive transformation of germs from saprophyte or commensal 
organisms into harmful parasitism, and important environmental changes. Grmek added 
further, however, that  
 
We could envisage the theoretical possibility of an artificially produced 
disease emerging either as the result of an intended action (for instance, in 
view of biological warfare), or as an undesirable accident that occurred in 
the course of biotechnological manipulations. This would be a sub-
category of the larger category of absolutely new diseases (1993, 285; 
emphasis added).    
 
In the last decade, the possibility of engineering disease from scratch has become a 
pressing social and political issue and is no longer just a “theoretical possibility”. In effect, 
during the past ten years virologists and microbiologists provided strong evidence that 
with genomic sequences of a number of extinct diseases scientists could bring those 
diseases back to life, so to speak, and that wholly new virulent ones could be artificially 
created as well, like in Fouchier’s experiment with influenza viruses. The additional 
category of emergence suggested by Grmek twenty years ago is useful because it 
highlights the need to readjust our definition(s) of the concept of emerging diseases (or 
emerging infections) to include man-made diseases. Furthermore, it re-emphasizes the 
potentia dimension of the concept. Finally, this perspective on the possibility to create 
emerging diseases calls for the development of more appropriate governance responses 
to this new form of biological threat. By re-aligning the active concept of emerging 
disease with those issues we may hope that the international organizations will respond 
promptly as they did fifteen years ago when they economically and politically rebranded 
the category of communicable diseases as emerging infections.  
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RINGING THE ALARM: MOUSEPOX, POLIO, SMALLPOX, AND THE 1918 INFLUENZA STRAIN 
Prior to 2005, three articles gathered a fair bit of scientific, political, and public 
attention because they generated controversy over the highly sensitive nature of the 
reported findings and their possible consequences for public health and for biosecurity: 
these articles had potential for what is now called “dual-use research” (Selgelid 2009). 
The first one, published in 2001 in The Journal of Virology, reports how a team of 
researchers constructed an extremely lethal poxvirus in mice. Inserting the gene for 
interleukin-4 (Il4) into the mousepox virus using genetic engineering techniques, 
researchers were hoping to develop a way to control the pest in Australia by making the 
mice infertile.155 To their own surprise, however, the Australian team discovered that the 
virus was not only lethal to naturally resistant mice but also to previously vaccinated ones 
(Jackson et al. 2001). In other words, they had accidentally fabricated a virulent disease 
able to overcome vaccinated and naturally-resistant mice. Immunological protection 
granted by vaccination is thus undermined by the possibility of creating viruses capable to 
infect and cause disease in previously vaccinated or immune organisms. A similar 
technique could technically permit the development of hypervirulent strains of smallpox 
(for which there is no treatment) and cricumvent vaccination which so far is the sole line 
of defense against it (Selgelid 2003).  
The second article, published a year later in Science (Cello, Paul, and Wimmer 2002), 
concerns the chemical synthesis of the polio virus in the absence of any natural viral 
sample. The research was carried out at the State University of New York at Stony 
Brookes where the team chemically reconstructed a DNA sequence by assembling 
oligonucleotides and following the instruction of the DNA sequence of the virus that was 
available on the internet, thanks to prior sequencing and mapping of its genome. This 
artificially-made DNA strand was then inserted into a living cell where RNA polymerase 
transcribed the cDNA sequence. The DNA sequence further started to replicate itself, 
resulting in a virulent phenotype typical of polio virus. This cascade of in vivo and in vitro 
macromolecular events was possible without researchers using any viral material. 
Researchers claimed to have accomplished this achievement “to send a warning that 
                                                                
155
 Ronald Jackson, the principal investigator, was in the late 1980s on a project aiming at enhancing 
myxomatosis. 
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terrorists might be able to make biological weapons without obtaining a natural virus” 
(Pollack 2002, in Selgelid 2009, 721). This experiment, however, raises question regarding 
the polio vaccination campaigns aimed at eradicating the disease. While the number of 
vaccinated people globally increases thanks to international efforts, the disease cannot in 
principle be totally eradicated because it could eventually be re-generated anew, and re-
emerge. A recent U.S. report titled Sequence-Based Classification for Select Agents: a 
Brighter Line, led by microbiologist Stanley Falkow, arrived at the same conclusion, 
namely that “it is possible that no virus (or microorganism) can ever be considered extinct 
[…] as long as basic sequence information is available to support its synthetic 
reconstruction” (2010, 66). As a consequence if polio is one day declared eradicated, 
governmental and public health efforts to control or prevent it (e.g. vaccination) would 
nevertheless have to continue in case of artificial re-emergence.  
Finally, the third article (Rosengard, Liu, Nie, and Jimenez 2002) deals with smallpox, 
the only successfully eradicated human disease in 1977. Nowadays, in vivo experiments 
with variola, the organism that causes smallpox, are forbidden by international law, and 
samples of the disease are well kept by both U.S. and Russian governments although it is 
likely that other governments have since learned how to cultivate the organism (Selgelid 
2003). WHO also bans DNA recombination studies between variola and other pox viruses. 
However, scientists report in this article on how they successfully engineered a variola 
protein which is a crucial virulence factor in the overall pathogenesis mechanism of 
smallpox. More precisely, they “molecularly engineered” the “smallpox inhibitor of 
complement enzymes” – or SPICE – and demonstrated the links between this protein and 
the specificity of smallpox to human tropism. In brief, even if smallpox is eradicated it 
remains possible to recreate the proteins that contributed to make it so deadly. The 
authors emphasized that this research is crucial for public health purposes as disabling 
SPICE protein mechanism could be a fruitful way to treat smallpox.  
As a consequence of these new experimental possibilities, however, the perceived 
biosecurity threat of emerging diseases – once understood mainly as the result of the 
introduction of a new select agent in a population, a newly detected, but already existing 
microbe, or as an important change in the environment (Lederberg, Shope, Oaks, 1992, 
34) – should be re-worked to include the artificial creation of pathogenic agents, as 
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Grmek already suggested nearly twenty years ago. This new form of biological threat 
results from combining the tools of synthetic biology and genomics science. Both 
approaches, indeed, are crucial to firstly identify and sequence the particular genes 
responsible for the virulence of the disease inside the pathogen’s genome (genomics), 
and secondly to synthetically recreate and complete the (often incomplete) genetic 
sequence of the virus in laboratory (synthetic biology). Charles Nicolle once commented 
that “no scientist can today pretend to have created a wholly new disease from scratch” 
(Nicolle 1930, 122). This view is now on the verge of being challenged on both theoretical 
and practical grounds, as the 2006 report of the NSABB indicates, throwing into disarray 
the current legislation system to control the production and proliferation of dangerous 
pathogens.  
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Fig. 7. Process for Deriving Select Agents De Novo Using Mail-Ordered DNA. The relevant 
sequence is first identified by the research team and is then ordered to a provider who 
will synthesize it. One the select agent is reconstructed it is sent back to the research 
team who can culture it (From NSABB 2006, 19). 
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In the remainder of this section I report and comment on the discussion that took 
place in the journal Science regarding the safety issues raised by the publication of 
Taubenberger’s article on 1918 influenza. Drawing on the work of former member of the 
Sunshine Project (an organization dedicated to global surveillance of biological warfare in 
the U.S. and in Europe) Jan van Aken, this section also introduces some fundamental 
ethical questions concerning the relevance, from a public health perspective, of 
Taubenberger and similar research projects.  
 
RECONSTRUCTING THE 1918 INFLUENZA STRAIN: AN EXAMPLE OF DUAL-USE RESEARCH         
The publication of the whole sequence of the 1918 strain in 2005 sparked lively 
debates among scientists and raised concerns as to whether it is safe to publish the 
receipe that was used to resurrect such a deadly pathogen. Upon releasing the complete 
sequence (and methodology) used to reconstruct the virus in the prestigious journals 
Nature and Science discussions took place among scientists and journal editors regarding 
how safe it was to publish these sensitive data: What if someone with nefarious 
intentions reconstruct the virus? How likely is it that this genetic information be used for 
harmful purposes? What if, by accident or not, the virus escapes into the environment? 
As biologist Richard H. Ebright from Rutgers University said “there is a risk, verging on 
inevitability, of accidental release of the virus” but “there is also a risk of deliberate 
release of the virus”. For Ebright, the 1918 flu virus “is perhaps the most effective 
bioweapons agent ever known”.156  
Yet others argued that the work of Taubenberger and Tumpey was entirely legitimate 
and well-founded as it could be applied to other areas and problems in virology such as 
the N5N1 pandemic. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases in the U.S., and Julie Gerberding, head of the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), in a joint-statement, agreed that “the new studies [of 
Taubenberger and Tumpey] could have an immediate impact by helping scientists focus 
on detecting changes in the evolving H5N1 virus that might make widespread 
                                                                
156
 From New York Times article by Gina Kolata (2005) which can be accessed at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/06/health/06flu.html?pagewanted=all 
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transmission among humans more likely”. 157 The case of the Spanish influenza pandemic 
is today a text-book example of a technique which has the potential for “dual-use” 
research as the result can either help to understand the disease and fight it, but it also 
could be used to disseminate it further (Rappert 2007, 3). This example of dual-use 
technologies and the often-expressed fears of misuse of scientific research by terrorists 
should be understood in the context of post-9/11 and anthrax attack on the U.S. territory.   
 
THE SCIENCE SAFETY REVIEW 
The publication of the article “Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish 
influenza pandemic virus” by T. Tumpey et al. in Science in October 2005 came out with a 
short Editorial note by Philip A. Sharp from MIT – “1918 flu and responsible science” 
(Sharp 2005). As the title suggests, Sharp claimed that the research published by Tumpey 
et al. was a piece of good, responsible scientific work. Addressing the possibility that 
terrorist groups come into possession of knowledge enabling them them to instigate a 
pandemic, Sharp dismissed it as very unlikely, however. According to him it is, on the 
contrary, “reassuring” that the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), a 
government body created in 2003, was asked to consider these papers prior to 
publication. Furthermore, the committee concluded that “the scientific benefit of the 
future use of this information far outweighs the potential risk of misuse”. Thus, Sharp 
continues, the decision to publish the paper was made in consultation with agencies 
representing the public, the journal (i.e. Science) and the scientific community.  
For, according to Sharp, not only the work of Tumpey and his colleagues made a 
fundamental contribution to the mechanism of pathogenicity but this research was done 
according to the safety rules that apply in such situation (i.e. the experiments were 
conducted in a Biosafety Level 3 laboratory). Overall, Sharp argued that the decision of 
publishing the article, despite the sensitive nature of its findings, was the right decision. 
For him, it not only has the potential to “stimulate” further research into this and other 
                                                                
157
 This statement was jointly issued by Fauci and Gerberding. See Kolata (2005). 
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areas but can also lead to the development of new drugs and the prevention of future 
pandemics. In brief, “the system is working”. 
The reassuring and politically correct response given by Sharp contrasted sharply 
with the almost challenging tone of the Editor-in-chief of Science that appeared in an 
editorial one week later, on the 14th of October (Kennedy 2005). Filling the gap in the 
history of the publication of the sensitive article of the 1918 strain, Kennedy began by 
recalling the creation of NSABB following the recommendation of Gerald Fink in 2003. 
Like Sharp, he reported that this board was consulted prior to the publication of Tumpey 
et al. and that its members “voted unanimously in favor of publication”. (The way the 
NSABB got involved is explained in more detail below). Moreover, prior consultations on 
the nature of the material in the article were made with Anthony Fauci and Julie 
Gerberding.  Amy Patterson, head of the Office of Biotechnology Activities, was also 
informed of the planned publication. “All three felt that the public health benefits of the 
study far outweighed any biosecurity risks”, Kennedy reports.  
And yet, on the 27th of September, one day before the article and the whole issue 
was going to go off to print, the Office of the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) informed the editors of Science that they had concerns about 
the publication of the article and asked for a second safety review. The HHS Secretary 
Michael Leavitt argued that the NSABB should review the paper to ensure its publication 
does not endanger public health. The review committee was quickly organized and they 
reviewed the paper within a day. The NSABB review was thus a very last-minute 
operation, not something planned long ahead, or part of a normal review process. The 
committee suggested two things: firstly, to add an editorial addressing a number of 
ethical and safety issues arising from the publication (this was done by P.A. Sharp); and 
secondly, the committee asked the editors to add a note on the paper to highlight the 
safety of the scientific procedures and the potential benefits in terms of public health.158  
Although the paper was judged appropriate to go to print, the editor-in-chief was not 
                                                                
158
 The note added in proof says “The research was done by staff taking antiviral prophylaxis and using 
stringent biosafety precautions to protect the researchers, the environment, and the public. The 
fundamental purpose of this work was to provide information critical to protect public health and to 
develop measures effectives against future influenza pandemics” (Tumpey et al. 2005, 80).   
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happy with the decision of the HHS to review it once again, especially on such short 
notice and after other positive reviews by competent scientists. Kennedy also reminded 
the NSABB that their mandate is to provide guidelines, not to “screen individual papers”. 
The last minute intervention of the NSABB was later explained to the editors to be 
intended as a practical exercise on a “live” issue.  
But all this is somewhat beside the fundamental point that was raised by the NSABB 
review. As Kennedy pointed out “there is a real question of authority here”. In other 
words, who should police the scientists? Who should decide whether an article should be 
published or classified? With the current system into place there is no other alternative to 
either publish or classify an article. And no scientific article, so far, is known to have been 
denied publication for reasons related to biosecurity (Aken 2006, 10). In his editorial 
Kennedy was adamant that government and science are distinct bodies and that while 
the former can inform the latter – emphasizing that scientists would be “wise” to listen to 
those recommendations – government agents, however, should not directly interfere 
with the review process of scientific publication. In a somewhat defiant tone, Kennedy 
concluded asking whether Science would have published the paper if the NSABB had 
voted differently. His response was “absolutely – unless they had it classified”. 159 This 
indicates that the current measures to control and assess the publication of sensitive 
findings in the life sciences are inadequate. For one thing, they conflict with scientific 
autononomy, a value often branded as essential to scientific research itself.  
 Nature also published a sensitive paper on influenza in 2005. In “Characterization of 
the 1918 influenza polymerase genes” (2005) Taubenberger and his team published the 
sequence of the last three genes of the virus, providing thus a full and complete sequence 
of the deadly pathogen that killed millions of people worldwide in 1918 and 1919. The 
responses in Nature were more polarized than in the case of Science, and although some 
scientists openly considered that the paper should not be published, no one suggested 
                                                                
159
 According to Peter Galison the amount of classified science in the U.S. is five to ten times larger than the 
open scientific literature (2004, 231). In the U.S. only, 4000 people – called Original Classifiers – can 
transform documents, pictures, graphs, equation from the realm of publicly accessible research objects to 
the “classified universe”. The amount of classified knowledge just mentioned, however, does not include 
research which does not require a classification act, for instance nuclear knowledge which is “born” 
classified, as it were (Ibid). 
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that the research should not have been undertaken from the outset. 160 Following the 
publication of the article the virus of the 1918 influenza pandemic was, however, 
immediately classified as a select agent by the Department of Health and Human Services 
and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. This legislation, amended by Michael 
Leavitt, renders “any portion of the coding regions of all eight gene segment” subject to 
strict regulation regarding use, possession, and transfer. The document added that “the 
apparent virulence of this virus, together with the fact that the level of immunity in the 
general population and the ability of the virus to readily transmit among persons are 
unknown at this time, makes it prudent to immediately regulate this virus as a select 
agent”, despite its potential benefit in terms of fundamental research and vaccines 
development (Federal Register 2005). 
As sociologist Brian Rappert (2007) reports, the discourse behind the official scientific 
scene was somewhat different and raised new questions that did not emerge so sharply 
during the discussion between editors, scientists and government officers. For instance, in 
contrast with those who voiced concerns about the publication of the results, the 
members of the Sunshine Project asked whether it was wise to conduct this research in 
the first place (Aken 2006).161 According to Aken the debate on whether or not to publish 
sensitive data is necessary despite that it leaves out the deeper issue of what kind of 
science should be funded and promoted. Questioning the scientific justification of the 
project and its potential benefits in terms of prevention altogether, Aken argues that a 
cost-benefits analysis reveals important flaws in the 1918 influenza research, blurring at 
the same time the line between the development of bioweapons and biomedical 
research.  
According to Aken, while the costs of such project can (and have been) readily be 
identified, the benefits are much harder to discern. Costs include the possibility for rogue 
scientists to recreate the virus and the risk to see yet another influenza pandemic in 
                                                                
160
 For an analysis of the Nature reports see Rappert (2007).  
 
161
 This NGO, though perhaps not that visible, was not however as marginalized as what Rappert appears to 
say. In fact, one of the members published a piece in 2006 in the European Molecular Biology Organization 
(EMBO) reports (Aken 2006).   
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populations now wholly susceptible, and the possibility for the virus to escape 
laboratories and contaminate the environment. As we have seen in this chapter, 
reconstructing the 1918 strain of influenza was predicated (and largely funded) on the 
possibility of identifying the genes responsible for its extreme pathogenicity, and on the 
hope that this deeper molecular understanding of virulence factors could lead to the 
development of vaccines designed to protect public health in case of future influenza 
pandemic. The first goal of the project (identifying virulence genes in the 1918 sequence) 
was not reached and the second is always in progress because although influenza 
vaccines exist, the capacity for influenza A viruses to mutate at a rapid pace hampers the 
development of long-term vaccination efforts. Moreover, although inactivated vaccines 
could be made readily available in several developed countries following the outset of an 
influenza pandemic, the stocks are not however unlimited (Webby and Webster. 2003). It 
is often stressed that identifying those factors of virulence would further allow predicting 
the occurrence of future pandemics, also contributing to public health protection (von 
Bubnoff 2005).  
Those arguments in terms of public health benefits are, however, too general to 
counterbalance the costs of the influenza project in terms of biosecurity (Aken 2006). 
Indeed, it is virtually true of every scientific research in biomedicine that the outcomes 
will somehow provide a better understanding of a particular disease. Thus, cost-benefit 
analysis should ask more specific question like: is this project addressing a genuine public 
health problem? Could the problem be addressed and investigated differently? What are 
the alternatives to recreating the 1918 Spanish flu strain to understand influenza 
pandemics? Indeed, research on influenza viruses can be done (and indeed, is done) on 
other strains than the 1918 one. The existence of the Influenza Genome Project 
facilitated the sequencing of a number of influenza strains, some more virulent than 
others, so why sequencing the 1918 one, knowing that serious risks for both public health 
and biosecurity are associated with it? This question concerns not only levels of 
biosecurity but underlines the fact that scientists sometimes secure massive amount of 
funding over long periods of years based on rather vague claims and promises about 
possible benefits in terms of health improvement or the development of new treatments.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Sunshine Project report concluded that the global and individual benefits of such 
research remain, so far, unclear. Moreover, they think we are at greater risk of 
experiencing an influenza pandemic now that the virus has been recreated. For them, 
there was “no valid reason to recreate the virulent virus, as the risks far outweighs the 
benefits” (2003, in Rappert 2007, 6). The Sunshine Project report also claimed that the 
reconstruction of the Spanish influenza virus, a technological achievement in itself, was 
primarily carried out not for nefarious reasons or to find new treatment but because it 
was technologically possible to do it: “It appears that this work was not triggered by a 
search for flu treatments, or the serach for new biowarfare agent, but by a rather simple 
motivation: Taubenberger and his team were just able to do it. In previous experiments 
they had developed a new technique to analyse DNA in old, preserved tissues and were 
now looking for new applications” (2003, in Rappert 2007, 6). In other words, according 
to the Sunshine Project reports, a powerful technological determinism has led 
Taubenberger and its team into reconstructing the strain of influenza virus that killed 
millions of people worldwide. While this is certainly part of the explanation, there is also a 
historical reason here that needs to be emphasized here. Looked at from a longue durée 
history standpoint, the research undertaken by Taubenberger epitomizes the end point of 
a wider reductionist research program (or style) in the life sciences which has attempted 
to uncover the nature of virulence by looking always deeper within pathogens – tissues, 
cells, genes, and genome – in the hope to discover the source of disease power they too 
often display. The available technology enabled the researchers to carry out a project 
otherwise impossible. However, one should be careful in attributing responsibility only to 
the technology being available in the development of the project. The experiments of 
Taubenberger and others are part of a larger picture which should not be ignored.  
The concept of emerging disease should be rebranded anew to include manmade 
artificial diseases. As this concept is able to lever economical and political powers it could 
be helpful to use it to call attention to those new threats posed by the life sciences. While 
it might be said that dual-use is a characteristic of most life sciences nowadays (Atlas 
2009), only a small number of experiments and experimental practices are, overall, seen 
as posing real threats to public health and global security. In addition, dual-use 
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technologies are often characterized by unexpected findings such as, for instance, the 
accidental discovery that a modified virus injected in mice was lethal to otherwise 
vaccinated animals. This case can be regarded as an example of what Grmek called an 
“undesirable accident”, not only because the publication of these findings provided 
instructions as to how to create a highly virulent virus, and this information is now 
publicly available to anyone, but because the results were unforeseen. As if often the 
case in research, the experimental system designed to answer certain questions opens-up 
new possibilities that could simply not be envisaged at the outset (Rheinberger 1997). If 
unpredictability is truly the essence of scientific research, dual-use technologies are an 
unavoidable trade-off to deal with. This epistemic dimension of scientific research 
reinforces the need to develop appropriate governance responses to biomedical research 
on pathogens and potentially pathogenic organisms. More generally, it underlines the 
need for the development of a “sociology of virulence” (Van Loon 2002), a “culture of 
responsibility” (NSABB 2011) in the life sciences, that is, a new ethos to address questions 
of security, risk and scientific autonomy, among others. The intricacy of power and 
knowledge is well reflected in the biomedical concept of virulence whose effects is not 
contained within the walls of the laboratories but translates at several levels and foster 
changes in both discourses and practices in the biomedical sciences.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 The historian of biology and Nobel Prize laureate François Jacob once remarked that 
there are two approaches to the history of science. According to Jacob, the history of 
science 
 
may be considered as a succession of ideas, thus involving a search for the 
thread which guided thought along the path to current theories. This is 
reverse history, so to speak, which moves back from the present towards 
the past. Step by step, the forerunner of the current hypothesis is chosen, 
then the forerunner of the forerunner, and so on [...].  
 
 
Yet this is just one possible option. An alternative approach 
 
involves the attempt to discover how objects become accessible to 
investigation thus permitting new fields of science to be developed. It 
requires analysis of the nature of these objects, and of the attitude of the 
investigators, their methods of observation, and the obstacles raised by 
their cultural background. The importance of a concept is defined 
operationally in terms of its role in directing observation and experience. 
There is no longer a more or less linear sequence of ideas, each produced 
from its predecessor, but instead a domain which thought strives to 
explore, where it seeks to establish order and attempts to construct a 
world of abstract relationships in harmony not only with observations and 
techniques, but also with current practices, values and interpretations 
(Jacob 1973, 11). 
 
 The second part of the quote summarizes well what was attempted here: to follow 
the intertwined emergence of research objects and investigative techniques through a 
particular form of scientific practice: the formation of concepts. I argued that a history of 
concepts, informed by the philosophical method of Georges Canguilhem and other 
historical epistemologists, is promising in terms of an integrated approach to the history 
and philosophy of science. Building on a new interpretation of operational analysis, I 
challenged the claim that concepts are inadequate units of narration and analysis. Against 
the interpretation that concepts are “products”, i.e., static things, I endeavoured to show 
that, on the contrary, concepts are evolving, morphing, and especially acting entities. 
Concepts are not innocent; they do not just represent, they also intervene in the outside 
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world, to use Hacking’s words (1983). For instance, they direct “observation and 
experience” (Jacob 1973, 11) and in this respect, they significantly contribute in shaping 
the process of scientific research and the growth of knowledge. Looking at virulence as a 
concept in action provided new ways of interpreting the development of important 
episodes of the past’s century biomedicine and their broader significance from a longue 
durée standpoint. We have seen, for example, how the problem of changes in virulence in 
Griffith’s experiment has triggered a fifteen years long search for the material basis of 
virulence which culminated in the (unforeseen) discovery that genes are made of DNA. 
Particularly so in the life sciences, also, concepts are crucial operators around which 
disciplines, knowledge, practices, discourses, and evaluations become established. 
 In turn, this approach to concepts headed not into a “linear sequence of ideas” or 
“reverse history” but rather into the examination of the formation of  a broad domain of 
research, or as Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger have called it, an 
“epistemic space” (2007, 3). Maybe not unlike the concept of heredity (Gayon 2000), the 
concept of virulence could interestingly be characterized as being either an 
operationalized magnitude (or force) or as a structure. However, in the case of virulence 
(unlike heredity) the two conceptions developed alongside parallel lines and did not 
undergo a sharp shift from one another. But this is a topic that would deserve more space 
than what can be given in a conclusion. Likewise, though, to map out the contours and 
the place of virulence at different points within contemporary biomedical sciences, it has 
been necessary to investigate a number of apparently disconnected fields, often not 
related in any obvious ways. 
 Following the investigation of several of these fields, the present work brings out in a 
new light the importance given to the nature of infection as part of our scientific 
discourses and practices during the past two centuries. And within this epistemic space, I 
examined two of the main roads that were developed in exploring this conceptual 
domain: the exogenous and the endogenous styles. Following the development of those 
styles, we have seen how each of them “opened-up new territory” to use Hacking’s words 
again (1992, 8). The formation of those fields, where “thought strives to explore” as Jacob 
put it, allowed for distinctly new concepts, practices and problems to come into view.  
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 What is emerging at the end of this journey, underneath the concept of virulence so 
to speak, is the wider problem of inter-species relations, or parasitism, in shaping states 
of health and illness. As philosopher Michel Serres wrote several years ago, the 
introduction of a parasite within a system is always destabilizing: it “provokes a 
difference, disequilibrium” (1982, 182). Following the course of infection, while organisms 
attempt to restore their lost equilibrium (or to create a new one), the parasite either 
becomes adapted or is destroyed by the host in which it provoked a big or a small 
physiological difference we call illness or health. Parasitism is part of the natural order of 
things although this order is never given once and for all. Indeed, “the parasite is an 
exciter” (Serres 1982, 191). The concept of “evolving parasitism” as coined by Theobald 
Smith can be seen as an attempt to come to terms with the ecological dynamics of host 
and parasite’s relations, and with the existence of diseases as natural phenomena. The 
optimism in the “law of declining virulence” reflects the hope of undermining the 
dynamics of the parasite, or at least to momentarily escape this logic of constant 
destabilizations. Smith, Burnet and many others who, likewise, were seduced by this 
evolutionarily attractive hypothesis knew, however, that this logic holds only in cases of 
unchanging environments. Yet this was an unrealistic assumption for, as the natural world 
is always subject to change, so are its inhabitants. Since environments and organisms 
fluctuate, the parasite keeps on introducing differences within previously established 
physiological orders. Homeostasis, the conquest of equilibrium, is always precarious.  
 Other concepts endeavouring to locate the cause of infection deep inside certain 
structures in organisms belonging to certain species mirror a comparable attitude before 
the parasite, namely the desire to place order onto the natural world. Following Koch, 
only some living things are endowed with pathogenic powers; and following Pasteur 
health is, for an organism, synonymous with being germ-free. In both cases infection is 
ruled out as pathological, as abnormal. The parasite is like an intruder in natural history. 
Attempting to address the nature of parasitic infection one-sidedly, this logic culminated 
with the molecularization of Koch’s postulates and the search for an utter difference 
between pathogenic and non-pathogenic organisms at the level of the genome. 
Sharpening the distinction between what is and what is not parasitic (and hence, normal 
and pathological) in absolute terms, however, is to erect conceptual barriers that are 
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estranged to the nature of the parasite. As a permanent difference-maker, the parasite 
disturbs sometimes long-established equilibriums, for example in moving freely between 
phylogenetically distant organisms. Provided that we think of the phenomenon of 
parasitism in broad enough terms we can see that the transfer of pathogenicity islands, 
able to transform a previously benign organism into a wholly pathogenic one, is one such 
example. The process of species evolution by association (Sapp 1994) could itself be 
interpreted as a series of perpetual conquest of imbalances within distinct biological 
systems resulting from the introduction of parasitic intruders. Biological adaptation is a 
ramified process that can work in “quantum leap” (Groisman and Ochman 1996). 
 From 1880 until the present, the problem infection was most of the time addressed 
as coming either from outside or from within organisms. It is plain, however, that the 
frontier between what is inside and what is outside is relative. The inside of a cell is the 
outside of its intra-cellular elements. An organism is a complex ecological site, itself 
situated in a wider milieu. Similarly, individuality is not a being; it is a mobile relation, as 
Canguilhem stressed (2008 [1952]). Ascertaining particulars ways over others to address 
the problem of infection, the concepts developed within the two styles are the result of 
looking at virulence inwardly or outwardly. Those gazes finally met briefly in the mid-
1990s during the aftermath of a crisis triggered by what appeared to be a wholly new 
disease: AIDS. Facilitated by the concept of emerging disease, and motivated by the 
growing fears of a world “out of balance” (Garrett 1994), the two styles were drawn 
together. At last, infection was addressed at the same time both as an external 
(ecological) and an internal (molecular, genetic) problem, and their relation.  
 From a historical point of view, this convergence between styles thanks to the 
concept of emerging disease, allowed completing a shift instigated in the nineteenth 
century in the concept of “new disease”. In effect, this concept wrapped up a much 
earlier attempt to see the living world as one dominated by change, not stasis. This shift 
was called for in pathology by Charles Boersch in 1836 who wrote:  
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There are animal and plant races which no longer exist in their primitive 
form; each day, art, education, and civilisation transform animal and 
plants living with us. Why would it be different in the case of diseases? 
Why could there not be historical diseases, just like there are fossils of 
plants and animal? (Boersch 1836, 96 quoted in Anglada 1869, 33).    
 
 While including plants and higher organisms within an evolutionary framework was 
successfully achieved by the first half of the twentieth century (symbiosis aside; Sapp 
1994), bacteria and other disease agents continued to stand uneasily outside the Modern 
Synthesis framework as more or less static entities, or at least as relatively unchanging 
ones (see Snowden 2008).162 By being more inclusive towards the microbial world and by 
looking at diseases from an evolutionary lens, it became possible in the mid-1990s to 
make sense of historical diseases, that is, to think about emerging diseases dynamically. 
Breaking with traditional views about microorganisms, the recent convergence between 
styles also indicates the acknowledgement, from different perspectives, that the 
microbial world is not static but is “full of potential and surprise” (Weir and Mykhalovski 
2010, 62). In a “world on alert” (Ibid.), the need for broader and wider surveillance and 
detection systems to monitor emerging diseases grows stronger. In light of the 
pathological possibilities contained within the microbial world that can be unleashed 
through human activities as well as from other forms of evolutionary changes 
microorganisms naturally undergo, the concept of “forward looking” evolutionary 
explanation (chapter 2), as intended to capture the idea that disease agents are things 
that are still evolving, is most significant. As Lederberg long indicated, we can read the 
history of epidemics as “one of the last refuges of the concept of special creationism, with 
scant attention to dynamic change on the parts of the agents of disease” (1993, 3). 
Furthermore, it is conceivable that the concept of emerging disease could bring Darwinian 
and evolutionary medicine closer to one another. For instance, the etiology of a number 
of chronic diseases (disease of evolution) turns out be the result of evolutionarily changes 
in infectious agents (evolution of disease), as the cases of peptic ulcer and human 
papilloma virus-caused cancer exemplify. These evolutionary perspectives on disease may 
                                                                
162
 These views about the fixity of the mircobial world during the twentieth century will require further 
research.  
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well be two sides of the same coin. Then again, practitioners in each category have 
distinct commitments as to how best approach medicine from an evolutionary 
standpoint. At any rate, the development of the two styles also allows revising the claim 
that there was little articulation between evolutionary biology and medicine until the 
dawn of Darwinian medicine in the 1990s. On the contrary, such encounters have 
frequently occurred and evolutionary thinking supported some of the most influential 
models of disease evolution. 
 Stepping back, the persistence of the two approaches to virulence throughout the 
twentieth century invites reflection. Knowing that explanations of virulence took two 
different forms for decades (even centuries), it hardly comes as a surprise that scientific 
explanations of the 1918-19 pandemic reflect this ancient dichotomy. Bearing this in 
mind, it becomes clearer why both reductionist and environmental-driven styles continue 
to being developed in a relatively independent fashion to one another. These styles, 
however, are not genuinely new but are instead the result of older and deeper trends in 
the history of the life sciences. In fact, the discontinuity between these different styles 
reflects slow and deep historical movements, the shifts from one of these approaches to 
another being the result of history that “unfolds slowly and is slow to alter, often 
repeating itself and working itself out in cycles which are endlessly renewed”, to quote 
the historian Fernand Braudel (1980, 3). This longue durée perspective also sheds new 
light on the ethical issues raised by the reconstruction of the 1918-19 strain of influenza. 
This project of recreating potentially dangerous organisms, coming into sight in the late 
1990s, does not merely reflect newly developed practical possibilities but caps a much 
longer research tradition within the endogenous style where infection is conceptualized 
in reductionist terms. 
 The structuring role and the centrality of the concept of virulence in today’s health 
sciences are, to some extent, truly surprising, however. Why do scientists continue to use 
this centuries-old concept? Perhaps the concept of virulence is still in use because it 
allows scientists to maintain previously established terms and facilitates communication 
among them. Understood in this way, the concept of virulence persists for pragmatic 
reasons alone. It may be, however, that it persists because the “theme” of infection is one 
of those that Georges Canguilhem once said “are few in numbers” and “come from far 
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away”. Such themes, he continues, “survive the apparent destruction that polemics and 
refutations pride themselves in having wrought” (2008, 56 [1952]). These “ancient 
images”, as Canguilhem put it, or “proto-ideas”, to use Ludwig Fleck’s vocabulary, become 
deeply entrenched in scientific practices to the extent that it becomes virtually impossible 
to let them go or replace them. These concepts and themes are crucial as they provide 
continuity with the past of a science while at the same time establish wider connections 
with social and political concerns.  
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